Kievlan v. Judges Retirement System of Illinois

2026 IL App (1st) 250150

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: March 5, 2026
• Docket: 1-25-0150
• Status: Published

Opinion

2026 IL App (1st) 250150

Opinion filed March 5, 2026 _____________________________________________________________________________

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIRST DISTRICT

PATRICIA KIEVLAN and NATOSHA ) Appeal from the TOLLER, ) Circuit Court of ) Cook County Plaintiffs-Appellants, ) ) v. ) ) JUDGES RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF ) ILLINOIS; BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF ) JUDGES RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF ) ILLINOIS; TIMOTHY B. BLAIR, in His ) Appeal No. 1-25-0150 Official Capacity as Executive Secretary ) Circuit No. 24-CH-1708 of Judges Retirement System of Illinois; ) CHARLES M. FEENEY III, MICHAEL ) FRERICHS, THOMAS HOFFMAN, ) CATHERINE M. SHANNON, MARY ) JANE THEIS, DEBRA B. WALKER, and ) KAREN WALL, in Their Official ) Capacities as Board Members of Judges ) Retirement System of Illinois, ) The Honorable ) Alison C. Conlon, Defendants-Appellees. ) Judge, Presiding.

____________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE PETERSON delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Justices Anderson and Bertani concurred in the judgment and opinion. _____________________________________________________________________________

OPINION ¶1 Plaintiffs, Patricia Kievlan and Natosha Toller, a retired and a current trial court judge,

filed appeals with the Judges Retirement System of Illinois (JRS) Board of Trustees (Board),

objecting to JRS’s classification of them as Tier 2 members of JRS and seeking to be reclassified

as Tier 1 members based upon their participation in other Illinois pension systems prior to the

effective date of Public Act 96-889 (eff. Jan. 1, 2011). That act established the two-tier structure

for public-employee pension benefits in Illinois and made significant changes to the Illinois public

pension systems. Plaintiffs asserted that JRS’s classification of them as Tier 2 members violated,

among other things, the pension protection clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art.

XIII, § 5). The Board found that the applicable statute supported JRS’s position. Thus, the Board

rejected plaintiffs’ pension protection clause argument on that basis and denied plaintiffs’ requests

for reclassification. Plaintiffs filed a complaint for administrative review in the trial court to

challenge the Board’s decision and also to litigate certain other constitutional claims that the Board

did not have the authority to decide. The trial court ultimately disagreed with plaintiffs’ arguments

and upheld the Board’s decision. Plaintiffs appealed. After the appeal was filed, this court allowed

the State Universities Annuitants Association (SUAA), We Are One Illinois Coalition, and the

Illinois Retired Teachers Association to file amici curiae briefs in support of plaintiffs. For the

reasons that follow, we affirm the decisions of both the Board and the trial court.

¶2 I. BACKGROUND

¶3 A. The Illinois Public Pensions Systems,

the Reciprocal Act, and Public Act 96-889

¶4 There are five State-funded pension/retirement systems for public-sector employees in

Illinois: the General Assembly Retirement System (GARS) (40 ILCS 5/art. 2 (West 2024)), the

State Employees’ Retirement System of Illinois (SERS) (40 ILCS 5/art. 14 (West 2024)), the State

2 Universities Retirement System (SURS) (40 ILCS 5/art. 15 (West 2024)), the Teachers’

Retirement System of the State of Illinois (TRS) (40 ILCS 5/art. 16 (West 2024)), and JRS (40

ILCS 5/art. 18 (West 2024)). In re Pension Reform Litigation, 2015 IL 118585, ¶ 4 (Heaton). Each

of those systems provides a traditional defined benefit plan or plans through which its members

(or participants) can earn specific benefits based upon their years of service, income, and age. Id.

The requirements and benefits of each system are set forth in the Illinois Pension Code (40 ILCS

5/1-101 et seq. (West 2024)), with a separate article of the Pension Code devoted to each system.

In addition, each system is subject to the pension protection clause of the Illinois Constitution.

Heaton, 2015 IL 118585, ¶ 4.

¶5 One key benefit of the five State-funded pension systems is that members are entitled to

receive a retirement annuity, which is commonly referred to as a pension. See id. ¶ 5. The amount

of a member’s monthly pension benefit and how soon a member may begin receiving that benefit

depend, in part, on the length of service in each system, when the member first began making

contributions into each pension system and the particular calculation for each system. See id.

¶6 Prior to January 1, 2011, none of the five State-funded pension systems had a tier structure.

See id. Within a particular pension system, benefits were calculated in the same manner for each

member. See id. ¶¶ 6-8. In SERS, for example, a member’s initial monthly pension benefit would

be calculated by multiplying together three variables: (1) the member’s final average monthly

compensation, (2) the member’s total number of years of credited service, and (3) a specific

statutory multiplier percentage, such as 1.67%, that was set forth in the applicable article and

section of the Pension Code. See id. ¶ 8. That initial monthly benefit amount would typically be

subject to an annual increase after the first year of retirement. See id. ¶ 9. In addition, a member

of any one of the five State-funded pension systems and certain other local pension systems could

3 use the State’s reciprocal pension provisions contained in the Retirement Systems Reciprocal Act

(Reciprocal Act) to combine his or her service credit if the member had participated in more than

one of the State-funded or local pension systems during the course of his or her career. See 40

ILCS 5/20-115, 20-117 (West 2024).

¶7 In 2010, the Illinois legislature implemented certain pension reforms to the five State-

funded pension systems by passing Public Act 96-889 (eff. Jan. 1, 2011) (Public Act or Act) into

law. The public pension reforms went into effect on January 1, 2011, the effective date of most of

the Public Act. 1 Among other things, the Public Act established a two-tier pension structure in

each of the five State-funded pension systems. See id. Pursuant to that structure, members who

had participated in a specific system prior to January 1, 2011, were generally classified as Tier 1

members of that system, and members who had not participated in the system prior to January 1,

2011, were generally classified as Tier 2 members. Id. Tier 2 members received significantly lower

pension benefits than Tier 1 members and had to work longer or to a later age to receive those

benefits. See 40 ILCS 5/1-160(c), (d) (West 2024); Heaton, 2015 IL 118585, ¶ 5. In addition to

creating the two-tier structure, the Public Act also limited the ability of members of other pension

systems to use the Reciprocal Act to qualify for Tier 1 benefits in JRS or GARS. See, e.g., 40 ILCS

5/2-119, 18-124 (West 2024). However, the Public Act did not impose such restrictions to qualify

for Tier 1 benefits in any of the other three State-funded pension systems. See id. § 1-160(a). To

that end, the Public Act made Tier 1 JRS/GARS benefits available to only those persons who had

“first served” as a judge (JRS) or a participant in GARS prior to January 1, 2011. See, e.g., id.

