IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
KING COUNTY, a political subdivision of the State of Washington, No. 82671-9-I
Respondent, DIVISION ONE
v. UNPUBLISHED OPINION
ABDULHAFID TAHRAOUI, individually, and AMANA GLOBAL COMPANY, a sole proprietorship,
Appellants.
HAZELRIGG, J. — Abdulhafid Tahraoui, owner of Amana Global Company,
appeals an order authorizing the issuance of a writ of restitution and orders
denying reconsideration or vacation of the writ. Finding no error, we affirm.
FACTS
In December 2015, Tahraoui signed a five-year commercial lease
agreement for Amana Global Company to occupy a portion of a warehouse and
an adjacent fenced storage yard at 22230 Russell Road in Kent (the Property).
The lease was set to expire on August 31, 2021, but automatically terminated upon
condemnation, by its own terms.
In May 2016, King County purchased the Property in order to construct the
Lower Russell Levee Setback Project. The County determined that Tahraoui was
a displaced person eligible for relocation benefits authorized by the Uniform
Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies for Federal and
Federally Assisted Programs Act (“Uniform Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 4621, and the No. 82671-9-I/2
Washington State Relocation Assistance Act (“Relocation Act”), chapter 8.26
RCW, and chapter 468-100 WAC. In August 2016, King County sent Tahraoui a
letter notifying that he: (1) was eligible for relocation assistance, (2) would need to
move from the Property, but would “not be required to vacate the property before
December 5, 2016, which is at least 90 days from the date you receive this letter,”
and, (3) was entitled to moving and reestablishment expenses.
Thereafter, King County and Tahraoui began disputing the amount of his
relocation benefits. In January 2017, King County sent Tahraoui a second letter
of eligibility, entitlements, and a 90-day notice to vacate, which instructed that he
would not be required to vacate before April 30, 2017. While the parties continued
negotiations until mid-2018, they could not agree on terms for Tahraoui’s
voluntarily relocation. By the end of negotiations, Tahraoui was seeking at least
$1.4 million in relocation expenses.
In July 2018, King County, along with the King County Flood Control Zone
District, filed a petition for condemnation seeking to appropriate Tahraoui’s
leasehold interest in the Property. Over a year later, in November 2019, the trial
court entered a “Stipulated Final Judgment and Decree of Appropriation in
Condemnation and Order of Disbursement” (the Decree) that, among other things,
terminated any leasehold interest Tahraoui had to the Property as of November
12, 2019. Tahraoui sought discretionary review of that order, but this court denied
his request and our Supreme Court denied his petition for review for lack of
standing.1
1 See King County v. Amana Global Company, No. 80877-0-I (January 28, 2020 ruling
denying review), review denied, No. 98797-1 (September 11, 2020 ruling denying review). In April
-2- No. 82671-9-I/3
On November 22, 2019, King County served Tahraoui with a notice to
vacate, requiring him to leave the Property by December 31, 2019. King County
also noted that if Tahraoui failed to comply with this notice, it would commence an
unlawful detainer action. Tahraoui, however, refused to vacate.
In January 2020, King County filed a complaint for unlawful detainer and an
eviction summons, seeking a writ of restitution directing the sheriff to restore
possession of the Property to King County as well as a judgment against Tahraoui
for its attorney fees and related costs. Two weeks later, Tahraoui filed an answer
to the unlawful detainer complaint and raised affirmative defenses of retaliation
and King County’s failure to pay his relocation benefits under both the Uniform and
Relocation Acts.
King County did not immediately request a show cause hearing in the
unlawful detainer action but, instead, resumed negotiations with Tahraoui to
voluntarily relocate.2 In the summer of 2020, Tahraoui executed a lease at a facility
in Chehalis, and King County committed to paying his moving expenses: up to
$50,000 in reestablishment expenses, $32,500 for the first four months of rent and
utilities at the new facility, and $2,500 for site search expenses. To aid him in
securing the new facility, King County made an advance payment to Tahraoui of
$41,250 prior to executing the new lease, and a second payment of $41,250 to
Tahraoui before he had made any improvements to the new facility, but
2019, another entity acquired Tahraoui’s leasehold interests and later reached an agreement with King County on the Decree to conclude the condemnation matter. 2 Tahraoui’s briefing suggests that he administratively appealed the King County’s initial relocation expenses determination to the King County Water and Land Resources Division. None of these materials were presented to the trial court in the unlawful detainer action.
