Kingsford v. Northern Lights

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: July 16, 2026
• Docket: 25CA1636
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

25CA1636 Kingsford v Northern Lights 07-16-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA1636 Weld County District Court No. 22CV30064 Honorable Shannon Lyons, Judge

Ron A. Kingsford,

Attorney-Appellant,

and

Kingsford Law Offices,

Appellant,

v.

Northern Lights Exteriors LLC,

Defendant-Appellee.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division III Opinion by JUDGE TAUBMAN* Freyre and Kuhn, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced July 16, 2026

Kingsford Law Offices, Christopher Kelly, Greeley, Colorado, for Attorney- Appellant and Appellant

Hall Booth Smith, P.C., Elizabeth C. Moran, Greenwood Village, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee *Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2025. ¶1 Ron A. Kingsford (Kingsford) and Kingsford Law Offices (KLO),

who represented plaintiff, Kendall Vonfeldt, in an underlying

construction dispute, appeal the order awarding defendant,

Northern Lights Exteriors LLC (NLE), its reasonable attorney fees.1

We affirm.2

I. Background

¶2 This appeal followed a dispute between Vonfeldt and NLE over

alleged construction defects stemming from NLE replacing siding on

Vonfeldt’s home. Vonfeldt and NLE entered into a contract

1 Vonfeldt filed a separate appeal challenging the merits, but the

case was dismissed without prejudice due to her failure to respond to NLE’s motion to dismiss. Vonfeldt v. N. Lights Exteriors LLC, (Colo. App. No. 25CA0132, Aug. 25, 2025) (unpublished order). 2 On the date of filing the notice of appeal, this case was not

properly before us because there were pending claims in the district court. However, after those claims were resolved on January 5, 2026, the appeal is now properly before us. See Musick v. Woznicki, 136 P.3d 244, 246-47 (Colo. 2006) (holding that when a party files a premature notice of appeal, as long as the jurisdictional defect is cured, the appellate court can review the appeal). NLE filed third- party claims against third-party defendant Speedy Siding Home Improvements, Inc. (Speedy), NLE’s subcontractor. A clerk’s entry of default was entered against Speedy on October 18, 2023. The claims between Vonfeldt and NLE were resolved on December 6, 2024. Then on October 13, 2025, NLE moved for default judgment and damages against Speedy. It was not until January 5, 2026, that NLE and Speedy resolved their dispute, and the district court entered an order vacating the damages hearing and dismissing NLE’s claims against Speedy.

1 pursuant to which NLE agreed to install James Hardie siding on

Vonfeldt’s home and remove the existing exterior cladding. NLE

contracted with Speedy to complete the installation. Vonfeldt

asserted that she had selected a three-color scheme for the siding,

but during the installation process, a two-color scheme was used.

She also asserted that during the removal and installation process,

NLE damaged her home by removing shingles from her roof, putting

holes in her roof, failing to install certain materials, and using

incorrectly sized materials. Due to the alleged damage, Vonfeldt did

not make the final payment owed to NLE under the contract.

Consequently, NLE filed a mechanic’s lien against Vonfeldt’s

property.

¶3 In January 2022, Vonfeldt filed a complaint against NLE

asserting claims for breach of contract, breach of warranties,

excessive amounts of lien, and exemplary damages. NLE then filed

claims against Vonfeldt for breach of contract and foreclosure of the

mechanic’s lien, and the cases were consolidated. In July 2022,

Vonfeldt amended her complaint to add claims for negligence,

negligence per se, unfair or deceptive trade practices in violation of

2 the Colorado Consumer Protection Act (CCPA), and invalid

mechanic’s lien.

¶4 On January 18, 2023, Vonfeldt received a payment from her

insurer, American Family Insurance Company (AFI), for the

damages she had suffered from the siding installation. NLE learned

of the payment from AFI and moved to add AFI as an involuntary

plaintiff on May 12, 2023. On June 13, 2023, AFI was added as an

involuntary plaintiff.

¶5 The district court granted summary judgment for NLE on the

construction defect claims and dismissed the negligence and

negligence per se claims. At trial, the court granted directed

verdicts in favor of NLE on the CCPA and breach of warranties

claims, and a jury found for NLE on the breach of contract claim

and awarded NLE damages on its breach of contract counterclaim.