§§ 2-119, 18-124.

1 The effective date of the Public Act is generally January 1, 2011. The amendments that the Public Act made to section 17-129 of the Pension Code (40 ILCS 5/17-129 (West 2024)), however, went into effect on April 14, 2010, the date that the Public Act became law. Pub. Act 96-889, § 10 (eff. Apr. 14, 2010) (amending 40 ILCS 5/17-129). 4 ¶8 B. Plaintiff Kievlan’s Public Sector

Career and Her Interactions With JRS

¶9 In 1997, plaintiff Patricia Kievlan began working in the public sector as a teacher at a

community college. In that position, Kievlan became a participating member of SURS, a public

pension system under the Pension Code that had adopted the Reciprocal Act (see 40 ILCS 5/15-

192 (West 1996)). In 2008, Kievlan was elected to the St. Clair County Board and began

participating in the Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund (IMRF), another public pension system

under the Pension Code that had adopted the Reciprocal Act (see 40 ILCS 5/7-215 (West 2008)).

Kievlan was reelected to that position in 2012. In May 2013, Kievlan was appointed as an associate

judge of St. Clair County. Upon becoming a judge, Kievlan began participating in JRS, a third

public pension system under the Pension Code that had adopted the Reciprocal Act (see 40 ILCS

5/18-157 (West 2012)).

¶ 10 In May 2023, Kievlan applied for retirement benefits with JRS and opted for proportional

annuities under the Reciprocal Act. Kievlan’s retirement was to take effect at the end of June or

beginning of July 2023. In calculating Kievlan’s monthly pension benefit, JRS classified Kievlan

as a Tier 2 JRS member because Kievlan had begun her judicial service after the January 1, 2011,

effective date of the Public Act.

¶ 11 Kievlan sent a letter to JRS objecting to that classification and requesting that JRS

reclassify her as a Tier 1 member and recalculate her pension benefits in all three systems (JRS,

IMRF, and SURS) based upon that reclassification. Kievlan claimed in the letter that JRS’s

calculation of her pension benefits as a Tier 2 member violated the pension protection clause of

the Illinois Constitution, the equal protection clause of the United States and Illinois Constitutions

(U.S. Const., amend. XIV, § 1; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 2), and the special legislation clause of

5 the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, § 13). Kievlan also claimed that the entire Public

Act was void and unconstitutional because the legislature had violated the three-readings

requirement of the Illinois Constitution (Id. § 8(d)) in passing the Public Act into law.

¶ 12 The executive secretary of JRS sent a response letter to Kievlan denying her request for

reclassification. In the response letter, the executive secretary explained that under the applicable

provisions of the Pension Code, as amended by the Public Act, “anyone who [became] a JRS

member after January 1, 2011, [was] eligible for Tier 2 JRS benefits, regardless of the judge’s Tier

1 service in other Illinois reciprocal retirement systems.” The executive secretary set forth in the

letter the total amount of the monthly pension benefit that Kievlan would receive as a Tier 2

member of JRS, the total amount that Kievlan would have received if she had been classified as a

Tier 1 member of JRS, and the portions of those total amounts that were attributable to each of the

three pension systems in which Kievlan had participated. The amounts in the letter indicated that

Kievlan would have received a substantially greater monthly pension benefit if she had been

classified as a Tier 1 member of JRS, rather than a Tier 2 member.

¶ 13 Kievlan appealed JRS’s classification decision to the Board. In her appeal letter, Kievlan

explained her three-readings challenge in greater detail and also added a contention that, based

upon comments that were made during the legislative debate on the Public Act (indicating the

legislature’s intent), the Public Act did not apply to her because she was already a public-sector

employee when the Public Act was passed into law. Kievlan attached a copy of the relevant

legislative transcript to her appeal letter. The transcript showed that during the floor debates in the

House and Senate on the bill that eventually became the Public Act, the chief sponsors of the bill

made comments shortly before the bill was passed into law indicating that the Tier 2 provisions of

the bill would apply only to new public-sector employees and not to current employees.

6 ¶ 14 C. Plaintiff Toller’s Public-Sector

¶ 15 Plaintiff Natosha Toller began working in the public sector in Illinois in 2005 as an assistant

state’s attorney with the Cook County State’s Attorney’s Office. In that position, Toller

participated in the County Employees’ and Officers’ Annuity and Benefit Fund of Cook County

(CEOABF), a public pension system under the Pension Code that had adopted the Reciprocal Act

(see 40 ILCS 5/9-223 (West 2004)). Like Kievlan, when Toller began paying into CEOABF, no

pension tiers existed. In 2022, Toller began working for the Judicial Inquiry Board and began

participating in SERS, another public pension system under the Pension Code that had adopted the

Reciprocal Act (see 40 ILCS 5/14-145 (West 2022)). Under SERS, Toller was classified as a Tier

1 member based upon her prior participation in CEOABF. In March 2023, Toller was appointed

as an associate judge in Cook County and began participating in JRS.

¶ 16 Shortly after Toller was appointed as a judge, she sent JRS a letter challenging her

classification as a Tier 2 member of JRS and repeating the same assertions that Kievlan had made

to JRS regarding the applicability of the Public Act. As with Kievlan, JRS’s executive secretary

sent Toller a response letter denying Toller’s request for reclassification and explaining that, based

upon the language of the Public Act, Toller would remain classified as a Tier 2 JRS member. Toller

appealed that decision to the Board.

¶ 17 D. The Board’s Final Administrative Decision

¶ 18 In October 2023 and January 2024, the Board held its official meetings. During those

meetings, the Board considered and discussed plaintiffs’ requests to be reclassified as Tier 1

members/participants of JRS.

7 ¶ 19 In January 2024, the Board entered its written decision denying plaintiffs’ requests for

reclassification. 2 The decision was sent to plaintiffs the following month. In the decision, the Board

applied the same reasoning as to each plaintiff. According to the Board, under the applicable

statutory language of the Public Act, the determination of whether a JRS participant was to be

classified as Tier 1 or Tier 2 was made based upon when the participant “first serve[d] as a judge.”

See id. § 18-124. Pursuant to that statutory language, the Board maintained that JRS had

consistently paid Tier 2 benefits to participants who first served as a judge on or after January 1,

2011, “notwithstanding prior service credit in a reciprocal system that predate[d] January 1, 2011.”

