KAUGER, J.;
{1 The issue presented is whether the trial court, in a small claims proceeding without a jury, may apply the applicable statute of limitations, or other rules of law, to the evidence adduced at the small claims proceeding in resolving in the case before it. The public policy goal of the Small Claims Procedure Act.1 is to provide an informal and uncomplicated mechanism for inexpensive and speedy justice. In order to effect that goal, trial judges are allowed latitude in their discretionary decision-making. Accordingly, we hold that because the Small Claims Procedure Act is informal in nature, a trial court may apply the applicable statute of limitations or other rules of law, to the evidence adduced at a small claims proceeding.
FACTS
12 The plaintiff/appellant, Troy Kimble (Kimble) was awarded the marital home and certain personal property following a divorce from the defendant/appellee Linda Kimble (ex-wife) in 2007. Subsequently, he brought a contempt proceeding against his ex-wife for the removal of some of the fixtures from the home, particularly the carport, which she gave to her daughter, the defendant/appellee Debbie Haskell (daughter). The ex-wife was found guilty of contempt.
T3 Two year later, in 2009, Kimble brought a replevin action in small claims court against his ex-wife and her daughter alleging that they wrongfully possessed some of his farm equipment. The trial court held a hearing on December 28, 2009, and the parties did not request a court reporter. The ex-wife disclaimed any interest in the property and the daughter insisted that some of the property belonged to her, but she was willing to allow Kimble to pick up some of [1231]*1231the "other" equipment that was in her possession.
11 4 The trial court took the matter under advisement and issued its order on December 28, 2009.2 It determined that Kimble could have included the allegations he was making now in his contempt action which was filed two years earlier, therefore the claims were barred by the preclusive effect of the contempt proceeding. The trial court also found that the claims were barred by the two-year statute of limitations pursuant to 12 0.8. Supp.2009 § 95(A)(3)3 because the maximum reasonable time for exchanging property following a divorcee is thirty days and the replevin action was brought more than two years later.4
A TRIAL COURT MAY APPLY THE APPLICABLE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, OR OTHER RULES OF LAW, TO THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED AT A SMALL CLAIMS PROCEEDING.
15 Kimble argues that the trial court erred in raising dispositive legal issues sug sponte, after a hearing on his replevin action. The ex-wife and daughter contend that the Small Claims Procedures Act (the Act) 5 requires the trial court to dispense speedy justice and the Act's informalities allows a trial court to apply rules of law in deciding the case, even though the parties may not have raised the dispositive rule in their respective presentations to the court We agree.
16 The Act is set forth at 12 O.S. Supp.2004 §§ 1751 et seq. The unmistakable public policy goal of the Act is to provide small claims forums as "people's courts, uncomplicated by the formal demands of superior courts."6 This is evidenced throughout the Act which provides for informal procedures for actions when claims are less than $6,000.00.7 For example, the Act's simplified procedure is reflected in the lack of the requirement of formal pleadings other [1232]*1232than the basic claim and notice.8 The only pretrial motion allowed is a motion to transfer the cause to District Court and the Act imposes a penalty on a defendant who sue-cessfully transfers the action but does not prevail.9 The Act specifically prohibits depositions, interrogatories and all other typical discovery procedures unless it is after a judgment to aid in its execution.10 It also prohibits the addition of new parties or the ability to intervene.11
T7 The goal of this simplified version of litigation is to "facilitate the access of parties to simple, inexpensive, and speedy justice."12 A party cannot delay the pro[1233]*1233ceedings by requesting a jury trial13 and even if a jury is employed, the rules of evidence are "relaxed." 14
T8 The rationale and the policy reasons for the latitude provided to trial judges and litigants in small claims court have been reiterated in cases by this Court. In Thayer v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 1980 OK 95, 8, 613 P.2d 1041 the Court said:
The Act established an informal court, void of rigid restrictions with little or no regard for the technicalities pertaining to the rules of evidence which authorized the judge, within the bounds of due process, to exercise direct affirmative authority to control all aspects of a hearing. (Emphasis Supplied.)15
