King v. Chapman

4 F. Supp. 3d 1017, 2013 WL 6709623, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177129
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Illinois
DecidedDecember 16, 2013
DocketCase No. 09 C 1184
StatusPublished
Cited by18 cases

This text of 4 F. Supp. 3d 1017 (King v. Chapman) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
King v. Chapman, 4 F. Supp. 3d 1017, 2013 WL 6709623, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177129 (N.D. Ill. 2013).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 1

SIDNEY I. SCHENKIER, United States Magistrate Judge

On February 24, 2009, Raymond E. King brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against certain medical and dental providers employed by or under contract to the prisons in which he was incarcerated, alleging that they were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs, in violation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments (doc. # l).2 During the relevant time period, defendants Dr. Nathan Chapman, Dr. Parthasarathi Ghosh, and Dr. Ladeane Fattore-Bruno were employed by Wexford Health Sources, Inc. (“Wexford”) (collectively, the “Wexford Defendants”), and defendants Steven Newbold, D.D.S., Jacqueline Mitehell-Lawshea, D.D.S., Sangita Garg, D.D.S., and Jeffery Saffold, D.D.S., were employed by the State of Illinois (collectively, the “State Defendants”).3 Mr. King alleges that the defendants denied him adequate treatment for his temporomandibular joint (“TMJ”) disorder (“TMD”), which involves the jaw, the jaw joint, and the surrounding facial muscles, while he was incarcerated at Menard Correctional Facility (“Menard”) from August 2004 to September 2007, and while he was incarcerated at Stateville Correctional Facility (“Stateville”) from September 2007 through the present (doc. # 88: 2d Am. Compl. at 1-4). Both the Wexford and Slate Defendants have moved for summary judgment on all of plaintiffs claims (doc. #246: State Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J; doc. # 238: Wexford Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J.). For the reasons that follow, the Court grants in part and denies in part the State Defendants’ motion (doc. # 246). and grants in part and denies in part the Wexford Defendants’ motion (doc. #238).

I.

The legal standards governing motions for summary judgment are well-established. Summary judgment is appropriate if “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the [moving party] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A genuine issue exists when “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be [1021]*1021counted.” Id. The party seeking summary judgment bears the burden of establishing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that he or she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Cebtex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

The party moving for summary judgment has an initial burden of production to inform the court why a trial is not necessary. Modrowski v. Pigatto, 712 F.3d 1166, 1168 (7th Cir.2013) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548). “Where the nonmovant bears the ultimate burden of persuasion on a particular issue, however, the requirements that Rule 56 imposes on the moving party are not onerous.... Rather, the movant’s initial burden ‘may be discharged by showing — that is, point out to the district court — that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party’s case.’ ” Modrowski, 712 F.3d at 1168 (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548).

Upon such a showing, to withstand the motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party must present evidence sufficient to establish a triable issue of fact on the essential elements of its case. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548. “The nonmovant need not depose her [or his] own witnesses or produce evidence in a form that would be admissible at trial, but she [or he] must ‘go beyond the pleadings’ (e.g., produce affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories, or admissions on file), to demonstrate that there is evidence ‘upon which a jury could properly proceed to find a verdict’ in her favor.” Modrowski, 712 F.3d at 1168-69 (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505; Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548).

In deciding a motion for summary judgment, courts may not “assess the credibility of witnesses, choose between competing reasonable inferences, or balance the relative weight of conflicting evidence. The courts must view all the evidence in the record in the light reasonably most favorable to the nonmoving parties.” Stokes v. Board of Educ. of the City of Chicago, 599 F.3d 617, 619 (7th Cir.2010). When a material fact or set of facts yields competing, but reasonable, inferences, then there is a genuine issue that precludes summary judgment. Coles v. City of Chicago, 361 F.Supp.2d 740, 741-42 (N.D.Ill.2005).

II.

We begin by setting forth the material undisputed facts established by the parties’ submissions, made pursuant to Local Rule 56.1. “In determining what is disputed, we focus not only on whether the parties profess to dispute a fact, but also on the evidence the parties offer to support their statements.” Barkl v. Kaysun Corp., No. 10 C 2469, 2011 WL 4928996, at *1 n. 2 (N.D.Ill. Oct. 13, 2011) (citing Zitzka v. Vill. of Westmont, 743 F.Supp.2d 887, 899 n. 2 (N.D.Ill.2010)). “We review only those facts whose substance would be admissible at trial under a form permitted by the Federal Rules of Evidence, although the form produced at summary judgment need not be admissible.” Wragg v. Vill. of Thornton, 604 F.3d 464, 466 (7th Cir.2010).

In their reply briefs, both the State and the Wexford Defendants argue that plaintiffs Additional Statement of Facts (“PSAF”) (doc. # 256) and response to defendants’ statements of facts do not comport with Local Rule 56.1; specifically, they claim that most of the numbered additional facts and responses combine several discrete statements of facts § Id.) (doc. #288: State Defs.’ Reply at 1-2; doc. # 286: Wexford Defs.’ Reply at 1-2). Local Rule 56.1 mandates “short numbered paragraphs” in the statement of additional facts and a “concise response” to defendant’s statement of facts. Addition[1022]*1022ally, the State Defendants contend that plaintiffs responses to their statement of facts should be stricken because they are unresponsive and add new and unrelated facts (State Defs. Reply at 1-2).

We do not find that plaintiffs failure to follow Local Rule 56.1 warrants the ultimate sanction of striking his PSAF or his responses because defendants were not prejudiced by his failure to comply with the rules. See, e.g., Modrowski, 712 F.3d at 1169 (holding that the decision to enforce or relax the local rules is left to the district court’s discretion provided that the rules are applied equally among the parties). The Court granted several extensions of time to defendants to respond to plaintiffs facts and response brief.

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4 F. Supp. 3d 1017, 2013 WL 6709623, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177129, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/king-v-chapman-ilnd-2013.