In further explaining its decision, the Board stated that the pension protection clause only protected

“vested rights;” that participation in JRS was a prerequisite to obtaining JRS benefits; and that

because plaintiffs were not participants in JRS when the Public Act was passed (presumably, when

the Public Act went into effect), their rights to JRS benefits had not yet “accrued” and were not

protected by the pension protection clause. The Board noted that the legislature had chosen the

“restrictive language” that appeared in the Public Act and that if the legislature had intended to

confer Tier 1 benefits on JRS participants based upon their prior service in other pension systems,

the legislature could have so specified. As a final matter, the Board commented that it lacked the

authority to address plaintiffs’ remaining constitutional claims, to declare the Public Act

unconstitutional, or to even question the validity of the Public Act.

¶ 20 E. The Administrative Review Proceedings in the Trial Court

¶ 21 In March 2024, plaintiffs filed a complaint in the trial court for administrative review of

the Board’s decision. The complaint contained multiple counts and raised the same arguments that

2 The Board issued a separate decision as to each plaintiff. However, for the purpose of simplicity, and because the reasoning in both decisions was the same, we have referred to the Board’s ruling as a single decision here. 8 plaintiffs had made to the Board—that JRS’s classification of plaintiffs as Tier 2 members and the

application of the Public Act to the determination of plaintiffs’ pension benefits violated the

pension protection clause of the Illinois Constitution, the equal protection clause of the United

States and Illinois Constitutions, the special legislation clause of the Illinois Constitution, the

legislative intent behind the Public Act, and the three-readings requirement of the Illinois

Constitution. Defendants filed an answer to the complaint, which consisted of the administrative

record that was before the Board when the Board made its decision. The parties filed briefs in

support of their respective positions. In addition to the parties’ briefs, the trial court also granted

SUAA leave to file an amicus curiae brief in support of plaintiffs.

¶ 22 In October 2024, a hearing was held on plaintiffs’ complaint for administrative review.

After listening to the oral arguments of the attorneys, the trial court took the matter under

advisement. A few months later, in December 2024, the trial court issued a written ruling rejecting

plaintiffs’ arguments and upholding the Board’s administrative decision to deny plaintiffs’

requests to be reclassified as Tier 1 members of JRS. Plaintiffs appealed. 3

3 None of the parties or amici have questioned whether it is proper for this court to hear this case. Every judge, regardless of tier classification, has a pecuniary interest in the outcome of this case. Such an interest would normally require us to disqualify ourselves, and arguments can be made both for and against the application of the common law rule of necessity. See Jorgensen v. Blagojevich, 211 Ill. 2d 286, 298-99 (2004); see also Ill. Code Jud. Conduct (2023), Canon 2, R. 2.11 cmt. 3 (eff. May 17, 2023) (recognizing, as an example, that under the rule of necessity a judge might be required to participate in judicial review of a judicial salary statute). Our supreme court, however, is well aware of the conflict issue that any judge would face if called upon to decide this case and has, nevertheless, assigned this case to this district of the appellate court to decide after the First District Appellate Court recused from this case. We, therefore, proceed with deciding this case. 9 ¶ 23 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 24 On appeal, plaintiffs argue that the Board and the trial court erred in denying plaintiffs’

requests to be reclassified as Tier 1 members of JRS based on the same arguments that they made

throughout the proceedings. Plaintiffs also again assert that the entire Public Act was void and

unconstitutional because the legislature violated the three-readings requirement of the Illinois

Constitution in passing the Public Act into law. We will address each of those arguments in turn.

¶ 25 A. Standard of Review

¶ 26 In cases involving administrative review, the appellate court reviews the decision of the

administrative agency, not the determination of the trial court. Marconi v. Chicago Heights Police

Pension Board, 225 Ill. 2d 497, 531 (2006). Judicial review of a decision of the Board is governed

by the Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3-101 et seq. (West 2024)) and extends to all

questions of fact and law presented by the entire record. See 40 ILCS 5/18-164 (West 2024); 735

ILCS 5/3-110 (West 2024); Marconi, 225 Ill. 2d at 531-32. The standard of review that applies on

appeal is determined by whether the question presented is one of fact, one of law, or a mixed

question of fact and law. Marconi, 225 Ill. 2d at 532. The arguments presented in this particular

case raise questions as to the interpretation of the Pension Code and the constitutionality of

amendments made to the Pension Code by Public Act 96-889. Those questions are questions of

law that are subject to a de novo standard of review on appeal. See Williamson County Board of

Commissioners v. Board of Trustees of the Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund, 2020 IL 125330,

¶ 26 (indicating that questions regarding the constitutionality of a statute and statutory

interpretation are questions of law that are subject to de novo review on appeal). In addition, to the

extent that the Board interpreted the applicable JRS pension statutes, that interpretation is relevant,

10 but not binding on, the reviewing court. Branson v. Department of Revenue, 168 Ill. 2d 247, 254-

58 (1995).

¶ 27 B. Plaintiffs’ Pension Protection Clause Claim

¶ 28 Plaintiffs argue that the Board erred in denying plaintiffs’ requests to be reclassified as Tier

1 members of JRS. Plaintiffs assert that the Board’s underlying interpretation of the Pension Code,

as amended by the Public Act, and the Board’s ultimate denial of plaintiffs’ requests for

reclassification were flawed and violate the pension protection clause of the Illinois Constitution.

In support of that assertion, plaintiffs make two related contentions: (1) that when plaintiffs first

started working in the public sector and began contributing to pension systems that were covered

by the Reciprocal Act, the Pension Code gave them the right to move to other covered pension

systems, including JRS, and to access the benefits of those systems that were in effect at the time

that plaintiffs first started working in the public sector; and (2) that because the Public Act, which

went into effect after plaintiffs first started working in the public sector, eliminates that right of

access to such benefits for plaintiffs, who first served as judges after January 1, 2011, the Public

Act violates the pension protection clause and is unconstitutional. According to plaintiffs, the right

of access upon which they rely is contained in section 20-101 of the Reciprocal Act (40 ILCS 5/20-

101 (West 1996)), which grants a participant in a covered pension system the right to combine

“pension credit” earned from two or more covered employers to calculate a single pension annuity

that may be greater than would be received if the participant had retired from each system

individually.

