Kincey v. AT&T Corporation

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Georgia
DecidedDecember 20, 2022
Docket1:22-cv-02786
StatusUnknown

This text of Kincey v. AT&T Corporation (Kincey v. AT&T Corporation) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Kincey v. AT&T Corporation, (N.D. Ga. 2022).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA ATLANTA DIVISION

JEREMY J. KINCEY, Plaintiff, v. CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:22-CV-02786-JPB AT&T CORP., Defendant.

ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on AT&T’s (“Defendant”) Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 3]. This Court finds as follows: BACKGROUND Jeremy Kincey, proceeding pro se, filed a Complaint in the Superior Court of Fulton County on April 5, 2022. [Doc. 1-1, p. 2]. Defendant removed the matter to this Court on July 15, 2022, on the basis of diversity jurisdiction and federal question jurisdiction. [Doc. 1]. The Complaint is one for “life-threatening conspiracy” and “domestic terrorism.” [Doc. 1-1, p. 2]. It is 114 pages long and includes, without context or explanation, the following materials: police incident reports, photographs, lists and excerpts of federal and state statutes, President Joe Biden’s inauguration speech and a list of United States government agencies and departments. Plaintiff alleges that he is being “attacked” by government officials and other individuals via satellite, television and radio transmissions broadcast by

Defendant. Id. at 13–14. Portions of the Complaint appear to enumerate federal and state crimes allegedly perpetrated against Plaintiff. See id. at 28–47 (federal crimes); id. at 48–76 (state crimes). In the Complaint, Plaintiff identifies “people

involved,” presumably, in these alleged crimes. Such persons include Defendant’s CEOs from 1987 to the present; President Joe Biden and former Presidents Donald Trump, Barack Obama and George Bush; various state officials, including Georgia Governor Brian Kemp and former Governor Nathan Deal; “all civilians, family,

friends, [and] coworkers”; and various entities such as the “New York stock exchange,” Tesla, “Georgia power” and “Illuminati corporations and every demon in hell.” See id. at 77–81. Plaintiff seeks thirty trillion dollars and “rising debt” in

damages. Id. at 3. On July 22, 2022, Defendant filed the instant Motion to Dismiss, asking this Court to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint with prejudice for failure to state a claim under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) and 12(b)(6). [Doc. 3]. On July

29, 2022, Plaintiff filed a document entitled “Counterclaim for Removal and Dismissal.” [Doc. 4]. That filing does not respond in substance to the Motion to Dismiss and instead lists federal statutes and procedural rules and appears to specify the amount and nature of damages Plaintiff seeks. Plaintiff did not otherwise respond to the Motion to Dismiss.

ANALYSIS A. Legal Standard “At the motion to dismiss stage, all well-pleaded facts are accepted as true,

and the reasonable inferences therefrom are construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1273 n.1 (11th Cir. 1999). In determining whether an action should be dismissed for failure to state a claim, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) provides that a pleading must

contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Although detailed factual allegations are not necessarily required, the pleading must contain more than “‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a

formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Importantly, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se in this action, the Court has an obligation to “liberally construe” his pleadings. Sarhan v. Mia. Dade Coll., 800 F. App’x 769, 771 (11th Cir. 2020). “This leniency, however, does not require or allow courts to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an

action.” Thomas v. Pentagon Fed. Credit Union, 393 F. App’x 635, 637 (11th Cir. 2010). Pro se litigants must still follow the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rodriguez v. Scott, 775 F. App’x 599, 602 (11th Cir. 2019). As such, a pro se

plaintiff’s complaint must comply with Rule 8 by making a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. Id. B. Motion to Dismiss Defendant first argues that the Complaint should be dismissed because it is a

shotgun pleading. In light of Plaintiff’s pro se status and the liberal construction afforded his pleadings, the Court will assume without deciding that the Complaint is not a shotgun pleading and will turn to whether it states a claim to relief.

As a threshold matter, at 114 pages and with a range of disjointed contents, the Complaint does not contain “a short and plain statement” of the claim to relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Moreover, discerning a cause of action in the Complaint is a difficult task. The title of the Complaint suggests that Plaintiff seeks relief for

“life-threatening conspiracy” and “domestic terrorism.” [Doc. 1-1, p. 2]. However, Plaintiff does not provide any basis, statutory or otherwise, for the existence of a cause of action for these claims. Plaintiff also fails to support his allegations of conspiracy and domestic terrorism with plausible and particularized facts, let alone facts showing that Defendant is in any way liable for the alleged

conduct. To the extent that the Complaint seeks to bring claims for domestic terrorism or conspiracy, these claims lack facial plausibility and are due to be dismissed. See Rodriguez, 775 F. App’x at 602 (“A claim has facial plausibility

when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678)). The remainder of the Complaint does not pass muster. As one example,

Plaintiff asserts that he is being[] subtly and violently[] framed, attacked, slandered, scoffed, mocked, threatened, ostracized, patronized, put on a pedestal and mutilated unceasingly day and night by Government officials, religious clergy, [t]reasurers, civilians, and business people of all sorts who are practicing (the [H]ollywood expose occult witchcraft) in my community of Atlanta, Georgia, via satellite, [television], radio transmission from [t]he telecommunications company[] AT&T [at] 51 Peach Tree Center Avenue Atlanta, Georgia.

[Doc. 1-1, pp. 13–14]. The Complaint is replete with statements like this one: conclusory assertions that lack factual development and do not create a reasonable inference of liability. Rodriguez, 775 F. App’x at 602 (explaining that even for pro se pleadings, “conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts or legal conclusions masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal” (quoting Oxford Asset Mgmt., Ltd. v. Jaharis, 297 F.3d 1182, 1188 (11th Cir. 2002))). At bottom, the Complaint is patently frivolous, and it fails to state a cognizable claim to relief.

C.

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Related

Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc.
187 F.3d 1271 (Eleventh Circuit, 1999)
Oxford Asset Mgmt. Ltd. v. Michael Jaharis
297 F.3d 1182 (Eleventh Circuit, 2002)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Anthony L. Thomas v. Pentagon Federal Credit Union
393 F. App'x 635 (Eleventh Circuit, 2010)
Eric Watkins v. Associate Warden D. Hudson
560 F. App'x 908 (Eleventh Circuit, 2014)

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