UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
CHRISTINA KIRVEN,
Plaintiff, v. Civil Action No. 25-2506 (JEB) NATIONAL NETWORK OF PUBLIC HEALTH INSTITUTES, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In June 2025, Plaintiff Christina Kirven, a Black woman, was terminated from her
director-level role at the National Network of Public Health Institutes (NNPHI), a non-profit
organization with offices in Washington, D.C., and Louisiana. The stated basis for termination
was corporate-expense misconduct. Kirven paints a different picture. In her rendition, the
expense rationale was the final, pretextual blow in a sustained campaign of retaliation and race
and sex discrimination.
Proceeding pro se, she brought this employment action against NNPHI and three of its
executives: Defendants Vincent Lafronza (President and CEO), Tyra Alexander (Director of
Human Resources), and Kim Ramsey (Senior Vice President for Finance and Administration).
The three now move to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Because the record contains
material gaps, the Court will hold the Motion in abeyance pending jurisdictional discovery and
declarations identifying the individual Defendants’ residences.
1 I. Background
According to the Complaint, whose facts the Court credits at this stage, Kirven joined
NNPHI’s D.C. office in 2022. See ECF No. 27-2 (Third Am. Compl.), ¶¶ 3.1, 4.1. In 2023, she
earned a promotion to Director of Administrative Operations but, despite solid performance, was
paid less than similarly situated White or male colleagues. Id., ¶¶ 4.1, 7.2, 9.5.3. During her
tenure, management accused Kirven of multiple corporate-expense violations, id., ¶¶ 6.2, 7.4,
while she reported various concerns including unequal compensation, expense-policy
“inconsistencies,” and “a hostile work culture.” Id., ¶¶ 1.2, 4.6, 5.4, 6.4. NNPHI terminated her
employment in June 2025, citing the expense misconduct. Id., ¶¶ 4.7, 5.1–5.3, 5.5, 6.2, 7.4.
Plaintiff’s suit sets forth 18 counts against NNPHI and several of its senior employees
spanning federal law (under Title VII, the Equal Pay Act, and the False Claims Act); D.C.
statutory law (under the D.C. Wage Payment and Collection Law, the D.C. Wage Theft
Prevention Amendment Act, and the D.C. Human Rights Act); and various common-law
theories. Id., ¶¶ 9.2–9.5.6. At root, she alleges retaliation for her reporting efforts, id., ¶¶ 1.2,
3.2, 4.8, 5.5; unequal treatment and compensation, id., ¶¶ 4.1, 4.3–4.5, 4.8, 7.2–7.3; and unlawful
termination. Id., ¶¶ 1.2, 4.7, 5.5, 6.4, 7.5.
To Kirven, the alleged mistreatment was a “death by a thousand cuts,” id., ¶ 1.3, resulting
in financial, emotional, and professional harm, among other impacts. Id., ¶¶ 8.1, 8.3–8.4. She
seeks monetary, equitable, and declaratory relief, including reinstatement, compensatory and
punitive damages, and modification of her personnel records. Id., ¶¶ 8.4, 10.1–10.6.
NNPHI answered the Complaint in March 2026. See ECF No. 17 (Answer). The
individual Defendants now move to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. See ECF Nos. 28
(Mot.); 28-1 (Supp. of Mot.).
2 II. Legal Standard
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), a defendant may move to dismiss if the
court lacks personal jurisdiction over her. The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing such
jurisdiction, see Erwin-Simpson v. AirAsia Berhad, 985 F.3d 883, 888 (D.C. Cir. 2021), and its
requirements “must be met as to each defendant.” Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 332 (1980).
The Court resolves factual discrepancies in favor of the plaintiff. Crane v. N.Y. Zoological
Soc’y, 894 F.2d 454, 456 (D.C. Cir. 1990). Conclusory statements, however, are insufficient to
satisfy the plaintiff’s burden. IMAPizza, LLC v. At Pizza Ltd., 334 F. Supp. 3d 95, 107–08
(D.D.C. 2018).
When personal jurisdiction is challenged, a court may look beyond the four corners of the
complaint to other evidence. See Sharp Corp. v. Hisense USA Corp., 292 F. Supp. 3d 157, 165–
66 (D.D.C. 2017). As complaints filed by pro se parties are to be liberally construed, see Haines
v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and “supplement[ation]” should be readily permitted, the
Court will consider facts adduced in Plaintiff’s Complaint and her other filings. Brown v. Whole
Foods Mkt. Grp., 789 F.3d 146, 152 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
III. Analysis
The Court first determines whether personal jurisdiction exists here and then whether
jurisdictional discovery is warranted. It may exercise personal jurisdiction over Defendants only
if permitted by both D.C. law and the Constitution’s Due Process Clause. See United States v.
