OPINION
MORRISON, Judge.
The offense is felony theft; the punishment, four (4) years.
Appellant’s first ground of error is the alleged failure of the State to prove venue in Travis County. Appellant was a member of the House of Representatives. Pursuant to a requisition by appellant, Frederick B. Scott, an employee of the House of Representatives, mailed to appellant at his address in Amarillo $1200 in 6-cent stamps. Upon receipt of such stamps appellant traded them for a pickup truck at the Plains Motor Company in Amarillo. The stamps were the property of the State of Texas and.were held by Scott as agent of the House of Representatives. Scott was acting as appellant’s agent in mailing the stamps to him. Scott was in no wise connected with the appropriation by appellant of the stamps as set forth above. He was clearly an innocent agent in the transaction.
A very similar fact situation was before this Court in Speer v. State, 123 Tex.Cr.R. 188, 58 S.W.2d 95. There defendant, the Sheriff of Walker County, received from Austin through the mail a warrant from the Comptroller of Public Accounts which he cashed at the Huntsville State Bank and which was in turn paid by the State Treasurer in Austin, Travis County, Texas. It was there insisted that the venue was in Walker County. This Court held in effect that the Comptroller was acting as an innocent agent for appellant and since the funds converted by appellant were the property of the State of Texas and in the custody of the State officials in Austin, Travis County, Texas, that venue properly lay in Travis County. The question of venue was fully discussed in that opinion and is here dispositive of the contention before us. We hold that the trial court did not err in refusing to grant a motion for instructed verdict on the ground that venue had not been proven in Travis County.
Ground of error number two, briefed without citation of authority, relates to the failure of the court to instruct the jury that they must acquit unless the State proved that the stamps were taken and appropriated by appellant in Travis County and to acquit if they found that the taking and appropriation occurred in Potter or Randall Counties.
The court in that portion of the charge which applied the law to the facts required a finding that the appropriation occurred in Travis County. This was proper and sufficient.
Under the record in this case the question of venue was a question of law and not a question of fact to be submitted to the jury.
Ground of error number three is directed to paragraph two of Defendant’s [425]*425Objections and Exceptions to the Court’s Charge, to which the trial court appended the notation “granted—charge re-written to delete proposed paragraph”. Nothing is presented for review.
Ground of error number four, as we construe it, is an attack upon the sufficiency of the evidence. Appellant claims the court erred in failing to grant an instructed verdict, as requested in his Objections and Exceptions to the Court’s Charge, on the ground that the evidence failed to show a false pretext made by appellant or relied upon by anyone.
As we view this record the facts showed a violation of the second mode denounced by Article 1413, Vernon’s Ann.P.C., and it was so submitted to the jury. Under such a prosecution there is no reliance upon false pretext and none need be proven. Finley v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 440 S.W.2d 849, and cases there cited.
Grounds of error five, six, seven and eight relate to the admissibility of State’s Exhibits la, lb, lc and Id, which were requisitions for stamps issued to appellant before and after the stamps directly involved in this prosecution but during the same calendar year. It is appellant’s theory that these constituted proof of extraneous transactions. We disagree and conclude the exhibits were admissible.
House Simple Resolution No. 41 would have authorized appellant to draw $10,500 1 actual and necessary expenses. So then, no requests for withdrawals from such fund were illegal unless it was shown that appellant exceeded this sum or that some withdrawal was appropriated to appellant’s own use and not applied to the actual and necessary expenses of his office.
Appellant’s brief recognized this reasoning when it is said:
“In the instant case the request for stamps was lawful by virtue of House Simple Resolution No. 41.”
This being so there was no error to show that appellant drew the sum of $10,500 or any part thereof.
Further, part of the State’s case was proof that even though appellant had drawn $8,500 in stamps during the year, he had requisitioned only 6,000 envelopes. The stamps which he had drawn were sufficient to mail over 140,000 pieces of mail. This discrepancy was valid proof that the stamps were not drawn for a legitimate purpose and was the reason assigned by the trial court for admitting the evidence as to the stamps requisitioned by appellant both prior to and after May 28.
