Opinion
MOSK, J.
The City of Los Angeles has adopted an ordinance to control rental increases in “rental units.” The sole issue in this action is whether that term applies to a room in a retirement residence in which the tenant, for a single charge, receives such services as meals, transportation and maid service, in addition to lodging. The trial court determined that a residence which provides such “amenities and facilities” is not within the rent regulation law and granted summary judgment in favor of defendant, the operator of the facility.
On August 30, 1978, the city enacted ordinance No. 151.415 (the rent roll-back ordinance). The ordinance declared that there was a growing shortage of housing units in the city, with resulting exorbitant rentals, and that this condition had a detrimental effect on the lives of a substantial number of the city’s residents, endangering the health and welfare of senior citizens and persons of low income. Pending adoption' of a measure to alleviate this problem, the ordinance rolled back certain rents, and declared a moratorium on most rent increases for a period of six months, or until the city council enacted an ordinance regulating rents, whichever came first. The ordinance applied to “Rental Units,” which were defined as “[a]ll dwelling units designed for rental use or actually rented ... including single family dwellings .... ” (Ord. No. 151.415, § 2 E.)1
[896]*896In March 1979, the city adopted ordinance No. 152.120 (L.A. Mun. Code, ch. XVI, art. 1, § 151.00 et seq., hereinafter the rent stabilization ordinance), which was an extension and refinement of the rent roll-back ordinance, and contained a declaration of purpose similar to that measure. (§ 151.01.) The stabilization ordinance also applied to “Rental [897]*897Units,” but it set forth a detailed definition of the meaning of that term, i.e., “[a]ll dwelling units, efficiency dwelling units, guest rooms, and suites in the City of Los Angeles, as defined in Section 12.03” of the city’s code, “together with ... all housing services, privileges, furnishings and facilities supplied in connection with the use or occupancy thereof, including garage and parking facilities.” (Ord. No. 152.120, § 151.02 M.) Section 12.03 is contained in the provisions relating to zoning, and sets forth definitions applicable to the city’s zoning laws. The section defines a “dwelling unit” as a “group of two or more rooms, one of which is a kitchen, designed for occupancy by one family for living and sleeping purposes.”2
[898]*898Plaintiff Harriet Klarfeld resided in a retirement residence known as Westwood Horizons. The facility had 301 units, consisting of private or semiprivate rooms and suites of rooms, none of which contained a kitchen. Plaintiff was 86 years old, had lived at the facility for 1-1/2 years, occupied a 10-by-12-foot room, and shared a bath with another tenant. [899]*899She paid a monthly charge of $555 a month, for which she was entitled to three meals a day, snacks, maid service, linen and cleaning services, and twice weekly bus service to nearby medical or social appointments, and she had the right to participate in recreational activities planned by the facility.3 Westwood Horizons had 115 employees who spent most of their time providing services to the residents.
Plaintiff was notified that as of October 1, 1978, (after the effective date of the rent roll-back ordinance, but prior to the enactment of the rent stabilization ordinance) her “new monthly rate” would be raised to $595 a month. She refused to pay the charge, and was requested to vacate her room.
Thereafter, she filed this action on behalf of herself and other residents of Westwood Horizons, against the operator of the facility, alleging that the increase was barred by the terms of the rent roll-back ordinance. She sought a determination that defendant was not entitled to the increase, a refund for those residents of the facility who had paid increased charges in violation of the ordinance, and punitive damages. Following' the filing of her complaint, plaintiff vacated her room at Westwood Horizons.
Defendant moved for summary judgment after adoption of the rent stabilization ordinance. He argued in support of the motion that the terms of the two ordinances should be construed together, and that since the stabilization ordinance in effect defined a “dwelling unit” as including a kitchen, the limitation on rent increases for “dwelling units” in the rent roll-back ordinance did not apply to Westwood Horizons, which contained no accommodations with kitchen facilities.
As we have seen, the trial court determined that the roll-back ordinance was not intended to apply to “amenities and facilities of the scope [900]*900furnished to plaintiff and her class here, even though one facility may be housing,” and granted summary judgment to defendant.
On this appeal from the ensuing judgment, plaintiff maintains that the facts Westwood Horizons offers only rooms without kitchens, and that other facilities and services in addition to housing are included in the monthly charge, do not except the facility from the provisions of the city’s rent regulation laws. We agree with these assertions.
In analyzing the text of these enactments, we are bound by the fundamental rule that it is our duty to adopt a construction which will effectuate the purpose which the legislative body sought to promote in enacting the statute or ordinance. (People ex rel. S.F. Bay etc. Com. v. Town of Emeryville (1968) 69 Cal.2d 533, 543 [72 Cal.Rptr. 790, 446 P.2d 790]; Select Base Materials v. Board of Equal. (1959) 51 Cal.2d 640, 645 [335 P.2d 672].) There can be no doubt of the city council’s purpose here, for both ordinances expressly provide that rising rents are endangering the health and welfare of the city’s senior citizens, and both are aimed at controlling the amount of rent increases.