-3- No. 82671-9-I/4
conditioned on his signing of a new lease elsewhere. Despite King County
agreeing to provide $85,000 to compensate for relocation expenses, Tahraoui
remained on the Property.
In February 2021, a trial court commissioner issued an order requiring
Tahraoui to appear for a hearing to show cause why a writ of restitution restoring
King County to possession of the Property should not be issued.
On March 12, 2021, the commissioner issued an order (1) finding that the
Decree, entered in November 2019, appropriated Tahraoui’s leasehold, which
entitled King County to have Tahraoui evicted from the Property, (2) instructing the
court clerk to issue a writ of restitution directing the sheriff to evict Tahraoui, (3)
declining to award King County costs and fees, and (4) concluding that the balance
of King County’s claims, “including but not limited to losses that may accrue from
unpaid past or future rent or physical damage or destruction to the Premises and
other damage flowing directly or indirectly from Defendants’ actions are preserved”
for a future hearing. Four days later, the trial court clerk issued a writ of restitution
(the Writ) directing the King County Sheriff to evict Tahraoui from the Property.
On March 22, 2021, the sheriff posted the Writ at the warehouse on the
Property. That same day, Tahraoui filed a motion seeking revision of the
commissioner’s decision and to vacate the judgment, quash the Writ, and dismiss
the unlawful detainer action entirely. He also filed an emergency motion
requesting a stay of execution of the Writ until the hearing of his motion for
reconsideration, which was scheduled for April 23, 2021. On March 24, 2021, a
-4- No. 82671-9-I/5
commissioner issued an order staying execution of the Writ until April 23,
contingent on Tahraoui posting a $30,000 bond, which he immediately did.
On April 23, 2021, the trial judge heard oral argument on the motion for
revision. A week later, the judge issued an order denying Tahraoui’s motion for
revision, affirming the commissioner’s issuance of the Writ and judgment against
Tahraoui, and extending the stay of execution of the Writ, at Tahraoui’s request,
until May 7, 2021.3 The judge ordered that Tahraoui’s “remaining rights and
claims” against King County were “preserved and specifically reserved,” but also
expressly affirmed the Commissioner’s prior rejection of his asserted defense of
retaliation and argument that “failure to provide relocation benefits is a defense to
an unlawful detainer action.” Tahraoui filed a motion for reconsideration of the
order denying revision, but the judge denied it.
After Tahraoui failed to post a bond to further extend the stay of execution,
the sheriff evicted Tahraoui from the Property on May 10, 2021. The next day,
Tahraoui filed an emergency motion before another trial court commissioner
asking that the Writ be vacated and that he be restored to possession of the
Property. After the commissioner denied the motion to vacate, Tahraoui timely
appealed.
ANALYSIS
I. Mootness
At the outset we address King County’s motion to dismiss this appeal as
moot. King County contends that this court cannot provide the relief Tahraoui
3 The order required Tahraoui to post a $250,000 bond by May 7, 2021 in order to extend
the stay of execution of the Writ beyond May 7, 2021.
-5- No. 82671-9-I/6
seeks which, it claims, is possession of the warehouse on the Property that was
destroyed during the summer of 2021.
“A case is technically moot if the court cannot provide the basic relief
originally sought, or can no longer provide effective relief.” Snohomish County v.
State, 69 Wn. App. 655, 660, 850 P.2d 546 (1993) (citation omitted). Lack of
possession does not necessarily moot an unlawful detainer action. Hous. Auth. of
City of Pasco & Franklin County v. Pleasant, 126 Wn. App. 382, 388, 109 P.3d 422
(2005). When a tenant does not concede the right of possession, which is the
case here, the tenant has the right to have the issue determined. Id. at 389.