Ferrara, 54 F.3d 825, 828 (D.C. Cir. 1995). Personal jurisdiction may either be in the form of
general or specific jurisdiction. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S.
915, 919 (2011).
3 A. General Jurisdiction
Due process permits general jurisdiction when a defendant has “continuous and
systematic” contacts with the forum state, regardless of whether such contacts triggered the
underlying suit. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 127 (2014) (quotation marks omitted).
General jurisdiction ordinarily turns on an individual defendant’s domicile. Id. at 137 (citing
Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 924). D.C. law mirrors this requirement: courts “may exercise personal
jurisdiction over a person domiciled in” the District. See D.C. Code § 13-422.
There are two “essential elements of domicile”: “[r]esidence in fact” and a defendant’s
“purpose to make the place of residence one’s home.” Texas v. Florida, 306 U.S. 398, 424
(1939). Courts have accordingly rejected domicile in D.C. where defendants do not reside in this
city. See, e.g., Bigelow v. Garrett, 299 F. Supp. 3d 34, 43 (D.D.C. 2018) (defendant residing in
Virginia “not ‘domiciled’ in [D.C.] for purposes of” § 13-422); Lambert L. Firm v. Hansel, 2024
WL 4987026, at *2 (D.D.C. Dec. 5, 2024) (no jurisdiction where plaintiff failed to “allege that
[defendant was] domiciled in D.C.” and complaint cited “Maryland office address”).
To be sure, Kirven does not assert that the individual Defendants live in D.C. See Third
Am. Compl.; ECF Nos. 30 (Opp.) (focusing on Defendants’ business activities, not their
residences); 30-2 (Exhs.). Nor does she otherwise allege where they reside. Id. She states only
that NNPHI itself “resides or conducts business” in D.C. See Third Am. Compl., ¶ 2.1. While
she asserts ties between the individual Defendants and NNPHI’s D.C. office, see Opp., this says
nothing about their personal residences.
It is also worth noting that the individual Defendants offer no evidence of where they
reside. See Mot. at 1; Supp. of Mot. at 1–6. There is thus no conclusive basis for determining
domicile in either the parties’ substantive filings or the surrounding record. Compare, e.g., ECF
4 Nos. 5-1 (Cert. of Serv.) at 1–2 (listing NNPHI’s Louisiana address for individual Defendants in
their “[i]ndividual[-][d]efendant capacity”); 6 (Notice) at 2 (same), with, e.g., ECF Nos. 14 (Feb.
Summons) at ECF p. 3 (citing NNPHI’s D.C. address for defendant); 25 (Summons Receipt) at
ECF p. 1 (same).
Although Plaintiff has not carried her burden of establishing general jurisdiction at this
stage, the Court will order jurisdictional discovery on other grounds (discussed below); as a
result, it will require the individual Defendants to identify their states of residence before
definitively ruling on general jurisdiction.
B. Specific Jurisdiction
Even in cases where general jurisdiction is unavailable, a court may exercise specific
jurisdiction to adjudicate only those claims arising out of or relating to a defendant’s contacts
with the forum state. See Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919 (noting that specific jurisdiction covers
only those “issues deriving from, or connected with, the very controversy that establishes
jurisdiction”) (quotation marks omitted). As jurisdiction must comport with both due process
and the forum state’s long-arm statute, Urquhart-Bradley v. Mobley, 964 F.3d 36, 44 (D.C. Cir.
2020), courts generally turn first to the statutory question. See, e.g., GTE New Media Servs. Inc.
v. BellSouth Corp., 199 F.3d 1343, 1347 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
D.C.’s long-arm statute authorizes courts to exercise jurisdiction over non-resident
defendants who, in relevant part,
(1) transact[] any business in [D.C.] . . . [or] (4) cause[] tortious injury in [D.C.] by an act or omission outside [D.C.] if [they] regularly do[] or solicit[] business, engage[] in any other persistent course of conduct, or derive[] substantial revenue from goods used or consumed, or services rendered, in [D.C.]
