King v. Habib Bank Limited

District Court, S.D. New York·Decided March 31, 2025·No. 1:20-cv-04322·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK --------------------------------------------------------------x KEVIN KING, et al., : : Plaintiffs, : 20-CV-4322 (LGS) (OTW) : -against- : ORDER : HABIB BANK LIMITED, : : Defendant. --------------------------------------------------------------x ONA T. WANG, United States Magistrate Judge: Pending now before the Court is Plaintiffs’ request to compel Defendant Habib Bank Limited (“HBL”) to produce foreign regulator inspection records. (See ECF Nos. 308, 314, 324, 333, 338, 348, 355, 364). For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs’ motion is GRANTED. I. INTRODUCTION The Court assumes familiarity with the facts of this case. On September 13, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a letter motion seeking an order to compel HBL to produce “information relating to regulatory audits, investigations, and inspections by the State Bank of Pakistan … and Central Bank UAE into deficiencies in HBL’s anti-money laundering …, know your customer …, counter- terrorism financing …, and transaction monitoring practices.” (ECF 308). Defendant filed a letter in opposition on September 18, 2024. (ECF 314). The Court entertained oral argument on this issue at the in-person discovery conference on Wednesday, October 9, 2024. (ECF 319, 330). At the October 9 conference, I directed Defendant to seek permission from the State Bank of Pakistan and the Central Bank of the United Arab Emirates (“CBUAE”) (the “Foreign Regulators”) to “disclose final reports, findings, notifications of findings, and internal communications resulting from such reports and notifications,” (the “Foreign Regulators’ Reports”). (ECF 330). In the alternative, if the Foreign Regulators denied permission to disclose

their, I also directed the parties to submit supplemental briefing on (1) the relevance of the Foreign Regulators’ Reports and (2) whether the comity analysis favors compelling production of the Foreign Regulators’ Reports, notwithstanding the applicability of foreign bank secrecy laws. (ECF 319, 330). The parties completed their supplemental briefing on November 8, 2024. (See ECF Nos. 324, 333, 338, 348, 355, 364).

II. DISCUSSION A. The Foreign Regulators’ Reports Are Relevant In general, a party may “obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense.” Wultz v. Bank of China Ltd., 32 F. Supp. 3d 486, 491– 92 (S.D.N.Y. July 21, 2014) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1)). Rule 26 provides that discovery should be “proportional to the needs of the case, considering [1] the importance of the issues at stake

in the action, [2] the amount in controversy, [3] the parties’ relative access to relevant information, [4] the parties’ resources, [5] the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and [6] whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 (emphasis added). “Proportionality and relevance are ‘conjoined’ concepts; the greater the relevance of the information in issue, the less likely its discovery will be found to be disproportionate.” Vaigasi v. Solow Management Corp., 2016 WL 616386, at *14

(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2016)). As an initial matter, HBL contends that they do not have “possession, custody, or control” of the Foreign Regulators’ Reports for the purposes of Rule 34(a)(1), because they are not Defendant’s “property,” and are thus not discoverable. (See ECF 348 at 11). Courts in this

district have held that “control” does not require legal ownership, and the mere “practical ability” to obtain the documents at issue is sufficient. In re NTL, Inc. Sec. Litig., 244 F.R.D. 179, 195 (S.D.N.Y. 2007), aff'd sub nom. Gordon Partners v. Blumenthal, 02-CV-7377 (LAK), 2007 WL 1518632 (S.D.N.Y. May 17, 2007) (quoting Bank of New York v. Meridien BIAO Bank Tanzania Ltd., 171 F.R.D. 135, 146–47 (S.D.N.Y.1997)). Here, HBL has actual possession of the Foreign Regulators’ Reports, which is sufficient under Rule 34. See Shcherbakovskiy v. Da Capo Al Fine,

Ltd., 490 F.3d 130, 39 (2d Cir. 2007) ( “Appellees are entitled to the production of the [relevant] documents in question if appellant has access to them and can produce them.”). We next turn to the question of relevance. Plaintiffs argue that the Foreign Regulators’ Reports are relevant as they tend to show systematic failures in HBL’s compliance programs, and this goes to whether HBL “knowingly provided substantial assistance” to the Taliban-led

Syndicate. (See ECF 333 at 4-5). Plaintiffs also posit that public records concerning the Foreign Regulators’ Reports suggest potential compliance violations similar to those documented in reports by U.S. regulators, which reports are undisputably relevant. Defendant contends, however, that the Foreign Regulators’ Reports only show a general failure to comply with regulatory requirements, and this, is and of itself, does not show “conscious, culpable participation in terrorism.” (ECF 355 at 2). Both parties rely in part on Twitter, Inc. v. Taamneh

to support their positions. 598 U.S. 471 (2023). Defendant has twice attempted to cite to Twitter to overturn Judge Schofield’s decision denying HBL’s motion to dismiss with respect to Plaintiffs’ secondary liability claims, specifically the claims for aiding-and-abetting and conspiracy liability both in this case and the now

consolidated Hakimyar v. Habib Bank Limited. See King v. Habib Bank Limited, 23-CV-4322 (LGS) (OTW), 2023 WL 8355359 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 2023); see also Hakimyar v. Habib Bank Limited, 24- CV-993 (LGS) (OTW), 2025 WL 605575 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2025). As Judge Schofield explicitly set out in this case: While the Supreme Court emphasized the significance of the nexus between the assistance and a specific act of terrorism, it also left room for the possibility that some set of allegations involving aid to a known terrorist group would justify holding a secondary defendant liable for all the group’s actions or perhaps some definable subset of terrorist acts. For example, if a provider of routine services does so in an unusual way, those actions might well constitute aiding and abetting a foreseeable terrorist attack. Consistent with these principles, King I held that the Complaints sufficiently allege that Defendant provided non-‘routine’ banking services to terrorists and their allies … placing Defendant in a category of defendants that the Second Circuit has found secondarily liable based on their special treatment of the terrorist- affiliated Customers. King, 2023 WL 8355359, at *3 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Despite this explicit finding, Defendant argues now that “[t]he Foreign Reports are irrelevant … because there is nothing about a supposedly general failure to comply with regulatory requirements that inherently demonstrates conscious, culpable participation in terrorism… If that were the case, then any bank with compliance shortcomings would face liability under the ATA.” (ECF 353 at 7). However, this evidence—regulator reports concerning routine services done in a potentially unusual way—is exactly the type that would tend to prove or disprove the claim that Judge Schofield expressly held was cognizable under Twitter and Second Circuit precedent. Defendant’s argument is, at best, a poorly concealed attempt to revisit Judge Schofield’s prior ruling under the guise of a relevance inquiry.

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Related

Shcherbakovskiy v. Da Capo Al Fine, Ltd.
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Bank of New York v. Meridien BIAO Bank Tanzania Ltd.
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