It is illogical, given the latitude of discretionary power of a trial judge in a small claims action,16 to preclude the judge from applying the dispositive law to the evidence adduced at the proceeding, simply because the parties did not raise the dispositional legal rule in their presentation.17 Small claims actions are meant to be simple and uncomplicated and for all litigants to pursue justice even for the smallest matters without the worry of attorney fees and the expenses of litigation that might otherwise serve as a barrier to them.18
T9 In Patterson v. Beall, 2000 OK 92, 19 P.3d 839, a trial judge allowed the parties in a small claims action to file motions for summary judgments found in the District Court [1234]*1234Rules.19 The Court, outlining six reasons, found that allowing motions for summary judgment was inappropriate, holding:
1) the timing requirements of rules relating to summary judgment would be contrary to the Act's purpose of speed and efficiency;
2) the technicality of the summary judgment rule conflicts with the simple, uncomplicated "people's court" procedures of the Act designed to dispense with the necessity of lawyers;
3) a motion for summary judgment would likely require the use of discovery which is prohibited under the Act;
4) the Act relaxes the rules of evidence whereas the formal summary judgment rule does not;
5) the Act only allows for one pretrial motion to be filed, a motion to transfer and under the maxim "expresio unius est exelusion alterius," the mention of only one thing implies the exclusion of any other; and
6) the motion to transfer allows either party to access the full panoply of district court procedures which the Act seeks to avoid.
{10 The Patterson rationale applies here. If motions for summary judgments are inappropriate in small claims proceedings because they conflict with the simple, inexpen[1235]
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KAUGER, J.;
{1 The issue presented is whether the trial court, in a small claims proceeding without a jury, may apply the applicable statute of limitations, or other rules of law, to the evidence adduced at the small claims proceeding in resolving in the case before it. The public policy goal of the Small Claims Procedure Act.1 is to provide an informal and uncomplicated mechanism for inexpensive and speedy justice. In order to effect that goal, trial judges are allowed latitude in their discretionary decision-making. Accordingly, we hold that because the Small Claims Procedure Act is informal in nature, a trial court may apply the applicable statute of limitations or other rules of law, to the evidence adduced at a small claims proceeding.
FACTS
12 The plaintiff/appellant, Troy Kimble (Kimble) was awarded the marital home and certain personal property following a divorce from the defendant/appellee Linda Kimble (ex-wife) in 2007. Subsequently, he brought a contempt proceeding against his ex-wife for the removal of some of the fixtures from the home, particularly the carport, which she gave to her daughter, the defendant/appellee Debbie Haskell (daughter). The ex-wife was found guilty of contempt.
T3 Two year later, in 2009, Kimble brought a replevin action in small claims court against his ex-wife and her daughter alleging that they wrongfully possessed some of his farm equipment. The trial court held a hearing on December 28, 2009, and the parties did not request a court reporter. The ex-wife disclaimed any interest in the property and the daughter insisted that some of the property belonged to her, but she was willing to allow Kimble to pick up some of [1231]*1231the "other" equipment that was in her possession.
11 4 The trial court took the matter under advisement and issued its order on December 28, 2009.2 It determined that Kimble could have included the allegations he was making now in his contempt action which was filed two years earlier, therefore the claims were barred by the preclusive effect of the contempt proceeding. The trial court also found that the claims were barred by the two-year statute of limitations pursuant to 12 0.8. Supp.2009 § 95(A)(3)3 because the maximum reasonable time for exchanging property following a divorcee is thirty days and the replevin action was brought more than two years later.4
A TRIAL COURT MAY APPLY THE APPLICABLE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, OR OTHER RULES OF LAW, TO THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED AT A SMALL CLAIMS PROCEEDING.
15 Kimble argues that the trial court erred in raising dispositive legal issues sug sponte, after a hearing on his replevin action. The ex-wife and daughter contend that the Small Claims Procedures Act (the Act) 5 requires the trial court to dispense speedy justice and the Act's informalities allows a trial court to apply rules of law in deciding the case, even though the parties may not have raised the dispositive rule in their respective presentations to the court We agree.
