1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA
3 * * *
4 Janelle Lynn Khamvongsa, Case No. 2:25-cv-01742-CDS-BNW
5 Plaintiff, SCREENING ORDER 6 v.
7 CSL Plasma, et al.,
8 Defendants.
9 10 Pro se plaintiff filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis and a complaint. ECF 11 No. 1. Plaintiff submitted the affidavit required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) showing an inability to 12 prepay fees or costs or give security for them. Accordingly, her request to proceed in forma 13 pauperis will be granted. This Court now screens her complaint. 14 I. ANALYSIS 15 A. Screening standard 16 Upon granting a request to proceed in forma pauperis, a court must screen the complaint 17 under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). In screening the complaint, a court must identify cognizable claims 18 and dismiss claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim on which relief may be 19 granted or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. 20 § 1915(e)(2). Dismissal for failure to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2) incorporates the standard 21 for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Watison v. Carter, 668 22 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). To survive § 1915 review, a complaint must “contain sufficient 23 factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” See Ashcroft 24 v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The court liberally construes pro se complaints and may only 25 dismiss them “if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of 26 his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 27 2014) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). 1 In considering whether the complaint is sufficient to state a claim, all allegations of 2 material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Wyler 3 Summit P’ship v. Turner Broad. Sys. Inc., 135 F.3d 658, 661 (9th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). 4 Although the standard under Rule 12(b)(6) does not require detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff 5 must provide more than mere labels and conclusions. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 6 544, 555 (2007). A formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action is insufficient. Id. 7 Unless it is clear the complaint’s deficiencies could not be cured through amendment, a pro se 8 plaintiff should be given leave to amend the complaint with notice regarding the complaint’s 9 deficiencies. Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995). 10 B. Screening the complaint 11 “Federal district courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, possessing only that power 12 authorized by Constitution and statute.” K2 Am. Corp. v. Roland Oil & Gas, LLC, 653 F.3d 1024, 13 1027 (9th Cir. 2011) (quotation omitted). Federal district courts “have original jurisdiction of all 14 civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States,” otherwise 15 known as federal question jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Federal district courts also have original 16 jurisdiction over civil actions in diversity cases “where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum 17 or value of $75,000” and where the matter is between “citizens of different States.” 28 U.S.C. 18 § 1332(a). “Section 1332 requires complete diversity of citizenship; each of the plaintiffs must be 19 a citizen of a different state than each of the defendants.” Morris v. Princess Cruises, Inc., 236 20 F.3d 1061, 1067 (9th Cir. 2001). 21 A case in federal court based on diversity of citizenship requires a disclosure statement 22 from each party that names and identifies the citizenship of that party, or entity whose citizenship 23 is attributed to that party, at the time the complaint is filed (and, if applicable, when the case was 24 removed to federal court). Fed. R. Civ. P. 7.1(a)(2). For a corporation, citizenship is determined 25 by its state of incorporation and its principal place of business. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (“[A] 26 corporation shall be deemed to be a citizen of every State and foreign state by which it has been 27 incorporated and of the State or foreign state where it has its principal place of business.”). A 1 headquarters. See Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 92-93 (2010) (“[I]n practice [the ‘nerve 2 center’] should normally be the place where the corporation maintains its headquarters—provided 3 that the headquarters is the actual center of direction, control, and coordination.”). “A limited 4 liability company ‘is a citizen of every state of which its owners/members are citizens,’ not the 5 state in which it was formed or does business.” NewGen, LLC v. Safe Cig, LLC, 840 F.3d 606, 6 612 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Johnson v. Columbia Props. Anchorage, LP, 437 F.3d 894, 899 (9th 7 Cir. 2006)) (emphasis added). Moreover, “[i]f even one of [an LLC’s] members is another 8 unincorporated entity, the citizenship of each of that member’s members (or partners, as the case 9 may be) must then be considered.” D.B. Zwirn Special Opportunities Fund, L.P. v. Mehrotra, 661 10 F.3d 124, 126 (1st Cir. 2011). The court must “trac[e] through however many layers there may 11 be” to ensure the citizenship of every partner or member is accounted for in the court’s 12 jurisdictional analysis. West v. Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 951 F.3d 827, 830 (7th Cir. 2020). 13 “Diversity jurisdiction depends on the citizenship of all of the members of the LLC and may be 14 destroyed if any owner or member” of any layer of an unincorporated entity on one side has the 15 same citizenship as a party on the other side. Holden v. Fluent, Inc., No. 20-cv-03816-JCS, 2020 16 WL 6822914, at *1 n.3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2020). 17 A court may raise the question of subject-matter jurisdiction sua sponte, and it must 18 dismiss a case if it determines it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. Special Investments, Inc. v. 19 Aero Air, Inc., 360 F.3d 989, 992 (9th Cir. 2004); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). 20 Plaintiff alleges that she is a plasma donor with CSL Plasma. According to Plaintiff, CSL 21 Plasma entered into an agreement with Paysign Card Services for purposes of paying for plasma 22 donations. In essence, it appears that the payment Plaintiff (and others) receive for donating 23 plasma is provided via a Paysign card loaded with a specified, prearranged amount.
