Elizabeth Estevill v. Tomas Estevill

• Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida
• Decided: November 20, 2024
• Docket: 3D2024-0168
• Status: Published

Opinion

Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida

Opinion filed November 20, 2024. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________

No. 3D24-0168 Lower Tribunal No. 23-5059 CC ________________

Elizabeth Estevill, Appellant,

vs.

Tomas Estevill, Appellee.

An Appeal from the County Court for Miami-Dade County, Milena Abreu, Judge.

Law Office of Alexander Borell, and Alexander Borell, for appellant.

Feinstein & Mendez, P.A., and Brett Feinstein and Daniela Cardenas Capote, for appellee.

Before EMAS, LINDSEY and BOKOR, JJ.

EMAS, J. INTRODUCTION

Elizabeth Estevill (“Elizabeth”) appeals from a final judgment of

unlawful detainer rendered by the county court in favor of Tomas Estevill

(“Tomas”), her uncle. Elizabeth contends that the county court was without

subject-matter jurisdiction because she alleged, in her pro se answer and

affirmative defenses, an equitable ownership interest in the property, thus

requiring transfer of this action to the circuit court, with exclusive jurisdiction

to adjudicate this as an ejectment action, as provided by section 26.012(2)(f),

Florida Statutes (2023). We agree, and for the reasons that follow, we

vacate the final judgment and remand with directions to transfer the cause

to the circuit court.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Tomas is the title holder of a property in Hialeah (“the Property”). In

1997, he allowed his niece Elizabeth and her family to move into the Property

without any written agreement. In January 2023, he revoked his consent for

Elizabeth and her family to live in the Property, and demanded that she

vacate. She refused.

Tomas first filed an eviction action in county court against Elizabeth,

but when that action was dismissed by the court for failure to plead the proper

2 cause of action, he filed (also in county court), a complaint for unlawful

detainer pursuant to section 82.03, Florida Statutes (2023).

Elizabeth initially proceeded pro se, filing a handwritten answer and

affirmative defenses to the complaint. Elizabeth alleged that she was the only

person residing in the Property for the past 27 years, and that Tomas never

lived there. Pertinent to this appeal, Elizabeth’s pleading further alleged that:

● She paid in full “since pre-construction all deposits, down payments,

appliance fees, commodity fees, and their closing costs”;

● She has “always had interest in ownership of the property and paid

the mortgage for 25 years.”

● The Property “was put in Tomas’ name when purchased because

the FHA loan mortgage required a longer employment history than [she] had

at the moment.”

● “This was done with the premise of the house being moved to under

my name.”

Tomas filed a motion for summary judgment on his unlawful detainer

action. Thereafter, Elizabeth hired an attorney, who filed evidence in

response to the summary judgment motion and to further support Elizabeth’s

claim that she had made mortgage payments, and had paid taxes, insurance,

association dues and utilities on the Property. The written response to the

3 motion for summary judgment re-asserted that Elizabeth had an equitable

interest in the Property, and that the intention of the parties was that the title

of the Property would be transferred to Elizabeth.

Elizabeth also filed the affidavit of her friend, Gricel Barrios, who

worked for the developer of the Property, and who averred that Elizabeth

came into the office and executed a contract to purchase the Property, but

could not qualify for financing and convinced her uncle Tomas to act as a

“strawman” to purchase the Property, but that Tomas never lived there and

breached their agreement. Elizabeth’s daughter (Elizabeth Morales) also

provided an affidavit, averring that Tomas has never lived at the property and

that “my mother has made almost every single payment of the mortgage and

all of the other expenses of our house and has only failed to do so because

my uncle, Tomas Estevill, prevented her from doing so.”

