UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA FORT MYERS DIVISION
KIRILL VLADIMIROVICH POPOV,
Petitioner,
v. Case No.: 2:26-cv-00028-SPC-DNF
DAVID HARDIN et al.,
Respondents, /
OPINION AND ORDER Before the Court are petitioner Kirill Vladimirovich Popov’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1), his supporting memorandum (Doc. 2), and the government’s response (Doc. 8). For the below reasons, the Court grants the petition. A. Background Popov is a native of Russia. He entered the country under a visa in 2007, then overstayed that visa. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) commenced removal proceedings, and an immigration judge ordered him removed in 2014. ICE detained Popov on September 27, 2025, with the intention to execute the removal order. On November 17, 2025, Popov filed a motion to reopen his removal case, and it remains pending. He is currently detained in Glades County Detention Center. Popov challenges the legality of his detention under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), and
the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”). B. Jurisdiction Before addressing the merits of Popov’s claim, the Court must address its jurisdiction. The respondents argue two sections of the INA strip the Court
of jurisdiction over this action. They first point to a provision that bars courts from hearing certain claims. It states: Except as provided in this section and notwithstanding any other provisions of law (statutory or nonstatutory), including section 2241 of Title 28, or any other habeas corpus provision, and sections 1361 and 1651 of such title, no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any alien under this chapter.
8 U.S.C. § 1252(g). This jurisdictional bar is narrow. “The provision applies only to three discrete actions that the Attorney General may take: her ‘decision or action’ to ‘commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders.’” Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 482 (1999); see also Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 294 (2018) (“We did not interpret this language to sweep in any claim that technically can be said to ‘arise from’ the three listed actions of the Attorney General. Instead, we read the language to refer to just those three specific actions themselves.”). “When asking if a claim is barred by § 1252(g), courts must focus on the action being challenged.” Canal A Media Holding, LLC v. United States Citizenship
and Immigration Servs., 964 F.3d 1250, 1258 (11th Cir. 2020). The respondents also raise the INA’s “zipper clause,” which states: Judicial review of all questions of law and fact, including interpretation and application of constitutional and statutory provisions, arising from any action taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien from the United States under this subchapter shall be available only in judicial review of a final order under this section. Except as otherwise provided in this section, no court should have jurisdiction, by habeas corpus under section 2241 or title 28 or any other habeas corpus provision, by section 1361 or 1651 of such title, or by any other provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory), to review such an order or such question of law or fact.
8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9). The zipper clause only applies to claims requesting review of a removal order. See Madu v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 470 F.3d 1362, 1365 (11th Cir. 2006) (holding the INA did not divest the district court of jurisdiction over a § 2241 challenge to detention of the petitioner pending deportation). Popov does not challenge the commencement of a proceeding, the adjudication of a case, or the execution of his removal order. Nor does he ask the Court to review the removal order. Rather, Popov challenges the legality of his detention under a framework devised by the Supreme Court for district courts to apply. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 682 (stating the Court’s limitation on post-removal detention “is subject to federal-court review.”). A decision in Popov’s favor would not impair ICE’s ability to execute the removal order. The INA does not strip the Court of jurisdiction over this action.
C. Legality of Detention “Once a noncitizen’s order of removal becomes administratively final, the Government ‘shall’ remove the person within 90 days.” Singh v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 945 F.3d 1310, 1313 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A)).
The government must detain the noncitizen during the 90-day removal period, which begins when the removal order becomes administratively final. Id. Detention may continue after the removal period, but not indefinitely. In Zadvydas, the Supreme Court held, “if removal is not reasonably
foreseeable, the court should hold continued detention unreasonable and no longer authorized by statute.” 533 U.S. at 700-01 (2001). If removal is not practically attainable, detention no longer serves its statutory purpose of “assuring the alien’s presence at the moment of removal.” Id. at 699. The
Court found it unlikely Congress “believed that all reasonably foreseeably removals could be accomplished in [90 days].” Id at 701. So, “for the sake of uniform administration in the federal courts,” it established a “presumptively reasonable period of detention” of six months—the 90-day removal period plus
an additional 90 days. Id. Courts use a burden-shifting framework to judge the constitutionality of additional post-removal detention: After this 6-month period, once the alien provides good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the Government must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut the showing.