¶ 29 Plaintiffs claim that the phrase “pension credit” in that statute means or includes the right

to access the benefits of other covered pension systems. Plaintiffs contend that was the “deal” that

was in place when plaintiffs first began working in the public sector and is an interpretation of the

11 statute that considers the Pension Code as a whole. In further support of their statutory-

interpretation argument, plaintiffs point out that the purpose of the Reciprocal Act is to empower

employees to transfer employment from one governmental unit to another while “assur[ing] full

and continuous pension credit” for all covered pension systems. See id. Plaintiffs also note that

any ambiguity created by JRS’s interpretation of the Reciprocal Act should be resolved in

plaintiffs’ favor, as members of certain public pension systems (see Carmichael v. Laborers’ &

Retirement Board Employees’ Annuity & Benefit Fund of Chicago, 2018 IL 122793, ¶ 24). For

these reasons, plaintiffs ask that we reverse the Board’s decision, as being in violation of the

pension protection clause, and that we remand this case to the Board with directions to reclassify

plaintiffs as Tier 1 JRS members.

¶ 30 Amici repeat many of the same assertions that plaintiffs make and also point out the general

contract principle that the law in existence at the time a contract is formed is considered to be part

of the contract (see Taft v. Board of Trustees of the Police Pension Fund of Winthrop Harbor, 133

Ill. App. 3d 566, 572 (1985)), a principle that plaintiffs refer to as well in their reply brief. Citing

that principle, amici contend that (1) the benefit formula that was in effect in JRS when plaintiffs

first started working in the public sector was part of plaintiffs’ contract and determines how

plaintiffs’ JRS pension benefits should be calculated, and (2) the “first serves as a judge”

requirement that was added to the JRS pension provisions by the Public Act did not exist when

plaintiffs first started working in the public sector and cannot be applied as to plaintiffs without

violating the pension protection clause. For those reasons, amici join plaintiffs in requesting that

12 we reverse the Board’s decision and that we remand this case with directions to the Board to

reclassify plaintiffs as Tier 1 JRS members. 4

¶ 31 Defendants argue that the Board’s ruling was proper and should be upheld. In support of

their argument, defendants contend that (1) when plaintiffs first started working in the public

sector, neither the Reciprocal Act, nor any other provisions of the Pension Code, accorded

plaintiffs the right to access the benefit structure that was in place in a different pension system of

which plaintiffs were not members—JRS, nor did it promise plaintiffs a continuity of benefits

when they moved from one covered pension system to another; (2) nothing in the Reciprocal Act

creates a single government-wide pension system, establishes a multisystem membership that

applies once a person becomes a member of any covered pension system, creates a single unified

pension based on multisystem membership, or makes persons’ rights to benefits in each covered

system relate back to the date of their first membership in any covered system; (3) the Reciprocal

Act merely provides for the continuity of pension credits (that pension credits may be combined

in certain specified ways) and not for the continuity of pension benefits; (4) plaintiffs’ assertion to

the contrary conflates the concept of pension credits with the concept of pension benefits;

(5) plaintiffs’ argument in that regard is not supported by a reading of the Pension Code as a whole

as no other provisions of the Pension Code entitle persons to access the benefits of a system before

they become members of that system; (6) plaintiffs also are not aided by the principle that an

ambiguous pension statute should be liberally construed in favor of the pensioner as there is no

ambiguity in the Reciprocal Act or the Pension Code as a whole that would support plaintiffs’

efforts in the present case to read promises into those statutes that the statutes do not contain; and

4 In their briefs on appeal, amici address only the pension protection clause issue and do not address, or take a position on, any of the other issues raised by plaintiffs. 13 (7) plaintiffs received what they were promised under the Reciprocal Act and other provisions of

the Pension Code (the continuity of pension credits) and, thus, their constitutionally protected

benefits were not diminished in violation of the pension protection clause. For all the reasons set

forth, defendants ask that we affirm the Board’s ruling, denying plaintiffs’ requests to be

reclassified as Tier 1 members of JRS.

¶ 32 The pension protection clause of the Illinois Constitution provides that “[m]embership in

any pension or retirement system of the State, any unit of local government or school district, or

any agency or instrumentality thereof, shall be an enforceable contractual relationship, the benefits

of which shall not be diminished or impaired.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. XIII, § 5. Pursuant to that

clause, a public employee’s membership/participation in a State or local government pension or

retirement system is an enforceable contractual relationship and an employee has a constitutionally

protected and legally enforceable right to receive the benefits of that particular relationship. See

Williamson County Board of Commissioners, 2020 IL 125330, ¶¶ 31-32. The clause “is a statement

by the people of [this state], made in the clearest possible terms, that the authority of the legislature

does not include the power to diminish or impair the benefits of membership in a public retirement

system.” Heaton, 2015 IL 118585, ¶ 76.

¶ 33 The protection provided by the pension protection clause is broad in nature. The language

of the clause places no limits on the kind of benefits that are protected and protects from

diminishment any benefits of the enforceable contractual relationship that flow from membership

in a particular State retirement system. See id. ¶ 45; Williamson County Board of Commissioners,

2020 IL 125330, ¶¶ 31-32; Kanerva v. Weems, 2014 IL 115811, ¶¶ 38-41; Carmichael, 2018 IL

122793, ¶¶ 29-30. Under the pension protection clause, if something qualifies as a benefit of the

enforceable contractual relationship derived from membership in any one of the individual State

14 pension systems, it is protected and cannot be diminished or impaired. Heaton, 2015 IL 118585,

¶ 45.

¶ 34 The protection provided by the pension protection clause attaches once an individual

begins employment in a position covered by a public pension system, not when the individual

ultimately retires. Id. ¶ 46. Therefore, once a person begins work and becomes a member of a

particular public pension system, any subsequent changes to the Pension Code that would diminish

or impair the benefits conferred by membership in that system are prohibited by the pension

protection clause (as to that person) and cannot be applied to that person. Id. Thus, the clause

prohibits unilateral action by the legislature (statutory amendment) that diminishes or impairs a

constitutionally protected pension benefit. Williamson County Board of Commissioners, 2020 IL

125330, ¶ 32.

¶ 35 The “benefit” that plaintiffs claim is protected by the pension protection clause in this case

is the right to access Tier 1 membership in JRS. Plaintiffs insist that they were granted such right

under section 20-101 of the Reciprocal Act and its provisions for continuity and preservation of

“pension credit” at the time they first contracted to be employed as a government employee.

Plaintiffs maintain that “pension credit” must be interpreted as meaning or including “pension

benefits” as well. Plaintiffs’ pension protection clause claim, therefore, calls upon this court to

interpret section 20-101 and any related provisions of the Reciprocal Act.