16 The Act is set forth at 12 O.S. Supp.2004 §§ 1751 et seq. The unmistakable public policy goal of the Act is to provide small claims forums as "people's courts, uncomplicated by the formal demands of superior courts."6 This is evidenced throughout the Act which provides for informal procedures for actions when claims are less than $6,000.00.7 For example, the Act's simplified procedure is reflected in the lack of the requirement of formal pleadings other [1232]*1232than the basic claim and notice.8 The only pretrial motion allowed is a motion to transfer the cause to District Court and the Act imposes a penalty on a defendant who sue-cessfully transfers the action but does not prevail.9 The Act specifically prohibits depositions, interrogatories and all other typical discovery procedures unless it is after a judgment to aid in its execution.10 It also prohibits the addition of new parties or the ability to intervene.11
T7 The goal of this simplified version of litigation is to "facilitate the access of parties to simple, inexpensive, and speedy justice."12 A party cannot delay the pro[1233]*1233ceedings by requesting a jury trial13 and even if a jury is employed, the rules of evidence are "relaxed." 14
T8 The rationale and the policy reasons for the latitude provided to trial judges and litigants in small claims court have been reiterated in cases by this Court. In Thayer v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 1980 OK 95, 8, 613 P.2d 1041 the Court said:
The Act established an informal court, void of rigid restrictions with little or no regard for the technicalities pertaining to the rules of evidence which authorized the judge, within the bounds of due process, to exercise direct affirmative authority to control all aspects of a hearing. (Emphasis Supplied.)15
It is illogical, given the latitude of discretionary power of a trial judge in a small claims action,16 to preclude the judge from applying the dispositive law to the evidence adduced at the proceeding, simply because the parties did not raise the dispositional legal rule in their presentation.17 Small claims actions are meant to be simple and uncomplicated and for all litigants to pursue justice even for the smallest matters without the worry of attorney fees and the expenses of litigation that might otherwise serve as a barrier to them.18
T9 In Patterson v. Beall, 2000 OK 92, 19 P.3d 839, a trial judge allowed the parties in a small claims action to file motions for summary judgments found in the District Court [1234]*1234Rules.19 The Court, outlining six reasons, found that allowing motions for summary judgment was inappropriate, holding:
1) the timing requirements of rules relating to summary judgment would be contrary to the Act's purpose of speed and efficiency;
2) the technicality of the summary judgment rule conflicts with the simple, uncomplicated "people's court" procedures of the Act designed to dispense with the necessity of lawyers;
3) a motion for summary judgment would likely require the use of discovery which is prohibited under the Act;
4) the Act relaxes the rules of evidence whereas the formal summary judgment rule does not;
5) the Act only allows for one pretrial motion to be filed, a motion to transfer and under the maxim "expresio unius est exelusion alterius," the mention of only one thing implies the exclusion of any other; and
6) the motion to transfer allows either party to access the full panoply of district court procedures which the Act seeks to avoid.
{10 The Patterson rationale applies here. If motions for summary judgments are inappropriate in small claims proceedings because they conflict with the simple, inexpen[1235]*1235sive and speedy justice, it would be equally inappropriate to require the parties to raise dispositive legal issues before a trial judge could apply such law. Such a requirement is inconsistent with the purpose of simple, inexpensive, and speedy resolution of small claims cases.
11 In the case below, the parties provided enough information for the judge to use his wide latitude of discretion to make a decision based upon the law. That is precisely what the Act and our case law have said is the purpose the judge serves-to dispense justice informally and without complication.
CONCLUSION
{12 The purpose of the Act is to provide speedy and efficient justice to parties with smaller claims.20 It is meant to be inexpensive, informal, and simple so as to provide access to justice to all. Trial courts are given the latitude to effect this justice.21 The purpose and intent of the Act as well as our precedent allow judges presiding over small claims actions to apply legal rules to evidence adduced at the proceeding in resolving the cases before them even though the parties did not raise or invoke the dispositive legal rule or rules in their presentation to the court.22
CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED; COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OPINION VACATED; TRIAL COURT AFFIRMED.
KAUGER, WINCHESTER, EDMONDSON, REIF, COMBS, GURICH, JJ., concur.
TAYLOR, C.J., COLBERT, V.C.J., WATT, J., dissent.