Kizer v. State

1939 OK CR 91, 93 P.2d 58, 67 Okla. Crim. 16, 1939 Okla. Crim. App. LEXIS 161
CourtCourt of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma
DecidedJuly 28, 1939
DocketNo. A-9400.
StatusPublished
Cited by20 cases

This text of 1939 OK CR 91 (Kizer v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Kizer v. State, 1939 OK CR 91, 93 P.2d 58, 67 Okla. Crim. 16, 1939 Okla. Crim. App. LEXIS 161 (Okla. Ct. App. 1939).

Opinion

DAVENPORT, J.

On rehearing, the petition of the defendant for rehearing is sustained, and the law and facts reconsidered.

Joe Kizer was by information jointly charged with John Kizer in the district court of Choctaw county with the crime of murder; was tried separately; convicted of manslaughter in the first degree; and sentenced to serve a term of 50 years in the state penitentiary.

Motion for a new trial was filed, considered, overruled, exceptions saved, and the defendant has appealed.

The case of the defendant, Joe Kizer, was called for trial on the 7th day of April, 1937. Hal Welch, as a special prosecutor, and M. W. Gross, county attorney, appeared for the state. The defendant appeared in person and by his attorney, O. A. Brewer.

The defendant’s counsel moved the court to quash the panel and continue the cause for the reason that when the *19 case was called on the morning of April 7, 1937, the county attorney called out the names of witnesses and, among others, the name of one Merle Slaton. Her father was in the courtroom and advised that the witness was not present, but was visiting in the state of Arkansas.

The county attorney in the presence of the entire jury panel made the statement: “Why did she take such a sudden notion to leave and go to Arkansas?”

The defendant in his motion contended that the statement of the county attorney made in the presence of all the jury panel left the implication with the jury panel that the defendant or some one for him had caused the absence of the witness, and procured the same.

The defendant further contended that such statement, regardless of the effect it had or did not have on the jurors, would leave some impression on their minds in their deliberation of the case, and precluded the defendant from having a fair and impartial trial by a jury of his peers.

This motion was overruled by the court, and the defendant excepted.

The defendant further excepted to the ruling of the court for the reason that he insisted that the court had deprived him of his right to. offer testimony, and make a showing by offering witnesses that the statement made by the county attorney had some impression on the minds of the jurors, composing the panel.

The court stated:

“I have not denied that. The court finds that the statement made by the county attorney, made in the presence of the jury, was as stated in the defendant’s motion. The court further finds that the jurors may be questioned and qualified as to whether or not said statement would have any bearing in their trial of this case; and if said jurors answer in the affirmative, they may be excused for cause; and the court admonishes the jury at this time not to consider the statement made by the county attorney for any purpose whatever.”

*20 Mr. Hal Welch, an attorney of the Bar, who was employed specially to assist in the prosecution, was called as a witness, and examined by the county attorney, and stated in substance:

“I was employed by members of the family of the deceased, and assisted in the prosecution of the case of John Kizer and Joe Kizer at the last term of court. A severance was asked and granted, and the defendant John Kizer was tried, I believe, in October, 1936. A subpoena was issued for the witness Mrs. Merle Slaton requiring her attendance on the court on the 14th day of October, 1936, which is the usual form. I do not know, but I imagine she was discharged from the attendance of the court on that hearing. I have never seen the discharge.”

The defendant called the court clerk, and he identified what had been marked as Defendant’s Exhibit “A”, which is a discharge of witnesses, showing that Mrs. Merle Slaton was on the 22nd day of October, 1936, discharged as a witness in the case.

It was then stipulated by and between the prosecutor and defendant’s counsel that no subpoena had been issued for Mrs. Merle Slaton to attend the trial of Joe Kizer, in which this hearing is being had.