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1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA
3 * * *
4 Janelle Lynn Khamvongsa, Case No. 2:25-cv-01742-CDS-BNW
5 Plaintiff, SCREENING ORDER 6 v.
7 CSL Plasma, et al.,
8 Defendants.
9 10 Pro se plaintiff filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis and a complaint. ECF 11 No. 1. Plaintiff submitted the affidavit required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) showing an inability to 12 prepay fees or costs or give security for them. Accordingly, her request to proceed in forma 13 pauperis will be granted. This Court now screens her complaint. 14 I. ANALYSIS 15 A. Screening standard 16 Upon granting a request to proceed in forma pauperis, a court must screen the complaint 17 under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). In screening the complaint, a court must identify cognizable claims 18 and dismiss claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim on which relief may be 19 granted or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. 20 § 1915(e)(2). Dismissal for failure to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2) incorporates the standard 21 for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Watison v. Carter, 668 22 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). To survive § 1915 review, a complaint must “contain sufficient 23 factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” See Ashcroft 24 v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The court liberally construes pro se complaints and may only 25 dismiss them “if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of 26 his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 27 2014) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). 1 In considering whether the complaint is sufficient to state a claim, all allegations of 2 material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Wyler 3 Summit P’ship v. Turner Broad. Sys. Inc., 135 F.3d 658, 661 (9th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). 4 Although the standard under Rule 12(b)(6) does not require detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff 5 must provide more than mere labels and conclusions. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 6 544, 555 (2007). A formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action is insufficient. Id. 7 Unless it is clear the complaint’s deficiencies could not be cured through amendment, a pro se 8 plaintiff should be given leave to amend the complaint with notice regarding the complaint’s 9 deficiencies. Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995). 10 B. Screening the complaint 11 “Federal district courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, possessing only that power 12 authorized by Constitution and statute.” K2 Am. Corp. v. Roland Oil & Gas, LLC, 653 F.3d 1024, 13 1027 (9th Cir. 2011) (quotation omitted). Federal district courts “have original jurisdiction of all 14 civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States,” otherwise 15 known as federal question jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Federal district courts also have original 16 jurisdiction over civil actions in diversity cases “where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum 17 or value of $75,000” and where the matter is between “citizens of different States.” 28 U.S.C. 18 § 1332(a). “Section 1332 requires complete diversity of citizenship; each of the plaintiffs must be 19 a citizen of a different state than each of the defendants.” Morris v. Princess Cruises, Inc., 236 20 F.3d 1061, 1067 (9th Cir. 2001). 21 A case in federal court based on diversity of citizenship requires a disclosure statement 22 from each party that names and identifies the citizenship of that party, or entity whose citizenship 23 is attributed to that party, at the time the complaint is filed (and, if applicable, when the case was 24 removed to federal court). Fed. R. Civ. P. 7.1(a)(2). For a corporation, citizenship is determined 25 by its state of incorporation and its principal place of business. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (“[A] 26 corporation shall be deemed to be a citizen of every State and foreign state by which it has been 27 incorporated and of the State or foreign state where it has its principal place of business.”). A 1 headquarters. See Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 92-93 (2010) (“[I]n practice [the ‘nerve 2 center’] should normally be the place where the corporation maintains its headquarters—provided 3 that the headquarters is the actual center of direction, control, and coordination.”). “A limited 4 liability company ‘is a citizen of every state of which its owners/members are citizens,’ not the 5 state in which it was formed or does business.” NewGen, LLC v. Safe Cig, LLC, 840 F.3d 606, 6 612 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Johnson v. Columbia Props. Anchorage, LP, 437 F.3d 894, 899 (9th 7 Cir. 2006)) (emphasis added). Moreover, “[i]f even one of [an LLC’s] members is another 8 unincorporated entity, the citizenship of each of that member’s members (or partners, as the case 9 may be) must then be considered.” D.B. Zwirn Special Opportunities Fund, L.P. v. Mehrotra, 661 10 F.3d 124, 126 (1st Cir. 2011). The court must “trac[e] through however many layers there may 11 be” to ensure the citizenship of every partner or member is accounted for in the court’s 12 jurisdictional analysis. West v. Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 951 F.3d 827, 830 (7th Cir. 2020). 13 “Diversity jurisdiction depends on the citizenship of all of the members of the LLC and may be 14 destroyed if any owner or member” of any layer of an unincorporated entity on one side has the 15 same citizenship as a party on the other side. Holden v. Fluent, Inc., No. 20-cv-03816-JCS, 2020 16 WL 6822914, at *1 n.3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2020). 17 A court may raise the question of subject-matter jurisdiction sua sponte, and it must 18 dismiss a case if it determines it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. Special Investments, Inc. v. 19 Aero Air, Inc., 360 F.3d 989, 992 (9th Cir. 2004); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). 20 Plaintiff alleges that she is a plasma donor with CSL Plasma. According to Plaintiff, CSL 21 Plasma entered into an agreement with Paysign Card Services for purposes of paying for plasma 22 donations. In essence, it appears that the payment Plaintiff (and others) receive for donating 23 plasma is provided via a Paysign card loaded with a specified, prearranged amount. But Plaintiff 24 alleges that Paysign charges fees for all kinds of things, which in turn diminishes the net balance 25 on card. These fees were not explained to Plaintiff, nor did she agree to them. Accordingly, 26 Plaintiff filed this lawsuit alleging a breach of the contract (as well as other causes of actions). 27 / / 1 1. Jurisdiction 2 Plaintiff alleges that she is a citizen of Nevada. But there isn’t much information regarding 3 the defendants other than the allegation that Paysign operates in Pennsylvania. Without more, it is 4 impossible to determine whether there is full diversity in this case. Here, Plaintiff does not allege 5 facts sufficient to invoke the Court’s jurisdiction. 6 In addition, it is not clear how the amount in controversy exceeds the $75,000 minimum 7 that would give the Court jurisdiction over this matter. Plaintiff lists a variety of different 8 categories (some which are questionable) but does not provide much explanation as to how her 9 damages exceed $75,000. “Conclusory allegations as to the amount in controversy are 10 insufficient” to establish jurisdiction. Matheson v. Progressive Specialty Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 1089, 11 1090–91 (9th Cir. 2003). In addition, while it is not the purpose of a screening order to assess the 12 merits of a claim for punitive damages, it is relevant to note that party in Nevada may not recover 13 punitive damages resulting from a breach of contract. S.J. Amoroso Const. Co. v. Lazovich and 14 Lazovich, 810 P.2d 775 (Nev. 1991). As such, the amount Plaintiff lists for punitive damages 15 does not factor into the calculation to determine the amount in controversy. 16 2. Causes of actions without supporting facts 17 While Plaintiff lists a variety of causes of actions on page seven of her complaint, she only 18 details the breach of contract claim. A properly pled complaint must provide “[a] short and plain 19 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); Bell 20 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). While Rule 8 does not require detailed 21 factual allegations, it demands “more than labels and conclusions.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 22 662, 678 (2009) (citation omitted). 23 3. Role of PaySign in breach of contract 24 Lastly, this Court notes that it is not clear how PaySign breached any contractual duties 25 toward Plaintiff as her contract, apparently, was only with CSL. 26 4. Amendment 27 If Plaintiff chooses to amend, she must read this order carefully and address the current 1 || providing specifics regarding the amount in controversy, providing supporting facts as to each 2 || cause of action she wishes to include in her complaint, and specifying how Paysign breached an 3 || agreement with Plaintiff (was there any agreement?). 4 Additionally, Plaintiff is advised that if she files an amended complaint, the original 5 || complaint (ECF No. 1-1) no longer serves any function in this case. As such, if Plaintiff files an 6 || amended complaint, each claim and the involvement of each specific defendant must be alleged 7 || sufficiently. The Court cannot refer to a prior pleading or to other documents to make □□□□□□□□□□□ 8 || amended complaint complete. The amended complaint must be complete in and of itself without 9 || reference to prior pleadings or to other documents. 10 Lastly, Plaintiff is advised that, should there not be jurisdiction in federal court, she can 11 || always file a complaint in Nevada state court. 12 || IL CONCLUSION 13 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiffs application for leave to proceed in 14 || forma pauperis (ECF No. 1) is GRANTED. Plaintiff is permitted to maintain this action to 15 || conclusion without prepaying fees or costs or giving security for them. 16 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court detach and separately file 17 || Plaintiff's complaint (ECF No. 1-1). 18 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's complaint is dismissed without prejudice 19 || and with leave to amend. If Plaintiff chooses to file an amended complaint, she must do so by 20 || October 23, 2025, or this Court will recommend that her case be dismissed. 21 22 DATED: September 19, 2025 23 KE pr la WOE BRENDA WEKSLER 25 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 26 27 28