¶ 36 Section 20-101 of the Reciprocal Act, which specifically addresses the continuity and

preservation of pension credit, provides as follows:

“There is established a plan for the continuity and preservation of pension credit,

in accordance with the provisions hereof, in the case of employees transferring

employment from one governmental unit to another. The purpose of this plan is to

15 assure full and continuous pension credit for all service in public employment

which is covered by a retirement system.

The acceptance of the provisions of this Article, shall be optional with the

employee, or in the event of his death, with his survivor; however, the provisions

of Section 20-120 [40 ILCS 5/20-120 (West 1996)] shall be applicable to every

person who applies for benefits from 2 or more retirement systems covered by this

Article.” 40 ILCS 5/20-101 (West 1996).

¶ 37 Subject to certain exceptions that do not apply in the present case, “ ‘[p]ension credit’ ” is

defined in the Reciprocal Act as “[c]redit or equities acquired by an employee in the form of

contributions, earnings or service as defined under the law governing each of the systems in which

he has credits or equities.” Id. § 20-109.

¶ 38 In addition, section 20-117 of the Reciprocal Act, which addresses the vesting of pension

credit under all participating or covered systems, provides that:

“If the vesting of pension credit in any participating system for a retirement annuity

or survivor’s annuity is based upon length of service, the combined service under

all participating systems shall be considered in establishing such vesting of pension

credit.” Id. § 20-117.

¶ 39 Finally, section 20-121 of the Reciprocal Act, the section that addresses the calculation of

proportional retirement annuities (pensions), provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

“Upon retirement of the employee, a proportional retirement annuity shall be

computed by each participating system in which pension credit has been established

on the basis of pension credits under each system. The computation shall be in

accordance with the formula or method prescribed by each participating system

16 which is in effect at the date of the employee’s latest withdrawal from service

covered by any of the systems in which he has pension credits which he elects to

have considered under this Article.” (Emphasis added.) Id. § 20-121.

¶ 40 In interpreting section 20-101 of the Reciprocal Act and any related provisions, we must

be mindful of the rules of statutory construction. Statutes are presumed to be constitutional, and

the party challenging the validity of a statute bears the burden of rebutting that presumption by

establishing a clear constitutional violation. Carmichael, 2018 IL 122793, ¶ 24. A court has a duty

to construe a statute in a manner that upholds its validity and constitutionality if such a construction

is reasonably possible. Id. The fundamental rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give

effect to the intent of the legislature. Gaffney v. Board of Trustees of the Orland Fire Protection

District, 2012 IL 110012, ¶ 56. The most reliable indicator of that intent is the plain and ordinary

meaning of the language of the statute itself. Id. In determining the plain meaning of statutory

terms, a court should consider the statute in its entirety and keep in mind the subject the statute

addresses and the apparent intent of the legislature in enacting the statute (the reason for the law,

the problem sought to be remedied, the goals to be achieved, and the consequences of construing

the statute one way or another). See Blum v. Koster, 235 Ill. 2d 21, 29 (2009); Carmichael, 2018

IL 122793, ¶ 35; 5 ILCS 70/1.01 (West 2024) (indicating that in construing a statute, “[a]ll general

provisions, terms, phrases and expressions shall be liberally construed in order that the true intent

and meaning of the General Assembly may be fully carried out”). If the statutory language is clear

and unambiguous, it must be applied as written, without resorting to further aids of statutory

construction. Gaffney, 2012 IL 110012, ¶ 56. A court may not depart from the plain language of

the statute and read into it exceptions, limitations, or conditions that are not consistent with the

express legislative intent. Id. However, if the language of a statute is ambiguous in that it is

17 susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, a court may consider extrinsic aids to

determine the meaning of the statutory language. See Williams v. Illinois State Scholarship

Comm’n, 139 Ill. 2d 24, 51 (1990). In addition, when a pension statute is involved, if there is any

question as to the legislative intent and clarity of the language of the statute, the statute must be

liberally construed in favor of the rights of the pensioner. See Carmichael, 2018 IL 122793, ¶ 24.

¶ 41 In the present case, after applying the rules of statutory interpretation to the provisions of

the Reciprocal Act, we conclude that the Reciprocal Act does not support plaintiffs’ and amici’s

position. Contrary to plaintiffs’ and amici’s assertion, nothing in the Reciprocal Act grants

plaintiffs the right to access Tier 1 JRS benefits based upon their participation in a reciprocal

pension system prior to the January 1, 2011, effective date of the Public Act. The language of

section 20-101 of the Reciprocal Act, the main section upon which plaintiffs and amici rely, is

clear and unambiguous. It provides solely for the continuation and preservation of “pension credit”

and not for the continuation and preservation of “pension benefits” as plaintiffs and amici contend.

See 40 ILCS 5/20-101 (West 1996). In addition, section 20-117 of the Act allows “pension credit”

to be combined to satisfy any applicable vesting requirements that are based upon length of service,

and section 20-121 of the Act requires each system to compute its portion of a member’s

proportional annuity based upon the “pension credits” that a member has under each individual

system. This demonstrates that the Act’s focus is on the preservation and continuation of “pension

credit,” and not upon the preservation and continuation of particular “pension benefits.” See id.

§§ 20-117, 20-121. “Credits” and “benefits” are two different things. The legislature used those

two different words in the Reciprocal Act for a reason. See In re Marriage of Paris, 2020 IL App

(1st) 181116, ¶ 38 (recognizing, as an elementary rule of statutory construction, that when the

legislature uses certain words in one instance and different words in another, it intends a different

18 meaning). We may not depart from the plain language of the Reciprocal Act and read into it

exceptions, limitations, or conditions that are not consistent with the express legislative intent. See

Gaffney, 2012 IL 110012, ¶ 56.

¶ 42 Nor do we believe that plaintiffs’ and amici’s position on this issue is supported by a

reading of the Pension Code as a whole. The provisions of the Pension Code that govern JRS

benefits are contained in article 18 and specifically limit Tier 1 benefits to those persons who first

served as a judge before January 1, 2011. See 40 ILCS 5/18-124, 18-125, 18-125.1, 18-128.01

(West 2022). Although the law in existence at the time a contract is entered into is generally

considered to be part of the contract (see Taft, 133 Ill. App. 3d at 572), we do not agree that in this

case, that legal principle would make Tier 1 JRS benefits part of plaintiffs’ previous contracts.