5 D.C. Code § 13-423(a). Kirven invokes these two subsections, although she does not expressly
map all her allegations onto them. See Opp. at 6–16. Viewing the record in the light most
favorable to Plaintiff, the Court considers the entirety of her allegations under each subsection,
beginning with (a)(1).
1. Subsection 13-423(a)(1)
Plaintiff first contends that the individual Defendants “transacted business in” D.C. under
subsection (a)(1). Id. at 6 (formatting altered). As noted above, the Due Process Clause permits
courts to adjudicate claims that arise out of or relate to a defendant’s contacts with the forum
state. Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919. Our circuit treats subsection (a)(1) as “coextensive . . . with
the Constitution’s due process limit,” Crane v. Carr, 814 F.2d 758, 762 (D.C. Cir. 1987),
meaning that the “statutory and constitutional” inquiries “merge” here. Urquhart-Bradley, 964
F.3d at 44 (quotation marks omitted). Specific jurisdiction therefore exists where a defendant
has “minimum contacts” with the forum such that he “should reasonably anticipate being haled
into court there.” Id. (alteration removed) (quotation marks omitted). That is, there must be “a
relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation such that the defendant’s suit-
related conduct creates a substantial connection with the forum.” Id. (alterations removed)
(quotation marks and citation omitted). Finally, actions conducted in the scope of employment
count when assessing a defendant’s contacts. Id. at 45–46.
Although the inquiry is necessarily fact specific, see Tierney v. de Wet, 695 F. Supp. 3d
69, 86 (D.D.C. 2023) (“no mechanical test for determining” jurisdiction “over an individual
defendant who acted on behalf of an organization”) (quotation marks omitted), caselaw provides
some guidance. For example, in Urquhart-Bradley, the plaintiff alleged that a non-resident CEO
personally “reached into the District” by terminating her over the phone, “oversaw” the
6 company’s D.C. office, maintained “continuing contacts” with District-based employees,
appointed and later removed the plaintiff from his leadership team, and “engaged in a series of
adverse communications” with her. See 964 F.3d at 48. The D.C. Circuit concluded that the
plaintiff’s allegations bore considerable “heft,” though it remanded to the district court to
determine whether the defendant’s contacts were sufficient in the first instance. Id.; see also
Urquhart-Bradley v. Cushman & Wakefield, Inc., 2020 WL 7495548, at *2 n.2 (D.D.C. Dec. 21,
2020) (parties stipulated to personal jurisdiction after remand).
Drawing on Urquhart-Bradley, courts in this district have found jurisdiction over
defendant-employees where the plaintiff alleged specific and sustained ties to this city. See, e.g.,
US Dominion, Inc. v. Herring Networks, Inc., 639 F. Supp. 3d 143, 164 (D.D.C. 2022)
(defendants closely oversaw company’s District operations and regularly traveled to D.C.);
Tierney, 695 F. Supp. 3d at 86–87 (companies “registered” in District held board and
shareholder meetings there, defendants attended such meetings, and documents “giving rise to
alleged liability” were produced there); cf. Daughtry v. kmG Hauling, Inc., 2021 WL 4078686,
at *3 (D.D.C. Sept. 8, 2021) (no jurisdiction where plaintiff failed to allege that defendant “took
any specific action” related to company in D.C., suggesting only that he had “power” to take
such actions).
Here, two immediate issues arise. First, several of Plaintiff’s assertions are not attributed
to the individual Defendants at all, focusing solely on NNPHI itself. See Opp. at 7–8, 11, 14
(e.g., “NNPHI maintains a D.C. office”) (emphasis added). The Court excludes these NNPHI-
specific contacts from its analysis. Second, other allegations implicate “Defendants”
collectively, id. at 7–11, whereas jurisdiction “must be met as to each defendant.” Rush, 444
U.S. at 332. To the extent Kirven’s assertions can be delineated on a defendant-by-defendant
7 basis, she advances five core allegations: that the individual Defendants participated in “D.C.
conferences,” “controlled access” to NNPHI’s D.C. office, participated in the termination of a
District-based employee, engaged with the District’s employment system, and oversaw business
and operational functions tied to the city, including relationships with D.C. vendors. See Opp. at
6–16. She further alleges that Ramsey is “NNPHI’s registered agent in the District.” Id. at 8.
