KEVIN JOSUE ARANDA MARTINEZ, Case No.: 26-cv-2905-JES-AHG
Petitioner, ORDER GRANTING PETITION v. FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
WARDEN, Otay Mesa Detention Center; FIELD OFFICE DIRECTOR, ICE San Diego Field Office; TODD M. LYONS, Acting Director, United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement; KRISTI NOEM, Secretary of Homeland Security; and MERRICK GARLAND, United States Attorney General, Respondents. Before the Court is Petitioner Kevin Josue Aranda Martinez’s Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (“Petition”), now the operative petition in this matter. ECF No. 7. Per the Court’s order, Respondents responded to the Petition. ECF No. 9 (“Return”). Petitioner filed an optional Traverse. ECF No. 10. For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS the petition. Petitioner, a native of Honduras, entered the United States in January of 2019. Pet. at 2. He was arrested by Border Patrol, placed in removal proceedings, and paroled into the country. Id. While living in the country, Petitioner applied for a Special Immigrant Juvenile Visa. Id. He received a work permit and a Social Security number. Id. at 3. He has attended all his court dates and has no criminal history. Id. On February 22, 2026, Petitioner was re-detained. Id. He was not given any notice, information, or opportunity to be heard regarding his re-detention. Id. A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). “The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). A court may grant a writ of habeas corpus to a petitioner who demonstrates to be in custody in violation of the Constitution or federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Traditionally, “the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its protections have been strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001). Accordingly, challenges to immigration-related detention are within the purview of a district court's habeas jurisdiction. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see also Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 517 (2003). In his petition, Petitioner argues that his re-detention and the manner in which it was carried out violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Administrative Procedure Act. Pet. at 3-7. In their return, Respondents briefly argue that Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention, but acknowledge that this Court and courts in this district have reached the opposite conclusion under similar facts. Return at 2. As such, Respondents state that they “do[] not oppose the petition and defer[] to the Court on the appropriate relief.” Id. “The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits the Government from depriving individuals of their life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 990 (9th Cir. 2017). “[T]he Due Process Clause applies to all persons within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 679. “Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint— lies at the heart of the liberty that Clause protects.” Id. at 690. A person at risk of suffering a serious loss being given notice and an opportunity to be heard, in a meaningful manner and at a meaningful time, is the essence of procedural due process. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). Courts have identified various ways that a petitioner may be granted some form of parole. The choice is “discretionary and is made on a case-by-case basis.” J.S.H.M v. Wofford, No. 1:25-CV-01309 JLT SKO, 2025 WL 2938808, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 2025). Parole can be made for humanitarian reasons or for it providing a significant public benefit under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A), or it can be for conditional parole under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Id. Courts have recognized that typically, the term “released on their own recognizance” refers to conditional parole. Id.; see also Ortega-Cervantes v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1111, 1115 (9th Cir. 2007) (“It is apparent that the INS used the phrase ‘released on recognizance’ as another name for ‘conditional parole’ under § 1226(a)”); Castellon, 2025 WL 2373425, at *4; Faizyan v. Casey, No. 3:25-CV-0884-RBM-JLB, 2025 WL 3208844, at *1 n.2 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2025). Courts have held that such parole status entitles the petitioner to certain due process rights under both procedural due process and the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). See Y-Z-L-H v. Bostock, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1123, 1146 (D. Or. 2025) (finding violation under APA); Mata Velasquez v. Kurzdorfer, 794 F. Supp. 3d 128, 154 (W.D.N.Y. 2025) (finding violation under procedural due process). Similarly, for conditional release under § 1226(a), the court in Pinchi explained similar procedural due process rights: [Petitioner’s] release from ICE custody after her initial apprehension reflected a determination by the government that she was neither a flight risk nor a danger to the community, and [Petitioner] has a strong interest in remaining at liberty unless she no longer meets those criteria. The regulations authorizing ICE to release a noncitizen from custody require that the noncitizen “demonstrate to the satisfaction of the officer that such release would not pose a danger to property or persons” and that the noncitizen is “likely to appear for any future proceeding.” 