KING v. X. PONCE

District Court, D. New Jersey·Decided September 9, 2021·No. 1:21-cv-05628·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY CAMDEN VICINAGE

: MARKIESE KING, : CIV. NO. 21-5628 (RMB/KMW) : Plaintiff : : OPINION v. : : X. PONCA et al., : : Defendants :

BUMB, United States District Judge

Plaintiff Markiese King, a federal prisoner presently confined in the Federal Correctional Institution in Pollock, Louisiana brings this pro se civil rights action pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics. 403 U.S. 388 (1971) for alleged unconstitutional conduct of prison employees at the Federal Correctional Institution in Fort Dix, New Jersey (“FCI Fort Dix”). (Compl., Dkt. No. 1.) Plaintiff filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) which establishes his financial eligibility to proceed without prepayment of fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. (Dkt. No. 4.) Plaintiff also filed a motion to appoint pro bono counsel under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). (Dkt. No. 5.) When a prisoner is permitted to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee or when the prisoner pays the filing fee for a civil action regarding prison conditions and seeks redress from a governmental entity, officer or employee of a governmental entity, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B); 1915A(b) and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1) require courts to review the complaint and sua sponte dismiss any claims that are: (1) frivolous or malicious; (2) fail to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (3) seek monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. For the reasons discussed below, the Court will permit the complaint to proceed in part. I. Sua Sponte Dismissal Courts must liberally construe pleadings that are filed pro se. Erickson v. Pardus, 551

U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). Thus, “a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to ‘less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “Court personnel reviewing pro se pleadings are charged with the responsibility of deciphering why the submission was filed, what the litigant is seeking, and what claims she may be making.” See Higgs v. Atty. Gen. of the U.S., 655 F.3d 333, 339–40 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Jonathan D. Rosenbloom, Exploring Methods to Improve Management and Fairness in Pro Se Cases: A Study of the Pro Se Docket in the Southern District of New York, 30 Fordham Urb. L.J. 305, 308 (2002)). A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “[T]he legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to § 1915A is identical to the legal standard employed in ruling on 12(b)(6) motions.” Courteau v. United States, 287 Fed.Appx. 159, 162 (3d Cir.2008) (citing Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir.2000)). Therefore, the Court relies on precedent discussing the Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss standard for failure to state a claim. “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.) Legal conclusions, together with threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, do not suffice to state a claim. Id. Thus, “a court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings

that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. “While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.” Id. If a complaint can be remedied by an amendment, a district court may not dismiss the complaint with prejudice but must permit the amendment. Grayson v. Mayview State Hospital, 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002). II. DISCUSSION A. The Complaint Plaintiff alleges the following facts in his complaint, accepted as true for purposes of screening for dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B); 1915A(b)(1) and 42 U.S.C. §

1997e(c)(1). (Compl. at 1-6, Dkt. No. 1.) At the time of the incidents alleged in the complaint, Plaintiff was confined in FCI Fort Dix. During this time, Plaintiff worked for UNICOR, sewing clothes for the United States Army. He alleges sexual harassment and retaliation by Defendant Officer X. Ponca (“Ponca”). Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that while he was working one morning, Ponca called him into his office. Plaintiff alleges Ponca “had a creepy grin on his face,” and to break the silence, Plaintiff asked if there was a problem. Ponca responded that his sources told him Plaintiff was in the TV room with a transgender person with the lights out. Plaintiff contends he told Ponca not to disrespect him, left the office, and informed other inmates of the encounter. Plaintiff further alleges that Ponca told the entire UNICOR factory that Plaintiff had been in a dark room with a transgender person. Plaintiff approached Ponca and asked him to stop spreading misinformation. Ponca allegedly called him into the office again, and asked if Plaintiff “knew what it felt like being

inside a man.” He allegedly told Plaintiff “there was nothing wrong with it” and “not to knock it until you try it” because “it’s the same feeling as a woman.” Ponca then allegedly asked Plaintiff if the tattoos on his hands were new, grabbed Plaintiff’s left hand, and began caressing it “in a sexual manner….” Plaintiff immediately removed his hand, and upon leaving the office, Ponca allegedly stated, “the world is changing, and you will one day understand what I’m saying.” The following day, Plaintiff went to the psychology office and filed a PREA complaint. Plaintiff alleges that when Ponca discovered he had filed the PREA complaint, he began harassing him with cell searches and writing him up for no reason. Plaintiff reported Ponca’s behavior to the psychology office on multiple occasions, but he was told

there was nothing they could do. Weeks after filing the PREA complaint, Plaintiff was sent to the Special Housing Unit (“SHU”) from September 30, 2020 to October 21, 2020. Plaintiff alleges Ponca set this up by having Inmate Ryker file a false PREA complaint against Plaintiff.

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