Kittle v. Commissioner

21 T.C. 79, 1953 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 46, 3 Oil & Gas Rep. 891
CourtUnited States Tax Court
DecidedOctober 19, 1953
DocketDocket No. 35442
StatusPublished
Cited by36 cases

This text of 21 T.C. 79 (Kittle v. Commissioner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Tax Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Kittle v. Commissioner, 21 T.C. 79, 1953 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 46, 3 Oil & Gas Rep. 891 (tax 1953).

Opinion

OPINION.

•BRUce, Judge:

Petitioner claims a net operating loss deduction for the calendar year 1945 under sections 23 (s) and 122 of the Internal Revenue Code,1 based upon a net operating loss carry-back from the calendar year 1947. The first question for determination is whether petitioner’s net loss incurred during 1947 in mine exploration and development work, amounting to $14,032.34, represents a loss incurred by petitioner in regularly carrying on a trade or business within the meaning of section 122 (d) (5).

It is not disputed that during the calendar year 1947 petitioner suffered a net loss from his mining exploration work in the aggregate amount of $14,032.34, and that such net loss represented a proper deduction for the taxable year 1947. Respondent contends, however, that such loss was not incurred by petitioner in regularly carrying on a trade or business within the meaning of section 122 (d) (5). Asa basis of his contention respondent argues that it is not possible from the record to ascertain what petitioner’s business was, or what course he would have followed if ore had been discovered, so as to realize a profit or income. Assuming petitioner would have actively mined any discovery made or would have leased the mineral rights to third parties, respondent asserts the expenditures incurred in 1947 in connection with the discovery would not have been deductible as operating expenses but, pursuant to the requirements of Regulations 111, section 29.23 (m)-15,2 would have been capital items recoverable only through deduction for depreciation and depletion, citing Rialto Mining Corporation, 25 B. T. A. 980, and G. E. Cotton, 25 B. T. A. 866. Respondent concedes that if it be assumed petitioner would have sold the mineral rights to third parties, petitioner would be in the business of selling mineral properties and the expenditures incurred in 1947 would have constituted operating expenses rather than the cost of each mine or mineral property.

Petitioner contends, however, that his business consisted of exploring and developing mineral properties as distinct from the business of commercial mining production and therefore that the loss incurred therein representó deductions otherwise allowed by law attributable to the operation of a trade or business regularly carried on within the meaning of section 122 (d) (5) of the Internal Revenue Code.

We agree with petitioner’s position. That he followed a regular course of action cannot be denied. Beginning in 1946, after his release from the military service, and continuing through 1949, petitioner employed all his business energies and time in the exploration and development of mining properties. He established and maintained an office for such business, kept records of expenditures, and employed others to assist him. His working assets were the $10,000 or more which he allocated for such work, his engineering abilities, and personal services. The fact that he never realized any income from his activities (except an unexplained item of $36.04) does not of itself prevent such activities from constituting a trade or business. As respondent on brief has stated, the question of whether or not the net loss incurred in 1947 should be deemed attributable to the operation of a trade or business, cannot be held to turn upon petitioner’s success or failure in discovering mineral properties. Nor do we think it material, under the facts of this case, what course petitioner would have pursued had he found a commercially productive ore body. Both petitioner and Krai testified that had such an ore body been discovered the beneficiation thereof would have been the subject of an entirely new enterprise and that they would have continued in their activities of exploring and developing other ore bodies. Had he discovered an ore body in any of the properties examined worthy of commercial production his interest therein would unquestionably have been capable of evaluation and such evaluation would have been recognized by way of cash, stock, or partnership interest by any company organized to exploit such ore deposits. Such valuation would have represented income of petitioner’s business of exploration and development of mineral properties. Petitioner’s business was not merely that of a particular venture or development of a particular mining lease as in the Rialto and Cotton cases, supra. The various mining properties explored were not isolated transactions but part of his regular business and the losses incurred-were from the operation of a business regularly carried on by him. Such losses incurred in 1947 are accordingly eligible for carry-back to the calendar year 1945 under the provisions of sections 23 (s) and 122 of the Internal Revenue Code. See Oscar K. Eysenbach, 10 B. T. A. 716; Royal W. Irwin, 37 B. T. A. 51; Henry E. Sage, 15 T. C. 299.

Having determined that the nef loss incurred by petitioner during 1947 in mining exploration and development work, amounting to $14,032.34, represents a loss incurred in regularly carrying on a trade or business and as such eligible for carry-back to the year 1945, it becomes necessary to determine whether amounts received by petitioner in 1947 as payments under a so-called amended lease of mine lands represent capital gain or ordinary income, in order that the amount of net operating loss available for carry-back may be determined.

As of January 1, 1946, petitioner, by succession in interest, was a party to a mining lease dated October 2,1899. This lease, by its terms, was to run for a period of 50 years and 3 months, or until January 1, 1950, and provided for certain production and advance or minimum royalties.

The 1899 lease was considered in the case of Estelle Burt DeVelin et al., Trustees, 22 B. T. A. 1400, wherein it was held that the royalty payments were ordinary income and not the proceeds of sale of any part of the land or other capital assets. Koyalti.es paid to petitioner prior to 1946 were reported by him in his income tax returns as ordinary income.

As of January 1,1946, petitioner and other successors to the original interests of the lessors under the 1899 lease entered into an “Amended Lease” of the Bust Mine Lands with Oliver Iron Mine Company, the successor in interest of the lessee. This amended lease was to run for a period of 50 years from January 1, 1946, and its stated purpose was “to extend the term of said [1899] mining lease and to make certain other modifications thereof.” Petitioner’s position is that under the amended lease he, as owner of a %3 interest of the mineral rights appurtenant to the Rust Mine Lands, effected a sale of his pro rata share of 20,000,000 tons of ore in place.

The amended lease, which is included in the record by stipulation, is quite lengthy, containing some 56 separate paragraphs. It need not all be here set out, as we are concerned merely with those sections which determine the nature of the instrument and the character of the payments provided to be made, to wit, whether it is a lease of the lands providing for royalty payments to the lessors who, under its terms, retained an economic interest in the minerals to be mined by the lessee, or whether it is a contract of sale of such minerals in place and the payments provided to lie made are merely ones in consideration of such conveyance. The pertinent provisions of the lease are as follows:

1.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
21 T.C. 79, 1953 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 46, 3 Oil & Gas Rep. 891, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kittle-v-commissioner-tax-1953.