H. M. Pardoe was called by the defendant and stated in substance:

“My name is H. M. Pardoe. I am a member of the jury panel. I was in the courtroom this morning when the State v. Joe Kizer was called. Yes, sir, I heard a statement of the county attorney. It was in regard to one of the witnesses leaving the jurisdiction of the court, and going over in Arkansas. I afterward saw you in the county attorney’s office. I expressed an opinion as to whether or not I would be qualified as a juror after hearing that statement.”
“By Mr, Welch: Just a minute, that’s what I objected to.”

Witness Pardoe asked if it was all right to state what he said, and the court said, “Sure.”

*21 “I made the remark that naturally that would come into my mind all through the trial. I heard the admonition of the court, admonish the jury not to consider the statement made by the county attorney for any purpose. I do not know, Judge, whether or not I could follow the instructions of the court or not. Naturally it could come in my mind. I think it would come back in my mind. I want to try to go by the evidence of the case, but naturally that would come into my mind along. I would say that I do not want to sit on the jury after hearing that remark. By the Court: You may be excused from jury service.”

The defendant’s counsel then stated to the court:

“I think that would be the condition of the mind of every juror. By the Court: If they say that, I will excuse every one of them. By Mr. Brewer: I offer this evidence to show that the entire jury panel is disqualified. By the Court: Let the record show that this j uror is disqualified. By Mr. Brewer: I want to offer the evidence to show the state of mind of the jury.”

The offer was refused as to the entire jury.

“By Mr. Brewer: We except. By the Court: Is there any other record you want to make? By Mr. Brewer: We want to present that as a motion for continuance and a motion to quash the panel and continue this case. By the Court: The motion for continuance and motion to quash the panel is overruled. By Mr. Brewer: We at this time offer in evidence each individual juror in support of our motion to disqualify, in the presence of the other jurors. By Mr. Welch: We have no objection to it. Is it your request that the court permit you to call each member of the jury panel into court separately, out of the presence of the other jurors, and interrogate them? By Mr. Brewer: To offer each individual juror. By the Court: That is so far removed from the general practice of courts throughout Oklahoma, the court will have to refuse that offer. By Mr. Brewer: Refused, and exception allowed. By the Court: Call the jurors in.”

Dr. Boyer, testifying on behalf of the state, stated that he examined the body of Jordan Swink the night he was shot.

*22 “He was in the house on a bed, or a couch of some kind, at the time I examined him. It was about 2 a.m. in the morning.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

State v. Peterson
722 P.2d 768 (Utah Supreme Court, 1986)
Johnson v. State
1983 OK CR 53 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma, 1983)
Jones v. State
1976 OK CR 207 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma, 1976)
Somers v. State
1975 OK CR 196 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma, 1975)
People v. Simbolo
532 P.2d 962 (Supreme Court of Colorado, 1975)
State v. Pence
428 S.W.2d 503 (Supreme Court of Missouri, 1968)
Davis v. State
1966 OK CR 53 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma, 1966)
People v. Perez
373 P.2d 617 (California Supreme Court, 1962)
Young v. State
1962 OK CR 70 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma, 1962)
McCluskey v. State
1962 OK CR 46 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma, 1962)
Hutchison v. State
1957 OK 300 (Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 1957)
Starns v. State
1956 OK CR 50 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma, 1956)
Billy v. State
1954 OK CR 75 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma, 1954)
Thompson v. State
1953 OK CR 136 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma, 1953)
State v. Spencer
258 P.2d 1147 (Idaho Supreme Court, 1953)
Leeth v. State
1951 OK CR 54 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma, 1951)
Carr v. State
1950 OK CR 38 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma, 1950)
Pebworth v. State
1948 OK CR 114 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma, 1948)
Ex Parte Hibbs
1948 OK CR 16 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma, 1948)
Montgomery Ward Co., Inc. v. Curtis
1947 OK 388 (Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 1947)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
1939 OK CR 91, 93 P.2d 58, 67 Okla. Crim. 16, 1939 Okla. Crim. App. LEXIS 161, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kizer-v-state-oklacrimapp-1939.