King v. Kevin

District Court, S.D. New York·Decided August 26, 2024·No. 1:24-cv-02949·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK KEJOHNA KING, Plaintiffs, 24-CV-2949 (LTS) -against- ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH JODICE KEVIN, et al., LEAVE TO REPLEAD Defendants. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff Kejohna King, who is currently detained at the Orange County Jail in Goshen, New York, brings this action, pro se, against City of Newburgh Police Officers Jodice Kevin, Edgar Kevin, Salazar Gilberto, and Dolshun Hunter. Because Plaintiff alleges that police officers violated his “civil rights,” the Court construes the complaint as asserting constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983. (ECF 1, at 5.) By order dated June 7, 2024, the Court granted Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of the filing fees. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within 60 days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that federal courts screen complaints brought by prisoners who seek relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). The Court must also dismiss a complaint if the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470

F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In

reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. Moreover, a complaint is subject to dismissal if its “form or substance prevents the defendant from forming a ‘fair understanding’ of the plaintiff’s allegations or otherwise prejudices the defendant in responding to the complaint.” Ong v. Park Manor (Middletown Park) Rehab. & Healthcare Ctr., 51 F. Supp. 3d 319, 345 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). Ultimately, a complaint must give “fair notice” to the defendants. See Simmons v. Abruzzo, 49 F.3d 83, 86 (2d Cir. 1995) (“The function of pleadings under the Federal Rules is to give fair notice of the claims asserted.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). BACKGROUND The following facts are drawn from the complaint.1 On January 11, 2024, police officers

from the City of Newburgh Police Department pursued Plaintiff and, at some point during the pursuit, the officers “broke four of [his] teeth.” (ECF at 5). During this incident, the officers “tr[ied] to cover the [body] camera to try to hide.” (Id.). This body camera footage allegedly shows “tamper[ing] of evidence” and that the officers tried to “modify [a] weapon.” (Id.). DISCUSSION A. Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Plaintiff’s complaint does not comply with Rule 8 because, although Plaintiff’s complaint is short, it does not make a plain statement showing that he is entitled to relief from any of the Defendants. For example, it is unclear how the Plaintiff’s alleged physical injury was caused by the Defendants and therefore, whether they are liable for the alleged use of excessive force.

Moreover, Plaintiff does not describe what occurred during the alleged incident regarding the bodycam footage and the alleged fabricated evidence. Thus, in any amended complaint Plaintiff files, he must address these deficiencies, as discussed below. Excessive Force The Court construes the complaint as alleging that Defendants used excessive force against him during his arrest, in violation of the Fourth Amendment. “[C]laims that law

1 The Court quotes from the complaint verbatim. All spelling, grammar, and punctuation are as in the original unless noted otherwise. enforcement officers have used excessive force . . . in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other ‘seizure’ of a free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its ‘reasonableness’ standard.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989). In evaluating an excessive force claim against a police officer under the Fourth Amendment, the central question is “whether the officers’ actions are objectively reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances

confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation.” Id. at 396 (quotations omitted). The reasonableness of an officer’s force depends on the totality of the circumstances and involves a “careful balancing of the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests’ against the countervailing governmental interests at stake.” Id. A plaintiff need not always sustain lasting injuries to state a claim for excessive force. See, e.g., Graham v. City of New York, 928 F. Supp.

King v. Kevin, (S.D.N.Y. 2024).

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