The trial court did not rule on the motion for summary judgment, instead

setting the matter for trial. Following a two-day nonjury trial,1 the trial court

1 The record on appeal does not contain a transcript of the nonjury trial. However, this is not fatal to the issue presented, because the question of subject matter jurisdiction is to be decided de novo, is not waivable, and can be raised for the first time on appeal. See Page v. Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Americas, 308 So. 3d 953, 960 (Fla. 2020) (“Subject-matter jurisdiction is universally acknowledged to never be waivable.”); Colucci v. Greenfield, 547 So. 2d 224, 225 n.1 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) (“The law is well-settled that the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time.”)

4 entered final judgment in favor of Tomas, finding an unlawful detainer by

Elizabeth, and rejecting her claim of equitable ownership interest, concluding

it was not pled. 2 The final judgment also indicated that, on the merits, the

evidence presented was insufficient to entitle her to an ownership interest in

the Property.

Elizabeth moved for reconsideration, arguing, for the first time, that the

county court was without subject-matter jurisdiction because she had

asserted an equitable ownership interest in the property. The motion was

denied, and this appeal followed. Our standard of review of this question is

de novo. See Golden Cape of Fla., Inc. v. Ospina, 324 So. 3d 558, 559 (Fla.

3d DCA 2021) (“Whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction involves a

question of law, thus, is reviewed de novo.”)

ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

As provided in section 82.01(4), Florida Statutes (2023): “‘Unlawful

detention’ means possessing real property, even if the possession is

temporary or applies only to a portion of the real property, without the

consent of a person entitled to possession of the real property or after the

withdrawal of consent by such person.”

2 Given our disposition of this matter, we do not reach, and express no opinion regarding, the merits of Elizabeth’s claim of equitable ownership interest.

5 A person entitled to possession of the property “has a cause of action

against a person who obtained possession of that real property by . . .

unlawful detention and may recover possession and damages.” § 82.03(1),

Fla. Stat. (2023). See also § 82.04, Fla. Stat. (2023) (providing that in an

unlawful detainer action: “The court shall determine only the right of

possession and any damages.”)

Importantly, although the county court has exclusive jurisdiction over

unlawful detainer actions such as the one filed by Tomas, where a defendant

asserts “an equitable ownership interest in the property, the matter sound[s]

in ejectment,” and “the circuit courts of this state have ‘exclusive original

jurisdiction’ over ejectment actions.” Thompson v. Thompson, 342 So. 3d

818, 820 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022).

As we explained in Thompson: “‘Unlawful detention is a statutory

action created under chapter 82,’ the essence of which is a claim for ‘unlawful

withholding of possession by the defendant,’ The issue raised by a claim of

unlawful detainer is one of possession, not ultimate title to the property.”

(emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). See § 26.012(2)(f), Fla. Stat.

(2023) (providing: “Circuit courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction. . .

[i]n actions of ejectment”). See also Pro-Art Dental Lab, Inc. v. V-Strategic

Grp., LLC, 986 So. 2d 1244, 1250 (Fla. 2008) (“Florida’s county courts lack

6 subject-matter jurisdiction to entertain ejectment actions.”); Babcock v.

Golden Acres South, LLC, 361 So. 3d 406 (Fla. 5th DCA 2023) (same).

Where a final judgment is entered by the county court in an ejectment

action, the judgment is void. Thompson, 342 So. 3d at 821. Void judgments

may be attacked at any time. Id. at 820, n.2 (holding “the issue of subject

matter jurisdiction may be considered by an appellate court even though

raised for the first time on appeal”); Metro. Mortg. Co. of Miami v. Rose, 353

So. 3d 1230 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022); Strommen v. Strommen, 927 So. 2d 176,

179 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (“[Subject matter jurisdiction] cannot be conferred

by waiver, acquiescence, or agreement of the parties. A trial court’s lack of

subject matter jurisdiction makes its judgments void, and a void judgment

can be attacked at any time, even collaterally.”) (internal citation omitted);

Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.540(b)(4). Thus, Elizabeth’s failure to raise this issue before

the trial court’s entry of final judgment is not fatal to her appeal.

