Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc.

322 F. Supp. 1331
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
DecidedJanuary 16, 1971
DocketCiv. A. 70-933
StatusPublished
Cited by20 cases

This text of 322 F. Supp. 1331 (Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 322 F. Supp. 1331 (E.D. Pa. 1971).

Opinion

ON MEMORANDUM AND ORDER AMENDING JUDGMENT

MASTERSON, District Judge.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On April 8, 1970 plaintiff, a trustee of American Depositary Receipts representing 2000 shares of Roan Selection Trust, Ltd., (RST), a Zambian corporation, filed a complaint against defendants, American Metal Climax Company (AMAX) and Roan Selection Trust, Ltd., seeking to enjoin the proposed amalgamation of the defendant companies on the grounds that the disclosure provisions of the Securities Exchange Act had been violated, that the amalgamation *1334 was violative of the antitrust laws, was unfair to non-AMAX shareholders of RST, and was effectuated by the fraud and breach of fiduciary duty on the part of certain directors of RST. From May 11th to 18th a hearing was held on plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction. On June 8th we filed an Opinion, 313 F.Supp. 1251, making Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, denying without prejudice plaintiff’s request for a preliminary injunction on the grounds that it was premature in that (1) before the amalgamation could be effectuated it would have to be approved by the shareholders who, prior to the vote, were to be sent an explanatory statement which was intended to fully explain the proposed amalgamation, and (2) if and when the shareholders voted in favor of the plan, it would then have to be submitted to the High Court of Zambia for its approval. In late June, just prior to the time when the explanatory materials were to be sent, plaintiff made a motion to enjoin their distribution on the ground that they were violative of the Securities Exchange Act. On July 2nd we held a hearing on plaintiff’s motion and, at that hearing, enjoined the distribution of the explanatory materials. The defendants’ appeal from this action was dismissed on the ground that, since no written order had been executed by the District Court, the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction. On July 8th we entered a written order enjoining the distribution of the materials unless certain conditions were met by defendants. These conditions were met and we allowed the materials to be sent without prejudice to the plaintiff’s claims that the materials were violative of the Securities Exchange Act. On August 5th, just prior to the time when the proposed amalgamation was to be put before the shareholders for a vote, plaintiff again made a motion to enjoin the defendants from taking any further steps to effectuate the amalgamation. We denied plaintiff’s motion on that same day only insofar as it sought to enjoin the amalgamation from being put before the shareholders for a vote. On the balance of plaintiff’s motion we held a hearing on August 12th. On August 6th the shareholders voted to approve the reduction of capital, the first step necessary to effectuate the amalgamation. On August 12th we preliminarily enjoined the amalgamation, making Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law that the plaintiff had demonstrated a strong probability that he would, upon final hearing, be granted relief. We set the case down for a final hearing for September 8th. On August 13th the defendants appealed our August 12th Order. On that day, the Court of Appeals stayed the effect of our Order upon certain conditions, one of them being that the defendant AMAX would deposit with the Court ten million dollars as security for any injury plaintiff might suffer from the granting of the stay. On August 14th the High Court of Zambia approved the reduction of capital. Also on August 14, 1970, plaintiff made a motion to the Court of Appeals for a re-hearing of the August 13th appeal and for an amendment to the Court of Appeals Order of August 13th. On August 31st the Court of Appeals amended and supplemented its August 13th Order in certain respects and further ordered that this court proceed forthwith with the trial and disposition of the case, notwithstanding the pendency of an appeal from our preliminary injunction, and that we reach final judgment prior to October 29, 1970. On August 25, 1970 plaintiff made a motion for leave to file an amended and supplemental complaint and for summary judgment. During this time we continued generally the final hearing scheduled for September 8th. On September 14th we granted plaintiff’s motion for leave to file an amended and supplemental complaint and on that day the complaint was filed adding, inter alia, new party defendants. On September 21st the defendants moved for summary judgment. On September 25th we heard oral argument on the cross motions for summary 'judgment and on September 30th both motions were denied. On October 5th the trial of this case commenced and a jury was called. On that *1335 day, after the calling of the jury, the parties entered into a stipulation waiving their rights to a jury trial. At that time the case against the new defendants added on September 14th was severed and it was agreed that the case should proceed solely against the defendant companies, the trial being continued to October 13th. On October 8,1970, plaintiff moved in the Court of Appeals for a further amendment of the Court of Appeals Order of August 31st. The Court of Appeals amended its August 31st Order to extend the time for our final disposition of the case from October 29, 1970 to November 27, 1970. The trial commenced as scheduled and continued to November 3, 1970. At the conclusion of the trial, we ordered that briefs and proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law be submitted on November 11th and that replies to those briefs and Findings of Fact be submitted on November 13th. On November 16th we heard oral argument.

After careful consideration of the entire record in this ease, we enter the following

FINDINGS OF FACT, OPINION, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,

AND ORDER

I. FINDINGS OF FACT

A. NATURE OF ACTION AND JURISDICTION.

1. This action was originally brought in three counts by plaintiff, Harold E. Kohn, trustee for the Pension of Harold E. Kohn, P.A., attorneys-at-law, against defendants AMAX and RST. It was brought both as a derivative action on behalf of RST and as a class action on behalf of all shareholders of RST, except AMAX, and'principally seeks to enjoin AMAX from acquiring some of the assets of RST remaining after the acquisition of control of RST by the Government of Zambia.

2. Count I was brought under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j, and Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5, promulgated thereunder. In substance, it charges that AMAX conspired with one or more of the directors of RST to perpetrate a fraud on the non-AMAX shareholders of RST and that, pursuant to this conspiracy, they made untrue statements of material fact and omitted to state other material facts necessary to be stated in order to make the statements made not misleading.

3. Count II charged AMAX with the above-mentioned fraud and with a breach of fiduciary duty owed to RST and its non-AMAX shareholders.

4. Count III was brought only as a derivative action on behalf of RST. It charges that the proposed acquisition of RST by AMAX is violative of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.

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Bluebook (online)
322 F. Supp. 1331, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kohn-v-american-metal-climax-inc-paed-1971.