Kidwell v. Kidwell

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Kidwell v. Kidwell

181 So. 3d 1190, 2015 Fla. App. LEXIS 17816, 2015 WL 7686949

CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida

DecidedNovember 25, 2015

Docket3D15-2065

StatusPublished

Cited by3 cases

This text of 181 So. 3d 1190 (Kidwell v. Kidwell) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Kidwell v. Kidwell, 181 So. 3d 1190, 2015 Fla. App. LEXIS 17816, 2015 WL 7686949 (Fla. Ct. App. 2015).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM.

Petitioner David Lee Kidwell seeks a writ of prohibition, essentially challenging a Final Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage with a Minor Child that adjudicated issues of child support and parental responsibility. Kidwell asserts that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the couple’s child, pursuant to the Florida Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, Fla. Stat. § 61.501-61.542 (2014). We deny the petition.

The Florida Supreme Court has consistently recognized that the issuance of a writ of prohibition is an extraordinary measure and ought to be used only in very narrow circumstances. English v. McCrary, 348 So.2d 293, 296 (Fla.1977). The writ of prohibition “is preventive and not corrective_ Its purpose is to prevent the doing of something, not to compel the undoing of something already done. It cannot be used to revoke an order already entered.” Id. at 296-97. See also State ex rel. Harris v. McCauley, 297 So.2d 825 (Fla.1974); State ex rel. R.C. Motor Lines, Inc. v. Boyd, 114 So.2d 169 (Fla.1959).

In this case, the challenged final judgment was entered by the trial court before Kidwell filed a petition for a writ of prohibition. Thus, irrespective of any merit to Kidwell’s petition, prohibition is not an available avenue to a remedy.

Additionally, we are without jurisdiction to treat the petition as an appeal under rule 9.040(c) of the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, because the petition was not timely filed. The trial court issued the final judgment on June 15, 2015. Kidwell filed the petition for a writ of prohibition on September 9, 2015, well beyond the thirty-day jurisdictional window for an appeal of a final judgment. Fla. R. App. P. 9.110(b). Thus, we cannot review Kid-well’s petition as an appeal.

Although pro se litigants are often given leniency on certain procedural technicalities in how they draft motions or request relief, they are still subject to the rules of procedure. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972). “Notwithstanding the fundamental principle of allowing pro se litigants procedural latitude, a practice effected to ensure access to the courts for all citizens, pro se litigants are not immune from the rules of procedure.” Barrett v. City of Margate, 743 So.2d 1160, 1162 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999).

Petition denied.

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PER CURIAM.

Petitioner David Lee Kidwell seeks a writ of prohibition, essentially challenging a Final Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage with a Minor Child that adjudicated issues of child support and parental responsibility. Kidwell asserts that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the couple’s child, pursuant to the Florida Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, Fla. Stat. § 61.501-61.542 (2014). We deny the petition.

The Florida Supreme Court has consistently recognized that the issuance of a writ of prohibition is an extraordinary measure and ought to be used only in very narrow circumstances. English v. McCrary, 348 So.2d 293, 296 (Fla.1977). The writ of prohibition “is preventive and not corrective_ Its purpose is to prevent the doing of something, not to compel the undoing of something already done. It cannot be used to revoke an order already entered.” Id. at 296-97. See also State ex rel. Harris v. McCauley, 297 So.2d 825 (Fla.1974); State ex rel. R.C. Motor Lines, Inc. v. Boyd, 114 So.2d 169 (Fla.1959).

In this case, the challenged final judgment was entered by the trial court before Kidwell filed a petition for a writ of prohibition. Thus, irrespective of any merit to Kidwell’s petition, prohibition is not an available avenue to a remedy.

Additionally, we are without jurisdiction to treat the petition as an appeal under rule 9.040(c) of the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, because the petition was not timely filed. The trial court issued the final judgment on June 15, 2015. Kidwell filed the petition for a writ of prohibition on September 9, 2015, well beyond the thirty-day jurisdictional window for an appeal of a final judgment. Fla. R. App. P. 9.110(b). Thus, we cannot review Kid-well’s petition as an appeal.

Although pro se litigants are often given leniency on certain procedural technicalities in how they draft motions or request relief, they are still subject to the rules of procedure. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972). “Notwithstanding the fundamental principle of allowing pro se litigants procedural latitude, a practice effected to ensure access to the courts for all citizens, pro se litigants are not immune from the rules of procedure.” Barrett v. City of Margate, 743 So.2d 1160, 1162 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999).

Petition denied.

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181 So. 3d 1190, 2015 Fla. App. LEXIS 17816, 2015 WL 7686949, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kidwell-v-kidwell-fladistctapp-2015.

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