Moreover, if a tenant has a monetary stake in the outcome of the case, like the
judgment entered against Tahraoui, our Supreme Court has said that “[o]bviously
[such a] case is not moot.” McGary v. Westlake Invs., 99 Wn.2d 280, 284, 661
P.2d 971 (1983).
Because the trial court entered a judgment against Tahraoui and he seeks
relief beyond restoration of possession, this case is not moot. Thus, we will
consider the merits of this appeal. Tahraoui raises numerous assignments of error.
We address them individually, though in an order different than that set out in
briefing.
II. Termination of the Lease Agreement
Notwithstanding the condemnation action, in which the trial court
appropriated the leasehold interest in the Property to King County, Tahraoui
contends that the lease agreement did not terminate according to its terms. We
disagree.
-6- No. 82671-9-I/7
“Leases are conveyances whose covenants are interpreted under contract
law.” Lane v. Wahl, 101 Wn. App. 878, 883, 6 P.3d 621 (2000). We interpret
contracts as matters of law and review them de novo. Kim v. Moffett, 156 Wn.
App. 689, 697, 234 P.3d 279 (2010).
When interpreting an agreement, we attempt “to determine the parties’
intent by focusing on the objective manifestations of the agreement, rather than on
the unexpressed subjective intent of the parties.” Hearst Commc’ns, Inc. v. Seattle
Times Co., 154 Wn.2d 493, 503, 115 P.3d 262 (2005). We give words “their
ordinary, usual, and popular meaning unless the entirety of the agreement clearly
demonstrates a contrary intent.” Id. at 504. We interpret only what was written in
the agreement, not what the parties intended to write. Id. Additionally, “[a] contract
provision is not ambiguous merely because the parties to the contract suggest
opposing meanings.” GMAC v. Everett Chevrolet, Inc., 179 Wn. App. 126, 135,
317 P.3d 1074 (2014). We do “not read ambiguity into a contract ‘where it can
reasonably be avoided.’” Id. at 135 (quoting Mayer v. Pierce County Med. Bureau,
Inc., 80 Wn. App. 416, 421, 909 P.2d 1323 (1995)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Here, the lease agreement terminated by its terms, upon condemnation, as
set forth in section 14(b):
Condemnation. If the Premises are made untenantable by eminent domain, or conveyed under a threat of condemnation, this Lease shall automatically terminate as of the earlier of the date title vests in the condemning authority or the condemning authority first has possession of the Premises and all Rents and other payments shall be paid to that date.
-7- No. 82671-9-I/8
Tahraoui argues that, because King County condemned only his “leasehold,” not
“the Premises” upon which the leasehold sits, the lease agreement remains valid.
But Tahraoui ignores the fact that in one of his prior appeals concerning the
Property at issue in this matter, this court explained:
[I]n July 2018, King County brought a condemnation action against Amana [Global Company] to acquire its leasehold interest in a parcel of land. The [trial] court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law, determining that the land under leasehold was needed to construct and operate a flood control project. The court subsequently denied Amana’s motion for reconsideration, because “the condemnation of the real property interest is for flood protection (capital project). The project secondarily provides for salmon habitat restoration.”
Pan Abode Homes, Inc. v. Abdulhafid, No. 79670-4-I, slip op. at 12 (Wash. Ct.
App. June 15, 2020), https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/796704.pdf.
The record reflects that the land under the leasehold was condemned on
November 12, 2019. Therefore, the condemnation provision under section 14(b)
was triggered as of that date and, in turn, automatically terminated the lease
agreement.
III. Notice to Vacate
After the lease was terminated, King County gave Tahraoui a 30-day notice
to vacate the Property. Tahraoui contends that he was entitled to a 90-day notice
to vacate and, absent such notice, the trial court lacked authority to exercise
jurisdiction over this matter. He is incorrect.