With this purpose in mind, we observe, first, that the rent roll-back ordinance contained no definition of a “dwelling unit.” Defendant urges, nevertheless, that the city council must have had in mind the definition of that term in section 12.03 when it enacted the ordinance. This contention is of dubious merit. As we have seen, section 12.03 is a part of the city’s zoning code, and there is no reference to that section in the rent roll-back ordinance.
More important, the exceptions contained in the roll-back ordinance indicated that the measure was intended to apply to residential units which did not include kitchens. There was a clear implication in the ordinance that hotels which were occupied by permanent residents for more than 14 days, and homes for the aged run for profit, were within the coverage of the rent regulations.4 Since such accommodations ordinarily do not include kitchen facilities, it is implicit that the ordinance was not intended to apply only to “dwelling units” as defined in section 12.03, i.e., accommodations which include a kitchen.
[901]
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Opinion
MOSK, J.
The City of Los Angeles has adopted an ordinance to control rental increases in “rental units.” The sole issue in this action is whether that term applies to a room in a retirement residence in which the tenant, for a single charge, receives such services as meals, transportation and maid service, in addition to lodging. The trial court determined that a residence which provides such “amenities and facilities” is not within the rent regulation law and granted summary judgment in favor of defendant, the operator of the facility.
On August 30, 1978, the city enacted ordinance No. 151.415 (the rent roll-back ordinance). The ordinance declared that there was a growing shortage of housing units in the city, with resulting exorbitant rentals, and that this condition had a detrimental effect on the lives of a substantial number of the city’s residents, endangering the health and welfare of senior citizens and persons of low income. Pending adoption' of a measure to alleviate this problem, the ordinance rolled back certain rents, and declared a moratorium on most rent increases for a period of six months, or until the city council enacted an ordinance regulating rents, whichever came first. The ordinance applied to “Rental Units,” which were defined as “[a]ll dwelling units designed for rental use or actually rented ... including single family dwellings .... ” (Ord. No. 151.415, § 2 E.)1
[896]*896In March 1979, the city adopted ordinance No. 152.120 (L.A. Mun. Code, ch. XVI, art. 1, § 151.00 et seq., hereinafter the rent stabilization ordinance), which was an extension and refinement of the rent roll-back ordinance, and contained a declaration of purpose similar to that measure. (§ 151.01.) The stabilization ordinance also applied to “Rental [897]*897Units,” but it set forth a detailed definition of the meaning of that term, i.e., “[a]ll dwelling units, efficiency dwelling units, guest rooms, and suites in the City of Los Angeles, as defined in Section 12.03” of the city’s code, “together with ... all housing services, privileges, furnishings and facilities supplied in connection with the use or occupancy thereof, including garage and parking facilities.” (Ord. No. 152.120, § 151.02 M.) Section 12.03 is contained in the provisions relating to zoning, and sets forth definitions applicable to the city’s zoning laws. The section defines a “dwelling unit” as a “group of two or more rooms, one of which is a kitchen, designed for occupancy by one family for living and sleeping purposes.”2
[898]*898Plaintiff Harriet Klarfeld resided in a retirement residence known as Westwood Horizons. The facility had 301 units, consisting of private or semiprivate rooms and suites of rooms, none of which contained a kitchen. Plaintiff was 86 years old, had lived at the facility for 1-1/2 years, occupied a 10-by-12-foot room, and shared a bath with another tenant. [899]*899She paid a monthly charge of $555 a month, for which she was entitled to three meals a day, snacks, maid service, linen and cleaning services, and twice weekly bus service to nearby medical or social appointments, and she had the right to participate in recreational activities planned by the facility.3 Westwood Horizons had 115 employees who spent most of their time providing services to the residents.
Plaintiff was notified that as of October 1, 1978, (after the effective date of the rent roll-back ordinance, but prior to the enactment of the rent stabilization ordinance) her “new monthly rate” would be raised to $595 a month. She refused to pay the charge, and was requested to vacate her room.
Thereafter, she filed this action on behalf of herself and other residents of Westwood Horizons, against the operator of the facility, alleging that the increase was barred by the terms of the rent roll-back ordinance. She sought a determination that defendant was not entitled to the increase, a refund for those residents of the facility who had paid increased charges in violation of the ordinance, and punitive damages. Following' the filing of her complaint, plaintiff vacated her room at Westwood Horizons.
Defendant moved for summary judgment after adoption of the rent stabilization ordinance. He argued in support of the motion that the terms of the two ordinances should be construed together, and that since the stabilization ordinance in effect defined a “dwelling unit” as including a kitchen, the limitation on rent increases for “dwelling units” in the rent roll-back ordinance did not apply to Westwood Horizons, which contained no accommodations with kitchen facilities.
As we have seen, the trial court determined that the roll-back ordinance was not intended to apply to “amenities and facilities of the scope [900]*900furnished to plaintiff and her class here, even though one facility may be housing,” and granted summary judgment to defendant.
