Kojes v. United States

241 F. Supp. 762, 16 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 6131, 1965 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9140
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. New York
DecidedJune 3, 1965
Docket63-C-286
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 241 F. Supp. 762 (Kojes v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Kojes v. United States, 241 F. Supp. 762, 16 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 6131, 1965 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9140 (E.D.N.Y. 1965).

Opinion

BARTELS, District Judge.

Arthur Kojes died on August 31,1956. Shortly thereafter, on September 19, 1956, $32,922.00 was discovered in a steel safe located in a diner, in which the decedent held a half interest. $26,-922 was turned over to the decedent’s executrix and included in the estate tax return filed on February 19, 1958. Two days later an estate tax of $2,761.40 was paid and an additional assessment of $1,-349.20 was paid on August 17,1960. The discovery of the cash hoard led to an investigation by the Internal Revenue Service which disclosed that, in addition to operating a diner, the decedent had been engaged in money lending and had failed to report income earned from that source. Accordingly, the Commissioner proposed to assess income tax deficiencies for the years 1949 through 1956. On September 14, 1960, the taxpayer filed a petition in the Tax Court contesting the proposed deficiencies. The case was subsequently settled by the parties and the Tax Court entered a final order with respect thereto on February 23, 1962.

Approximately eight months later, on October 4, 1962, after a refund of estate taxes had been barred by Limitations, the estate filed a claim for refund of said estate taxes in the amount of $4,081 upon the ground that the income taxes and interest paid were a proper deduction as a debt for estate tax purposes. On October 31,1962, the claim was rejected and on March 12,1963 this suit was filed. On April 22, 1964, the Government moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that plaintiff’s failure to file a timely claim for refund of estate taxes in accordance with the provisions of Sections 7422(a) and 6511(a) of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) of 1954 1 deprived this Court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action.

On May 21, 1964, this Court granted the Government’s motion to dismiss the complaint with leave to the taxpayer to serve an amended complaint setting forth the theory of equitable recoupment. This was done on July 14, 1964, and the Government again moved under Rule 12(b) (1), Fed.Rules Civ.Proc., 28 U.S.C.A., to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction or, in the alternative, under Rule 12(b)(6), Fed.Rules Civ.Proc., 28 U.S. C.A., for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

I

The doctrine of equitable recoupment was introduced in tax law initially in 1935 by the case of Bull v. United States, 1935, 295 U.S. 247, 55 S.Ct. 695, 79 L.Ed. 1421, which allowed recoupment in favor of the taxpayer. There an executor of an estate erroneously included in the estate, on which he paid an estate tax, certain income upon which the Commissioner subsequently assessed an income tax. The executor appealed to the Board of Tax Appeals from the proposed income tax deficiency but his appeal was dismissed. It was then too late to file a claim for refund of the estate taxes. Thereafter the executor paid the income *764 tax, filed a claim for refund thereof, and instituted an action in the Court of Claims to recover the income tax or,, in the alternative, a credit against said income tax in the amount of the estate tax paid upon the same item. The Supreme Court allowed the claim for refund of the estate tax in recoupment against the Government’s claim for income tax upon the ground that both taxes arose out of the same transaction. Sections 608(a) and 609 (b) of the Revenue Act of 1928 2 were not mentioned in the decision although effective at the time of the decision but not at the time the claim arose.

Two years later in Stone v. White, 1937, 301 U.S. 532, 57 S.Ct. 851, 81 L.Ed. 1265, recoupment was allowed in favor of the Government in an attempt by Trustees to recover taxes improperly paid by them on income payable to and taxable to their beneficiaries against whom the Government’s claim was then barred. 3 Later in the same year, however, the principle received a severe shock in the case of McEachern v. Rose, 1937, 302 U.S. 56, 58 S.Ct. 84, 82 L.Ed. 46, where it was held that the Government was barred from resorting to recoupment by virtue of Sections 607 and 609(a) 4 of the 1928 Act, which prohibited the Government from crediting an unpaid tax deficiency whose collection was barred against a taxpayer’s overpayment. 5 The corollary of these sections forbidding a credit by a taxpayer of a barred overpayment against a tax deficiency is found in the same statute. 6 These sections have been carried forward into the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 as Sections 6401, 6514(b) and 6514(a)(1). 7 There is nothing in the history of the statute which indicates that the sections are not applicable where there is a claim of recoupment. No persuasive reason seems to have been advanced as to why McEachern v. Rose does not hold that recoupment in tax cases is no longer available although several have been offered. 8 At all events it *765 is quite clear that there is no statutory warrant for the recoupment theory and the case law, at most, strictly limits the doctrine to a situation where both the claim and the recoupment arise out of a single taxable event. Rothensies v. Electric Storage Battery Co., 1946, 329 U.S. 296, 67 S.Ct. 271, 91 L.Ed. 296. 9 As said by Judge Frank in Wood v. United States, 2 Cir. 1954, 213 F.2d 660, 661: “Frankly, we do not know just how much of that doctrine still lives. But we think it lacks all vitality unless there has occurred a ‘single taxable event.’ ”

*764 before or after the enactment of this

*765 II

Even were one not convinced that recoupment has lost its vitality, there are two reasons which bar its availability here. The only theory under which plaintiff can fall within Bull v. United States is by adopting the fiction that the plaintiff’s claim for a refund of estate taxes is actually a claim for refund of income taxes. 10 In such event the claim would be timely inasmuch as the income tax was paid on December 15, 1961 and the claim was filed on October 4,1962, which was within the two-year period provided by Section 6511(a) of the IRC of 1954. While these facts approach, they are not identical with, the facts in the Bull case for the following reasons:

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

In Re Carter
125 B.R. 832 (D. Kansas, 1991)
Mann v. United States
552 F. Supp. 1132 (N.D. Texas, 1982)
Wilmington Trust Co. v. United States
610 F.2d 703 (Court of Claims, 1979)
Twitchco, Inc. v. United States
348 F. Supp. 330 (M.D. Alabama, 1972)
Holzer v. United States
250 F. Supp. 875 (E.D. Wisconsin, 1966)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
241 F. Supp. 762, 16 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 6131, 1965 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9140, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kojes-v-united-states-nyed-1965.