Id. The respondents argue Popov’s petition is premature because his current detention has not exceeded 180 days. They assume the six-month presumptively reasonable period of detention resets each time a noncitizen is detained. That assumption is inconsistent with Zadvydas. It would effectively allow DHS to detain noncitizens indefinitely and avoid judicial scrutiny by releasing and re-detaining them every 180 days. As the Eleventh Circuit recognized, “[t]he Supreme Court’s stated rationale for establishing a presumptively reasonable ‘6-month period’ for detention pending removal supports our conclusion that this period commences at the beginning of the
removal period.” Akinwale v. Ashcroft, 287 F.3d 1050, 1052 n.3 (11th Cir. 2002). The respondents’ concerns about the Court’s understanding of Zadvydas are overblown. It does not “effectively eliminate ICE’s ability to ever remove
an alien unless it does so within the presumptively reasonable timeframe.” (Doc. 8 at 8).
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA FORT MYERS DIVISION
KIRILL VLADIMIROVICH POPOV,
Petitioner,
v. Case No.: 2:26-cv-00028-SPC-DNF
DAVID HARDIN et al.,
Respondents, /
OPINION AND ORDER Before the Court are petitioner Kirill Vladimirovich Popov’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1), his supporting memorandum (Doc. 2), and the government’s response (Doc. 8). For the below reasons, the Court grants the petition. A. Background Popov is a native of Russia. He entered the country under a visa in 2007, then overstayed that visa. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) commenced removal proceedings, and an immigration judge ordered him removed in 2014. ICE detained Popov on September 27, 2025, with the intention to execute the removal order. On November 17, 2025, Popov filed a motion to reopen his removal case, and it remains pending. He is currently detained in Glades County Detention Center. Popov challenges the legality of his detention under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), and
the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”). B. Jurisdiction Before addressing the merits of Popov’s claim, the Court must address its jurisdiction. The respondents argue two sections of the INA strip the Court
of jurisdiction over this action. They first point to a provision that bars courts from hearing certain claims. It states: Except as provided in this section and notwithstanding any other provisions of law (statutory or nonstatutory), including section 2241 of Title 28, or any other habeas corpus provision, and sections 1361 and 1651 of such title, no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any alien under this chapter.
8 U.S.C. § 1252(g). This jurisdictional bar is narrow. “The provision applies only to three discrete actions that the Attorney General may take: her ‘decision or action’ to ‘commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders.’” Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 482 (1999); see also Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 294 (2018) (“We did not interpret this language to sweep in any claim that technically can be said to ‘arise from’ the three listed actions of the Attorney General. Instead, we read the language to refer to just those three specific actions themselves.”). “When asking if a claim is barred by § 1252(g), courts must focus on the action being challenged.” Canal A Media Holding, LLC v. United States Citizenship
and Immigration Servs., 964 F.3d 1250, 1258 (11th Cir. 2020). The respondents also raise the INA’s “zipper clause,” which states: Judicial review of all questions of law and fact, including interpretation and application of constitutional and statutory provisions, arising from any action taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien from the United States under this subchapter shall be available only in judicial review of a final order under this section. Except as otherwise provided in this section, no court should have jurisdiction, by habeas corpus under section 2241 or title 28 or any other habeas corpus provision, by section 1361 or 1651 of such title, or by any other provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory), to review such an order or such question of law or fact.
8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9). The zipper clause only applies to claims requesting review of a removal order. See Madu v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 470 F.3d 1362, 1365 (11th Cir. 2006) (holding the INA did not divest the district court of jurisdiction over a § 2241 challenge to detention of the petitioner pending deportation). Popov does not challenge the commencement of a proceeding, the adjudication of a case, or the execution of his removal order. Nor does he ask the Court to review the removal order. Rather, Popov challenges the legality of his detention under a framework devised by the Supreme Court for district courts to apply. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 682 (stating the Court’s limitation on post-removal detention “is subject to federal-court review.”). A decision in Popov’s favor would not impair ICE’s ability to execute the removal order. The INA does not strip the Court of jurisdiction over this action.
