Kevin Lipscomb v. Foss Maritime Company

83 F.3d 1106, 1996 A.M.C. 1598, 96 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 3317, 96 Daily Journal DAR 5413, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 10905, 1996 WL 239320
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedMay 10, 1996
Docket95-35418
StatusPublished
Cited by26 cases

This text of 83 F.3d 1106 (Kevin Lipscomb v. Foss Maritime Company) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Kevin Lipscomb v. Foss Maritime Company, 83 F.3d 1106, 1996 A.M.C. 1598, 96 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 3317, 96 Daily Journal DAR 5413, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 10905, 1996 WL 239320 (9th Cir. 1996).

Opinion

*1108 FLETCHER, Circuit Judge:

The shipowner Foss appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the seaman Kevin Lipscomb. The appeal requires us to determine the proper method for determining a seaman’s “unearned wages” for purposes of his entitlement under the general maritime law to maintenance, cure, and unearned wages when taken ill or injured in the service of a ship. We agree with the district court’s conclusion that a seaman is entitled to the compensation he would have earned had he not been injured, to the extent such determination can be made without speculation. Because it is undisputed that the plaintiff, Kevin Lipscomb, would have earned an employment benefit called “accumulated time off’ (“ATO”) in the amount of $955.35 had he not been injured, in addition to his base wage rates, he was entitled to that amount as part of his unearned wages. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment in favor of Lipscomb in the amount of $955.35.

I.

The essential facts are undisputed. Lipscomb was employed by Foss on the tug JOHN BRIX during October 1993 as an able-bodied seaman. He was employed pursuant to the terms of a collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) between Foss and the Inlandboatmen’s Union of the Pacific (“Union”). On or about October 15, 1993, Lipscomb was injured while in the service of the ship. Lipscomb was taken ashore for medical treatment. As a result of the injury, Foss paid Lipscomb a total of 15.5 days of unearned wages at his base wage rate of $89.62 per day, for a total payment of $1,389.11.

Lipscomb was not paid ATO as part of his unearned wages. Under the CBA, ATO is compensation earned, in addition to base wages, “[f]or each day worked and for each day a crew member is required to remain on board the vessel.” Seamen in Lipscomb’s class work eight hours per day for up to ninety days straight and then are off work for up to ninety days. They are paid a “base wage” for the time working aboard ship and also earn ATO. The base wages are paid immediately, whereas ATO is paid out during the time they are ashore. From the Union’s point of view, “the purpose of ATO is to guarantee a seaman a paycheck between voyages and to guarantee that a seaman will have his health and welfare benefits paid during periods of unemployment.”

The parties stipulated that if unearned wages include ATO, Lipscomb was entitled to an additional $955.35. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The district court granted Lipscomb’s motion and denied Foss’s motion. The court entered judgment in favor of Lipscomb in the amount of $955.35. We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment. See Warren v. City of Carlsbad, 58 F.3d 439, 441 (9th Cir.1995), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 1261, 134 L.Ed.2d 209 (1996).

II.

A.

Foss first contends that the CBA limits seamen’s compensation when ill or injured to the daily wage rates. We disagree. The CBA provides for ATO benefits when seamen are “working” or are “required to remain on board the vessel.” Foss asserts that since Lipscomb met neither of these prerequisites, he is not entitled to ATO as unearned wages. This argument is without merit. The CBA also states that “the daily rates specified in Appendix D shall be paid for each day worked.” As the district court noted, Foss’s argument would serve to eliminate unearned wages altogether — something clearly not contemplated by the CBA or permitted under the general maritime law. Lipscomb is not suing for breach of the collective bargaining agreement; he is suing for a violation of the general maritime law right to maintenance, cure, and unearned wages. This right is imposed by law and cannot be abrogated by contract, Cortes v. Baltimore Insular Line, 287 U.S. 367, 371, 53 S.Ct. 173, 174, 77 L.Ed. 368 (1982), although the method for calculating the amount of maintenance, cure, and wages may be determined by the collective bargaining process, Gardiner v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., *1109 786 F.2d 943, 949 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 924, 107 S.Ct. 381, 93 L.Ed.2d 303 (1986). Only if the collective bargaining agreement “express[ly]” provides for a different computation of maintenance, cure, and wages does it modify the general maritime law. Id. (CBA expressly stated that $8 per day would be provided as “maintenance” for an ill or injured seaman). The CBA between Foss and the Union does not discuss the amount to be provided an ill or injured seaman as “wages.” Accordingly, it does not modify Lipscomb’s entitlement to unearned wages under the general maritime law.

We turn, then, to the meaning of unearned wages under the general maritime law.

B.

Under the general maritime law, a seaman who falls ill or becomes injured while in the service of a ship is entitled to “maintenance and cure” by his employer. Id. at 945-46. This right includes (1) “maintenance”—a living allowance for food and lodging to the ill seaman; (2) “cure”—reimbursement for medical expenses; and (3) “unearned wages” from the onset of injury or illness until the end of the voyage. 1 Id. at 946. The purposes of this right, which dates back to the Middle Ages, id. at 945, are threefold: (1) to protect “poor and improvident” seamen; (2) to encourage shipowners to protect seamen’s health and safety; and (3) to induce employment in the merchant marine. Vella v. Ford Motor Co., 421 U.S. 1, 3—4, 95 S.Ct. 1381, 1382-83, 43 L.Ed.2d 682 (1975); Gardiner, 786 F.2d at 946.

The district court adopted a “but for” test for determining what elements of compensation are required to be paid as part of unearned wages: “ATO is a benefit that Lipscomb would have received but for his injury, and as such, ATO is recoverable as unearned wages.” Although the Ninth Circuit has not directly addressed the issue, other courts have adopted “but for” tests and have concluded that “comp time,” tips, “accumulated leave,” and similar employment benefits constitute “unearned wages” for purposes of a seaman’s entitlement to maintenance, cure, and wages. We agree, and conclude that ATO is part of Lipscomb’s unearned wages under the general maritime law.

In Flores v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 47 F.3d 1120 (11th Cir.1995), the Eleventh Circuit held that an injured cabin steward was entitled to not only his base wages but also the tips that “he would have earned had he not become disabled.” Id. at 1123. The court reasoned that the right to maintenance, cure, and unearned wages is “one designed to put the sailor in the same position he would have been had he continued to work.” Id. at 1127.

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83 F.3d 1106, 1996 A.M.C. 1598, 96 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 3317, 96 Daily Journal DAR 5413, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 10905, 1996 WL 239320, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kevin-lipscomb-v-foss-maritime-company-ca9-1996.