Plaintiffs’ contracts, at least initially, were with the pension systems that they became members of

when they first started working in the public sector. 5 The benefits and rules that applied to those

systems are defined in the article of the Pension Code devoted to each of those systems and not in

the article that was devoted to JRS. The JRS system and every other public pension system under

the Pension Code is a separate system with separate statutory provisions, separate funds, and

separate administrations. The Reciprocal Act certainly protects “vested” “pension credit,” but

explicitly and unambiguously recognizes the singularity of each of the systems. See 40 ILCS 5/20-

109 (West 1996) (defining “pension credit” as that created under the “law governing each of the

systems”); Id. § 20-117 (providing for the combination of “pension credit” in “any participating

system”); Id. § 20-121 (providing that a proportional retirement annuity is to be calculated utilizing

Arguably, each plaintiff has three different contracts in this case, one for each pension system in 5

which each plaintiff has participated. 19 “pension credits under each system” using the formula “prescribed by each participating system”).

The JRS Tier 2 legislation does not impair credits earned in each individual system.

¶ 43 Because the Reciprocal Act did not grant plaintiffs the right to access Tier 1 benefits in

JRS when plaintiffs first started working in other units of government, plaintiffs’ pension benefits

were not diminished in violation of the pension protection clause when the Public Act later limited

Tier 1 JRS benefits to those persons who first served as a judge before January 1, 2011. Plaintiffs

did not decide to serve as judges until well after the effective date of the Public Act date and were,

therefore, properly classified as Tier 2 members by JRS. As the amici point out, the law in

existence at the time a contract is entered is presumed to be part of that contract. At the time

plaintiffs entered their agreements with the State of Illinois to accept their positions in the judiciary,

the law designating them as Tier 2 members and the formula to be applied to calculate their pension

annuity was in existence. Accordingly, the Board did not err in denying plaintiffs’ requests to be

reclassified as Tier 1 JRS members.

¶ 44 Although we have reviewed the case law decisions that plaintiffs and amici rely on in

support of their arguments, we do not agree that those decisions require that a different result be

reached on this issue. In each of those cases, a pension protection clause violation was found

because the plaintiffs were already members of the particular pension system at issue when the

Pension Code was amended and certain retirement benefits of that particular system were taken

away or diminished. See, e.g., Heaton, 2015 IL 118585, ¶ 47 (finding that amendments to the

Pension Code that reduced the Tier 1 pension benefits of current Tier 1 members of several of the

public pension systems violated the pension protection clause); Carmichael, 2018 IL 122793,

¶¶ 32, 51 (finding that amendments to the Pension Code that took away the rights of current

members of the public pension systems at issue to earn pension service credit while they worked

20 for private unions during leaves of absence and to have their pension benefits calculated using

their higher union salaries violated the pension protection clause); Taft, 133 Ill. App. 3d at 573

(finding that amendments to the Pension Code that required that the disability pension of a current

member of the pension system or systems at issue be reduced to offset the related workers’

compensation award that the member had received diminished the member’s increased pension

benefits and violated the pension protection clause). Those are not the facts before this court in the

present case, and there is no Illinois case law supporting plaintiffs’ arguments under the specific

circumstances of the case at bar.

¶ 45 C. Plaintiffs’ Equal Protection Clause

and Special Legislation Clause Claims

¶ 46 As their second point of contention, plaintiffs argue that the Public Act as applied to them

violates the equal protection clause of the United States and Illinois Constitutions and the special

legislation clause of the Illinois Constitution. In support of that argument, plaintiffs assert that the

Public Act creates an arbitrary, unreasonable, and unconstitutional classification because (1) it

treats identically situated individuals (people with pre-2011 public service) differently depending

upon whether they join JRS (or GARS) as compared to any of the other reciprocal pension systems,

and (2) it does so without a rational basis. The effect of that unconstitutional classification,

according to plaintiffs, is that the Public Act confers a benefit on some individuals with pre-2011

public service by allowing them to keep their Tier 1 status if they transfer to another reciprocal

pension system (other than JRS (or GARS)) but declines to extend that same benefit to other

individuals who are identically or similarly situated who later transfer to JRS (or GARS). In

addition, plaintiffs maintain, the reason cited by defendants to justify that classification—the

alleged underfunding of JRS (and GARS) and of the State pension system as a whole—does not

21 constitute a rational basis because the mismanagement of the State-funded pension systems has

nothing to do with the conduct of the group of individuals that has been targeted by the

classification and that the provisions of the Public Act at issue are not rationally related to

addressing the underfunding problem. Plaintiffs ask that we find that the Public Act, as applied to

them, violates the equal protection and special legislation clauses, that we reverse the decisions of

the trial court and the Board on that basis, and that we remand this case with directions to the

Board to reclassify plaintiffs as Tier 1 members of JRS.

¶ 47 Defendants argue that plaintiffs’ equal protection and special legislation clause claims lack

merit and should be rejected. According to defendants, plaintiffs’ claims fail for two reasons. First,

defendants contend, plaintiffs have not shown that the challenged classification group in this case

(persons with pre-2011 membership in any of the covered pension systems who later become

members of JRS (or GARS)) is similarly situated to the comparison group (persons with pre-2011

membership in any of the covered systems who later become members of another covered pension

system, other than JRS (or GARS)). Rather, defendants maintain, the two groups are not similarly

situated because each of the covered pension systems is a separate entity with different benefits

and different requirements of membership and because JRS (and GARS) involves prestigious

positions with higher salaries. Second and finally, defendants contend the challenged classification

is supported by a rational basis because limiting Tier 1 benefits in JRS and GARS as the legislature

did in the Public Act rationally furthers the State’s economic goals by reducing costs and

promoting the financial health and viability of those two pension systems and rationally recognizes

the differences between those two pension systems and the other covered pension systems. In

making that contention, defendants point out that (1) the legislature was not required to make all

potential Tier 2 pension reforms in exactly the same manner, (2) JRS and GARS were the most

22 underfunded of the five State-funded pension systems (by funding ratio), (3) JRS and GARS

members received more favorable Tier 1 benefits and Tier 2 reforms than members of other

systems, and (4) there is less disincentive to transfer into JRS or GARS caused by the Tier 2

reforms than in other systems due to the prestige and higher salaries involved with JRS/GARS

positions. Thus, defendants maintain that, overall, the limitation on Tier 1 benefits imposed on

JRS (and GARS) by the Public Act struck a reasonable balance that promoted the fiscal health of

JRS (and GARS) while dealing with a complex situation that raised multiple competing concerns.

Therefore, defendants ask that we affirm the decisions of the trial court and the Board.

