Kiles v. Shinn

• Court: District Court, D. Arizona
• Decided: January 13, 2023
• Docket: 2:17-cv-04092
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Alvie Copeland Kiles, No. CV-17-04092-PHX-GMS

10 Petitioner, ORDER

11 v. DEATH PENALTY CASE

12 David Shinn, et al.,

13 Respondent. 14 15 Alvie Copeland Kiles is an Arizona State prisoner under sentence of death. Pending 16 before the Court in this capital habeas proceeding is Petitioner Kiles’s motion for an order 17 requiring the parties to meet and confer to establish a DNA testing protocol for the 18 prosecuting county’s investigation of a woman who believes she is one of two children 19 Kiles was convicted of murdering and whose body was never found. (Doc. 112.) 20 Respondents have filed an opposition (Doc. 113), and Kiles has filed a reply in support of 21 the motion (Doc. 114). For the reasons that follow, the Court denies the motion. 22 Background 23 In January 1989, Kiles moved in with Valerie Gunnell and her two daughters, S.G. 24 and L.K., in her apartment in Yuma, Arizona. 25 In 2000, Kiles was convicted of three counts of first degree murder and two counts 26 of child abuse for murdering Valerie Gunnell and her two daughters. In 2006, a jury found 27 three aggravating factors for each murder: (1) Kiles had been previously convicted of a 28 crime involving the use or threat of violence, (2) he had been convicted of multiple 1 homicides, and (3) he had committed the offenses in an especially cruel, heinous, or 2 depraved manner. See A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(2) (1989) (prior offense involving threat or use 3 of violence); A.R.S § 13-751(F)(6), (F)(8) (Supp. 2008) (multiple murders and especially 4 cruel, heinous or depraved).1 The jury also concluded that the two children were less than 5 fifteen years old. A.R.S. § 13–751(F)(9) (defendant an adult and victim younger than 6 fifteen). The jurors, however, returned a verdict of death only for the murder of Valerie 7 Gunnell. The jurors could not reach a unanimous verdict regarding the imposition of a 8 capital sentence for the murders of the children. The State dismissed the notice of death 9 penalty regarding those murders and the superior court sentenced Kiles to consecutive life 10 sentences. Kiles did not appeal those convictions or sentences. Kiles’s conviction and 11 death sentence for murdering Valerie were affirmed on appeal. Kiles’s post-conviction 12 proceedings concluded without relief and he noticed his intent to file a habeas petition in 13 this Court on Nov. 6, 2017 (Doc. 1.) That petition has been fully briefed and is under 14 advisement by this Court. 15 On December 14, 2022, Respondents filed a Notice of Disclosure indicating that a 16 woman claiming to be S.G., a person for whom Defendant has been convicted of murder 17 had provided her DNA to the Yuma Police Department as potential proof that S.G. had 18 never been murdered. This woman had not heard back from the Yuma Police. (Doc 111 at 19 2.) 20 Respondents state they took steps to identify the Yuma Police Department detective 21 assigned to Kiles’s case and contacted the assigned detective by both voicemail and email, 22 detailing the new information and inquiring about what known DNA samples of the victims 23 are still in possession of the Yuma Police Department to be compared with a known sample 24 from the claimant. 25 According to Kiles’ counsel Respondents have declined the invitation to meet to

26 11 Arizona’s capital sentencing statutes were reorganized and renumbered to A.R.S. 27 §§ 13–751 to–759. Because the renumbered statutes are not materially different, the Court 28 cites the current version of the statute, unless otherwise noted. 1 establish a testing procedure agreeable to both parties. They now move for an order 2 requiring Respondents to do so. ” (Doc. 112 at 2.) 3 Discussion 4 The district court has “inherent power over the administration of its business” that 5 extends to regulating the conduct of the attorneys who appear before it and to promulgating 6 and enforcing rules for the management of litigation. (Doc. 114 at 4.) (citing Spurlock v. 7 F.B.I., 69 F.3d 1010, 1016 (9th Cir. 1995)). Nevertheless, “recognition of the need for a 8 proper balance between state and federal authority counsels restraint in the issuance of 9 injunctions against state officers engaged in the administration of the States’ criminal laws. 10 . . .” Olagues v. Russoniello, 770 F.2d 791, 804 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing City of Los Angeles 11 v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 112 (1983).) As Kiles notes, Arizona’s post-conviction DNA testing 12 procedures already provide that, under certain circumstances, a person convicted and 13 sentenced for a felony offense “may request the forensic [DNA] testing of any evidence 14 that is in the possession or control of the court or the state, that is related to the investigation 15 or prosecution that resulted in the judgment of conviction, and that may contain biological 16 evidence.” A.R.S. § 13-4240. Kiles suggests the State’s DNA testing statutes, both 17 postconviction testing, A.R.S. § 13-4240, and advanced forensic testing, A.R.S. § 13-4241, 18 provide an appropriate blueprint for testing in this case, but fails to clearly articulate why 19 he cannot utilize these state statutes to provide for the safeguards he proposes. Kiles 20 explicitly chooses not to invoke those procedures here and suggests reasons why he does 21 not have access to the relief provided in these statutes. Nevertheless, Kiles was convicted 22 of the murder of S.G., and thus it is not apparent why he cannot invoke these procedures. 23 There is nothing about the text of the statutes that preclude the Petitioner from pursuing 24 such relief even if Petitioner did not appeal his conviction for S.G.’s murder. And that 25 murder is sufficiently related to the current death penalty habeas that it would be unlikely 26 that Respondents could successfully argue that he has no interest in the results of the DNA. 27 Although the Court does not yet conclude that it has sufficient inherent authority to 28 compel the parties to meet and confer about appropriate DNA testing procedures, the Court 1 || need not need even consider the question of its inherent authority if sufficient statutory 2|| authority already exists by which Petitioner can obtain the relief he seeks. Pending an 3 || explanation as to why the Petitioner cannot invoke either of the two identified statutory 4|| procedures which set standards for and entitle him to compel such tests, the Court denies 5 || the motion without prejudice. 6 Accordingly, 7 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED Kiles’s Motion for Order Requiring the Parties to 8 || Meet and Confer Regarding a DNA Testing Protocol (Doc. 112) is DENIED WITHOUT 9|| PREJUDICE. 10 Dated this 13th day of January, 2023. Wars ) A Whacrsay Sooo) 13 Chief United States District Judge 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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