Kidd v. State

1953 OK CR 183, 266 P.2d 992, 97 Okla. Crim. 415, 1953 Okla. Crim. App. LEXIS 334
CourtCourt of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma
DecidedDecember 30, 1953
DocketA-11776
StatusPublished
Cited by15 cases

This text of 1953 OK CR 183 (Kidd v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Kidd v. State, 1953 OK CR 183, 266 P.2d 992, 97 Okla. Crim. 415, 1953 Okla. Crim. App. LEXIS 334 (Okla. Ct. App. 1953).

Opinions

POWELL, P. J.

This case involves an appeal by A. J. Kidd and George (Pat) Goff from a conviction in the district court of Rogers county, where the jury found each of them guilty of rape in the first degree. It was alleged in the information that “while acting conjointly and together * * * they did make an [417]*417assault upon one Nadine Huckleberry * * * by means of force and violence overcoming her resistance, each rape, ravish and carnally know her * The court, by reason of the jury being unable to agree upon the amount of penalty fixed the punishment of each defendaint at 25 years in the State Penitentiary.

For reversal the eleven assignments of error set out in petition in error are argued under two main heads in brief filed in this court.

It is first stated that:

It is the contention of the defendants that the evidence of the State is insufficient to sustain a conviction of first degree rape as charged in the information and that an application of the rule of this State as determined by this court to the evidence in this ease clearly reveals that the action should be reversed with directions to the trial court to dismiss the same.”

Under this heading counsel state:

“It is obvious from the opening statement of the county attorney to the close of the testimony of the State that the conduct and actions of the prosecuting witness, Nadine Huckleberry, was not that of an outraged female and that she did not mention rape -until taken to task by her mother for her late return from work on the evening in question.”

Before summarizing the evidence the statutory provision, Tit. 21 O.S. 1951 § 1114, and some of the cases construing the same should be kept in mind. The statute reads:

“Rape committed by a male over eighteen years of age upon a female under the age of fourteen years, or incapable through lunacy or unsoundness of mind of giving legal consent; or accomplished with any female by means of force overcoming her resistance, or by means of threats of immediate and great bodily harm, accompanied by apparent power of execution, preventing such resistance, is rape in the first degree. In all other cases rape is of the second degree.”

See, also, Tit. 21 O.S. 1951 § 1111, defining rape under varying circumstances.

In the case of Bulls v. State, 33 Okla. Cr. 64, 241 P. 605, this court, through Judge Doyle, said:

“To support charge of rape, female’s resistance need only be such as to make noneonsent and actual resistance reasonably manifest, having regard for her age, strength, and surrounding circumstances.”

In the body of the opinion, it was further stated:

“The old rule of ‘resistance to the uttermost’ is obsolete, and is repudiated by the more modern authorities. The law does not require that the woman shall do more than her strength, the surrounding facts, and all attending circumstances make it reasonable for her to do in order to manifest her opposition.”

The above principles have been approved in a number of later eases demonstrating the application of the rule. See Harris v. State, 88 Okla. Cr. 413, 204 P. 2d 310; Jackson v. State, 77 Okla. Cr. 160, 140 P. 2d 606; Roberts v. State, 87 Okla. Cr. 93, 194 P. 2d 219; and Epley v. State, 94 Okla. Cr. 308, 235 P. 2d 711.

In the Epley case this court said:

“To establish rape by force it is not necessary to show that prosecutrix resisted to uttermost, but it is only required that she made reasonable resistance under all the circumstances, and that resistance was genuine, active, in good faith.”

To be kept in mind, also, is the rule stated in Gullatt v. State, 80 Okla. Cr. 208, 158 P. 2d 353, 354, cited and urged by defendants, and reading:

[418]*418“While it is the law that a conviction for rape may be sustained upon the uncorroborated evidence of the outraged female, yet, it is equally well settled that the appellate court will closely scrutinize the testimony upon which the conviction was obtained, and, if it appears incredible and too unsubstantial to make it the basis of a judgment, will reverse the judgment.”

At this point it should be noted that an opinion was heretofore promulgated in this case under date of September 2, 1953; that a rehearing was sought and granted, and it may be said, principally for the reason that reference was made to and certain quotations were set out from evidence which were by the court stricken from the consideration of the jury. Counsel in one of their briefs on rehearing state:

“We submit that the record in this ease stripped as it is by action of the trial court of all evidence of threats, is devoid of proof of force overcoming her resistance.”

If the stricken evidence leaves the remaining evidence insufficient to support the charge, of course, the contention of appellants would have to be sustained, and would require a new trial. And it is true, as contended by counsel, that the stricken evidence, even though in case erroneously stricken by the trial court (which counsel do not admit), cannot now be considered by this court on appeal in determining the issues any more than it could have been considered by the jury. As called to our attention by appellants, this principle was involved in the case of Alford v. United States, 41 F. 2d 157, decided by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and there the court in the first paragraph of the syllabus stated:

“In criminal case, evidence which was stricken cannot be considered, even though clearly admissible.”

See, also, People v. Canadian Fur Trappers’ Corp., 248 N.Y. 159, 161 N.E. 455, 59 A.L.R. 372. We so hold. But at the same time we shall quote the stricken evidence for special purposes, indicating such as was stricken, which it will be seen was so intermingled with the evidence admitted as to justify quotation (if the evidence left should be determined as sufficient to support the charge), as to whether or not such stricken evidence might account for the punishment fixed by the court, the jury not having been able to agree upon the same, and the punishment appearing excessive in view of the weakness of the proof when shorn of the stricken evidence.

There are two other reasons why the stricken evidence must be considered for special purposes, and being, first, that even though the proof should be held sufficient to support the charge, omitting from consideration the stricken testimony, still, if the testimony was erroneously stricken, and even though under such circumstances it could not play any part in determining the sufficiency of the proof to support the charge, this court would not want to inferentially lend its stamp of approval to the action of the trial court in such respect. And, second, should the admitted evidence be found insufficient to support the charge and a new trial be granted, then it would be most important to determine whether or not the action of the trial court was correct or incorrect, so that if there was error, it might not be repeated.

So we proceed with consideration of the evidence. The defendants offered no testimony, so that the case stands or falls upon the admitted evidence presented by the state.

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Hazel v. State
157 A.2d 922 (Court of Appeals of Maryland, 1960)
Eubanks v. State
1958 OK CR 65 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma, 1958)
Washington v. State
1956 OK CR 8 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma, 1956)
Reid v. State
1955 OK CR 106 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma, 1955)
State v. Johnson
287 P.2d 425 (Idaho Supreme Court, 1955)
Hutchinson v. State
1955 OK CR 3 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma, 1955)
Kidd v. State
1953 OK CR 183 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma, 1953)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
1953 OK CR 183, 266 P.2d 992, 97 Okla. Crim. 415, 1953 Okla. Crim. App. LEXIS 334, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kidd-v-state-oklacrimapp-1953.