1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 KHALID MATAN, Case No.: 26-cv-0024-JES-DDL
12 Petitioner, ORDER GRANTING PETITION 13 v. 14 KRISTI NOEM, Secretary of the [ECF No. 1] Department of Homeland Security; 15 PAMELA JO BONDI, Attorney General; 16 TODD M. LYONS, Acting Director, Immigration and Customs Enforcement; 17 JESUS ROCHA, Acting Field Office 18 Director, San Diego Field Office; and CHRISTOPHER LAROSE, Warden at 19 Otay Mesa Detention Center, 20 Respondents. 21 22 23 Before the Court is Petitioner Khalid Matan’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 24 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, filed on January 4, 2026. ECF No. 1 (“Pet.”). Petitioner also 25 filed a motion for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) on January 4, 2026. ECF No. 2 26 The Petition and TRO have been fully briefed by the parties. ECF Nos. 8, 9. For the reasons 27 set forth below, the Court GRANTS the Petition on due process and regulatory grounds, 28 and DENIES the motion for TRO as moot. 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 Petitioner is a citizen of Somalia who fled his home country due to civil war. Pet. at 3 1. Petitioner entered the United States seeking asylum on December 2, 2015. Id. Petitioner 4 was on bond during his asylum proceedings and appeal. Id. In June of 2018, an immigration 5 judge entered an order denying petitioner’s asylum claim and granting withholding of 6 removal to Somalia. Id. Petitioner appealed the denial, and the Board of Immigration 7 Appeals dismissed his appeal on April 18, 2018. ECF No. 8 at 2. 8 On December 12, 2022, Petitioner married his wife, who is a U.S. Citizen. Pet. at 1. 9 She filed a family petition for Petitioner in November of 2023 which is still pending. Id. 10 At different times following the entry of Petitioner’s final order of removal, he has 11 been subject to parole with bond, the Compliance Assistance Reporting Terminal, and, 12 most recently, the Alternatives to Detention program with an ankle monitor. ECF No. 8 at 13 2. On December 17, 2025, Petitioner was arrested by ICE at a check in. Pet. at 1. ICE 14 presented Petitioner with a Notice of Revocation which he refused to sign, and then took 15 the notice away. Id. Petitioner states that he has not been told why his release was revoked, 16 given a chance to explain why release should not be revoked, or had the opportunity to 17 meet with ICE about his potential removal. Id. Respondents assert that Petitioner was given 18 an informal interview. ECF No. 8 at 6. 19 II. LEGAL STANDARD 20 A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United 21 States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). 22 “The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that 23 custody, and ... the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody.” 24 Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). A court may grant a writ of habeas corpus 25 to a petitioner who demonstrates to be in custody in violation of the Constitution or federal 26 law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Traditionally, “the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means 27 of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its protections 28 have been strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001). Accordingly, challenges 1 to immigration-related detention are within the purview of a district court's habeas 2 jurisdiction. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see also Demore v. Kim, 538 3 U.S. 510, 517 (2003). 4 III. DISCUSSION 5 Petitioner argues that his continued detention without an individualized finding of 6 justification violates Respondent’s regulations and the Due Process clause, and that his 7 continued detention violates the standards set forth in Zadvydas. See Pet.; 633 U.S. at 687. 8 The Court discusses these arguments in turn below. 9 A. Due Process and Regulatory Claims 10 Petitioner argues that he was not provided adequate notice or opportunity to be heard 11 in violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process clause and Respondents’ own 12 regulations. Pet. at 7. The Court agrees. 13 When the government grants a noncitizen parole or supervised release, it creates a 14 protected liberty interest subject to due process clause protection. See Sanchez v. LaRose, 15 No. 25-CV-2396-JES-MMP, 2025 WL 2770629 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2025). These 16 protections include at least notice and an opportunity to be heard regarding the revocation. 