Knight v. Industrial Dist. Group

2004 DNH 147
CourtDistrict Court, D. New Hampshire
DecidedOctober 12, 2004
DocketCV-04-182-SM
StatusPublished

This text of 2004 DNH 147 (Knight v. Industrial Dist. Group) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. New Hampshire primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Knight v. Industrial Dist. Group, 2004 DNH 147 (D.N.H. 2004).

Opinion

Knight v . Industrial Dist. Group CV-04-182-SM 10/12/04 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Cheryl Knight, Plaintiff

v. Civil N o . 04-182-SM Opinion N o . 2004 DNH 147 Industrial Distribution Group, Inc., Defendant

O R D E R

Cheryl Knight brings this action against her former

employer, Industrial Distribution Group, Inc. (“IDG”), seeking

damages for alleged violations of the Family Medical Leave Act,

29 U.S.C. § 2601, et seq. (“FMLA”). IDG moves to dismiss the

sole count of Knight’s complaint, asserting that the FMLA does

not apply to her because she is not an “eligible employee,” as

defined in 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2). Accordingly, says IDG, this

court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over her claim. See Fed.

R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Knight objects.

Discussion

In her complaint, Knight alleges that IDG “is an ‘employer,’

as defined in 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A) and subject to the requirements of the FMLA.” Complaint at para. 2 6 . She also

alleges that she was, during the course of her employment, “an

‘eligible employee,’ as defined in 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2)(A) of the

FMLA.” Id. at para. 2 7 . And, says Knight, after she was

diagnosed with acute, severe depression, IDG “interfered with and

denied Plaintiff the exercise of her rights under the FMLA, in

violation of 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1).” Id. at para. 3 3 .

IDG does not deny that it is an “employer” under the FMLA,

but it does challenge Knight’s assertion that she was an

“eligible employee.” IDG says that, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §

2611(2)(B), Knight was expressly excluded from coverage under the

FMLA. That section of the statute provides, in relevant part:

The term “eligible employee” does not include . . . any employee of an employer who is employed at a worksite at which such employer employs less that 50 employees if the total number of employees employed by that employer within 75 miles of that worksite is less than 50.

29 U.S.C. § 2611(2)(B)(ii). IDG has submitted affidavits and

documentary evidence which support its assertion that it employed

fewer than 50 employees at its various worksites within 75 miles

of the site at which Knight was employed. See Exhibit B to

2 defendant’s reply in support of motion to dismiss (document n o .

12) (a chart showing 48 people, including plaintiff, employed by

IDG within 75 miles of Knight’s place of employment).

In response, Knight has filed her own affidavit which: (1)

calls into question IDG’s method of counting its employees; and

(2) points out that IDG itself believed she was an eligible

employee, having provided her with a “Request for Family or

Medical Leave of Absence” form, which specifically references the

FMLA.1 Knight also notes that she is at a decided disadvantage

at this stage of the litigation, since she has not been permitted

to engage in any discovery relating to the number of employees

IDG actually employed within the 75 mile radius.

Plainly, whether IDG employed 50 persons within 75 miles of

the site at which Knight was employed is a genuinely disputed

material fact. Principles of equity and fairness dictate that

1 Knight does not suggest that, having once represented that she was covered by the FMLA, IDG is now estopped to deny that she was an “eligible employee.” Such an argument has been rejected by several courts. See, e.g., Nordquist v . City Finance Co., 173 F. Supp. 2d 5 3 7 , 540 (N.D. Miss. 2001) (citing cases). Nevertheless, the fact that IDG considered Knight eligible for benefits under the FMLA suggests that she might have been an “eligible employee.”

3 Knight be permitted to engage in discovery, at least regarding

that critical factual dispute. It may be that facts not

presently apparent will bear on whether Knight is entitled to the

protections afforded by the FMLA. See, e.g., McCulloch v . Velez,

364 F.3d 1 , 6-7 (1st Cir. 2004).

The next issue raised by IDG’s motion involves the

applicable standard of review. Typically, when ruling on a

12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction, the court may consider materials extrinsic to the

complaint, weigh the relevant evidence, and determine whether

jurisdiction exists or is lacking. The court of appeals for this

circuit has observed:

In a situation where the parties dispute the predicate facts allegedly giving rise to the court’s jurisdiction, the district court will often need to engage in some preliminary fact-finding. In that situation, the district court enjoys broad authority to order discovery, consider extrinsic evidence, and hold evidentiary hearings in order to determine its own jurisdiction. In such a case, the district court’s findings of fact will be set aside only if clearly erroneous.

Skwira v . United States, 344 F.3d 6 4 , 71-72 (1st Cir. 2003),

cert. denied, 124 S.Ct. 2836 (2004) (citation and internal

4 quotation marks omitted). See also Valentin v . Hosp. Bella

Vista, 254 F.3d 3 5 8 , 365 (1st Cir. 2001).

But, in cases such as this, where the jurisdictional

question is closely intertwined with an essential element of the

plaintiff’s cause of action, some courts have concluded that the

proper standard of review is that dictated by Rule 5 6 . In other

words, the court should not weigh and resolve conflicts in the

evidence but should, instead, leave that to the trier of fact.

While the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has not yet

addressed this issue, see Rivera-Flores v . Puerto Rico Tel. Co.,

64 F.3d 7 4 2 , 748 n.4 (1st Cir. 1995), the Court of Appeals for

the Eleventh Circuit has observed:

Like employer status under the ADEA, eligible-employee status under the FMLA is a threshold jurisdictional question, see 29 U.S.C. § 2611 (limiting the scope of the Act to statutorily-defined eligible employees), that also appears to be a prima facie element for recovery in a civil action, see 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(1) (“Any employer who violates section 2615 of this title shall be liable to any eligible employee affected . . .”) (emphasis added).

Morrison v . Amway Corp., 323 F.3d 9 2 0 , 927 (11th Cir. 2003).

Accordingly, the court concluded that, “[t]he question of

5 ‘eligible employee’ status implicates both jurisdiction and the

merits, and is properly reserved for the finder of fact.” Id. at

928. See also Figueira v . Black Ent. Television, Inc., 944 F.

Supp. 299, 308-09 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). The Eleventh Circuit did,

however, go on to note:

We wish to emphasize that our decision today does not mean eligible-employee status under the FMLA is always a jury question.

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Ramsdell v. Erskine Bowles
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McCulloch v. Velez-Malave
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