Tahraoui cites the Uniform Act’s regulations under 49 C.F.R. § 24.203(c),
and the regulations for Washington’s Relocation Act, WAC 468-100-203(3), to
support his contention. “We interpret regulations, like statutes, de novo.” Yaron
-8- No. 82671-9-I/9
v. Conley, 17 Wn. App. 2d 815, 825, 488 P.3d 855 (2021). “‘When interpreting an
administrative regulation, we follow the general rules of statutory construction.’” Id.
at 825 (quoting Clark v. City of Kent, 136 Wn. App. 668, 672, 150 P.3d 161 (2007)).
“‘In judicial interpretation of statutes, the first rule is the court should assume that
the legislature means exactly what it says. Plain words do not require
construction.’” State v. McCraw, 127 Wn.2d 281, 288, 898 P.2d 838 (1995)
(quoting Sidis v. Brodie/Dohrmann, Inc., 117 Wn.2d 325, 329, 815 P.2d 781
(1991)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The regulations upon which Tahraoui relies contain nearly identical
language. Compare 49 C.F.R. § 24.203(c)(1) (2019) (“No lawful occupant shall be
required to move unless he or she has received at least 90 days advance written
notice of the earliest date by which he or she may be required to move.”) with WAC
468-100-203(3)(a) (“No lawful occupant shall be required to move unless the
occupant has received at least ninety days advance written notice of the earliest
date by which he or she may be required to move.”). These regulations also
similarly define “unlawful occupant” as “[a] person who occupies without property
right, title or payment of rent or a person legally evicted, with no legal rights to
occupy a property under State law.” 49 C.F.R. § 24.2(a)(29) (2019); WAC 468-
100-002(29).
King County satisfied these regulations. On two separate occasions King
County provided Tahraoui more than 90 days’ notice to vacate the Property, while
he lawfully occupied the Property according to the terms of the lease agreement.
But when the lease terminated, as Tahraoui now acknowledges, “all [of his] rights,
-9- No. 82671-9-I/10
title and interest in the leasehold were acquired” by King County. Accordingly,
Tahraoui no longer had any right or title to occupy the Property and became an
“unlawful occupant,” who was not entitled to further notice, under both the Uniform
and Relocation Act. Because King County was not required to give Tahraoui
another 90-day notice to vacate before filing its unlawful detainer action, the trial
court’s exercise of jurisdiction over the matter was proper.
IV. Unlawful Detainer
Tahraoui asserts that the unlawful detainer action was improper. We
King County brought its action under RCW 59.12.030(1), which provides
that, in a tenancy for a term of years, a tenant becomes liable for unlawful detainer
“[w]hen he or she holds over or continues in possession . . . of the property or any
part thereof after the expiration of the term for which it is let to him or her.” It further
states, “[w]hen real property is leased for a specified term or period by express or
implied contract, whether written or oral, the tenancy shall end without notice at
the expiration of the specified term or period.” RCW 59.12.030(1).
Here, Tahraoui avers he was not a “holdover” tenant because the terminal
date fixed by the lease agreement, August 31, 2021, had not passed in January
2020, thus unlawful detainer under RCW 59.12.030(1) was not applicable.
Our Supreme Court’s decision in Spokane Airport Board v. Experimental
Aircraft Association, Chapter 79 is dispositive on this issue. 198 Wn.2d 476, 495
P.3d 800 (2021). There, a tenant entered into a five-year commercial lease
agreement to rent an aircraft hangar. The lease contained a 180-day cancelation
- 10 - No. 82671-9-I/11
provision. The landlord later provided the tenant notice that it was canceling the
lease with 180 days’ notice, which was eventually extended to August 17, 2018.
Id. at 479-81. The tenant remained in the hangar after that date and the landlord
filed a complaint for unlawful detainer under RCW 59.12.030(1). The trial court
issued an order authorizing a writ of restitution and later ruled, on summary
judgment, that the lease term expired after the 180-day notice to cancel and the
tenant was liable for unlawful detainer when it held over after that time. Id. at 481-
82.
