Klein v. Norton

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedSeptember 24, 2024
Docket7:24-cv-05636
StatusUnknown

This text of Klein v. Norton (Klein v. Norton) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Klein v. Norton, (S.D.N.Y. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK CHRISTIAN PAUL ENZO KLEIN, Plaintiff, 24-CV-5636 (CS) -against- ORDER OF SERVICE DR. JEROME NORTON, et al., Defendants. CATHY SEIBEL, United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who resides in Yonkers, New York, brings this action pro se, alleging that Defendants violated his federal constitutional and statutory rights while he was detained at the Westchester County Jail (“WCJ”), a facility operated by the Westchester Department of Corrections (“WDOC”). Named as defendants are: (1) Dr. Jerome Norton, identified as the Director of Wellpath Medical Services (“Wellpath”) at the WDOC; (2) Amy Schell, a therapist; (3) Wellpath, the medical provider at the WCJ; (4) the WDOC; (5) County of Westchester; (6) unidentified defendant “John Doe 1”; and (7) unidentified defendant “John Doe 2.” The Court construes Plaintiff’s claims as arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law. By order dated July 26, 2024, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees.1 For the reasons set forth below, the Court: (1) dismisses the claims against the WDOC; (2) directs service on Dr. Jerome Norton, Amy Schell, Wellpath, and the County of Westchester; (3) directs the Westchester County Attorney to provide Plaintiff and the Court with the identity, shield number, as well as service address of “John Doe 1”; and (4) declines to issue Valentin instructions with respect to “John Doe 2.”

1 Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee, even when they have been granted permission to proceed IFP. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or portion thereof, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a

complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted, emphasis in original). DISCUSSION A. Claims against the WDOC Plaintiff’s claims against the WDOC must be dismissed because municipal agencies and departments do not have the capacity to be sued under New York law. See Omnipoint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Town of LaGrange, 658 F. Supp. 2d 539, 552 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“In New York, agencies of a municipality are not suable entities.”); Hall v. City of White Plains, 185 F. Supp. 2d 293, 303

(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“Under New York law, departments which are merely administrative arms of a municipality do not have a legal identity separate and apart from the municipality and cannot sue or be sued.”); see also N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 2 (“The term ‘municipal corporation,’ as used in this chapter, includes only a county, town, city and village.”). The WDOC is an agency of the County of Westchester and is a municipal department that cannot be sued. Thus, Plaintiff’s claims against the WDOC will be considered as brought against the County of Westchester, which he also names as a defendant. 2 A. Service on Remaining Identified Defendants Because Plaintiff has been granted permission to proceed IFP, he is entitled to rely on the Court and the U.S. Marshals Service (“USMS”) to effect service.2 Walker v. Schult, 717 F.3d. 119, 123 n.6 (2d Cir. 2013); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (“The officers of the court shall issue and serve all process . . . in [IFP] cases.”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3) (the court must order the

Marshals Service to serve if the plaintiff is authorized to proceed IFP). To allow Plaintiff to effect service on Defendants Norton, Schell, Wellpath, and the County of Westchester through the USMS, the Clerk of Court is instructed to fill out a U.S. Marshals Service Process Receipt and Return form (“USM-285 form”) for each of these defendants. The Clerk of Court is further instructed to issue summonses and deliver to the Marshals Service all the paperwork necessary for the Marshals Service to effect service upon these defendants. If the complaint is not served within 90 days after the date summonses are issued, Plaintiff should request an extension of time for service. See Meilleur v. Strong, 682 F.3d 56, 63 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that it is the plaintiff’s responsibility to request an extension of time for

service). Plaintiff must notify the Court in writing if his address changes, and the Court may dismiss the action if Plaintiff fails to do so.

2 Although Rule 4(m) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure generally requires that a summons be served within 90 days of the date the complaint is filed, Plaintiff is proceeding IFP and could not have served summonses and the complaint until the Court reviewed the complaint and ordered summonses issued. The Court therefore extends the time to serve until 90 days after the date summonses are issued. 3 B. Valentin Instructions Under Valentin v. Dinkins, a pro se litigant is entitled to assistance from the district court in identifying a defendant. 121 F.3d 72, 76 (2d Cir. 1997). In the complaint, Plaintiff supplies sufficient information to permit the WDOC to identify unidentified defendant “John Doe 1,” the Assistant Warden who allegedly violated Plaintiff’s rights during his detention in the WCJ during

the Summer of 2021. It is therefore ordered that the Westchester County Attorney, who is the attorney for and agent of the WDOC, must ascertain the identity and badge number of this defendant whom Plaintiff seeks to sue here and the address where this defendant may be served. The Westchester County Attorney must provide this information to Plaintiff and the Court within 60 days of the date of this order. Within 30 days of receiving this information, Plaintiff must file an amended complaint naming that newly identified individual as a defendant. The amended complaint will replace, not supplement, the original complaint. An amended complaint form that Plaintiff should complete is attached to this order.

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Related

Coppedge v. United States
369 U.S. 438 (Supreme Court, 1962)
Meilleur v. Strong
682 F.3d 56 (Second Circuit, 2012)
Walker v. Schult
717 F.3d 119 (Second Circuit, 2013)
Harris v. Mills
572 F.3d 66 (Second Circuit, 2009)
Omnipoint Communications, Inc. v. Town of LaGrange
658 F. Supp. 2d 539 (S.D. New York, 2009)
Hall v. City of White Plains
185 F. Supp. 2d 293 (S.D. New York, 2002)

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Bluebook (online)
Klein v. Norton, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/klein-v-norton-nysd-2024.