On this appeal from the ensuing judgment, plaintiff maintains that the facts Westwood Horizons offers only rooms without kitchens, and that other facilities and services in addition to housing are included in the monthly charge, do not except the facility from the provisions of the city’s rent regulation laws. We agree with these assertions.
In analyzing the text of these enactments, we are bound by the fundamental rule that it is our duty to adopt a construction which will effectuate the purpose which the legislative body sought to promote in enacting the statute or ordinance. (People ex rel. S.F. Bay etc. Com. v. Town of Emeryville (1968) 69 Cal.2d 533, 543 [72 Cal.Rptr. 790, 446 P.2d 790]; Select Base Materials v. Board of Equal. (1959) 51 Cal.2d 640, 645 [335 P.2d 672].) There can be no doubt of the city council’s purpose here, for both ordinances expressly provide that rising rents are endangering the health and welfare of the city’s senior citizens, and both are aimed at controlling the amount of rent increases.
With this purpose in mind, we observe, first, that the rent roll-back ordinance contained no definition of a “dwelling unit.” Defendant urges, nevertheless, that the city council must have had in mind the definition of that term in section 12.03 when it enacted the ordinance. This contention is of dubious merit. As we have seen, section 12.03 is a part of the city’s zoning code, and there is no reference to that section in the rent roll-back ordinance.
More important, the exceptions contained in the roll-back ordinance indicated that the measure was intended to apply to residential units which did not include kitchens. There was a clear implication in the ordinance that hotels which were occupied by permanent residents for more than 14 days, and homes for the aged run for profit, were within the coverage of the rent regulations.4 Since such accommodations ordinarily do not include kitchen facilities, it is implicit that the ordinance was not intended to apply only to “dwelling units” as defined in section 12.03, i.e., accommodations which include a kitchen.
[901]*901But, claims defendant, the terms of the rent roll-back ordinance must be read with the language of the rent stabilization ordinance enacted a few months later. Defendant relies on the well-established rule that enactments with the same general purpose must be construed together to achieve a uniform and consistent legislative purpose, even though they may have been enacted at different times. (Isobe v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (1974) 12 Cal.3d 584, 590 [116 Cal.Rptr. 376, 526 P.2d 528]; County of Placer v. Aetna Cas. etc. Co. (1958) 50 Cal.2d 182, 188-189 [323 P.2d 753].) Under these rules of construction, argues defendant, the definition of “dwelling units” in section 12.03 must be applied to that term as used in the rent roll-back ordinance even though it is only the later-enacted stabilization ordinance which expressly refers to section 12.03.
If we accept the principle that the two ordinances are to be read together, we must look to provisions of the stabilization ordinance in addition to the definition of a “dwelling unit” to determine the city council’s intention regarding the scope of the roll-back ordinance. These additional provisions make explicit what was implied in the roll-back ordinance, i.e., that rental units without kitchens are encompassed within the rent limitations imposed by the city council. In the second ordinance, the term “rental units” is defined as including not only “all dwelling units” but also “guest rooms, and suites ... as defined in Section 12.03.” That section defines a “guest room” as “[a]ny habitable room except a kitchen, designed or used for occupancy by one or more persons and not in a dwelling unit,” and a “suite” as “[a] group of habitable rooms designed as a unit, and occupied by only one family, but not including a kitchen or other facilities for the preparation of food, with entrances and exits which are common to all rooms comprising the suite.” The room occupied by plaintiff obviously fits the definition of a “guest room” since it is a room used for occupancy by her and not in a “dwelling unit,” as defined by section 12.03. The language of the rent roll-back ordinance, when interpreted in the light of the later enactment, therefore compels the conclusion that it applies to the type of accommodation occupied by plaintiff.
[902]*902There is nothing in the language of these measures which excludes from coverage a residential facility which, like Westwood Horizons, includes meals and other services as part of a single overall charge. Indeed, the ordinances indicate otherwise. The rent stabilization measure, after declaring that “words and phrases ... shall be construed as defined in Section 12.03,” (Ord. No. 152.120, § 151.02), provides that accommodations in “hotels, motels, inns, tourist homes and boarding and rooming houses” which are occupied for 60 days or more by the same tenant, are subject to its terms (Ord. No. 152.120, § 151.02 M 2).5 A “boarding or rooming house” is defined in section 12.03 as a “dwelling containing a single dwelling unit and not more than five guest rooms or suites of rooms, where lodging is provided with or without meals, for compensation.” (Italics added.) And it is common knowledge that hotels and inns frequently provide many of the amenities supplied by Westwood Horizons, i.e., maid service, linen and cleaning service, a bellman and room service.
In addition, the rent stabilization ordinance, like the roll-back ordinance which it replaced, contains an exception for accommodations in a “non-profit home for the aged” (Ord. No. 152.120, § 151.02 M 4), again, by negative implication suggesting that a retirement residence like Westwood Horizons is within the scope of the rent regulations.6
In view of these conclusions, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to defendant.
The judgment is reversed.
Bird, C. J., Tobriner, J., Richardson, J., Newman, J., and Spencer, J.,
Assigned by the Chairperson of the Judicial Council.