Kien v. Allied Van Lines, Inc.

CourtDistrict Court, D. Nevada
DecidedAugust 15, 2025
Docket2:24-cv-01153
StatusUnknown

This text of Kien v. Allied Van Lines, Inc. (Kien v. Allied Van Lines, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Nevada primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Kien v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., (D. Nev. 2025).

Opinion

1 2 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEVADA 3 4 Maxime Kien, et al., Case No. 2:24-cv-01153-CDS-EJY

5 Plaintiffs Order Granting Defendant’s Motion in limine and Denying Plaintiffs’ Motion to 6 v. Reopen Discovery Dates

7 Allied Van Lines, Inc. [ECF Nos. 19, 20] 8 Defendant

9 10 Plaintiffs Maxime Kien and Jennifer Kien bring this action against defendant Allied Van 11 Lines, Inc., alleging a violation of the Carmack Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act, 12 49 U.S.C. § 14706. Am. compl., ECF No. 8. On June 18, 2025, Allied Van Lines filed a motion in 13 limine to exclude evidence and witnesses due to the plaintiffs’ discovery noncompliance. Mot., 14 ECF No. 19. 15 In the motion in limine, Allied Van Lines states that the plaintiffs have “failed to 16 participate in discovery, as they did not serve initial disclosures, failed to appear for their 17 depositions, and did not respond to requests for production or interrogatories.” ECF No. 19 at 2. 18 Thus, Allied Van Lines concludes that the plaintiffs must be precluded from introducing 19 evidence at trial regarding their claimed damages. Id. at 4. 20 In the plaintiffs’ response, they oppose the motion in limine1 and simultaneously request 21 that I re-open the discovery dates “so that this case may be heard on the merits.” Resp., ECF No. 22 20. The response states: “Counsel for Plaintiffs asks this Court and the Defendant to show mercy 23 on counsel. Counsel for Plaintiff was having personal and family problems during the discovery 24 phase that was ordered by this Court.” Id. at 2. Counsel for plaintiffs further explains that the 25 delay in complying with the discovery deadlines “was caused by mental health issues namely 26

1 The motion is fully briefed. See Reply, ECF No. 22. 1 depression and stress related to moving out of the family home, and the breakup of his family 2 unit.” Id. at 3. 3 I. Discussion 4 District courts have “broad discretion to manage discovery and to control the course of 5 litigation under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16.” Hunt v. Cnty. of Orange, 672 F.3d 606, 616 (9th 6 Cir. 2012) (quoting Avila v. Willits Envtl. Remediation Trust, 633 F.3d 828, 833 (9th Cir. 2011)). To 7 demonstrate a modification of the discovery scheduling order is warranted, the moving party 8 must demonstrate good cause. Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4); see also Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 9 975 F.2d 604, 608-09 (9th Cir. 1992). The “good cause” requirement primarily considers the 10 diligence of the party seeking the extension. Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609. “If that party was not 11 diligent, the inquiry should end.” Id. 12 Further, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 requires that “a party must, without awaiting 13 a discovery request” provide an opposing party with certain initial disclosures. Fed. R. Civ. P. 14 26(a)(1)(A). If a party fails to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26, the party is not 15 allowed to use that information or witness to supply evidence on a motion, at a hearing, or at 16 trial, unless the failure to do so was substantially justified or harmless. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1). 17 The burden is on the party facing exclusion to prove the delay was justified or harmless. Yeti by 18 Molly, Ltd. v. Deckers Outdoor Corp., 259 F.3d 1101, 1107 (9th Cir. 2001). The Ninth Circuit has made 19 clear that “[t]he district court is given broad discretion in supervising the pretrial phase of 20 litigation.” Continental Lab. Prods., Inc. v. Medax Int’l., Inc., 195 F.R.D. 675, 677 (S.D. Cal. 2000) 21 (quoting Miller v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 758 F.2d 364, 369 (9th Cir. 1985)). And, if a party, under Rule 22 37, seeks to preclude the introduction of evidence which amounts to dismissal of a claim, when 23 the court conducts its harmlessness inquiry under Rule 37, the court must make a finding of 24 willfulness or bad faith. Perry v. Brown, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 220596, at *9 (C.D. Cal. June 11, 25 2019) (citing R&R Sails Inc. v. Ins Co. of Pennsylvania, 673 F.3d 1240, 1247 (9th Cir. 2012)). 26 1 Allied Van Lines seeks to exclude all evidence related to damages, and damages are a 2 required element of the plaintiffs’ claim, meaning if I grant the defendant’s motion in limine, it 3 will be tantamount to dismissal of the claim. See Newens v. Orna Servs., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4 10685, at *6 (N.D. Cal. June 10, 2002) (explaining that a plaintiff must allege three elements to 5 establish a prima facie case of a violation of the Carmack Amendment: (1) delivery of the goods 6 to the initial carrier in good condition; (2) damage of the goods before delivery to their final 7 destination; and (3) the amount in damages (emphasis added)). Therefore, when conducting 8 the “harmlessness inquiry required under Rule 37(c)(1),” I may only preclude introduction of the 9 evidence if the plaintiffs’ failure to engage in the discovery process was willful or in bad faith. 10 R&R Sails Inc., 673 F.3d at 1247. 11 Allied Van Lines’ motion intersects with the plaintiffs’ request to reopen discovery. This 12 court is undoubtedly empathetic to plaintiffs’ counsel’s personal challenges, but the court must 13 evaluate the record and pending motions in accordance with the rules and applicable authority. 14 The requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 are that “a party must, without awaiting 15 a discovery request” provide an opposing party with certain initial disclosures, and if a party 16 fails to comply, then that party is not allowed to use that information without demonstrating 17 the failure was substantially justified or harmless. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A); Fed. R. Civ. P. 18 37(c)(1). 19 The record supports that the plaintiffs’ failure to engage in discovery was not done in 20 bad faith. The court recognizes that suffering a mental health crisis can be overwhelming and 21 all-consuming. Unfortunately, however, the court does find that plaintiffs’ counsel’s failure to 22 engage in discovery was willful, therefore neither justified nor harmless. As a threshold matter, 23 the plaintiffs’ request to reopen discovery violates this district’s Local Rules. See LR IC 2-2(b) 24 (“For each type of relief requested or purpose of the document, a separate document must be 25 filed and a separate event must be selected for that document.”). While a violation of the Local 26 Rules isn’t the crux of the issue here, it highlights the effect of plaintiffs’ counsel’s failure to 1 engage in discovery.

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Related

Avila v. Willits Environmental Remediation Trust
633 F.3d 828 (Ninth Circuit, 2011)
Miller v. Safeco Title Insurance Co.
758 F.2d 364 (Ninth Circuit, 1985)
William Hunt v. County of Orange
672 F.3d 606 (Ninth Circuit, 2012)
R & R Sails, Inc. v. Insurance Co. of Pennsylvania
673 F.3d 1240 (Ninth Circuit, 2012)
Haymond v. Lundy
205 F. Supp. 2d 390 (E.D. Pennsylvania, 2002)
City of Pomona v. Sqm North America Corp.
866 F.3d 1060 (Ninth Circuit, 2017)

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Kien v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kien-v-allied-van-lines-inc-nvd-2025.