¶6 Afterwards, NLE filed a motion for attorney fees under

section 13-17-102(4), C.R.S. 2025. The parties briefed the issue,

and the district court held an evidentiary hearing. On April 11,

2025, the court issued a thorough, thoughtful order decisively

rejecting Vonfeldt’s contentions and granting NLE’s motion for

attorney fees. NLE then filed a request for an award of reasonable

3 attorney fees in the amount of $408,422.50. On July 7, 2025, the

district court entered a detailed order rejecting some of NLE’s

submitted time entries, adjusting the time entries to include only

those entries for the specific claims awarded, and awarding NLE

$241,934.50 in attorney fees against Kingsford and KLO jointly and

severally. Kingsford and KLO appeal the July 7 order.

II. Attorney Fees

¶7 Kingsford asserts that the district court erred when it granted

NLE’s request for attorney fees for defending Vonfeldt’s allegedly

groundless and vexatious action and unnecessarily expanding the

proceedings by improper conduct. We disagree.

A. Standard of Review

¶8 “We review a district court’s award of attorney fees and costs

for an abuse of discretion.” Franklin Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Galvan,

2019 COA 107, ¶ 27, 457 P.3d 749, 753. A court abuses its

discretion if its ruling is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or

unfair, or is based on a misapplication of the law or clearly

erroneous assessment of the evidence. Id.

4 B. Applicable Law

¶9 Attorney fees may be awarded based on a district court’s

finding that an attorney or party “brought or defended an action, or

any part of an action, that lacked substantial justification” or that

an attorney or party “unnecessarily expanded the proceeding by

other improper conduct.” § 13-17-102(4).

¶ 10 A claim lacks substantial justification when it is substantially

groundless, frivolous, or vexatious. Front Range Res., LLC v. Colo.

Ground Water Comm’n, 2018 CO 25, ¶ 41, 415 P.3d 807, 815. A

claim is groundless when “the allegations in the complaint are not

supported by any credible evidence at trial.” Huffman v.

Westmoreland Coal Co., 205 P.3d 501, 511 (Colo. App. 2009). A

claim is vexatious when it is “brought or maintained in bad faith,”

including stubbornly litigious conduct. Id.

C. Analysis

¶ 11 The district court held that NLE was entitled to an award of

attorney fees for its time spent defending Vonfeldt’s CCPA and

negligence claims. The court concluded that the CCPA claim

“lacked substantial justification, was vexatious, and was

groundless” because Vonfeldt presented no evidence of the

5 significant public impact element required to succeed on a CCPA

claim. See Van Rees v. Unleaded Software, Inc., 2016 CO 51, ¶ 3,

373 P.3d 603, 605 (affirming the district court’s dismissal of a

CCPA claim because the plaintiff “failed to allege a significant public

impact”). The court also concluded that Vonfeldt’s continued

pursuit of the negligence claim was unjustified after she received

payment from AFI.

¶ 12 While the district court found that NLE was entitled to its

reasonable attorney fees, it concluded that the timeframe for billing

would be reduced from what NLE had requested. The court found

that the appropriate timeframe for billing related to the CCPA claim

was from December 6, 2023, the date the parties and the court

knew that Vonfeldt did not have any evidence or witnesses to testify

in support of the public impact element. The court also found that

the appropriate timeframe for billing related to the negligence

claims began on January 18, 2023, the date Vonfeldt received a

¶ 13 The district court concluded that Kingsford and Christopher

Kelly, an associate at KLO, were wholly responsible for continuing

to inappropriately prosecute the CCPA and negligence claims after

6 these dates. It found that Vonfeldt “is a widow in relatively poor

health who lives alone in the country and lacks legal training.”

Additionally, the court found that the driving force behind

Vonfeldt’s original claims were the color scheme and installation

defects, and it was Kingsford and Kelly who “failed to competently

understand the CCPA claim and failed to competently advise the

client.” The district court also found that because Kelly had only

been licensed for three months at the start of the case, Kingsford

was primarily responsible for the case and its outcome, and

therefore, Kingsford was 100% liable for NLE’s attorney fees.

¶ 14 Kingsford contends that the district court (1) abused its

discretion by concluding that Vonfeldt’s CCPA claim was

substantially groundless and vexatious and (2) erred by concluding

that Kingsford and Kelly unnecessarily expanded the proceeding by

improper conduct or otherwise maintaining a vexatious action. We

address and reject each contention in turn.

¶ 15 First, we conclude that the district court’s award of attorney

fees on the CCPA claim was not an abuse of discretion because the

record supports the conclusion that the claim was substantially

groundless and vexatious.

