Klitzke v. Menard, Inc.

District Court, D. South Dakota·Decided July 27, 2022·No. 4:21-cv-04029·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF SOUTH DAKOTA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

SCOTT KLITZKE, JENNI KLITZKE, 4:21-CV-04029-KES Plaintiffs, vs. ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS’ SECOND MOTION TO COMPEL

Docket No. 24 MENARD, INC., A WISCONSIN CORPORATION; Defendant.

INTRODUCTION Pending before the court is plaintiffs’ second motion to compel, which the district court referred to this magistrate judge for decision. Docket Nos. 24 & 32. Defendant resists the motion. Docket No. 31. FACTS Plaintiffs filed a complaint in state court which defendant removed to this court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. Docket Nos. 1, 1-1. The complaint alleges Scott Klitzke was injured at Menard’s Sioux Falls East store when a cart containing 4’ x 8’ sheets of plywood collided with him. Id. He asserts a claim of negligence and his wife, Jenni Klitzke, asserts a loss of consortium claim. Id. Previously, plaintiffs filed a first motion to compel and defendant filed a motion for a protective order which this court resolved. Docket No. 23. Plaintiffs’ current motion concerns the same two sets of discovery requests. Plaintiffs served defendant with 18 requests for the production of

documents and 30 interrogatories. Docket Nos. 26-10 and 26-11. Dissatisfied with defendant’s objections and responses following this court’s order on plaintiffs’ first motion to compel, plaintiffs’ counsel tried to work out a compromise with defendant to no avail and eventually filed this second motion to compel. Docket No. 24. Plaintiffs seek three things: (1) an order finding that defendant has waived any objections to all the discovery requested, (2) an order compelling defendant to answer all discovery completely within 14 days, and (3) an award of attorney’s fees for having to file this motion. Docket

No. 24. Defendant does not dispute the amount of time it took to provide discovery responses to plaintiffs. Docket No. 31. However, it points out that there was a change in the identity of corporate counsel which threw discovery production on defendant’s part into disarray for a time. Id. at p. 4. In addition, defense counsel was ill for a time. Docket No. 26-5 at p. 2. Nevertheless, defendant represents that it has provided plaintiffs with all discovery responsive to their requests with the exception of interrogatory

number 12 and request for the production of documents number 15. Docket No. 31 at pp. 3-4. Defendant represents this discovery was provided to plaintiffs’ prior to the filing of their second motion to compel. DISCUSSION A. Good Faith Efforts to Resolve Discovery Dispute Plaintiffs allege that they have engaged in good-faith efforts with Menards

to resolve this discovery dispute. Menards does not contravene that allegation. The court agrees that plaintiffs exhausted good-faith efforts to work things out with Menards before filing this motion. B. Standards Governing Discovery Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) sets forth the scope of discovery in civil cases pending in federal court: Scope in General. Unless otherwise limited by court order, the scope of discovery is as follows: Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit. Information within the scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). If a party fails to respond to a proper request for discovery, or if an evasive or incomplete response is made, the party requesting the discovery is entitled to move for a motion compelling disclosure after having made a good- faith effort to resolve the dispute by conferring first with the other party. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a). The scope of discovery under Rule 26(b) is extremely broad. See 8 Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. ' 2007 (3d ed. Oct. 2020 update). The reason for the broad scope of discovery is that “[m]utual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper litigation. To that end, either party may compel the other to disgorge whatever facts he has in his possession.” Id. (quoting Hickman v.

Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507-08 (1947)). The Federal Rules distinguish between discoverability and admissibility of evidence. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1), 32, and 33(a)(2) & (c). Therefore, the rules of evidence assume the task of keeping out incompetent, unreliable, or prejudicial evidence at trial. But these considerations are not inherent barriers to discovery. Discoverable information itself need not be admissible at trial; rather, the defining question is whether it is within the scope of discovery. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). Additionally, the court may limit the frequency and extent of

discovery. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2); see also Roberts v. Shawnee Mission Ford, Inc., 352 F.3d 358, 361 (8th Cir. 2003) (“The rule vests the district court with discretion to limit discovery if it determines, inter alia, the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.”); Cont’l Ill. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. of Chi. v. Caton, 136 F.R.D. 682, 684-85 (D. Kan. 1991) (“All discovery requests are a burden on the party who must respond thereto. Unless the task of producing or answering is unusual, undue or extraordinary, the general rule requires the entity answering or producing the documents to

bear that burden.”). The court notes that, after reading the briefs of the parties in this matter, the court was unable to discern which action plaintiffs were requesting for which specific discovery requests. The court therefore ordered plaintiffs to provide an executive summary containing a list of discovery requests at issue and the action requested as to each. Docket No. 34. Plaintiffs filed a response to the court’s request, but professed to be unable to provide a comprehensive

executive summary as requested. Docket No. 35. Therefore, the court addresses only general categories of objections as outlined by plaintiffs in their motion. C. General Objections Defendant lodged 13 general objections and four general “reservations of rights” to all of plaintiffs’ first set of interrogatories. Docket No. 26-10 at pp. 1- 4. None of these 17 statements are linked to any specific interrogatory or to any specific fact. Id. Defendant states it has waived these objections. Docket

NO. 31 at p. 3. Plaintiffs assert defendant’s general objections are improper because this district rejects general objections as without force or effect. See Gowan v. Mid Century Ins. Co., No. 5:14-CV-05025-LLP, 2015 WL 7274448, at *5 (D.S.D. Nov. 16, 2015); Nye v. Hartford Accident and Indem. Co., Civ. No. 12-5028- JLV, 2013 WL 3107492, at *8 (D.S.D. June 18, 2013); Collins v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., No. 5:15-CV-05047-JLV, 2016 WL 5794722, at *3 (D.S.D. Sept. 30, 2016). Rule 33 requires a party objecting to discovery to show

specifically how each production request is not subject to discovery. Fed.

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