Ground of error number nine is, as we construe it, another attempt to attack the sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction because it was a request to instruct the jury that they must believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the postage stamps issued to appellant on May 25 were the stamps used to purchase the pickup truck in Amarillo.
This is predicated upon the testimony of the witness Roberts, the salesman who dealt with appellant at the truck dealership. Roberts stated that he received the stamps in payment for the pickup on May 25 which was the same day the witness Scott testified he mailed the same to appellant from Austin.
This was an attempt to secure a verdict from the jury based upon the witness Roberts’ testimony alone, disregarding that of the witness Gilliland2, Roberts’ boss, and [426]*426the witness Lanford3, an employee of the Amarillo Post Office. These last two witnesses testified, in effect, that the final trade for the pickup was consummated on May 28, 1970, and that the stamps were turned in to the post office on May 28, 1970. Further contradictory evidence was shown by a notation on the work sheet of the motor company, not in Roberts’ handwriting, showing that the motor company received credit for the stamps on May 28.
All the evidence, as we view it, in this case is consistent and develops logically, except for Roberts’ testimony, that the stamps were delivered on the 25th. The record reflects that the stamps were mailed from Austin on the 25th, were received in Amarillo on the 27th and 28th, and that the trade for the pickup was consummated on the 28th. While none of the other witnesses testified specifically as to when the stamps were actually delivered to the motor company, it would logically follow that they were not delivered until after they arrived in Amarillo.
As we view it, the evidence is sufficient for the jury to disregard Roberts’ testimony concerning the date the stamps were delivered to him and rely upon that of the other witnesses.
In Hill v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 456 S.W.2d 699, we said:
“The jury is the judge of the facts, the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony. The jury may accept or reject any portion of the testimony, even that of one witness.”
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OPINION
MORRISON, Judge.
The offense is felony theft; the punishment, four (4) years.
Appellant’s first ground of error is the alleged failure of the State to prove venue in Travis County. Appellant was a member of the House of Representatives. Pursuant to a requisition by appellant, Frederick B. Scott, an employee of the House of Representatives, mailed to appellant at his address in Amarillo $1200 in 6-cent stamps. Upon receipt of such stamps appellant traded them for a pickup truck at the Plains Motor Company in Amarillo. The stamps were the property of the State of Texas and.were held by Scott as agent of the House of Representatives. Scott was acting as appellant’s agent in mailing the stamps to him. Scott was in no wise connected with the appropriation by appellant of the stamps as set forth above. He was clearly an innocent agent in the transaction.
A very similar fact situation was before this Court in Speer v. State, 123 Tex.Cr.R. 188, 58 S.W.2d 95. There defendant, the Sheriff of Walker County, received from Austin through the mail a warrant from the Comptroller of Public Accounts which he cashed at the Huntsville State Bank and which was in turn paid by the State Treasurer in Austin, Travis County, Texas. It was there insisted that the venue was in Walker County. This Court held in effect that the Comptroller was acting as an innocent agent for appellant and since the funds converted by appellant were the property of the State of Texas and in the custody of the State officials in Austin, Travis County, Texas, that venue properly lay in Travis County. The question of venue was fully discussed in that opinion and is here dispositive of the contention before us. We hold that the trial court did not err in refusing to grant a motion for instructed verdict on the ground that venue had not been proven in Travis County.
Ground of error number two, briefed without citation of authority, relates to the failure of the court to instruct the jury that they must acquit unless the State proved that the stamps were taken and appropriated by appellant in Travis County and to acquit if they found that the taking and appropriation occurred in Potter or Randall Counties.
The court in that portion of the charge which applied the law to the facts required a finding that the appropriation occurred in Travis County. This was proper and sufficient.
Under the record in this case the question of venue was a question of law and not a question of fact to be submitted to the jury.
Ground of error number three is directed to paragraph two of Defendant’s [425]*425Objections and Exceptions to the Court’s Charge, to which the trial court appended the notation “granted—charge re-written to delete proposed paragraph”. Nothing is presented for review.
