Knapp v. Romer

909 F. Supp. 810, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19103, 1995 WL 763413
CourtDistrict Court, D. Colorado
DecidedDecember 22, 1995
Docket95-K-1878
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 909 F. Supp. 810 (Knapp v. Romer) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Colorado primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Knapp v. Romer, 909 F. Supp. 810, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19103, 1995 WL 763413 (D. Colo. 1995).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

KANE, Senior District Judge.

Plaintiffs are nine Colorado Department of Corrections (DOC) inmates incarcerated in the Bowie County Correctional Facility (BCCF), Bowie County, Texas pursuant to a contract with the State of Colorado. Plaintiffs assert the Colorado defendants’ constitutional obligations toward inmates apply equally to prisons in Colorado and prisons outside Colorado where Colorado inmates are incarcerated. Plaintiffs contend BCCF fails to meet minimum constitutional standards. They allege the hostile conditions and policies at BCCF combine to inflict cruel and unusual punishment upon them in violation of their rights protected by the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. They also allege they are being denied their rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution to meaningful access to the courts. Plaintiffs seek declaratory and in-junctive relief permanently abating the allegedly unconstitutional conditions on behalf of *812 themselves and all others similarly situated. 1 See First Am.Compl., Part VIII (filed Nov. 17, 1995). '

Defendants deny the conditions under which Colorado inmates are kept at BCCF violate constitutional standards and deny Plaintiffs are entitled to any relief. Defs.’ Answer to First Am.Compl. (filed Dec. 5, 1995). First, however, they assert this action is more properly heard in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, and have filed a Motion for Transfer and Change of Venue pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). It is this motion that I consider in this Memorandum Opinion and Order.

I. THE LAW

Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) in 1948 to allow for the easy change of venue within a unified federal system. Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Country Chrysler, Inc., 928 F.2d 1509, 1515 (10th Cir.1991) (citing Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 254, 102 S.Ct. 252, 265, 70 L.Ed.2d 419 (1981)). Section 1404(a) provides that “[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought.”

The moving party bears the burden of showing the existing forum is inconvenient. Chrysler, 928 F.2d at 1515 (citing Texas Eastern Transmission Corp. v. Marine Office-Appleton & Cox Corp., 579 F.2d 561, 567 (10th Cir.1978) and William A Smith Contracting Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 467 F.2d 662, 664 (10th Cir.1972)), applied in Scheidt v. Klein, 956 F.2d 963, 965-66 (10th Cir.1992). “Unless the balance is strongly in favor of the movant the plaintiff’s choice of forum should rarely be disturbed.” William A. Smith Contracting Co., 467 F.2d at 664.

The decision of whether to transfer an action lies within the sound discretion of the trial judge. Texas Eastern, 579 F.2d at 567. Under standards articulated by the United States Supreme Court, I must “adjudicate motions for transfer according to an ‘individualized, case-by-case consideration of convenience and fairness.’ ” Stewart Org. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 29, 108 S.Ct. 2239, 2244, 101 L.Ed.2d 22 (1988) (quoting Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 622, 84 S.Ct. 805, 812, 11 L.Ed.2d 945 (1964)); see Chrysler, 928 F.2d at 1517; Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. United States Dist. Court for the Dist. of Wyoming, 790 F.2d 69, 71 (10th Cir.1986) (error for district court to deny § 1404(a) motion summarily without “giv[ing] air to those facts which the petitioners assert entitle them to a transfer”). Among the factors a district court should consider are

[1] the plaintiffs choice of forum; [2] the accessibility of witnesses and other sources of proof, including the availability of compulsory process to insure attendance of witnesses; [3] the cost of making the necessary proof; [4] questions as to the enforceability of a judgment if one is obtained; [5] relative advantages and obstacles to a fair trial; [6] difficulties that may arise from congested dockets; [7] the possibility of the existence of questions arising in the area of conflict of laws; [8] the advantage of having a local court determine questions of local law; and [9] all other considerations of a practical nature that make a trial easy, expeditious and economical.

Chrysler, 928 F.2d at 1516 (quoting Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. v. Ritter, 371 F.2d 145, 147 (10th Cir.1967)).

Based on the briefs and the record in this case, I determine proper consideration is possible without the need for a hearing or for oral argument on Defendants’ motion. I find Defendants have failed to establish the exist *813 ing forum is sufficiently inconvenient to tip the balance of equities in favor of transfer to Texas. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion is denied.

II. DISCUSSION

Defendants argue Plaintiffs’ choice of forum should be given less weight in this case because the prison conditions at issue exist in Texas; most of the inmates and other fact witnesses reside in Texas; and those who reside in Colorado would be moved at Defendants’ expense anyway. Defs.’ Reply at 1-3. Thus, Defendants assert, the financial and equitable convenience factors “militate heavily” in favor of transfer to Texas. Id. at 2. 2 Further, Defendants argue, it is Texas’s Jail Commission standards that apply to Plaintiffs’ claims and that therefore, the eighth Chrysler factor requiring consideration of the advantages of having “a local court determine questions of local law” weighs in favor of their motion. Finally, Defendants argue that several of their civilian witness are subject to compulsory process in Texas, not Colorado, such that the second Chrysler factor also weighs in then-favor.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
909 F. Supp. 810, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19103, 1995 WL 763413, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/knapp-v-romer-cod-1995.