King v. Rundle

15 Barb. 139, 1853 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 25
New York Supreme Court·Decided May 2, 1853·Published·Cited by 8 cases

Opinion

By the Court, Wright, J.

The devises and bequests in the will of the testator, to which objection is taken, are 1st. The devise of the homestead farm to the widow. 2d. The bequest in trust of $5000 to the Protestant Episcopal Society for the promotion of religion and learning in the state of Hew-York. 3d. The devise of the Potter Kill and Bell farms. 4th. The clause disposing of the residue of the testator’s estate, both real and personal. We shall examine these devises and bequests in the order stated.

1. The devise of the homestead farm is undoubtedly valid. It is wholly independent of other provisions in the will. The devise passed to the widow the fee. (2 R. S. 3d ed. 33, § 1.)

2. The next bequest is for a strictly pious use. The sum of five thousand dollars is given to the Protestant Episcopal Society for promoting religion and learning in the state of Hew-York, not as an absolute gift, as was urged by the distinguished, and eminent counsel appearing on behalf of the society, but in trust, to apply the interest and income of the sum to the support of the rector or minister, for the time being, of Christ’s Church, in the town of Greenville, in the county of Greene; with the direction that whatever interest might accrue during a vacancy in the office of rector or minister, should be paid to the clergyman who should next fill the office. The bequest to the society is clothed with a trust, and the objections to it are, 1st. That it involves a perpetuity; 2d. That it is void by the statute which forbids accumulations of interest of money, or income of personal property, except for the benefit of minors, and during their minority.

In Yates v. Yates, (9 Barb. 324,) we came to the conclusion that as a court of equity we possess no original inherent jurisdiction to enforce the execution of a charitable trust, void in law, as contravening the statute against perpetuities, or as being unauthorized. In this case, where the use is strictly a pious [145] one, additional reasons might be urged against the exercise of auch jurisdiction, were it important. Unless this trust will stand the statutory tests to be applied to it, it must fail.

The statute provides that “the absolute ownership of pergonal property shall not be suspended, by any limitation or condition whatever, for a longer period than during the continuance and until the termination of not more than two lives in being at the date of the instrument containing such limitation or condition ; or, if such instrument be a will, for-not more than two lives in being at the death of the testator.” (1R. S. 773.) The provision is the same in effect as that relating to real estate. This is a general statute, and general in its terms, and applies equally to trusts either of a private or public charitable and pious nature, and to individuals and corporations. There can be, in this case, no absolute disposition of the capital of the fund, until the conditions upon which it is given are performed, and for aught I perceive it is locked up for an indefinite and unlimited period. Uor is the suspense legally limited. There can be no limitation not measured by lives. Lives must be designated, and life must in some form enter into the limitation. (9 Barb. 346, and cases cited.) lío absolute period, however short, suspending the power of a limitation, is tolerated; and the possibility that an estate may transcend in duration the limit of the statute, is sufficient to render it void. (Hawley v. James, 16 Wend. 61. Coster v. Lorillard, 14 Id. 265. Yates v. Yates, 9 Barb. 346.) The testator, foreseeing that a vacancy might occur in the office of rector or minister of Christ’s Church, directs the accumulation of the interest of the fund, and the payment thereof to the clergyman who should next fill the office. This is a constituent and essential part of the limitation. The provision for accumulation is inseparably connected with the other provisions of the trust, and forms a part of the same fund and means for the support of the rector. It is absolutely void, and the effect is necessarily to avoid the entire limitation. It is no answer to say that the contingency of a vacancy in the rectorship may not occur. As was said by the court in Andrew v. N. Y. Bible and Prayer Book Society, (4 Sand. S. C. R. 188,) “that to render a limi[146] tation void, which, if sustained, would create a perpetuity, it is sufficient that the event upon which it depends may happen.” Again; if the trust were good, independently of the direction for accumulation, such direction would be clearly void. The statute avoids all directions for the accumulation of the interest, income or profits of personal property, except for the benefit' of minors, and to terminate at the expiration of their'minority. (1 R. S. 773, 774.) Testing this trust, therefore, by the provisions of the revised statutes, it is void, for the reasons that it involves a perpetuity, and directs an accumulation of interest for a purpose unauthorized by law.

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King v. Rundle, 15 Barb. 139, 1853 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 25 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1853).

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