Knapp Monarch Co. v. Commissioner

1 T.C. 59, 1942 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 37
CourtUnited States Tax Court
DecidedNovember 18, 1942
DocketDocket Nos. 106797, 107239
StatusPublished
Cited by27 cases

This text of 1 T.C. 59 (Knapp Monarch Co. v. Commissioner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Tax Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Knapp Monarch Co. v. Commissioner, 1 T.C. 59, 1942 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 37 (tax 1942).

Opinions

OPINION.

TueneR, Judge:

The question here is whether cash paid and common stock issued to preferred stockholders' as a part of the consideration for the exchange by them of $3.25 preferred stock for $2.50 preferred stock constituted a taxable dividend in the hands of petitioner’s stockholders. If so, the petitioner is entitled, under section 27 (a) 1 and (e)2 of the Revenue Act of 1936, to a dividends paid credit to the extent of cash plus the fair market value of the common stock so issued. If not, petitioner’s claim of credit must be denied. Sec. 27 (h).3

It is the claim of the respondent that surrender by the preferred stockholders of the old preferred stock and the receipt of the new preferred, plus common stock and cash, were steps in a reorganization, namely, a recapitalization, within the meaning of section 112 (g) (1) (D) of the statute, that the old preferred stock was surrendered in exchange for new preferred stock and common stock pursuant to the plan of reorganization, and under section 112 (b) (3),4 the gain or income therefrom is not taxable. The petitioner concedes that there was a recapitalization and therefore a reorganization within the meaning of the statute. It contends, however, that the issuance of the half shares of common stock to the preferred stockholders was outside the reorganization and not a part of the exchange of the old preferred stock for the new preferred but was the payment of a taxable dividend separate and apart from the exchange and therefore outside the scope of section 112 (b) (3). The respondent makes no claim that the petitioner did not have accumulated earnings or profits within the'meaning of section 115 (a)5 sufficient to cover a dividend of both the cash paid and the half shares of common stock herein issued. Neither is there any claim that the common stock was nontaxable because of a stock dividend within the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution. Sec. 115 (f) (1).6 If therefore the petitioner is correct in its claim that the issuance of the common stock to the old preferred stockholders was outside the reorganization and not a part of the exchange, its contention that the common stock was a taxable dividend is well taken, sections 115 (a), supra, and (f) (2),° and it is entitled to the dividends paid credit claimed in respect thereto.

The petitioner rests its claim that the issuance of the half shares of common stock to the holders of the old preferred stock was outside the reorganization and not a part of the exchange, under section 112 (b) (3), supra, on the facts, and in its brief summarizes the facts as follows: “However, the facts disclose that the recapitalization was concluded on September 12, 1936, when the notice * * * was sent to the shareholders- and informed them that their preferred shares were immediately exchangeable for new preferred shares and no mention was made of any other property, either in stock or otherwise, as being an incidental part of the exchange.” Later in the brief and in further support of its claim that the issuance of the new preferred stock and the half shares of common stock to the holders of the old preferred were two separate and distinct transactions, it is stated that “For all practical purposes the separation of three days distinguishes actions and nothing in the record indicates that either was dependent upon the other for accomplishment.”

The major difficulty with the proposition stated is that the record shows the facts to be exactly the opposite. At the time the plan of reorganization was determined upon the preferred stock outstanding was the $3.25 preferred, with accumulated arrearages of dividends thereon amounting to approximately $7.65 per share. There was no proposal, and apparently no thought or intention, that the holders of such preferred stock would or should surrender such shares solely for the new $2.50 preferred stock, and certainly there is no indication that the holders of the old preferred stock would have agreed to such a proposal or would have made such an exchange if it had been proposed. The stockholders themselves on August 17, in establishing the plan, form, and substance of the recapitalization and in authorizing the directors to carry it out, provided that part of the consideration to be received in exchange for the old shares of preferred stock was to be the half shares of common stock, and in one of the resolutions that day adopted stated that the issuance of the half shares of common stock to the old preferred stockholders would be “in consideration of their exchange of the $3.25 preferred stock for the $2.50 preferred stock,.with such options and elections, and at such time as to the Board of Directors may appear proper and expedient, in. order to carry out the proposition submitted to the holders of the old preferred stock, and as voted at this meeting.” That the half shares of common stock were a part of the consideration passing in exchange for the old preferred stock and were so considered by all parties concerned was again indicated by the letter of September 12, on which the petitioner so strongly relies and wherein it' was stated that the half shares of common stock would be issued to the preferred stockholders “in lieu of the dividend arrearage” on the old preferred and “in conformity with the plan/approved by our stockholders at the special meeting of August 17, 1936.” Furthermore, in requesting the holders of the old preferred stock to mail their old certificates to the petitioner’s transfer agent in St. Louis, Missouri, those holders were assured that the directors within three days would take the necessary action to see that the remainder of the consideration, namely, the half shares of common stock, to be received in exchange for their old preferred shares would very shortly be forthcoming. To say that the holders of the old preferred stock surrendered their old preferred shares in exchange only for the shares of new preferred would require the rewriting of the plan of reorganization, a revision of the agreement which the corporation, through the stockholders’ resolution of August 17, had with the holders of the old preferred shares, and a changing of the consideration prescribed and actually passing therefor. Since the common stock was in fact issued pursuant to the plan of reorganization and wras a part of the consideration for the exchange of the old preferred stock, and; being the shares of the corporation reorganized, the exchange falls squarely within the provisions of section 112 (b) (3), supra. South Atlantic Steamship Line, 42 B. T. A. 705; Skenandoa Rayon Corporation, 42 B. T. A. 1287; J. Weingarten, Inc., 44 B. T. A. 798; and Humphryes Manufacturing Co., 45 B. T. A. 114.

The petitioner urges, however, that a different rule obtains here and that the issuance of the common stock was outside the reorganization and therefore a taxable dividend, because in effecting the issuance of the new prefei’red stock and the half shares of common stock for the old preferred stock it was contemplated that the half shares of common stock should take the form of a dividend on the new shares of preferred stock; that a formal dividend resolution to that effect should be and was adopted and spread on the minutes of the corporation and the half shares of common stock were issued pursuant thereto. The same argument was advanced by the Commissioner in Commissioner v. Kolb, 100 Fed. (2d) 920, and was rejected. Under the plan in that case, the stock of the New York Co.

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Knapp Monarch Co. v. Commissioner
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Bluebook (online)
1 T.C. 59, 1942 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 37, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/knapp-monarch-co-v-commissioner-tax-1942.