17 Id.; Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976) (“The essence of due process is the 18 requirement that ‘a person in jeopardy of a serious loss [be given] notice of the case against 19 him and the opportunity to meet it.”). In Saengphet v. Noem, this Court ruled that notices 20 revoking protected liberty interests are constitutionally inadequate when they lack 21 individualized explanations of the changed circumstances giving rise to revocation. No. 22 3:25-CV-2909-JES-BLM, 2025 WL 3240808, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2025). 23 Constitutionally inadequate notice also often leads to constitutionally inadequate 24 opportunity to be heard, because opportunity to be heard must be meaningful to be 25 constitutionally sufficient. See Sanchez, 2025 WL 2770629 at *3; Ying Fong v. Ashcroft, 26 317 F. Supp. 2d 398, 403 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“The opportunity to be heard must be 27 meaningful, that is, an opportunity granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful 28 manner.”). A detainee’s opportunity to be heard is not meaningful if the detainee has not 1 been informed of the circumstances of his revoked release in a manner sufficient to allow 2 his response. Sarail A. v. Bondi, No. 25-CV-2144-ECT-JFD, 2025 WL 2533673, at *10 3 (D. Minn. Sept. 3, 2025). 4 Just as the Constitution requires adequate notice and opportunity to be heard prior 5 to the revocation of a protected liberty interest, so too do Respondent’s own regulations 6 governing such revocation. See Bui v. Warden of the Otay Mesa Det. Facility, No. 25-CV- 7 2111-JES-DEB, 2025 WL 2988356 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 23, 2025); Nguyen v. Noem, No. 25- 8 CV-3062-JES-VET, 2025 WL 3251374, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2025). Supervised 9 release and any revocation of such release thereafter is governed by either 8 C.F.R. § 241.4 10 or 8 C.F.R. § 241.13. Diaz v. Wofford, No. 1:25-CV-01079 JLT EPG, 2025 WL 2581575, 11 at *4 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 2025). As this Court analyzed in Bui and Ngyuen, both statutes 12 require adequate notice of the reasons for the revocation of release and a prompt initial 13 informal interview to afford the alien an opportunity to respond to the reasons given in the 14 notice. Nguyen, 2025 WL 3251374, at *3. Conclusory assertions that a detainee can be 15 removed from the United States are insufficient to meet the notice and opportunity to be 16 heard requirements of the U.S. Constitution and the governing regulations promulgated by 17 Respondents’ agencies.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 KHALID MATAN, Case No.: 26-cv-0024-JES-DDL
12 Petitioner, ORDER GRANTING PETITION 13 v. 14 KRISTI NOEM, Secretary of the [ECF No. 1] Department of Homeland Security; 15 PAMELA JO BONDI, Attorney General; 16 TODD M. LYONS, Acting Director, Immigration and Customs Enforcement; 17 JESUS ROCHA, Acting Field Office 18 Director, San Diego Field Office; and CHRISTOPHER LAROSE, Warden at 19 Otay Mesa Detention Center, 20 Respondents. 21 22 23 Before the Court is Petitioner Khalid Matan’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 24 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, filed on January 4, 2026. ECF No. 1 (“Pet.”). Petitioner also 25 filed a motion for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) on January 4, 2026. ECF No. 2 26 The Petition and TRO have been fully briefed by the parties. ECF Nos. 8, 9. For the reasons 27 set forth below, the Court GRANTS the Petition on due process and regulatory grounds, 28 and DENIES the motion for TRO as moot. 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 Petitioner is a citizen of Somalia who fled his home country due to civil war. Pet. at 3 1. Petitioner entered the United States seeking asylum on December 2, 2015. Id. Petitioner 4 was on bond during his asylum proceedings and appeal. Id. In June of 2018, an immigration 5 judge entered an order denying petitioner’s asylum claim and granting withholding of 6 removal to Somalia. Id. Petitioner appealed the denial, and the Board of Immigration 7 Appeals dismissed his appeal on April 18, 2018. ECF No. 8 at 2. 8 On December 12, 2022, Petitioner married his wife, who is a U.S. Citizen. Pet. at 1. 