The question then is whether, in her responsive pleadings to the

unlawful detainer complaint, Elizabeth adequately alleged an equitable

ownership interest in the Property such that the circuit court’s exclusive

subject-matter jurisdiction was invoked, requiring the county court to transfer

the action to circuit court as an ejectment action rather than adjudicating it in

7 the county court as an unlawful detainer action. We answer that question in

the affirmative.

Elizabeth’s pleadings alleged that she paid in full “since pre-

construction all deposits, down payments, appliance fees, commodity fees,

and their closing costs;” she “always had interest in ownership of the property

and paid the mortgage for 25 years;” the Property “was put in Tomas’ name

when purchased because the FHA loan mortgage required a longer

employment history than [she] had at the moment;” and that “this was done

with the premise of the house being moved to under my name.”

We hold that these allegations were sufficient to assert a claim of

equitable ownership interest in the Property. Although Elizabeth did not

actually use the word “equitable” in her pro se pleading, the sum and

substance of her allegations are sufficiently clear; any requirement of an

invocation of magic words or talismanic language would promote form over

substance, and would be contrary to the leniency courts have historically

afforded pro se litigants in these circumstances. See Hanna-Mack v. Bank

of America, N.A., 218 So. 3d 971, 973-74 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017) (“Pro se

litigants are also afforded leniency on certain procedural technicalities in

drafting motions and requesting relief. Kidwell v. Kidwell, 181 So. 3d 1190,

1190 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015). This leniency promotes the courts' fundamental

8 principle of allowing pro se litigants ‘procedural latitude, a practice effected

to ensure access to the courts for all citizens,’ id., although pro se litigants

are still subject to procedural rules.”)

We further note that “Florida law has no clear standard for determining

whether someone is the equitable or beneficial owner of property nominally

owned by another; the cases are fact specific, and the most critical factor

usually is control, and a second factor is who is receiving the benefits of the

asset.” Fla. Jur. Property § 13 Title to Property, generally; equitable title. See

also In re Trujillo, 626 B.R. 59 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2019). “‘Equitable title’ has

also been defined to be a right, imperfect at law, but which may be perfected

by the aid of a court of chancery by compelling parties to do that which in

good faith they are bound to do, or removing obstacles interposed in bad

faith to the prejudice of another.” Tyler v. Price, 821 So. 2d 1121, 1125-26

(Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (quoting George E. Sebring Co. v. O’Rourke, 134 So.

556, 559-60 (Fla. 1931)).

In Toledo v. Escamilla, 962 So. 2d 1028, 1030 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007), this

court held that the defendant’s answer “that she was not a tenant and that

she had an equitable interest in the property,” required the county court to

transfer the action to circuit court as an ejectment action rather than

adjudicating the case. In like fashion, Elizabeth’s answer to the unlawful

9 detainer complaint alleges that she “never had a lease agreement nor rented

from” Tomas, that she has “always had interest in ownership of the property,”

and that the title to the Property was to be transferred into her name. See

also Thompson, 342 So. 3d at 820; Mesnikoff v. FQ Backyard Trading, LLC,

239 So. 3d 765, 770 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018) (equitable interest found where

defendant alleged in his answer that he was not a tenant, had a joint bank

account with title holder from which all property expenses were paid and he

alleged title owner promised him he could live in the condominium for the

rest of his life). Under these circumstances, these allegations were adequate

to allege an equitable interest in the property, requiring the trial court to

transfer of the action from the county court to the circuit court to be

adjudicated as an ejectment action.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, because Elizabeth adequately pled an equitable

ownership interest in the Property in her response to the complaint, the

county court was without subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the action,

and the case should have been transferred to the circuit court to proceed as

an action in ejectment. The final judgment, entered without subject-matter

jurisdiction is therefore void. We vacate the final judgment and remand with

10 directions to transfer the cause to the circuit court, and for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Reversed and remanded.