On review, our Supreme Court addressed whether an unlawful detainer
action under RCW 59.12.030(1) was available when the tenant remained in the
hangar building after August 17, 2018. Id. at 485. It held that “a tenant in a fixed
term commercial lease becomes a holdover tenant liable for unlawful detainer
when they remain in possession ‘after the expiration of the term for which it is let,’
whether that term is the period fixed in the original lease agreement or as modified
pursuant to an early termination provision.” Id. (quoting RCW 59.12.030(1)).
The facts of this case and Spokane Airport are similar.4 Here, Tahraoui
entered into a fixed term commercial lease, which contained a provision that
4 Tahraoui offers only a cursory reference to Spokane Airport in his reply brief and does
not address the factual similarities between that case and this appeal. Further, on September 29, 2022, he submitted a motion for an extension of time to file his reply brief, which was granted. He submitted his reply on October 13, 2022 and certified that the brief “contains 6400 or less words, not in compliance with the Rules of Appellate Procedure.” (Emphasis added). RAP 18.17(c)(3) establishes a length limitation of 6000 words for reply briefs. The October 13 reply was rejected by the Clerk’s Office. On October 14, 2022, Tahraoui filed an amended reply brief with a certification that it “contain[ed] 6500 or less words, not in compliance with the Rules of Appellate Procedure.” (Emphasis added). He did not file a motion for leave to file an overlength brief until October 17, 2022. While Tahraoui failed to comply with the RAP because he submitted a reply brief which did not conform to the rules before he sought leave from this court to do so, his October 17 motion is nevertheless granted.
- 11 - No. 82671-9-I/12
automatically terminated the lease upon condemnation. The effect of that
provision in Tahraoui’s lease is similar in kind to the early termination clause at
issue in Spokane Airport, as they both modified the term specified in the original
lease agreement. Applying the Supreme Court’s holding in Spokane Airport here,
we conclude Tahraoui became a holdover tenant when he remained on the
Property after the lease terminated on November 12, 2019. Id.
Tahraoui also claims that King County’s only avenue for retaining
possession of the Property was to pursue an ejectment action under chapter 7.28
RCW. He is incorrect. The unlawful detainer action is an alternative to an
ejectment action. River Stone Holdings NW, LLC v. Lopez, 199 Wn. App. 87, 92,
395 P.3d 1071 (2017). An unlawful detainer action “relieves a landlord of having
to file an expensive and lengthy common law action of ejectment.” FPA Crescent
Assocs. v. Jamie’s LLC, 190 Wn. App. 666, 675, 360 P.3d 934 (2015).
Tahraoui has shown no procedural, or other, irregularities that would
warrant reversal of the trial court’s unlawful detainer order.
V. Affirmative Defenses
Tahraoui next contends that the trial court erred at the show cause hearing
by not considering his affirmative defenses of retaliation and King County’s failure
to pay his relocation expenses. This was not error.
A commissioner’s actions are subject to revision by a trial court judge. RCW
2.24.050. “On revision, the superior court reviews the commissioner’s findings of
fact and conclusions of law de novo based on the evidence and issues presented
to the commissioner.” In re Dependency of Ca.R., 191 Wn. App. 601, 607, 365
- 12 - No. 82671-9-I/13
P.3d 186 (2015). We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion for revision of a
commissioner’s order for abuse of discretion. River House Dev. v. Integrus
Architecture, 167 Wn. App. 221, 231, 272 P.3d 289 (2012). “A trial court abuses
discretion when its order is manifestly unreasonable or based on untenable
grounds.” Wash. State Physicians Ins. Exch. & Ass’n v. Fisons Corp., 122 Wn.2d
299, 339, 858 P.2d 1054 (1993). Once a trial court has decided the motion for
revision, as was done here, we focus our review on the trial court’s decision, as
opposed to the commissioner’s original order. Faciszewski v. Brown, 187 Wn.2d
308, 313 n.2, 386 P.3d 711 (2016).
