Kim Stevens v. State

Court of Appeals of Texas·Decided August 23, 2007·No. 02-05-00237-CR·Published

Opinion

COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 2-05-237-CR

KIM STEVENS APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE

------------

FROM THE 235TH DISTRICT COURT OF COOKE COUNTY

OPINION

I.  Introduction

Appellant Kim Stevens appeals her conviction and life sentence for the offense of capital murder.  Stevens argues in four points that the evidence is factually insufficient to support her conviction, that the trial court erred by allowing an adult witness to testify by two-way closed circuit television, that the trial court erred by allowing a social worker to give hearsay testimony that did not in fact fall within the medical-diagnosis-or-treatment exception to the hearsay rule, and that the trial court violated Stevens’s due process rights by excluding testimony that she claims was vital to her defense.  We will affirm.

II.  Brief Factual Background

During the afternoon of January 4, 2000, Stevens took Jorden Saager, a two-and-a-half-year-old girl whom she was babysitting, to the doctor.  The nurses at the doctor’s office rushed Jorden back to a room at the doctor’s office and shortly thereafter called 911.  An ambulance arrived and took Jorden to the hospital, where doctors pronounced her dead approximately twenty minutes later.  

The autopsy revealed that Jorden had a fairly recent fracture that was four to five inches long on the back left part of her skull, that her duodenum had been transected such that the two ends of Jorden’s bowel were completely torn apart, and that she had bruises all over her body.  The medical examiner who performed Jorden’s autopsy stated that death was caused by shock and sepsis as a result of the separation of the bowel and that the head injury could have contributed to Jorden’s death.  A jury convicted Stevens of murder for causing Jorden’s death, and this appeal followed.

III.  Factually Sufficient Evidence To Support Capital Murder Conviction

In her fourth point, Stevens contends that the evidence is factually insufficient to support her conviction for capital murder.  Specifically, Stevens argues that there was almost no evidence of her guilt; she argues that there was evidence only of a homicide and that both she and Jorden’s parents had the opportunity to commit the crime.  Thus, she argues that the jury was forced to choose between herself and Jorden’s parents as the perpetrator of the offense.  Because the jury’s verdict is based primarily on circumstantial evidence and because Stevens told numerous people slightly different stories about the events that transpired on January 4, 2000, we set forth an extremely detailed summary of the facts below.

A. Standard of Review

When reviewing the factual sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we view all the evidence in a neutral light, favoring neither party.   Watson v. State , 204 S.W.3d 404, 414 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Drichas v. State , 175 S.W.3d 795, 799 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).  We then ask whether the evidence supporting the conviction, although legally sufficient, is nevertheless so weak that the fact-finder’s determination is clearly wrong and manifestly unjust or whether conflicting evidence so greatly outweighs the evidence supporting the conviction that the fact-finder’s determination is manifestly unjust.   Watson , 204 S.W.3d at 414-15, 417; Johnson v. State , 23 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).  To reverse under the second ground, we must determine, with some objective basis in the record, that the great weight and preponderance of all the evidence, though legally sufficient, contradicts the verdict.   Watson , 204 S.W.3d at 417.

In determining whether the evidence is factually insufficient to support a conviction that is nevertheless supported by legally sufficient evidence, it is not enough that this court “harbor a subjective level of reasonable doubt to overturn [the] conviction.” Id .  We cannot conclude that a conviction is clearly wrong or manifestly unjust simply because we would have decided differently than the jury or because we disagree with the jury’s resolution of a conflict in the evidence.   Id .  We may not simply substitute our judgment for the fact-finder’s.   Johnson , 23 S.W.3d at 12; Cain v. State , 958 S.W.2d 404, 407 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).  Unless the record clearly reveals that a different result is appropriate, we must defer to the jury’s determination of the weight to be given contradictory testimonial evidence because resolution of the conflict “often turns on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor, and those jurors were in attendance when the testimony was delivered.” Johnson , 23 S.W.3d at 8.  Thus, we must give due deference to the fact-finder’s determinations, “particularly those determinations concerning the weight and credibility of the evidence.”   Id . at 9.

An opinion addressing factual sufficiency must include a discussion of the most important and relevant evidence that supports the appellant’s complaint on appeal.   Sims v. State , 99 S.W.3d 600, 603 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).   B. The Evidence (footnote: 1)

1. The Facts Concerning The Events Leading Up To Jorden’s Death

a. General Background

Yolanda and Lloyd Saager met while they were both in the Army and married.  At the time of the trial, they had been married for eleven years.  Their children are Branden, who was born in 1994; Alyssa, who was born in 1996; and Jorden who was born in 1997.  Yolanda was discharged from the Army after she gave birth to Branden and stayed home to raise the children.  When Lloyd was discharged from the Army in July 1999, he was offered a job as a field service technician for Remstar in Plano, and the family decided to move in with Yolanda’s “Grandpa,” Clyde Ward, (footnote: 2) in Gainesville until they could find a place to live.  

Stevens lived next door to Ward with her three children.  Yolanda met Stevens in August or September of 1999.  While their children played together, Yolanda got to know Stevens and felt that she could trust her.  

In the fall of 1999, Lloyd and Yolanda noticed that Jorden started having health issues. (footnote: 3)  They thought that she was developing allergies and petechiae because she had an ear infection and little red dots on her hands.  Yolanda was concerned about Jorden because Yolanda’s grandmother had been diagnosed with a bleeding condition during the preceding year, and petechiae was one of the symptoms.  Yolanda took Jorden to Dr. Gibbs, who gave Jorden antibiotics to clear up the ear infection and the petechiae.

b. Stevens Becomes Babysitter for Saagers

Later that fall, Yolanda obtained a job as a phlebotomist with LabCorp.

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