Kimberland v. Kimberland

D.C. Circuit

Kimberland v. Kimberland

204 F.2d 38, 92 U.S. App. D.C. 145, 1953 U.S. App. LEXIS 2388

Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit·Decided March 19, 1953·No. 11554_1·Published·Cited by 12 cases

Opinions

PER CURIAM.

Appellant was the husband and appellee the son of Mary A. G. Kimberland, who died March 4, 1952. Her purported will, dated July 1935, left her entire estate to ap-pellee. The estate included no real property in the District of Columbia.

Appellee .offered the will for probate. Appellant filed a caveat alleging incapacity of the testatrix and also fraud and undue influence of a third person. Appellee moved to dismiss the caveat on the ground that appellant lacked the necessary interest in the estate. Appellant will take the same share of the estate whether the will is or is not sustained. D.C.Code (1951) § 18-211. The District Court granted appellee’s motion.

D.C.Code (1951) § 19-307 provides that “If, upon or prior to the hearing of the application to admit the will to probate, any party in interest shall file a caveat in opposition, duly verified, and setting forth facts inconsistent with the validity of the will, the said will shall not be admitted to probate until the issues raised by said caveat shall be determined, as hereinafter directed.” In Angell v. Groff, 42 App.D.C. 198, 201, and again in Lonas v. Betts, 82 U.S. App.D.C. 55, 160 F.2d 281, we said “The interest which a person must possess to enable him to assail the validity of a will is such that, had the testator died intestate, he would have been entitled to a distributive share in the estate.” We take this to mean a distributive share different from what he would be entitled to if the will were held valid. In Werner v. Frederick, 68 App. D.C. 158, 161, 94 F.2d 627, 630, and again in Lonas v. Betts, supra, we said “the estate of a decedent ought not be subjected to the trouble and expense of an attack, except by one who, if the attack prove successful, would have some legal claim upon the estate.” We take this to mean a legal claim upon the estate different from what he would have if the attack upon the will prove unsuccessful.

Appellant bases his claim on D.C. Code (1951) § 20-204, which provides that “If the intestate leave a widow or surviving husband and a child or children, administration, subject to the discretion of the court, shall be granted either to the widow or surviving husband or to the child, or one or more of the children * * No doubt it is possible that if the will were set aside the court might appoint appellant [39]*39rather than appellee as administrator; and if he qualified and served he would be entitled to compensation for his services. But as Judge Proctor, sitting as a District judge, held in In re Estate of Phillips, D.C., Ill. F.Supp. 453, the mere possibility of an opportunity to perform such services does not make one “a party in interest”.

Affirmed.

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PER CURIAM.

Appellant was the husband and appellee the son of Mary A. G. Kimberland, who died March 4, 1952. Her purported will, dated July 1935, left her entire estate to ap-pellee. The estate included no real property in the District of Columbia.

Appellee .offered the will for probate. Appellant filed a caveat alleging incapacity of the testatrix and also fraud and undue influence of a third person. Appellee moved to dismiss the caveat on the ground that appellant lacked the necessary interest in the estate. Appellant will take the same share of the estate whether the will is or is not sustained. D.C.Code (1951) § 18-211. The District Court granted appellee’s motion.

D.C.Code (1951) § 19-307 provides that “If, upon or prior to the hearing of the application to admit the will to probate, any party in interest shall file a caveat in opposition, duly verified, and setting forth facts inconsistent with the validity of the will, the said will shall not be admitted to probate until the issues raised by said caveat shall be determined, as hereinafter directed.” In Angell v. Groff, 42 App.D.C. 198, 201, and again in Lonas v. Betts, 82 U.S. App.D.C. 55, 160 F.2d 281, we said “The interest which a person must possess to enable him to assail the validity of a will is such that, had the testator died intestate, he would have been entitled to a distributive share in the estate.” We take this to mean a distributive share different from what he would be entitled to if the will were held valid. In Werner v. Frederick, 68 App. D.C. 158, 161, 94 F.2d 627, 630, and again in Lonas v. Betts, supra, we said “the estate of a decedent ought not be subjected to the trouble and expense of an attack, except by one who, if the attack prove successful, would have some legal claim upon the estate.” We take this to mean a legal claim upon the estate different from what he would have if the attack upon the will prove unsuccessful.

Appellant bases his claim on D.C. Code (1951) § 20-204, which provides that “If the intestate leave a widow or surviving husband and a child or children, administration, subject to the discretion of the court, shall be granted either to the widow or surviving husband or to the child, or one or more of the children * * No doubt it is possible that if the will were set aside the court might appoint appellant [39]*39rather than appellee as administrator; and if he qualified and served he would be entitled to compensation for his services. But as Judge Proctor, sitting as a District judge, held in In re Estate of Phillips, D.C., Ill. F.Supp. 453, the mere possibility of an opportunity to perform such services does not make one “a party in interest”.

Affirmed.

Kimberland v. Kimberland, 204 F.2d 38, 92 U.S. App. D.C. 145, 1953 U.S. App. LEXIS 2388 (D.C. Cir. 1953).

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