A trial court may address a landlord’s unlawful detainer claims in a show
cause hearing. Hous. Auth., 126 Wn. App. at 390-92. But a show cause hearing
is not necessarily the time for a final determination of the parties’ rights. 4105 1st
Ave. S. Invs. v. Green Depot WA Pac. Coast, 179 Wn. App. 777, 786, 321 P.3d
254 (2014). RCW 59.12.130 provides that “[w]henever an issue of fact is
presented by the pleadings it must be tried by a jury.”
In unlawful detainer actions under chapter 59.12 RCW, trial courts sit “‘as a
special statutory tribunal, limited to deciding the primary issue of right to
possession together with the statutorily designated incidents thereto, i.e.,
restitution and rent or damages.’” Spokane Airport, 198 Wn.2d at 485 (quoting
MacRae v. Way, 64 Wn.2d 544, 546, 392 P.2d 827 (1964)). Issues unrelated to
possession cannot be resolved in an unlawful detainer action and must be
addressed in a civil action. Angelo Prop. Co. v. Hafiz, 167 Wn. App. 789, 809, 274
P.3d 1075 (2012). Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it
- 13 - No. 82671-9-I/14
“preserved and specifically reserved” Tahraoui’s affirmative defense claims
against King County.5
VI. Administrative Dismissal
King County filed its unlawful detainer complaint in January 2020 and then
filed its motion for an order to show cause in February 2021. The show cause
hearing was held in March 2021. Tahraoui claims that the action should have been
administratively dismissed due to King County’s failure to comply with King County
Superior Court Local Civil Rule (KCLCR) 41(b)(2)(G). Under KCLCR 41(b)(2)(G),
if no action is taken within 45 day of filing an unlawful detainer action “and no future
hearing date is scheduled, then the case may be administratively closed by the
clerk.” This rule gives the trial court clerk discretion to dismiss such matters, but it
does not mandate that the clerk dismiss them. See Vaughn v. Chung, 119 Wn.2d
273, 281, 830 P.2d 668 (1992) (the word “may” means something is permissible,
while the word “shall” indicates something is mandatory). Here, the clerk elected
not to dismiss this action. There was no error.
VII. Vacation of the Writ
Finally, Tahraoui contends that the Writ was unenforceable and the trial
court commissioner should have vacated it.6 Specifically, he argues that the Writ
5 Although Tahraoui challenges this ruling as well, for the same reasons, we conclude that
the trial court did not err in preserving any of King County’s remaining claims in the unlawful detainer action for further proceedings. 6 Tahraoui did not move to revise the order denying his motion to vacate, so it became a
final order of the trial court. RCW 2.24.050.
- 14 - No. 82671-9-I/15
expired after the sheriff failed to return it within 20 days of its issuance on March
16, 2021. The record does not support this contention.
Under RCW 59.12.090, a writ of restitution is required to “be return[ed] in
twenty days after its date” of issuance by the trial court clerk. Here, the sheriff
posted the Writ at the Property on March 22, 2021, seven days after the Writ was
issued. But, upon multiple motions and posting a $30,000 bond, Tahraoui stayed
execution of the Writ between March 24 and May 7, 2021. Within three days of
the stay expiring on May 10, 2021, the sheriff evicted Tahraoui from the Property.
On May 12, 2021, the sheriff filed the return of service of the Writ.
Based on these facts we conclude that the Writ was returned within the time
prescribed by RCW 59.12.090 and Tahraoui failed to present any grounds to
vacate the Writ.
The trial court’s orders are affirmed.7
WE CONCUR:
7 On October 20, 2022, Tahraoui filed “Appellants’ RAP 10.8 Statement of Additional
Authorities.” Under RAP 10.8(b), the body of the statement of additional authorities “must not exceed 350 words.” Tahraoui’s filing exceeds the 350-word limit established by the RAP. Because his filing does not comply with RAP 10.8(b), we do not consider it.
- 15 -