Koich v. Cvar

110 P.2d 964, 111 Mont. 463, 1941 Mont. LEXIS 9
CourtMontana Supreme Court
DecidedFebruary 28, 1941
DocketNo. 8,180.
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 110 P.2d 964 (Koich v. Cvar) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Montana Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Koich v. Cvar, 110 P.2d 964, 111 Mont. 463, 1941 Mont. LEXIS 9 (Mo. 1941).

Opinion

MR. JUSTICE ERICKSON

delivered the opinion of the court.

The city of East Helena advertised for bids on one unit of fire fighting equipment. Subsequent thereto a bid was accepted *465 and the contract let. Appellant, a taxpayer, averring the city had accepted a bid higher than the lowest responsible one, brought this action to enjoin the city council from proceeding with the execution of the contract. This appeal is from an order of the district court dissolving a temporary restraining order.

Stripped of all irrelevant matter, the appeal presents but one question: Did the city council abuse its discretion in awarding the contract to one other than the lowest bidder ?

Section 5070, Revised Codes, as amended by Chapter 18, Session Laws of 1939, relating to municipal contracts, provides in part as follows: “All contracts for work, or for supplies, or for material, for which must be paid a sum exceeding five hundred ($500.00) dollars, must be let to the lowest responsible bidder after advertisement for bids; provided that no contract shall be let extending over a period of three years or more without first submitting the question to a vote of the taxpaying electors of said city or town. ’ ’

Such a provision as just quoted is an enactment “for the protection of public interests and must be complied with by the municipal authorities for the benefit of the public. However, these authorities generally have a broad discretion in determining what bid is the one most nearly answering such requirements. In any event the discretion in awarding the contract must be exercised fairly and reasonably within the spirit of the law. The award must be in accordance with the terms of the advertisement, and the contract given to the lowest responsible bidder who complies with the advertised proposals. These provisions should not be so strictly construed as to reduce the authorities to mere ministerial agents, since this would often defeat the purpose for which they are designed, by allowing unscrupulous contractors to defraud the city. On the other hand, if the authorities are vested with too broad discretionary powers the way for fraudulent practices is again left open. Therefore, such provisions are to be applied according to their spirit in a manner best adapted to conserve the public interests. The municipal officers having authority to let con *466 tracts subject to provisions of this kind, are not purely ministerial officers, * * * [but when acting on these bids their function is quasi-judicial], since their duties require the exercise of discretion.” (3 McQuillin on Municipal Corporations, 2d ed., sec. 1329.)

It is settled law that the phrase “lowest responsible bidder” does not merely mean the lowest bidder whose pecuniary ability to perform the contract is deemed the best, but the bidder who is most likely in regard to skill, ability and integrity to do faithful, conscientious work, and promptly fulfill the contract according to its letter and spirit. (3 McQuillin on Municipal Corporations, 2d ed., sec. 1330, p. 913; 44 C. J., sec. 2208; State ex rel. Eaves v. Rickards, 16 Mont. 145, 40 Pac. 210, 50 Am. St. Rep. 476, 28 L. R. A. 298; Brener v. City of Philadelphia, 305 Pa. 182, 157 Atl. 466; Kratz v. City of Allentown, 304 Pa. 51, 155 Atl. 116; Wilson v. New Castle City, 301 Pa. 358, 152 Atl. 102.)

Proceeding upon the premise that the city council may exercise discretion in selecting the lowest responsible bidder, we again turn to 3 McQuillin on Municipal Corporations, 2d ed., section 1330, at page 915, wherein it is stated: “Concerning the inquiry, how the responsibility is to be determined, ‘the authorities speak with practically one voice,’ namely, that the officers in whom the power is vested, ‘must determine the fact, and such determination cannot be set aside unless the action of the tribunal is arbitrary, oppressive or fraudulent. The determination of the question of who is the lowest responsible bidder does not rest in the exercise of an arbitrary and unlimited discretion, but upon a bona fide judgment, based upon facts tending to support the determination. The statute will not be so interpreted as to afford a cover for favoritism. The city authorities are required to act fairly and honestly upon reasonable information, but when they have so acted their decision cannot be overthrown by the court.’ ”

Under the guidance of the foregoing rules, we turn to the evidence to determine whether a full and careful investigation was made by the city council which, in the exercise of a *467 sound discretion, furnished it substantial cause to accept as the lowest responsible bid one not the lowest in dollars.

One Mills, the sales representative of the W. S. Nott Company appeared as the sole witness for the taxpayer’s cause. The Nott Company’s bid was $344.45 lower than that of the Howard Cooper Company, the successful bidder. Their respective bids were $3,155.55 and $3,500. The substance of his testimony is that he had been permitted to give his sales talk to the city council at the time the bids were opened; that the bid he submitted in behalf of his company met the specifications called for in the advertisement for bids in every way; and that his company was a responsible one. Cross-examination disclosed that he had been with the company approximately a year, but he could not say whether any of his company’s fire fighting equipment had ever been sold in the state.

Various members of the city council testified in their own behalf, and as a witness, also, they produced the city fire chief. Epitomized and reduced to narrative form, the following comprises the substance of the combined testimony of these witnesses: The city council put on an extensive investigation relative to the type of equipment it should buy. One particular type of equipment was known to some of the council members by reason of the fact that similar units were in service of the state. Such a unit had been seen in demonstration by some of the members at “Racetrack” near Butte. They were impressed by the demonstration and with relation to this particular unit felt they would know what they were getting, should they accept a bid covering it. The fire chief witnessed the demonstration and.recommended that the city accept the bid of the company selling that particular equipment. One feature of the demonstrated unit was that it possessed a “Seagraves” pump, which was a nationally known and old line of fire equipment. The rejected bid offered another make of pump, about which the council apparently knew little. The advertisement for bids called for a bronze pump — no particular brand being specified. The Seagraves pump was all bronze, and the other only partly so.

*468 Generally speaking, the rejected bid, as well as the accepted one, measured up to the specifications as advertised, with the exception noted above. However, in making its selection as between the two it is apparent that the city council considered also the various types of service offered by the two competing companies.

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Bluebook (online)
110 P.2d 964, 111 Mont. 463, 1941 Mont. LEXIS 9, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/koich-v-cvar-mont-1941.