Knepper v. Automotion, Inc.

788 F. Supp. 999, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1648, 1992 WL 77933
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Illinois
DecidedFebruary 14, 1992
Docket90 C 842
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 788 F. Supp. 999 (Knepper v. Automotion, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Knepper v. Automotion, Inc., 788 F. Supp. 999, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1648, 1992 WL 77933 (N.D. Ill. 1992).

Opinion

*1000 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

MORAN, Chief Judge.

Plaintiff sued defendant in early 1990, claiming a violation of COBRA and ERISA. The COBRA claim was settled for $11,-228.15, including attorneys’ fees attributable to that claim. The parties could not, however, resolve their differences respecting the ERISA claim, although they came close, and that claim proceeded to trial. This court found for the plaintiff after a less than three-day trial and thereafter entered judgment for him in the amount of $15,066.58. Plaintiff now seeks $43,075.25 in attorneys’ fees and $3,977.10 in taxable costs. Defendant does not believe that an award of substantial attorneys’ fees is appropriate in this case and disputes some of the costs.

We turn first to the applicable standards respecting fees. Some have treated fees under ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1), as akin to § 1988 fees, ordinarily available to prevailing plaintiffs in the absence of special circumstances. See, e.g., Smith v. CMTA-IAM Pension Trust, 746 F.2d 587, 589 (9th Cir.1984). That is not, however, the law in this circuit. In Janowski v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local No. 710 Pension Fund, 673 F.2d 931 (7th Cir.1982), vacated on other grounds, 463 U.S. 1222, 103 S.Ct. 3565, 77 L.Ed.2d 1406 (1983), the court adopted a set of factors considered important by other courts:

It is equally well-settled that in determining whether an award of attorneys’ fees in suits brought under ERISA is appropriate, courts have considered the following factors: (1) the degree of the offending parties’ culpability or bad faith; (2) the degree of the ability of the offending parties to satisfy personally an award of attorneys’ fees; (3) whether or not an award of attorneys’ fees against the offending parties would deter other persons acting under similar circumstances; (4) the amount of benefit conferred on members of the pension plan as a whole; and (5) the relative merits of the parties’ positions.

Id. at 940. The court went on to say, at 941, that the “need for awarding statutorily authorized attorney’s fees to encourage enforcement of the Act is not so compelling that the discretionary provision should be construed as virtually mandatory.”

The court followed that five-factor test in subsequent cases, but, two years later, in Bittner v. Sadoff & Rudoy Industries, 728 F.2d 820 (7th Cir.1984), it articulated a somewhat different approach even though it referred favorably to the five factors. In Bittner, the defendant was the prevailing party. The court there noted that the Ja-nowski factors were oriented toward a case where the plaintiff prevailed and that the five factors were not necessarily the only test. Observing that prevailing plaintiffs and defendants are both entitled to seek ERISA fees, the court turned to the Equal Access to Justice Act as a useful analogy— a prevailing party is entitled to fees unless the opposing parties’ position was substantially justified or special circumstances make an award unjust. That creates, according to the court, “a modest presumption ... in favor of awarding reasonable attorney’s fees to the winning party, plaintiff or defendant, unless the loser’s position, while rejected by the court, had a solid basis — more than merely not frivolous, but less than meritorious.” Id. at 830. That, the court said, is an “intermediate position between automatic fee shifting (or nearly automatic, as in the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act) and the common law position which allows shifting only against the frivolous litigant.” Id. at 830.

The First Circuit has read Bittner as espousing a five-factor test if the plaintiff prevails and a “substantially justified” standard if the defendant prevails, and it rejected the distinction, believing that uniform application of the five factors, being plaintiff-oriented, built in a slight but appropriate bias for the protection of plan participants. Gray v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 792 F.2d 251 (1st Cir.1986). But Bittner did not rest upon such a distinction, and the Seventh Circuit has since made it clear that it regards the five factors and the “substantially justified” standard as not dissimilar approaches to *1001 what should not be dissimilar results. Meredith v. Navistar Int’l Transp. Corp., 935 F.2d 124, 128 (7th Cir.1991); Tesch v. General Motors Corp., 937 F.2d 359, 362-363 (7th Cir.1991); Production & Maintenance Employees’ Local 504 v. Roadmaster Corp., 954 F.2d 1397 (7th Cir.1992).

Where does that leave us? We believe that this court has substantial discretion; that analysis of the five factors is an appropriate starting point; that we should consider any other factors that bear upon the appropriateness of awarding fees in the circumstances; that we must assess the reasonableness of the defendant’s position, which, of course, necessarily requires an assessment of the plaintiffs countervailing position; and that there is a slight bias in favor of awarding fees. Given the posture of the parties during the litigation, is it fair to award fees and, if so, how much?

Here the defendant terminated the plaintiff after he had been disabled for an extended period and at a time when it was uncertain whether or when he could return to work. He was then receiving and continued thereafter to receive disability benefits under the company plan. As it turned out, plaintiff was eventually able to return to employment and obtained a comparable job elsewhere. There was a period, however, during which plaintiff could have worked, prior to his new employment, and he would have earned more than his disability benefits. The defendant, however, faced with escalating insurance costs and wishing to change carriers, terminated plaintiff and manipulated his termination date to avoid reporting to the new carrier with which it was negotiating the adverse expense experience it had as a result of plaintiffs disability. We concluded that defendant might well have continued to carry plaintiff as an employee, hoping he could thereafter return, but for its desire to minimize insurance costs, although there was no dispute that it could have terminated plaintiff and replaced him with another if its purpose had been to get necessary work done.

That is bad faith of sorts, and it is the basis for the defendant’s culpability. Defendant did end up with a significantly lower insurance expense, a reduction considerably greater than the amount at stake in this lawsuit.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
788 F. Supp. 999, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1648, 1992 WL 77933, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/knepper-v-automotion-inc-ilnd-1992.