¶ 48 The equal protection clause of both the United States and Illinois Constitutions provides

that no person shall be denied “the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const., amend. XIV, § 1;

Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 2. The equal protection clause guarantees that the government must treat

similarly situated persons in a similar manner, unless the government can demonstrate an

appropriate reason to treat those persons differently. See Caulkins v. Pritzker, 2023 IL 129453,

¶ 46; People v. Kimbrough, 163 Ill. 2d 231, 237 (1994). The equal protection clause does not

prohibit the legislature from drawing distinctions in legislation among different categories of

people as long as the legislature does not do so based on criteria that is wholly unrelated to the

legislation’s purpose. See Caulkins, 2023 IL 129453, ¶ 46. A court uses the same analysis to

resolve an equal protection claim, regardless of whether that claim is made under the United States

or Illinois Constitution. See id.

¶ 49 In analyzing an equal protection claim, as a threshold matter, a court must determine

whether the claimant is similarly situated to the comparison group. See id. ¶ 47. Different treatment

of unlike groups will not support an equal protection claim. Id. Two classes/groups are similarly

situated only if they are alike in all relevant respects. Id. If a claimant fails to show that he is

23 similarly situated to the comparison group, his equal protection claim must be rejected. See id.

¶¶ 47, 53; In re M.A., 2015 IL 118049, ¶ 26. In determining whether a claimant is similarly situated

to a comparison group, a court must examine the purpose of the legislation at issue. See Caulkins,

2023 IL 129453, ¶¶ 48, 51, 53.

¶ 50 As in the instant case, when a statutory classification does not impinge upon a fundamental

constitutional right and is not based upon a suspect class, such as race, a court will use the rational

basis test to review the statute’s validity. Kimbrough, 163 Ill. 2d at 237. “Under the rational basis

test, [a] statutory classification is constitutional if it bears a rational basis to a legitimate State

interest.” Id. If any set of facts can reasonably be conceived to justify a classification, the

classification will survive the rational basis test. See id. at 238.

¶ 51 The special legislation clause of the Illinois Constitution provides that “[t]he General

Assembly shall pass no special or local law when a general law is or can be made applicable.” Ill.

Const. 1970, art. IV, § 13. The special legislation clause supplements the equal protection clause

and, in many cases, provides the same protection that the equal protection clause provides.

Caulkins, 2023 IL 129453, ¶ 49. Although the legislature enjoys broad discretion in making

statutory classifications, the special legislation clause prohibits the legislature from arbitrarily

conferring a special benefit or privilege upon one person or group while excluding other persons

or groups that are similarly situated. See id. Thus, the special legislation clause is intended to

prevent arbitrary legislative classifications that discriminate in favor of a select group without a

sound and reasonable basis for doing so. See id. A special legislation challenge is generally

evaluated under the same standards that are used to evaluate an equal protection challenge. Id.

¶ 52 In the present case, after considering the legal principles set forth above, we conclude that

the Public Act, as applied to plaintiffs, does not violate the equal protection or special legislation

24 clauses. We reach that conclusion for two reasons. First, upon considering the relative positions of

plaintiffs’ group and the comparison group in light of the broad purpose of the Public Act—

pension reform—we determine that the two groups are not similarly situated. Contrary to

plaintiffs’ underlying assertion throughout this case, the Illinois public pension system is not a

single unified system. Rather, there are multiple individual pension systems benefitting employees

working in different units of government, and each one of those systems has its own fund, its own

administrators, its own requirements, and its own benefits. In addition, unlike the persons in the

comparison group, persons who later transfer into JRS (or GARS) will generally be moving into

more prestigious positions with much higher salaries. It cannot be stated, therefore, that plaintiffs’

group and the comparison group are similarly situated. See id. ¶ 47 (indicating that two groups are

similarly situated only if they are alike in all relevant respects). Accordingly, we must reject

plaintiffs’ equal protection and special legislation clause claims. See id. ¶¶ 47, 53 (stating that if a

claimant fails to show that he is similarly situated to the comparison group, his equal protection

claim must be rejected).

¶ 53 Second, even if we had found that plaintiffs’ group and the comparison group were

similarly situated, plaintiffs’ equal protection and special legislation clause claims would still fail

because the classifications imposed by the Public Act are supported by a rational basis. See

Kimbrough, 163 Ill. 2d at 237-38. As defendants correctly point out, in limiting Tier 1 benefits in

JRS (and GARS), the Public Act rationally recognized that there were significant differences

between JRS (and GARS) and the other reciprocal pension systems—most notably, that JRS (and

GARS) members generally held more prestigious positions with much higher salaries and that,

because of that distinction, JRS (and GARS) had less of a transfer disincentive caused by the

enactment of the two-tier pension structure. In addition, in implementing the changes at issue to

25 the benefit structure of JRS (and GARS), the Public Act rationally furthered the State’s economic

goals by reducing costs and promoting the financial health and viability of JRS (and GARS) and

of the public pension system as a whole. See Piccioli v. Board of Trustees of the Teachers’

Retirement System, 2019 IL 122905, ¶ 21 (recognizing that advancement of the State’s economic

goals is clearly a legitimate rationale for legislation and also that inclusion of a cutoff date in a

statute that confers benefits or establishes a government program is entirely rational because the

State has only limited resources). Indeed, the limitations imposed upon JRS (and GARS) by the

Public Act were only a few of the many changes that the Public Act made to the Pension Code in

an attempt to help shore up the State’s public pension systems as a whole. We, therefore, reject

plaintiffs’ equal protection and special legislation clause claims.

¶ 54 D. Plaintiffs’ Legislative Intent Claim

¶ 55 As their third point on appeal, plaintiffs argue in the alternative that the Board’s

interpretation of the Public Act violates the legislative intent behind the Public Act and produces

absurd and unjust consequences that the legislature did not intend. In support of that argument,

plaintiffs assert that the transcripts of the proceedings in the House and Senate during the floor

debates of the bill that became the Public Act (showing comments that were made by the chief

sponsors of the bill shortly before the bill was passed into law) make it clear that the Public Act

was not meant to apply to individuals, like plaintiffs, who had already participated in a covered

pension system prior to the January 1, 2011, effective date of the Public Act. Plaintiffs ask,

therefore, that we reverse the decisions of the trial court and the Board on that basis and that we

remand this case with directions to the Board to reclassify plaintiffs as Tier 1 JRS members.

¶ 56 Defendants argue that plaintiffs’ legislative intent claim lacks merit and should be rejected.