9 She filed a family petition for Petitioner in November of 2023 which is still pending. Id. 10 At different times following the entry of Petitioner’s final order of removal, he has 11 been subject to parole with bond, the Compliance Assistance Reporting Terminal, and, 12 most recently, the Alternatives to Detention program with an ankle monitor. ECF No. 8 at 13 2. On December 17, 2025, Petitioner was arrested by ICE at a check in. Pet. at 1. ICE 14 presented Petitioner with a Notice of Revocation which he refused to sign, and then took 15 the notice away. Id. Petitioner states that he has not been told why his release was revoked, 16 given a chance to explain why release should not be revoked, or had the opportunity to 17 meet with ICE about his potential removal. Id. Respondents assert that Petitioner was given 18 an informal interview. ECF No. 8 at 6. 19 II. LEGAL STANDARD 20 A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United 21 States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). 22 “The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that 23 custody, and ... the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody.” 24 Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). A court may grant a writ of habeas corpus 25 to a petitioner who demonstrates to be in custody in violation of the Constitution or federal 26 law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Traditionally, “the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means 27 of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its protections 28 have been strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001). Accordingly, challenges 1 to immigration-related detention are within the purview of a district court's habeas 2 jurisdiction. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see also Demore v. Kim, 538 3 U.S. 510, 517 (2003). 4 III. DISCUSSION 5 Petitioner argues that his continued detention without an individualized finding of 6 justification violates Respondent’s regulations and the Due Process clause, and that his 7 continued detention violates the standards set forth in Zadvydas. See Pet.; 633 U.S. at 687. 8 The Court discusses these arguments in turn below. 9 A. Due Process and Regulatory Claims 10 Petitioner argues that he was not provided adequate notice or opportunity to be heard 11 in violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process clause and Respondents’ own 12 regulations. Pet. at 7. The Court agrees. 13 When the government grants a noncitizen parole or supervised release, it creates a 14 protected liberty interest subject to due process clause protection. See Sanchez v. LaRose, 15 No. 25-CV-2396-JES-MMP, 2025 WL 2770629 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2025). These 16 protections include at least notice and an opportunity to be heard regarding the revocation. 17 Id.; Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976) (“The essence of due process is the 18 requirement that ‘a person in jeopardy of a serious loss [be given] notice of the case against 19 him and the opportunity to meet it.”). In Saengphet v. Noem, this Court ruled that notices 20 revoking protected liberty interests are constitutionally inadequate when they lack 21 individualized explanations of the changed circumstances giving rise to revocation. No. 22 3:25-CV-2909-JES-BLM, 2025 WL 3240808, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2025). 23 Constitutionally inadequate notice also often leads to constitutionally inadequate 24 opportunity to be heard, because opportunity to be heard must be meaningful to be 25 constitutionally sufficient. See Sanchez, 2025 WL 2770629 at *3; Ying Fong v. Ashcroft, 26 317 F. Supp. 2d 398, 403 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“The opportunity to be heard must be 27 meaningful, that is, an opportunity granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful 28 manner.”). A detainee’s opportunity to be heard is not meaningful if the detainee has not 1 been informed of the circumstances of his revoked release in a manner sufficient to allow 2 his response. Sarail A. v. Bondi, No. 25-CV-2144-ECT-JFD, 2025 WL 2533673, at *10 3 (D. Minn. Sept. 3, 2025). 