Kirell Taylor v. Galvin Newsom

• Court: District Court, C.D. California
• Decided: January 21, 2020
• Docket: 2:20-cv-00410
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 KIRELL TAYLOR, Case No. CV 20-00410 MWF (RAO)

12 Petitioner, ORDER SUMMARILY 13 v. DISMISSING SUCCESSIVE PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS 14 GALVIN NEWSOM, Governor, CORPUS FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION AND DENYING 15 Respondent. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY 16 17 I. BACKGROUND 18 On January 15, 2020, the Court received Petitioner Kirell Taylor’s 19 (“Petitioner”) Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in Federal/State 20 Custody (“Petition”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. While Petitioner uses the form 21 habeas petition for individuals in federal custody, a review of the Petition makes clear 22 that Petitioner seeks habeas relief from his current state custody arising from a 2001 23 conviction in Los Angeles County Superior Court, case number LA033959. Pet. at 24 2, Dkt. No. 1. 25 The records of this Court establish that Petitioner has four prior habeas actions 26 concerning his 2001 conviction and sentence. See Taylor v. Pliler, No. 27 2:03-cv-06540-MMM-CT (C.D. Cal. Sept. 11, 2003); Bettis v. Tillie-Moore, 2:09- 28 1 cv-0265-MMM-CT (C.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2009)1; Bettis v. Haws, No. 2 2:09-cv-08970-MMM-CT (C.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2009); Taylor v. Stainer, No. 3 2:12-cv-09087-MMM-RZ (C.D. Cal. Oct. 23, 2012).2 In his first habeas action 4 concerning his 2001 conviction and sentence, the Court denied relief on the merits 5 and dismissed that action with prejudice. See Order Adopting Report and 6 Recommendation and Judgment, Taylor v. Pliler, No. CV 03-06540-MMM-CT 7 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 2003), Dkt. Nos. 24-25. In the three subsequent habeas actions, 8 the Court dismissed the operative petitions as successive. See Bettis v. Tillie-Moore, 9 2:09-cv-0265-MMM-CT (C.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2009), Dkt. No. 3; Bettis v. Haws, No. 10 2:09-cv-08970-MMM-CT (C.D. Cal. Dec. 30, 2009), Dkt. No. 3; Taylor v. Stainer, 11 No. 2:12-cv-09087-MMM-RZ (C.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 2012), Dkt. No. 6.3 12 A review of the instant Petition demonstrates that Petitioner again seeks federal 13 habeas relief concerning the same 2001 conviction and sentence. Pet. at 2. Neither 14 the Petition itself nor the records of the Ninth Circuit establish that the Ninth Circuit 15 has authorized Petitioner to bring a successive petition in this Court. 16 II. DISCUSSION 17 The United States Supreme Court has explained: 18 The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) established a stringent set of procedures that a 19 prisoner “in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State 20 court,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a), must follow if he wishes to file a “second or successive” habeas corpus application 21 challenging that custody, § 2244(b)(1). In pertinent part, 22 1 Petitioner filed two habeas actions using the name of “Kirell Francis Bettis.” 23 2 The Court takes judicial notice of these court records and files as well as those of 24 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, as necessary herein. See Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2); Harris v. Cty. of Orange, 682 F.3d 1126, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 2012); United 25 States v. Wilson, 631 F.2d 118, 119 (9th Cir. 1980). 26 3 The Court takes judicial notice of these court records and files as well as those of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, as necessary herein. See Fed. R. Evid. 27 201(b)(2); Harris v. Cty. of Orange, 682 F.3d 1126, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 2012); United 28 States v. Wilson, 631 F.2d 118, 119 (9th Cir. 1980). 1 before filing the application in the district court, a prisoner “shall move in the appropriate court of appeals for an order 2 authorizing the district court to consider the application.” 3 § 2244(b)(3)(A). A three-judge panel of the court of appeals may authorize the filing of the second or successive 4 application only if it presents a claim not previously raised 5 that satisfies one of the two grounds articulated in § 2244(b)(2). § 2244(b)(3)(C); Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 6 U.S. 524, 529-530, 125 S. Ct. 2641, 162 L. Ed. 2d 480 7 (2005); see also Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 656-657, 664, 116 S. Ct. 2333, 135 L. Ed. 2d 827 (1996). 8 Burton v. Stewart, 549 U.S. 147, 152-53, 127 S. Ct. 793, 166 L. Ed. 2d 628 (2007). 9 The Court finds that Petitioner’s present Petition is clearly a “second or 10 successive” habeas petition. Moreover, the Petition and records of the Ninth Circuit 11 establish that Petitioner has not been granted authorization by the Ninth Circuit to 12 file a successive petition to raise his claims. 13 For these reasons, the Court finds that it lacks jurisdiction to consider the 14 Petition. Therefore, the reference to the Magistrate Judge is vacated, and the Petition 15 is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. See Burton, 549 U.S. at 152-53. The Clerk is 16 directed to enter judgment dismissing the Petition. Because the Court must dismiss 17 the Petition, any pending motions are denied as moot. 18 III. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY 19 Under AEDPA, a state prisoner seeking to appeal a district court’s final order 20 in a habeas corpus proceeding must obtain a Certificate of Appealability (“COA”) 21 from the district judge or a circuit judge. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). A COA may 22 issue “only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a 23 constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). “A petitioner satisfies this standard by 24 demonstrating that jurists of reason could disagree with the district court’s resolution 25 of his constitutional claims or that jurists could conclude the issues presented are 26 adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 27 U.S. 322, 327, 123 S. Ct. 1029, 154 L. Ed. 2d 931 (2003). 28 1 When the Court dismisses a petition on procedural grounds, it must issue a 2 | COA if the petitioner shows: (1) “that jurists of reason would find it debatable 3 || whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right’; and 4 || (2) “that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was 5 || correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 478, 120 S. Ct. 6 || 1595, 146 L. Ed. 2d 542 (2000). 7 Here, the Court is dismissing the Petition without prejudice because it is a 8 || successive petition without proper authorization from the Ninth Circuit. Since the 9 || Petition is patently a successive petition, Petitioner cannot make the requisite 10 || showing that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was 11 || correct in its procedural ruling. 12 IV. QRDER 13 Based on the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED THAT: 14 1. The Petition is DISMISSED without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction; and 15 2. A Certificate of Appealability is DENIED. 16 _ 17 | DATED: January 21, 2020 C] () / (] He I MICHAEL W/FITZGERALD 19 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 20 21 || Presented by: 22 : . Rapeliis, A. OL

94 || ROZELLA A. OLIVER 0s UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

26 27 28