7 ¶ 16 Five elements must be met to succeed on a CCPA claim.

Shekarchian v. Maxx Auto Recovery, Inc., 2019 COA 60, ¶ 24, 487

P.3d 1026, 1031. As relevant here, the third element requires the

plaintiff to prove that the defendant engaged in a trade practice that

“significantly impacts the public as actual or potential” customers.

Id. In support of the significant public impact element, Vonfeldt

pointed to NLE’s website that advertised NLE as an “Elite Certified

Installer preferred by James Hardie siding” and that there were

“[six] certified James Hardie installation crews [in Colorado] and

three of them work[ed] for us.” Vonfeldt argued in the district court

that NLE employed subcontractors to complete the siding

installation work, and the subcontractors were not themselves Elite

Certified Installers preferred by James Hardie. To support the

significant public impact element of Vonfeldt’s CCPA claim,

Kingsford submitted a list of NLE customers for the prior three

years and argued that an uncertified subcontractor was assigned to

each of the customer projects.

¶ 17 We agree with the district court that this evidence did not

establish the element of actual significant public impact. We

acknowledge that Vonfeldt submitted the list of NLE customers.

8 However, as the district court pointed out, the list alone is not

enough because it “does not prove any customer viewed NLE’s

website . . . or . . . that any customer was induced to purchase

based on the contents of the NLE website,” and it “does not prove or

even tend to prove that any customer was deceived or otherwise

impacted by the allegedly deceptive language on the website.”

Without something more, such as testimony from the NLE

customers on the list, how those customers were impacted,

complaints against NLE, or other lawsuits against NLE, the list of

NLE customers alone was not evidence that proved significant

public impact.

¶ 18 We also reject Kingsford’s contention that the district court

construed the significant public impact element too narrowly and

did not consider potential customers in concluding that Vonfeldt

did not submit evidence of significant public impact. Even if the

district court did not consider potential customers, Vonfeldt never

presented any evidence that potential customers were damaged by

the representations on NLE’s website. For example, she could have

presented evidence from consumers who checked NLE’s website

and based their decisions whether to hire NLE on its claims about

9 certified installers. Similarly, she could have presented evidence

about potential customers who spoke with NLE employees and

received misleading information.

¶ 19 Therefore, based on the foregoing, we conclude that the

district court did not abuse its discretion by awarding attorney fees

based on its finding that the CCPA claim was substantially

¶ 20 Second, we agree with the district court that Kingsford should

not have continued to pursue the negligence claims after Vonfeldt

received payment from AFI. We are not persuaded by Kingsford’s

assertion that he was unaware that Vonfeldt had received a

payment from AFI to cover her damages resulting from the siding

installation, and that AFI’s payment did not cover all the relief

sought by Vonfeldt. Vonfeldt received her payment on January 18,

2023, and NLE filed its motion to add AFI as a plaintiff on May 12,

2023. While Kingsford may not have known on January 18 that

Vonfeldt had received a payment, he was on notice once NLE filed

its motion on May 12. Once a party receives payment from its

insurer, the insurer has a right to subrogation, and the party no

longer has any cause of action. Ferrellgas, Inc. v. Yeiser, 247 P.3d

10 1022, 1027 (Colo. 2011) (“[O]nce the subrogated insurer has

resolved the claim, either through litigation or settlement, the

insured is no longer entitled to recover the reimbursed portion of

the loss from the responsible party.”). Accordingly, even if she

thought she could get more damages, Vonfeldt was not justified in

continuing to pursue the negligence claims after she received the

payment from AFI. Therefore, we conclude that the district court

did not err in awarding attorney fees based on its conclusion that

Vonfeldt’s continued prosecution of the negligence claims was

unjustified.

¶ 21 Kingsford makes two additional contentions: (1) that the

district court should not have considered that Vonfeldt did not

accept or authorize offers of settlement because that is a client’s

decision, not counsel’s; and (2) that including KLO as jointly and

severally liable for NLE’s attorney fees violated KLO’s due process

rights. However, aside from making conclusory statements, neither

Kingsford nor KLO advance any argument or legal support for either

contention. Accordingly, “[w]e decline to address an undeveloped

argument without legal support.” Whiting-Turner Contracting Co. v.

11 Guarantee Co. of N. Am. USA, 2019 COA 44, ¶ 47, 440 P.3d 1282,

1290.

III. Conclusion

¶ 22 We affirm the district court’s order.

JUDGE FREYRE and JUDGE KUHN concur.