Kirchoff v. Wipro, Inc.

894 F. Supp. 2d 1346, 19 Wage & Hour Cas.2d (BNA) 1360, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142616, 2012 WL 4498903
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Washington
DecidedOctober 2, 2012
DocketNo. C11-568 TSZ
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 894 F. Supp. 2d 1346 (Kirchoff v. Wipro, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Washington primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Kirchoff v. Wipro, Inc., 894 F. Supp. 2d 1346, 19 Wage & Hour Cas.2d (BNA) 1360, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142616, 2012 WL 4498903 (W.D. Wash. 2012).

Opinion

ORDER

THOMAS S. ZILLY, District Judge.

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Defendants Wipro, Inc., Wipro Technologies, Inc. and Wipro, LTD, Delaware Corporations’ (collectively “Wipro”) motion for summary judgment, docket no. 42. Having reviewed all papers filed in support of and in opposition to this motion, the Court enters the following Order.

I. Background

The underlying facts of this case are not in dispute. Defendant Wipro is a Delaware corporation, with headquarters in East Brunswick, New Jersey. Wipro employs hundreds of employees in the State of Washington, and thousands of employees in the United States. Wipro provides consulting services for various technology companies.

Wipro hired Plaintiff Leif Kirchoff as a Senior Manager with an annual salary of $140,000. Kirchoff Decl. at ¶ 2 (docket no. 46). Mr. Kirchoff worked for Wipro from July 26, 2010, until January 27, 2011, Id., when Wipro terminated Mr. Kirchoff. Kirchoff Decl. at ¶ 9. The only issue in this case is whether Wipro violated federal and state wage and hour laws by using an improper formula to prorate Mr. Kirchoff s salary for his first and last week of employment. Mr. Kirchoff does not dispute Wipro’s right to prorate his salary during those two pay periods, but rather takes issue with the formula Wipro used to prorate his salary.

Wipro calculated Mr. Kirchoffs salary for the disputed periods using the “Pay Period” method,1 which bases an employ[1348]*1348ee’s partial salary on work days. Kirchoff Decl. ¶¶ 7 & 9. Mr. Kirchoff contends that by using the Pay Period method, Wipro underpaid him by $41.31 for the first week of employment and by $73.43 for the final week of employment in violation of federal and state wage and hour laws. Pl.’s Mem. Opp’n Summ. J. at 4:1, 5:1-2 (docket no. 45).

Mr. Kirchoff argues that 29 C.F.R. § 778.113(b) sets forth the authorized and mandated calculation method, the “Work Week” method,2 to calculate his pay for the pay periods at issue rather than the Pay Period method. Id. at 9-10. Mr. Kirchoff argues that Wipro under paid him because it used “a semi-monthly (or pay period) rather than a weekly salary figure in its calculation.” Kirchoff Decl. at ¶ 7 & 9. Mr. Kirchoff further argues that Wipro’s Pay Period method leads to inconsistencies in salary calculations due to fluctuations in the number of working days in a month.3 See Pi’s Mem. Opp’n Summ. J. at 10-14.

II. Standard

The Court shall grant summary judgment if no genuine dispute of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(a). The moving party" bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). A fact is material if it might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). In support of its motion for summary judgment, the moving party need not negate the opponent’s claim, Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548; rather, the moving party will be entitled to judgment if the evidence is not sufficient for a jury to return a verdict in favor of the opponent, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505. To survive a motion for summary judgment, the adverse party must present affirmative evidence, which “is to be believed” and from which all “justifiable inferences” are to be favorably drawn. Id. at 255, 257, 106 S.Ct. 2505. When the record, taken as a whole, could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, summary judgment is warranted. See, e.g., Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. [1349]*1349521, 529, 126 S.Ct. 2572, 165 L.Ed.2d 697 (2006).

III. Discussion

Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) Requirements

The FLSA requires that an exempt employee, such as Mr. Kirchoff, be paid on a salary basis. 29 C.F.R. § 541.602. Further, 29 C.F.R. § 541.602 mandates that “subject to the exceptions provided in paragraph (b) of this section, an exempt employee must receive the full salary for any week in which the employee performs any work without regard to the number of days or hours worked.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.602(a). However, an exception provides that an employer may deduct pay from the employee’s salary for days not worked in the initial and terminal weeks of employment:

An employer is not required to pay the full salary in the initial or terminal week of employment. Rather, an employer may pay a proportionate part of an employee’s full salary for the time actually worked in the first and last week of employment. In such weeks, the payment of an hourly or daily equivalent of the employee’s full salary for the time actually worked will meet the requirement.

29 C.F.R. § 541.602(b)(6).

The regulation also provides that an employer may reduce an employee’s salary to a daily or hourly rate for the purpose of calculating the amount owed to the employee: “When calculating the amount of a deduction from pay allowed under paragraph (b) of this section, the employer may use the hourly or daily equivalent of the employee’s full weekly salary or any other amount proportional to the time actually missed by the employee.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.602(c).

1. Methods of Calculation

Mr. Kirchoff argues that the Department of Labor (“DOL”) regulations mandate the Work Week method. Pl.’s Mem. Opp’n Summ. J. at 5, 9. This argument is misplaced for two reasons. First, Mr. Kirchoffs argument that 29 C.F.R. § 778.113(b) specifies the method for calculating pay for salaried employees’ first and final week of employment is flawed. 29 C.F.R. § 778.113(b) in relevant part provides the following:

Salary for periods other than workweek. Where the salary covers a period longer than a workweek, such as a month, it must be reduced to its workweek equivalent. A monthly salary is subject to translation to its equivalent weekly wage by multiplying by 12 (the number of months) and dividing by 52 (the number of weeks).

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Gerber Products Co. v. Hewitt
2016 Ark. 222 (Supreme Court of Arkansas, 2016)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
894 F. Supp. 2d 1346, 19 Wage & Hour Cas.2d (BNA) 1360, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142616, 2012 WL 4498903, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kirchoff-v-wipro-inc-wawd-2012.