C. Legality of Detention “Once a noncitizen’s order of removal becomes administratively final, the Government ‘shall’ remove the person within 90 days.” Singh v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 945 F.3d 1310, 1313 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A)).
The government must detain the noncitizen during the 90-day removal period, which begins when the removal order becomes administratively final. Id. Detention may continue after the removal period, but not indefinitely. In Zadvydas, the Supreme Court held, “if removal is not reasonably
foreseeable, the court should hold continued detention unreasonable and no longer authorized by statute.” 533 U.S. at 700-01 (2001). If removal is not practically attainable, detention no longer serves its statutory purpose of “assuring the alien’s presence at the moment of removal.” Id. at 699. The
Court found it unlikely Congress “believed that all reasonably foreseeably removals could be accomplished in [90 days].” Id at 701. So, “for the sake of uniform administration in the federal courts,” it established a “presumptively reasonable period of detention” of six months—the 90-day removal period plus
an additional 90 days. Id. Courts use a burden-shifting framework to judge the constitutionality of additional post-removal detention: After this 6-month period, once the alien provides good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the Government must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut the showing.
Id. The respondents argue Popov’s petition is premature because his current detention has not exceeded 180 days. They assume the six-month presumptively reasonable period of detention resets each time a noncitizen is detained. That assumption is inconsistent with Zadvydas. It would effectively allow DHS to detain noncitizens indefinitely and avoid judicial scrutiny by releasing and re-detaining them every 180 days. As the Eleventh Circuit recognized, “[t]he Supreme Court’s stated rationale for establishing a presumptively reasonable ‘6-month period’ for detention pending removal supports our conclusion that this period commences at the beginning of the
removal period.” Akinwale v. Ashcroft, 287 F.3d 1050, 1052 n.3 (11th Cir. 2002). The respondents’ concerns about the Court’s understanding of Zadvydas are overblown. It does not “effectively eliminate ICE’s ability to ever remove
an alien unless it does so within the presumptively reasonable timeframe.” (Doc. 8 at 8). The Zadvydas framework guards only against indefinite detention. The government loses the presumption of reasonableness after the six-month period, but it can still show that detention is reasonable by meeting its burden of proof. The government is wrong to suggest the burden would require it to counterfactually “justify over a decade of detention if the burden
shifts.” (Doc. 8 at 10). The Zadvydas framework is prospective, not retrospective. If the government can establish a significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, detention is lawful. Otherwise, the government can keep tabs on the noncitizen through reasonable conditions
of supervision while it continues removal efforts. If removal becomes likely, the government can detain the noncitizen while it irons out the details. Because the six-month period for presumptively reasonable detention has expired, Zadvydas’s burden-shifting framework applies. Popov has carried
his initial burden by showing a good reason to believe there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. ICE has been unable to execute the removal order for over a decade, there are no flights from the United States to Russia due to Russia’s ongoing war with Ukraine, and
ICE has identified no third country for removal. The respondents argue Popov withheld travel documents in bad faith by refusing to sign a I-229(a) Warning. But Popov states—and the government does not dispute—that he refused to sign the form because it had the wrong
name and date. The government also states it is working toward removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, but they present no evidence of any progress. There is no evidence that ICE has contacted Russia or any other country about accepting Popov, or that Russia or another country would likely accept him. D. Conclusion The Court finds no significant likelihood Popov will be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future. He is entitled to release from detention under Zadvydas. If removal becomes likely in the reasonably foreseeable future, DHS can detain Popov to “assur[e] [his] presence at the moment of removal.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 680. Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED: Kirill Vladimirovich Popov Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) is GRANTED. 1. The respondents shall release Popov within 24 hours of this Order. 2. The Clerk is DIRECTED to terminate any pending motions and deadlines, enter judgment, and close this case. DONE AND ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on February 6, 2026.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
SA: FTMP-1