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(c)(8). “Release [therefore] reflects a determination by the government that the noncitizen is not a danger to the community or a flight risk.” Saravia v. Sessions, 280 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1176 (N.D. Cal. 2017), aff'd sub nom. Saravia for A.H. v. Sessions, 905 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 2018). [Petitioner] was apprehended by ICE officers when she crossed the border into the United States . . . ICE then released her on her own recognizance. As ICE was not authorized to release [Petitioner] if she was a danger to the community or a flight risk, the Court must infer from [the] release that ICE determined she was neither. [Petitioner’s] release from ICE custody constituted an “implied promise” that her liberty would not be revoked unless she “failed to live up to the conditions of her release.” Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972). The regulatory framework makes clear that those conditions were th
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
KEVIN JOSUE ARANDA MARTINEZ, Case No.: 26-cv-2905-JES-AHG
Petitioner, ORDER GRANTING PETITION v. FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
WARDEN, Otay Mesa Detention Center; FIELD OFFICE DIRECTOR, ICE San Diego Field Office; TODD M. LYONS, Acting Director, United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement; KRISTI NOEM, Secretary of Homeland Security; and MERRICK GARLAND, United States Attorney General, Respondents. Before the Court is Petitioner Kevin Josue Aranda Martinez’s Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (“Petition”), now the operative petition in this matter. ECF No. 7. Per the Court’s order, Respondents responded to the Petition. ECF No. 9 (“Return”). Petitioner filed an optional Traverse. ECF No. 10. For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS the petition. Petitioner, a native of Honduras, entered the United States in January of 2019. Pet. at 2. He was arrested by Border Patrol, placed in removal proceedings, and paroled into the country. Id. While living in the country, Petitioner applied for a Special Immigrant Juvenile Visa. Id. He received a work permit and a Social Security number. Id. at 3. He has attended all his court dates and has no criminal history. Id. On February 22, 2026, Petitioner was re-detained. Id. He was not given any notice, information, or opportunity to be heard regarding his re-detention. Id. A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). “The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). A court may grant a writ of habeas corpus to a petitioner who demonstrates to be in custody in violation of the Constitution or federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Traditionally, “the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its protections have been strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001). Accordingly, challenges to immigration-related detention are within the purview of a district court's habeas jurisdiction. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see also Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 517 (2003). In his petition, Petitioner argues that his re-detention and the manner in which it was carried out violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Administrative Procedure Act. Pet. at 3-7. In their return, Respondents briefly argue that Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention, but acknowledge that this Court and courts in this district have reached the opposite conclusion under similar facts. Return at 2. As such, Respondents state that they “do[] not oppose the petition and defer[] to the Court on the appropriate relief.” Id. “The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits the Government from depriving individuals of their life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 990 (9th Cir. 2017). “[T]he Due Process Clause applies to all persons within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 679. “Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint— lies at the heart of the liberty that Clause protects.” Id. at 690. A person at risk of suffering a serious loss being given notice and an opportunity to be heard, in a meaningful manner and at a meaningful time, is the essence of procedural due process. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). Courts have identified various ways that a petitioner may be granted some form of parole. The choice is “discretionary and is made on a case-by-case basis.” J.S.H.M v. Wofford, No. 1:25-CV-01309 JLT SKO, 2025 WL 2938808, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 2025). Parole can be made for humanitarian reasons or for it providing a significant public benefit under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A), or it can be for conditional parole under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Id. Courts have recognized that typically, the term “released on their own recognizance” refers to conditional parole. Id.; see also Ortega-Cervantes v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1111, 1115 (9th Cir. 2007) (“It is apparent that the INS used the phrase ‘released on recognizance’ as another name for ‘conditional parole’ under § 1226(a)”); Castellon, 2025 WL 2373425, at *4; Faizyan v. Casey, No. 3:25-CV-0884-RBM-JLB, 2025 WL 3208844, at *1 n.2 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2025). Courts have held that such parole status entitles the petitioner to certain due process rights under both procedural due process and the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). See Y-Z-L-H v. Bostock, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1123, 1146 (D. Or. 2025) (finding violation under APA); Mata Velasquez v. Kurzdorfer, 794 F. Supp. 3d 128, 154 (W.D.N.Y. 2025) (finding violation under procedural due process). Similarly, for conditional release under § 1226(a), the court in Pinchi explained similar procedural due process rights: [Petitioner’s] release from ICE custody after her initial apprehension reflected a determination by the government that she was neither a flight risk nor a danger to the community, and [Petitioner] has a strong interest in remaining at liberty unless she no longer meets those criteria. The regulations authorizing ICE to release a noncitizen from custody require that the noncitizen “demonstrate to the satisfaction of the officer that such release would not pose a danger to property or persons” and that the noncitizen is “likely to appear for any future proceeding.” 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(c)(8). “Release [therefore] reflects a determination by the government that the noncitizen is not a danger to the community or a flight risk.” Saravia v. Sessions, 280 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1176 (N.D. Cal. 2017), aff'd sub nom. Saravia for A.H. v. Sessions, 905 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 2018). [Petitioner] was apprehended by ICE officers when she crossed the border into the United States . . . ICE then released her on her own recognizance. As ICE was not authorized to release [Petitioner] if she was a danger to the community or a flight risk, the Court must infer from [the] release that ICE determined she was neither. [Petitioner’s] release from ICE custody constituted an “implied promise” that her liberty would not be revoked unless she “failed to live up to the conditions of her release.” Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972). The regulatory framework makes clear that those conditions were that she remain neither a danger to the community nor a flight risk. . . . Accordingly, [Petitioner’s] private interest in retaining her liberty is significant.
Pinchi v. Noem, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1034-35 (N.D. Cal. 2025). Several district courts have followed suit and found due process violations. See C.A.R.V. v. Wofford, No. 1:25- CV-01395 JLT SKO, 2025 WL 3059549, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2025) (finding due process violation where petitioner was originally released on OREC); Leiva Flores, 2025 WL 3228306, at *5 (similarly finding procedural due process violation for petitioner released on OREC and requiring hearing before detention); Faizyan, 2025 WL 3208844, at *7 (same). The Court agrees with all the foregoing courts and similarly holds that Petitioner has procedural due process rights arising from his parole. As this Court explained in Sanchez v. ZaRose, due process requires not only notice and opportunity to be heard, but also that the notice and opportunity be meaningful. No. 25-CV-2396-JES-MMP, 2025 WL 2770629 *3 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2025). Here, Petitioner alleges that he was not provided with an opportunity to be heard regarding the revocation of his release. Pet. at 2. Respondents do not argue otherwise. See generally Return. Further, without changed circumstances or another factor justifying re-detention, any notice and opportunity to be heard that did occur could not have been meaningful. See Rios v. Noem, No. 25-CV-2866-JES-VET, 2025 WL 3141207, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2025) (“An alien's opportunity to be heard regarding a change in his status is only meaningful if the government comports with its own internal standards regarding parole revocation. DHS has the authority to revoke an alien's supervised release ‘at any time’ on a discretionary, but not unlimited, basis.”). Accordingly, Court finds that Respondents violated Petitioner’s due process rights when they re- detained him on February 22, 2026. For the reasons discussed above, the Court GRANTS Petitioner’s writ of habeas corpus. Because the Court grants the petition on the Due Process ground and concludes that Respondents’ revocation of Petitioner’s parole violates procedural due process, Respondents are ORDERED to immediately release Petitioner from custody, subject to conditions of his preexisting release that existed at the time he was re-detained. The Parties are ORDERED to file a Joint Status Report by May 28, 2026, confirming that Petitioner has been released. Dated: May 26, 2026 Aa Sin,
United States District Judge
«