Kilgore v. State
This text of 796 S.E.2d 290 (Kilgore v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
Jonathan Kilgore appeals the denial of his motion for new trial, as amended, and his convictions and sentences for felony murder while in the commission of aggravated assault, aggravated assault, and two counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony in connection with the fatal shooting of John Reid and the firing of a handgun at Jarvis Winder. Kilgore challenges certain portions of the State’s closing argument as improperly commenting on his right to remain silent and as being burden shifting; he also challenges the effectiveness of his trial counsel for not objecting to the allegedly improper comments. Finding the challenges to be without merit, we affirm.1
[430]*430The evidence construed to support the verdicts showed the following. Kilgore, his older brother Devoka Finch, and James Ward planned to rob Reid, a drug dealer, in order for Finch to obtain drugs and money to pay a fine involving Finch’s probation. Finch found out about Reid from Kilgore, and Finch enlisted Ward to get a ride to Reid’s house in Fulton County on the evening of February 2, 2003. Once parked near the home, the men further discussed the plan to rob Reid. They decided that Kilgore would approach the house first because Reid knew him and would let him in. Finch would then enter and handcuff those inside, and the three men were “going to get everything.” Kilgore was armed with a small caliber handgun, and Ward was armed with a .45 caliber pistol and a .357 caliber revolver. Finch was wearing a bullet-proof vest under his clothing and had handcuffs with him. Kilgore went to the back door of the house, and Reid let him in while Finch and Ward hid outside. Reid’s friend, Winder, was in the house when Reid allowed Kilgore to enter. After Kilgore was inside, Reid went briefly to the back of the house while Kilgore stayed in the kitchen. When Reid returned, there was gunfire. Ward had pushed past Finch and entered the house firing his pistol. When the shooting started, Finch fled into a nearby wooded area. Reid and Winder attempted to run to a back bedroom. Winder was following Reid when Reid collapsed and died from a fatal gunshot wound. Winder managed to grab a shotgun from the bedroom and was headed to the front of the house when Kilgore spied him and fired a shot at him but missed. Kilgore and Winder exchanged gunfire. [431]*431Kilgore and Ward, who had been wounded, left the house and fled the scene by car. Winder went to a neighbor’s house, and the police were summoned.
Finch was arrested nearby and told police of the plan to rob Reid, but maintained that he had not killed anyone. He further stated that Kilgore and Ward were armed with handguns, and that Ward fired repeatedly at Reid. Winder was also at the police station and encountered Finch there; he identified Finch as one of the perpetrators. Winder also identified Kilgore in a subsequent photographic lineup.
After the fatal shooting, Kilgore returned to the apartment where he was staying. Kilgore was carrying a .22 caliber handgun. The beige shirt he was wearing had blood on it, and Kilgore told a woman who was at the apartment that there had been a shootout and that the blood was Ward’s. That evening, Ward, using a fictitious name, received treatment at a local hospital for multiple gunshot wounds. Several weeks later, police learned that Kilgore was at his mother’s apartment, and when they arrived they observed Kilgore trying to hide in a pile of clothing. He then attempted to flee and resist the officers.
1. Although Kilgore does not challenge the legal sufficiency of the evidence of his guilt, in keeping with this Court’s general practice in appeals of murder cases, this Court has reviewed the record and concludes that the evidence at trial was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find Kilgore guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes of which he was convicted. Jackson V. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).
2. During closing argument and in response to defense claims in concluding argument that Kilgore and his co-defendant Ward did not know of any plan to rob Reid and were merely present at the crime scene, the prosecutor stated:
Distractions, ladies and gentlemen. Then they want you to say, well, they didn’t know it was a robbery planned. But they can’t deny being there, so they’ve got to come up with an excuse, so it was, we was just there, we didn’t know what was going on, we wasn’t part of it.
Kilgore challenges the very next statements by the prosecutor:
Because see, otherwise, they would be able to say something else. But you know they’re there.
He contends that such statements amounted to an impermissible comment on his right to remain silent and improperly shifted the [432]*432burden of proof from the State to him, and that the trial court should have taken curative measures.
However, such contentions are unavailing. Kilgore did not object to the cited argument; therefore, he has waived his right to rely upon it as a basis for reversal of his convictions. Gates V. State, 298 Ga. 324, 329 (4) (781 SE2d 772) (2016). Even if such objection had been preserved, it does not aid Kilgore.
An argument that the defendant has not rebutted or explained the State’s evidence does not amount to an improper burden-shifting argument. Ellington V. State, 292 Ga. 109, 142 (10) (a) (735 SE2d 736) (2012). As for a determination of whether a prosecutor has improperly commented on an accused’s right to remain silent, it involves an evaluation as to whether the prosecutor’s manifest intention was to do just that or whether the remarks were such that a jury would naturally and necessarily take the remarks to be a comment on the accused’s right to remain silent and not to testify Jennings v. State, 282 Ga. 679, 681-682 (4) (653 SE2d 17) (2007).
The prosecutor’s remarks do not satisfy either prong of the test. Jennings, supra. They were not directed at Kilgore’s right to remain silent, i.e., his decision not to testify; they were in response to the defense argument regarding the State’s case and the defense’s failure to counter the State’s evidence. Id.; Johnson v. State, 271 Ga. 375, 383 (15) (a) (519 SE2d 221) (1999). Consequently, curative measures were not warranted.
3. Inasmuch as the cited remarks by the prosecutor were not improper as urged by Kilgore, trial counsel’s failure to object to them cannot support Kilgore’s claim that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in that regard. Hendrix v. State, 298 Ga. 60, 66 (2) (d) (779 SE2d 322) (2015).
Judgments affirmed.
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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
796 S.E.2d 290, 300 Ga. 429, 2017 WL 279536, 2017 Ga. LEXIS 26, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kilgore-v-state-ga-2017.