Klock v. State of Utah

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
• Decided: December 12, 2024
• Docket: 24-4084
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

Appellate Case: 24-4084 Document: 16-1 Date Filed: 12/12/2024 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS December 12, 2024 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Christopher M. Wolpert __________________________________________________ Clerk of Court KENNETH RICHARD KLOCK,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. No. 24-4084 STATE OF UTAH; SPENCER D. (D.C. No. 1:24-CV-00031-DAO) WALSH; FIRST DISTRICT (D. Utah) COURT; BRANDON MAYNARD,

Defendants - Appellees.

__________________________________________________

ORDER AND JUDGMENT * ___________________________________________________

Before BACHARACH, McHUGH, and FEDERICO, Circuit Judges. ___________________________________________________

The plaintiff, Mr. Kenneth Klock, has sued for violations of his

constitutional rights. The alleged violations took place in state court,

* Oral argument would not help us decide the appeal, so we have decided the appeal based on the record and the parties’ briefs. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2)(C); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G).

This order and judgment does not constitute binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. But the order and judgment may be cited for its persuasive value if otherwise appropriate. See Fed. R. App. P. 32.1(a); 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A). Appellate Case: 24-4084 Document: 16-1 Date Filed: 12/12/2024 Page: 2

where Mr. Klock litigated divorce and eviction proceedings. 1 With these

allegations of constitutional violations, Mr. Klock sued two state-court

judges, a state court, and the state of Utah. The district court dismissed the

action without prejudice based on a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and

failure to state a valid claim.

For all of the dismissals, we conduct de novo review. Kane Cnty.

Utah v. Salazar, 562 F.3d 1077, 1085 (10th Cir. 2009). In conducting de

novo review, we assume the truth of Mr. Klock’s factual allegations.

Leverington v. City of Colo. Springs, 643 F.3d 719, 723 (10th Cir. 2011).

To review the dismissals, we consider the district court’s rationales.

The district court stated that it couldn’t tell from the complaint whether the

divorce and eviction proceedings were ongoing. Either way, the court

reasoned, jurisdiction would be lacking because

• abstention under Younger v. Harris 2 would be required if the actions remained pending and

• the Rooker-Feldman 3 doctrine would prevent federal jurisdiction if the state-court actions had ended.

In addition, the court reasoned that

1 Mr. Klock says that he had four state-court proceedings, but identifies only an action for divorce and eviction. He says nothing about the other two proceedings. 2 See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). 3 See Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); D.C. Ct. App. v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). 2 Appellate Case: 24-4084 Document: 16-1 Date Filed: 12/12/2024 Page: 3

• the judges enjoyed immunity in their personal capacities and

• the other claims failed because the state, state court, and judges (in their official capacities) weren’t considered persons.

Mr. Klock questions the court’s reliance on abstention, stating that

“[f]ederal courts are not required to defer under Younger when state

proceedings are conducted in bad faith or involve harassment or other

‘extraordinary circumstances.’” Appellant’s Opening Br. at 8 (quoting

Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423,

435 (1982)). We agree that abstention is not required when a state court

proceeding was brought in bad faith or with an intent to harass. See Phelps

v. Hamilton, 59 F.3d 1058, 1063–64 (10th Cir. 1995). But overcoming the

bar of Younger abstention is a “heavy burden,” requiring more than just

allegations. Id. at 1063–64, 1066. Mr. Klock has failed to satisfy that

burden because he relied solely on bare allegations of bad faith and

harassment.

Mr. Klock also denies the applicability of the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine when a judge has violated the constitution. We disagree. The

Rooker-Feldman doctrine may apply irrespective of an underlying

constitutional violation. See D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462,

486 (1983) (concluding that district courts lack jurisdiction “over

challenges to state court decisions in particular cases arising out of judicial

proceedings even if those challenges allege that the state court’s action

3 Appellate Case: 24-4084 Document: 16-1 Date Filed: 12/12/2024 Page: 4

was unconstitutional”); Van Sickle v. Holloway, 791 F.2d 1431, 1436 (10th

Cir. 1986) (“A federal district court does not have the authority to review

final judgments of a state court in judicial proceedings[,] even if a party

‘allege[s] that the state court's action was unconstitutional.’” (quoting

Feldman, 460 U.S. at 486)).

Irrespective of these rationales, the district court also reasoned that

• the judges enjoyed immunity in their personal capacities and

• the remaining defendants weren’t considered persons under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Mr. Klock doesn’t address these rationales, so we would need to affirm

irrespective of Younger abstention or the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See

Lebahn v. Nat’l Farmers Union Unif. Pension Plan, 828 F.3d 1180, 1188

(10th Cir. 2016) (“When a district court dismisses a claim on two or more

independent grounds, the appellant must challenge each of those

grounds.”).

We therefore affirm the dismissal.

Entered for the Court

Robert E. Bacharach Circuit Judge