Unlike in Urquhart-Bradley and the cases noted above where jurisdiction was found,
Kirven’s allegations lack detail regarding the frequency, extent, and degree of Defendants’
involvement. For example, bare “recurr[ence]” of conferences, id. at 9, says little about how
frequently those conferences occurred. Her other assertions are also thin. She maintains that
Defendants “controlled access” to NNPHI’s D.C. office through “key fobs, parking credentials,
and sublease” arrangements, id. at 7, but it is unclear whether Defendants regularly accessed the
office themselves, managed access for others, or merely exercised general oversight
responsibility. Likewise, her assertions that Defendants “oversaw” relationships with D.C.
vendors, “participat[ed] in the District’s unemployment[-]insurance system,” and “execut[ed]”
Plaintiff’s termination are void of clarifying detail. Id. at 8–9, 15–16.
To be sure, it is entirely plausible that one or more Defendants maintained sufficient
contacts with the District as executives of an organization with a D.C. office and workforce.
Kirven’s allegations point in that direction, but they ultimately lack the specificity necessary to
clear the hurdle at this stage.
2. Subsection 13-423(a)(4)
Invoking subsection (a)(4), Kirven next alleges that “[D]efendants engaged in a persistent
course of conduct” in D.C. See Opp. at 9 (formatting altered). For a court to possess jurisdiction
under this subsection, a plaintiff must establish that 1) she “suffered a tortious injury” here; 2)
8 “the injury was caused by the defendant’s act or omission outside of the District”; and 3) one of
three “plus factors” is satisfied. Hindu Am. Found. v. Viswanath, 646 F. Supp. 3d 78, 93–94
(D.D.C. 2022) (quotation marks omitted). There are three such factors: the defendant was
“regularly” doing or soliciting business, “engag[ing] in any other persistent course of conduct,”
or “deriv[ing] substantial revenue from goods used or consumed, or services rendered, in the
District.” Id. at 93 (quoting § 13-423(a)(4)).
The “plus factor” must be “separate from and in addition to the in-state injury,” serving
“‘to filter out cases in which the in[-]forum impact is an isolated event and the defendant
otherwise has no, or scant, affiliations with the forum.’” Id. at 94 (quoting Carr, 814 F.2d at
762–63). And the alleged contacts “must at least be continuing in character.” Id. (quotation
marks omitted). Subsection (a)(4) is thus “more restrictive than the Due Process Clause[,]”
“meaning the District government has made a deliberate decision not to allow access to D.C.
courts to every person who is injured here and otherwise could bring a claim for civil redress.”
Id. (emphasis added) (quotation marks omitted).
Here, Kirven satisfies the first (a)(4) requirement. She alleges several tort claims,
including intentional infliction of emotional distress, defamation, and negligence. See Third Am.
Compl., ¶¶ 9.4.3–9.4.8. Although she does not expressly situate her purported injuries in the
District, the Court may reasonably infer that at least some of them may have occurred here while
Kirven worked in NNPHI’s D.C. office.
The second requirement, however, is not fulfilled. Plaintiff asserts that “the events giving
rise to [her] claims occurred in” D.C., see Third Am. Compl., ¶ 2.1, which directly contravenes
subsection (a)(4)’s requirement that the injury be caused by conduct “outside the District.” D.C.
Code § 13-423(a)(4) (emphasis added). Nor does she identify any other location where the
9 conduct occurred. Subsection (a)(4) is therefore unavailable to her. The Court nonetheless turns
to the remaining requirement: whether any “plus” factor is satisfied.
Kirven relies exclusively on the “persistent course of conduct” factor, see Opp. at 9
(formatting altered), so the Court focuses its analysis there. To satisfy (a)(4), the “course of
conduct” must occur in the District. See D.C. Code § 13-423(a)(4). As such, “[t]he fact that a
defendant” has merely “directed his conduct toward [D.C.] is insufficient to establish a
‘persistent course of conduct’” here. Lewy v. S. Poverty L. Ctr., 723 F. Supp. 2d 116, 124
(D.D.C. 2010) (quoting § 13-423(a)(4)). For example, while communications directed into the
District from another state may support jurisdiction under subsection (a)(1), courts have held that
such communications do not constitute a “course of conduct” under subsection (a)(4) because the
conduct must occur in D.C. Compare Urquhart-Bradley, 964 F.3d at 48 (crediting non-resident
defendant’s phone call to D.C.-based employee for purposes of (a)(1)), with Tavoulareas v.