Ground of error number four, as we construe it, is an attack upon the sufficiency of the evidence. Appellant claims the court erred in failing to grant an instructed verdict, as requested in his Objections and Exceptions to the Court’s Charge, on the ground that the evidence failed to show a false pretext made by appellant or relied upon by anyone.
As we view this record the facts showed a violation of the second mode denounced by Article 1413, Vernon’s Ann.P.C., and it was so submitted to the jury. Under such a prosecution there is no reliance upon false pretext and none need be proven. Finley v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 440 S.W.2d 849, and cases there cited.
Grounds of error five, six, seven and eight relate to the admissibility of State’s Exhibits la, lb, lc and Id, which were requisitions for stamps issued to appellant before and after the stamps directly involved in this prosecution but during the same calendar year. It is appellant’s theory that these constituted proof of extraneous transactions. We disagree and conclude the exhibits were admissible.
House Simple Resolution No. 41 would have authorized appellant to draw $10,500 1 actual and necessary expenses. So then, no requests for withdrawals from such fund were illegal unless it was shown that appellant exceeded this sum or that some withdrawal was appropriated to appellant’s own use and not applied to the actual and necessary expenses of his office.
Appellant’s brief recognized this reasoning when it is said:
“In the instant case the request for stamps was lawful by virtue of House Simple Resolution No. 41.”
This being so there was no error to show that appellant drew the sum of $10,500 or any part thereof.
Further, part of the State’s case was proof that even though appellant had drawn $8,500 in stamps during the year, he had requisitioned only 6,000 envelopes. The stamps which he had drawn were sufficient to mail over 140,000 pieces of mail. This discrepancy was valid proof that the stamps were not drawn for a legitimate purpose and was the reason assigned by the trial court for admitting the evidence as to the stamps requisitioned by appellant both prior to and after May 28.
Ground of error number nine is, as we construe it, another attempt to attack the sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction because it was a request to instruct the jury that they must believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the postage stamps issued to appellant on May 25 were the stamps used to purchase the pickup truck in Amarillo.
This is predicated upon the testimony of the witness Roberts, the salesman who dealt with appellant at the truck dealership. Roberts stated that he received the stamps in payment for the pickup on May 25 which was the same day the witness Scott testified he mailed the same to appellant from Austin.
This was an attempt to secure a verdict from the jury based upon the witness Roberts’ testimony alone, disregarding that of the witness Gilliland2, Roberts’ boss, and [426]*426the witness Lanford3, an employee of the Amarillo Post Office. These last two witnesses testified, in effect, that the final trade for the pickup was consummated on May 28, 1970, and that the stamps were turned in to the post office on May 28, 1970. Further contradictory evidence was shown by a notation on the work sheet of the motor company, not in Roberts’ handwriting, showing that the motor company received credit for the stamps on May 28.
All the evidence, as we view it, in this case is consistent and develops logically, except for Roberts’ testimony, that the stamps were delivered on the 25th. The record reflects that the stamps were mailed from Austin on the 25th, were received in Amarillo on the 27th and 28th, and that the trade for the pickup was consummated on the 28th. While none of the other witnesses testified specifically as to when the stamps were actually delivered to the motor company, it would logically follow that they were not delivered until after they arrived in Amarillo.
As we view it, the evidence is sufficient for the jury to disregard Roberts’ testimony concerning the date the stamps were delivered to him and rely upon that of the other witnesses.
In Hill v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 456 S.W.2d 699, we said:
“The jury is the judge of the facts, the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony. The jury may accept or reject any portion of the testimony, even that of one witness.” [Emphasis Supplied]
Grounds of error ten and eleven are restatements of the last ground of error and will not be further discussed.
Ground of error number twelve complains of the refusal of the trial court to instruct the jury that the burden was upon the State to prove appellant came into possession of State’s Exhibits la, lb, lc and Id, with the fraudulent intent to appropriate the same and that he did so appropriate them.
This, of course, is predicated upon the assumption that each of them represented an extraneous offense and that the burden was upon the State to prove that each constituted a consummated transaction. What we have heretofore said concerning extraneous offenses disposes of this contention.