4 Just as the Constitution requires adequate notice and opportunity to be heard prior 5 to the revocation of a protected liberty interest, so too do Respondent’s own regulations 6 governing such revocation. See Bui v. Warden of the Otay Mesa Det. Facility, No. 25-CV- 7 2111-JES-DEB, 2025 WL 2988356 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 23, 2025); Nguyen v. Noem, No. 25- 8 CV-3062-JES-VET, 2025 WL 3251374, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2025). Supervised 9 release and any revocation of such release thereafter is governed by either 8 C.F.R. § 241.4 10 or 8 C.F.R. § 241.13. Diaz v. Wofford, No. 1:25-CV-01079 JLT EPG, 2025 WL 2581575, 11 at *4 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 2025). As this Court analyzed in Bui and Ngyuen, both statutes 12 require adequate notice of the reasons for the revocation of release and a prompt initial 13 informal interview to afford the alien an opportunity to respond to the reasons given in the 14 notice. Nguyen, 2025 WL 3251374, at *3. Conclusory assertions that a detainee can be 15 removed from the United States are insufficient to meet the notice and opportunity to be 16 heard requirements of the U.S. Constitution and the governing regulations promulgated by 17 Respondents’ agencies. Id.; Sanchez, 2025 WL 2770629, at *3; Saengphet, 2025 WL 18 3240808, at *5. 19 Here, Petitioner was given a Notice of Revocation of Release dated December 18, 20 2025, which contained the following language: 21 ICE has determined that you can be expeditiously removed from the United 22 States pursuant to the outstanding order of removal against you. ICE is currently working to obtained [sic] a valid travel document for your removal. 23 Based on the above, and pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2), your release on 24 an order of supervision will be revoked today and you will be taken into ICE 25 custody. You will be afforded an informal interview today at which you will be given an opportunity to respond to the reasons for the revocation. You may 26 submit any evidence or information you wish to be reviewed in support of 27 your release. 28 1 ECF No. 8-2 at 6. This language is substantially similar to language from other notices that 2 this Court and courts in this Circuit have held to be insufficient. See Nguyen, 2025 WL 3 3251374, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2025) (finding notice informing detainee that he could 4 be expeditiously removed insufficient); Saengphat, 2025 WL 3240808, at *7 (S.D. Cal. 5 Nov. 20, 2025) (finding similar language in notice to be too “conclusory” to provide 6 adequate notice); McSweeney v. Warden of Otay Mesa Det. Facility, No. 3:25-CV-02488- 7 RBM-DEB, 2025 WL 2998376, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2025) (holding that language in 8 notice stating that “ICE has determined that you can be expeditiously removed from the 9 United States pursuant to an outstanding order of removal” was “conclusory and unclear” 10 and failed to provide adequate notice of the basis of the revocation decision); J.L.R.P., v. 11 Wofford et al., No. 1:25-CV-01464-KES-SKO (HC), 2025 WL 3190589, at *7 (E.D. Cal. 12 Nov. 14, 2025) (holding that same language in the notice of revocation of release “did not 13 provide any specific changed circumstance applicable to petitioner”). The notice is thus 14 inadequate under both the U.S. Constitution and Respondents’ regulations. 15 As to the informal interview, the parties contest whether such an interview occurred. 16 See Pet. at 2; ECF No. 8 at 6. Based on the conclusory nature of the notice of revocation 17 and lack of apparent individualized findings, the Court declines to assume that an interview 18 occurred which met the requirement of the constitutions and Respondents’ own 19 regulations. See Sanchez 2025 WL 2770629, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2025) (declining to 20 presume constitutionality of interview considering lack of enumerated changed 21 circumstances in case). 22 Because Respondents did not meet their obligations to revoke Petitioner’s 23 supervised release under the Due Process Clause and their own regulations, the Court 24 GRANTS the petition on these grounds. 25 IV. CONCLUSION 26 For the reasons stated above, Petitioner’s Writ of Habeas Corpus is GRANTED on 27 statutory and due process grounds regarding the means of revocation of his release. 28 Because the requested release available on habeas is granted, Petitioner’s remaining claims 1 his motion for a TRO are DENIED as moot. Respondents are ORDERED to 2 ||immediately release Petitioner from custody, subject to his prior conditions of release. The 3 || Parties are ORDERED to file a Joint Status Report no later than 5:00 p.m. on January 4 2026, confirming that the Petitioner has been released. The Clerk of Court is 5 || ORDERED to CLOSE this case. 6 IT IS SO ORDERED. 7 || Dated: January 20, 2026
9 Honorable James E. Simmons Jr. 10 United States District Judge 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28