Kirk v. State

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Kirk v. State

481 So. 2d 510, 11 Fla. L. Weekly 67, 1985 Fla. App. LEXIS 17396

CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida

DecidedDecember 24, 1985

DocketNo. 84-2032

StatusPublished

This text of 481 So. 2d 510 (Kirk v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Kirk v. State, 481 So. 2d 510, 11 Fla. L. Weekly 67, 1985 Fla. App. LEXIS 17396 (Fla. Ct. App. 1985).

Pincite

Opinion

NESBITT, Judge.

Kirk was tried for and convicted of grand theft. During the proceeding he was held in criminal contempt. The trial court sentenced Kirk separately for the criminal contempt, instead of scoring that conviction on the guidelines sheet along with the grand theft. Kirk appeals his conviction for grand theft and his sentence on the criminal contempt conviction. Finding the contention regarding the sentence for criminal contempt to be the only one worthy of consideration, we discuss that point and affirm.

Kirk attacks his sentence on the criminal contempt charge, arguing that the conviction should have been scored on the guidelines sheet as an additional offense at conviction,¹ and not been subject to a separate sentence. We disagree.

First, criminal contempt is an offense against the court itself, arising from some conduct in the trial of the original cause. The contempt proceedings are independent of the proceedings on any other offenses. Conviction and sentence on the contempt may occur at any time during the pendency of the proceedings on the other offenses. Since the contempt proceeding is not directly a part of the original cause, see South Dade Farms, Inc. v. Peters, 88 So.2d 891, 899 (Fla.1956), the conviction is not an additional offense at conviction on the original charges.

Second, criminal contempt is a crime against the dignity of the court and the authority to punish it has been considered an inherent power. Ex Parte Earman, 85 Fla. 297, 95 So. 755 (1923); Vines v. Vines, 357 So.2d 243 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978). The power is essential to the vindication of the court’s authority. If criminal contempt convictions are factored into guidelines scoresheets the presumptive sentence [511]*511could, in many instances, be no greater than if the criminal contempt had not occurred. Such a result clearly diminishes the ability of the courts to vindicate their judicial authority. In other words, the nature of the offense, and its consequences, dictate that the courts be free to independently punish its occurrence. Accordingly, we affirm the sentence imposed for criminal contempt.

Affirmed.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

NESBITT, Judge.

Kirk was tried for and convicted of grand theft. During the proceeding he was held in criminal contempt. The trial court sentenced Kirk separately for the criminal contempt, instead of scoring that conviction on the guidelines sheet along with the grand theft. Kirk appeals his conviction for grand theft and his sentence on the criminal contempt conviction. Finding the contention regarding the sentence for criminal contempt to be the only one worthy of consideration, we discuss that point and affirm.

Kirk attacks his sentence on the criminal contempt charge, arguing that the conviction should have been scored on the guidelines sheet as an additional offense at conviction,¹ and not been subject to a separate sentence. We disagree.

First, criminal contempt is an offense against the court itself, arising from some conduct in the trial of the original cause. The contempt proceedings are independent of the proceedings on any other offenses. Conviction and sentence on the contempt may occur at any time during the pendency of the proceedings on the other offenses. Since the contempt proceeding is not directly a part of the original cause, see South Dade Farms, Inc. v. Peters, 88 So.2d 891, 899 (Fla.1956), the conviction is not an additional offense at conviction on the original charges.

Second, criminal contempt is a crime against the dignity of the court and the authority to punish it has been considered an inherent power. Ex Parte Earman, 85 Fla. 297, 95 So. 755 (1923); Vines v. Vines, 357 So.2d 243 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978). The power is essential to the vindication of the court’s authority. If criminal contempt convictions are factored into guidelines scoresheets the presumptive sentence [511]*511could, in many instances, be no greater than if the criminal contempt had not occurred. Such a result clearly diminishes the ability of the courts to vindicate their judicial authority. In other words, the nature of the offense, and its consequences, dictate that the courts be free to independently punish its occurrence. Accordingly, we affirm the sentence imposed for criminal contempt.

Affirmed.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

481 So. 2d 510, 11 Fla. L. Weekly 67, 1985 Fla. App. LEXIS 17396, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kirk-v-state-fladistctapp-1985.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack