K.L. v. A.G.
Opinion
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
K.L. : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
:
:
A.G. AND W.G. : No. 577 EDA 2020
Appeal from the Order Entered January 27, 2020 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Domestic Relations at No(s): No. 0C1901676
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., DUBOW, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E. MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.: FILED OCTOBER 13, 2020 Appellant, K.L. (“Father”), appeals from the January 27, 2020 Order that, inter alia, granted A.G. and W.G. (“Maternal Grandmother” and “Maternal Grandfather” collectively, “Maternal Grandparents”) standing to pursue custody of K.L (“Child”) and awarded Maternal Grandparents partial physical custody of Child. Upon review, we vacate the Order and remand for further proceedings in accordance with this Memorandum.
Father and B.G. (“Mother”) are parents to Child, who was born in September 2017. Mother has a history of substance abuse. Parents lived together with Child at Mother’s house until January 2018, when the Philadelphia Department of Human Services (“the Agency”) became involved after receiving a report that Mother left Child unattended while Father was at work. As part of a safety plan, Child lived with Maternal Grandparents until Father obtained his own housing. In March 2018, Child returned to Father’s
care. Maternal Grandparents continued to be involved in Child’s life, although the parties disagree to what extent.
In 2019, the Agency received a second report after Mother and Maternal Grandparents had an altercation in Maternal Grandparents home. The Agency received incorrect contact information for Father, could not initially contact him, and proceeded to file a dependency petition based on Mother’s inability to care for Child. On September 20, 2019, after a hearing where Father was present, DHS withdrew the dependency petition and the trial court confirmed legal and physical custody of Child in Father.
A day prior to the adjudicatory hearing, on September 19, 2019, the Maternal Grandparents filed a Petition for Custody averring that they had standing to pursue custody under Sections 5324 and 5325 of the Custody Act because Child lived with them for most of her life. In the Petition, Maternal Grandparents requested that the trial court award them full or partial custody of Child.
On September 20, 2019, Father filed a pro se Motion to Dismiss for Lack of In Loco Parentis Standing averring that Maternal Grandparents did not have standing to pursue custody because, inter alia, Child has always lived with parents except for a short time in 2019.
On January 27, 2020, the trial court held a hearing. Father appeared pro se and counsel represented Maternal Grandparents. In sum, Father testified that since March 2018 Child has lived “back and forth” with both him and Mother, that he always provided for Child by buying pampers and formula,
that Child has lived solely with him since September 2019, that he has been allowing Child to visit with Maternal Grandparents every week but he wants visitation to remain his decision rather than the court’s decision. N.T. Hearing, 1/27/20, at 6-12, 20-27. Importantly, Father denied that Child was living with Maternal Grandparents for an extended period. Id. at 28.
Counsel for Maternal Grandparents proffered that Child lived with Maternal Grandparents from November 2017 until January 2018, Mother has been in and out of Maternal Grandparents’ home, Mother has a continuing substance abuse problem, Maternal Grandparents provided Child with food, clothing, and went to her medical appointments, Maternal Grandparents have been serving as the Child’s parents for most of Child’s life, and Maternal Grandparents were not requesting full custody of Child but wanted a more formalized visitation agreement. Id. at 13-14. Counsel did not formally call Maternal Grandmother or Maternal Grandfather to testify as witnesses or ask either of them any direct questions. However, in response to questions from the court, Maternal Grandmother informed the court that Mother was getting ready to enter a drug rehab and stated, “[w]e had a relationship with [Child] since the day she was born.” Id. at 16, 26. Maternal Grandfather sua sponte informed the court, “I’d like to have my granddaughter experience what my other granddaughters have done and my children which is having us being – being with family.” Id. at 26.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court denied Father’s Motion to Dismiss, found that Maternal Grandparents had standing, and awarded
Maternal Grandparents partial physical custody of Child every Monday and every third Saturday.
Father timely appealed. Both Father and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.1 Father raises the following issues on appeal:
1. Did the court properly apply § 5324 or § 5325 when granting Maternal Grandparents standing to pursue custody as a matter of law?
2. Did the court err in granting Maternal Grandparents standing to pursue custody?
3. Did Judge Furlong’s order eliminate standing for Maternal Grandparents?
Father’s Br. at 4 (some capitalization omitted).
“Determining standing in custody disputes is a threshold issue that must be resolved before proceeding to the merits of the underlying custody action.” C.G. v. J.H., 193 A.3d 891, 898 (Pa. 2018). Whether an individual has standing in a custody dispute “is a conceptually distinct legal question which has no bearing on the central issue within the custody action—who is
1 Father failed to file a Rule 1925(b) Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal contemporaneously with his Notice of Appeal, see Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i), (b), but we decline to dismiss on this basis because no party asserted prejudice. See In re K.T.E.L., 983 A.2d 745, 747 (Pa. Super. 2009) (holding that the failure to file a rule 1925(b) statement contemporaneously with a notice of appeal in a children's fast track case will result in a defective notice of appeal which this Court will address on a case by case basis, avoiding the extreme action of dismissal when the defect does not prejudice any party)
entitled to physical and legal custody of Child in light of her best interests[.]” K.C. v. L.A., 128 A.3d 774, 779 (Pa. 2015).
“Issues of standing are questions of law; thus, the standard of review is de novo and the scope of review is plenary.” C.G. v. J.H., 193 A.3d at 898. “The concept of standing is vital in ensuring that cases are presented to the court by an individual who has a genuine, and not merely a theoretical, interest in the matter.” M.S. v. J.D., 215 A.3d 595, 598 (Pa. Super. 2019). “Thus, the traditional test for standing is that the proponent of the action must have a direct, substantial and immediate interest in the matter at hand.” Id. “In the area of child custody, principles of standing have been applied with particular scrupulousness because they serve a dual purpose: not only to protect the interest of the court system by assuring that actions are litigated by appropriate parties, but also to prevent intrusion into the protected domain of the family by those who are merely strangers, however well-meaning.” M.W. v. S.T., 196 A.3d 1065, 1069 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation omitted).
The Custody Act provides two separate provisions for grandparents seeking custody of their grandchildren. Relevant to this appeal, pursuant to Section 5324, a grandparent can seek “any form of physical or legal custody”
if they “stand in loco parentis to the child.”2 23 Pa.C.S. § 5324(2). Also, a
2 “The term in loco parentis literally means ‘in the place of a parent.’ . . . The status of in loco parentis embodies two ideas; first, the assumption of a parental status, and, second, the discharge of parental duties.” Peters v. Costello, 891 A.2d 705, 710 (Pa. 2005) (citations omitted).
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