Comnas, 720 F.2d 192, 193–94 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (defendant’s calls from outside D.C. to
individuals in District did not constitute “‘course of conduct in the District’ for purposes of
(a)(4)”), and Burman v. Phoenix Worldwide Indus., 437 F. Supp. 2d 142, 153–54 (D.D.C. 2006)
(same, where out-of-state defendant made 1,000-plus phone calls into District).
The only allegation that Plaintiff expressly locates in the District is that Defendants
“engaged in recurring D.C. conferences.” Opp. at 9. Even if all Defendants attended those
conferences in person (rather than virtually from another state), conference attendance satisfies
subsection (a)(4) only if it is sufficiently “continuing in character.” Viswanath, 646 F. Supp. 3d
at 94 (quotation marks omitted). Courts have therefore rejected conference attendance as a basis
for persistent conduct where plaintiffs provided no evidence that the conferences were “regular
in nature or otherwise exemplif[ied] a persistent course of conduct.” Burman, 437 F. Supp. 2d at
10 153; see also DBW Partners, LLC v. Mkt. Sec., LLC, 2024 WL 3741414, at *15 (D.D.C. Aug.
10, 2024) (virtual attendance at events not persistent). The same result follows here, as Kirven
alleges only that the conferences were “recurring,” Opp. at 9, offering no further detail regarding
their frequency. She thus strikes out on subsection (a)(4).
C. Jurisdictional Discovery
Kirven argues that if the Court is disinclined to find jurisdiction, it should at least permit
jurisdictional discovery. See Opp. at 17–19. A court has “broad discretion in its resolution of
[jurisdictional] discovery[,]” and “[t]he standard for permitting jurisdictional discovery is quite
liberal.” App Dynamic ehf v. Vignisson, 87 F. Supp. 3d 322, 329 (D.D.C. 2015) (quotation
marks omitted). In general, jurisdictional discovery should be “granted freely” so long as the
plaintiff demonstrates “a good faith belief that such discovery will enable [her] to show that the
court has personal jurisdiction over the defendant” and she “include[s] some facts about what
additional discovery could produce.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).
Plaintiff identifies five areas for discovery that purportedly bear on the individual
Defendants’ contacts with the District. See Opp. at 18. Her request is specific and targeted at
relevant information. Id. (seeking records concerning named D.C.-based vendors and
Defendants’ access to D.C. office and management of District-related work); compare Staggs v.
Smith & Wesson, 2022 WL 444110, at *8 (D.D.C. Feb. 14, 2022) (ordering discovery where
plaintiff sought business records that could connect defendant to D.C.), with Livnat v.
Palestinian Auth., 851 F.3d 45, 57–58 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (denying discovery where plaintiffs
“fail[ed] to tie their jurisdictional theory to [defendant’s conduct] with specific facts”). Kirven
specifically explains how such discovery could “demonstrate that Defendants’ conduct
was . . . directed through their D.C.-connected decision-making structure.” Opp. at 18; cf.
11 Makadet LLC v. Sweet Grace Distilling Co., 2024 WL 4650921, at *5 (D.D.C. Oct. 31, 2024)
(denying discovery where plaintiff “never explains what it specifically hopes to achieve via
discovery”). This suffices, as a plaintiff need show only that discovery “can supplement” her
allegations. Vignisson, 87 F. Supp. 3d at 329 (quoting GTE New Media Servs. Inc.,199 F.3d at
1351). It is not inconceivable that further information about the individual Defendants’ presence
in the D.C. office and District-related work could bolster Kirven’s allegations. See, e.g.,
Urquhart-Bradley, 964 F.3d at 49 (discovery into defendant’s D.C.-related “business activities”
would “undoubtedly” be useful because it would “flesh out” his contacts with forum) (quotation
marks omitted).
To be sure, a plaintiff may not engage in a “fishing expedition,” Lewis v. Mutond, 62
F.4th 587, 596 (D.C. Cir. 2023) (quotation marks omitted). But Kirven casts her line in good
faith and with sufficient specificity. The Court therefore will grant her discovery request.
IV. Conclusion
The Court will thus hold the Motion to Dismiss in abeyance pending jurisdictional
discovery and direct Defendants Lafronza, Alexander, and Ramsey to file declarations
identifying their respective residences. An Order so stating will issue this day.
/s/ James E. Boasberg JAMES E. BOASBERG Chief Judge Date: June 30, 2026