Defendants assert in general that plaintiffs provide no basis that would warrant this court taking

26 the extraordinary step of disregarding the plain language of the Public Act. More specifically,

defendants contend that (1) the language of the Public Act is clear and unambiguous and plainly

states that the retirement eligibility and benefits for a JRS participant depend on when that

participant “first serves as a judge”; (2) the plain language of the Public Act must be applied as

written without reading into the Public Act exceptions, limitations, or conditions that the

legislature did not express; (3) applying the Public Act’s plain, actual language would not lead to

absurd and unjust consequences not contemplated by the legislature as there is nothing absurd or

unjust about tying retirement benefits and eligibility under JRS to the date that a participant first

serves as a judge, regardless of whether that person held other government jobs and participated

in other state pension systems; (4) because the language of the Public Act is clear and

unambiguous, it would be improper for this court to consider the legislative history that plaintiffs

put forward, regardless of whether plaintiffs can show that remarks made by the bill’s chief

sponsors favor plaintiffs’ position on this issue; and (5) even if the language of the Public Act is

ambiguous, the floor debate comments that plaintiffs cite are generalized remarks that fall far short

of demonstrating a clearly expressed intent behind the Public Act that would be defeated by

applying the language of the Public Act as written. For all of the reasons stated, therefore,

defendants ask that we affirm the trial court’s and Board’s decisions.

¶ 57 As noted above, the fundamental rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give

effect to the intent of the legislature. Gaffney, 2012 IL 110012, ¶ 56. The most reliable indicator

of that intent is the plain and ordinary meaning of the language of the statute itself. Id. In

determining the plain meaning of statutory terms, a court should consider the statute in its entirety

and keep in mind the subject the statute addresses and the apparent intent of the legislature in

enacting the statute (the reason for the law, the problem sought to be remedied, the goals to be

27 achieved, and the consequences of construing the statute one way or another). See Blum, 235 Ill.

2d at 29; Carmichael, 2018 IL 122793, ¶ 35; 5 ILCS 70/1.01 (West 2024). If the statutory language

is clear and unambiguous, it must be applied as written, without resorting to further aids of

statutory construction. Gaffney, 2012 IL 110012, ¶ 56. A court may not depart from the plain

language of the statute and read into it exceptions, limitations, or conditions that are not consistent

with the express legislative intent. Id. However, if the language of a statute is ambiguous in that it

is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, a court may consider extrinsic aids to

determine the meaning of the statutory language. See Williams, 139 Ill. 2d at 51.

¶ 58 In addition to the above rules, when a pension statute is involved, if there is any question

as to the legislative intent and clarity of the language of the statute, the statute must be liberally

construed in favor of the rights of the pensioner. See Carmichael, 2018 IL 122793, ¶ 24.

Furthermore, in construing a statute, a court will presume that the legislature did not intend to

achieve absurd or unjust results. Wade v. City of North Chicago Police Pension Board, 226 Ill. 2d

485, 510 (2007). When a literal interpretation of a statutory term would lead to consequences that

the legislature could not have contemplated or intended, a court will give the statutory language a

reasonable interpretation. See id.

¶ 59 In the present case, after considering the language of the Public Act and the rules of

statutory construction, we conclude that plaintiffs’ argument on this issue lacks merit. The

language of the Public Act is clear and unambiguous and expressly limits Tier 1 JRS benefits to

those members of JRS “who first serve[d] as a judge” on or before the January 1, 2011, effective

date of the Public Act. Contrary to plaintiffs’ implied assertion, we cannot disregard the plain

language of the Public Act and read into the Act exceptions, limitations, or conditions that the

legislature did not express. See Gaffney, 2012 IL 110012, ¶ 56. Nor can we, under the present

28 circumstances, use legislative history or other extrinsic aids of statutory construction to go beyond

the Public Act’s clear and unambiguous plain language. See id. Although a court may do so when

the literal language of a statute is contrary to the clear and obvious intent of the legislature in

enacting the statute (see Collins v. Board of Trustees of the Firemen’s Annuity & Benefit Fund of

Chicago, 155 Ill. 2d 103, 112 (1993) (indicating that when the spirit and intent of the legislature

are clearly expressed and the objects and purposes of a statute are clearly set forth, courts are not

bound by the literal language of a particular statutory clause that might defeat the clearly expressed

intent)) or when applying the literal language of a statute would lead to an absurd result (see People

v. Hanna, 207 Ill. 2d 486, 498 (2003) (recognizing that when a plain or literal reading of a statute

produces an absurd result, the statute should be construed so as to avoid that absurdity)), such

instances are extremely rare and are not the circumstances before the court in the present case. We,

therefore, cannot adopt plaintiffs’ argument on this issue.

¶ 60 E. Plaintiffs’ Three-Readings Rule Claim

¶ 61 As their fourth and final contention on appeal, plaintiffs argue that the entire Public Act

must be found to be void and unconstitutional because the legislature violated the three-readings

rule of the Illinois Constitution in passing the Public Act into law (see Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV,

§ 8(d) (requiring that a bill be read by title on three different days in each house of the legislature)).

As plaintiffs 6 and defendants both note, however, our supreme court has already rejected that

challenge in circumstances, such as the present case, where the speaker of the House and the

president of the Senate have both signed the bill in question certifying that the proper procedure

was followed in passing the bill into law. See Friends of the Parks v. Chicago Park District, 203

Plaintiffs merely make this argument here to preserve it for later possible review by the Illinois 6

Supreme Court. 29 Ill. 2d 312, 328-29 (2003). We are bound by the supreme court’s decision in that regard. See

Angelini v. Snow, 58 Ill. App. 3d 116, 119 (1978). Thus, plaintiffs’ arguments on this issue cannot

prevail.

¶ 62 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 63 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decisions of the Board and of the trial court.

¶ 64 Affirmed.

30 Kievlan v. Judges Retirement System of Illinois, 2026 IL App (1st) 250150

Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 24-CH- 1708; the Hon. Alison C. Conlon, Judge, presiding.

Attorneys Terrence J. Sheahan and Jill C. Anderson, of Smith, Gambrell & for Russell, LLP, of Chicago, for appellants. Appellant:

Attorneys Kwame Raoul, Attorney General, of Chicago (Jane Elinor Notz, for Solicitor General, and Laura Wunder, Assistant Attorney Appellee: General, of counsel), for appellees.

Amici Curiae: John M. Fitzgerald, of Tabet Divito & Rothstein LLC, of Chicago, for amicus curiae Illinois Retired Teachers Association.

John T. Shapiro, of Porter Wright Morris & Arthur LLP, of Chicago, and Eric M. Madiar, of Madiar Government Relations, LLC, of Springfield, for amici curiae State Universities Annuitants Association et al.