Ground of error number thirteen is directed to the failure of the court to instruct the jury that no person could be convicted of theft of his own property. By such contention, if we properly understand appellant, he argues that House Simple Resolution No. 41 conveyed title to the $10,500 which he might draw in contingent expenses to him or created a fact issue as to ownership in such funds. This was not a jury question but a question of law. We do not so construe the Resolution.
Ground of error number fourteen relates to the failure of the court to instruct the jury that appellant must have had fraudulent intent to appropriate the property at the time he received the same. As we construe the court’s charge and especially Paragraph IV thereof, the jury was fully instructed on the question of fraudulent intent.
Ground of error number fifteen, another attack upon the sufficiency of the evidence, contends that, by introducing House Simple Resolution No. 41, the State raised the issue of reimbursement and that it became incumbent upon the State to negative such issue by offering proof that the property was not issued to him in the form of a reimbursement.
[427]*427As we have construed such Resolution, no issue of reimbursement was raised and, therefore, the court did not err in failing to instruct the jury on such issue.
Ground of error number sixteen relates to the failure of the court to respond to Paragraph 26 of Appellant’s Objections and Exceptions to the Court’s Charge. We quote such paragraph:
“Defendant’s objection excepts to the Court’s Charge for the reason that Paragraph IV thereof contains statements that constitute a comment by the Court upon the evidence in this case.”
This was clearly insufficient objection to call to the court’s attention the objection appellant seeks to now present to this Court. By his brief in this Court appellant contends that the court commented upon the weight of the evidence by assuming that the title to the stamps was in the State of Texas while the evidence might be construed as establishing title in the House of Representatives instead of the State of Texas. Such a contention was not called to the trial court’s attention by the objections made at the time of trial and nothing is presented for review.
Grounds of error seventeen and twenty complain of giving of Paragraph III of the court’s charge which reads as follows:
“You are further charged as the law in this case that the State is not bound to prove the exact date alleged in the indictment but may prove the offense, if any, to have been committed at any time prior to the filing of the indictment so long as said offense, if any, occurred within five years of the date of the filing of said indictment.”
The charge as given is substantially the same as appears in Willson’s Criminal Forms 7th Edition, Section 3598, and was a necessary charge for the guidance of the jury under the facts of this case and a correct statement of the law under Article 12.03, Vernon’s Ann.C.C.P.
Ground of error number eighteen complains of the giving of the charge on circumstantial evidence in that appellant alleges it singled out a particular fact. The charge as given is substantially the same as appears in Willson’s Criminal Forms 7th Edition, Section 3572, except that in the third paragraph thereof the name of appellant appears after the word “accused” and the phrase “the defendant committed the offense” appears instead of “the defendant’s guilt”.
The charge as given does not isolate essential elements and tell the jury the type of evidence which supports the same as did the charge in Montgomery v. State, 157 Tex.Cr.R. 44, 246 S.W.2d 209, upon which appellant relies. In that case the court’s charge instructed the jury as follows:
“In this case, the State relies upon circumstantial evidence to prove that the check in question was a forged check * ⅛ * »
Ground of error number nineteen complains that the court’s charge did not instruct the jury to acquit if they found appellant to be the bailee of the property alleged in the indictment.
This is not a jury question, but a question of law to be decided from the terms of House Simple Resolution No. 41. As we view the Resolution, it does not make appellant a bailee.
Appellant’s last ground of error grows out of the cross-examination of appellant’s character witness Miller, who was asked a “have you heard” question. The witness had been questioned concerning appellant’s prior marriage and children born to that union. He was then asked if he had heard about a “plan” appellant had to kidnap such children from his former wife in defiance of a court order. We perceive no reversible error. The witness testified [428]*428as to appellant’s good character and it was, therefore, permissible, in the absence of showing of bad faith, to ask him if he had heard about acts or reports which would be inconsistent with a good reputation. See Brown v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 477 S.W.2d 617; and Hart v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 447 S.W.2d 944.
Finding no reversible error, the judgment is affirmed.