1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION 7 8 KEVIN E. GILMORE, Case No. 24-cv-04112-YGR (PHK)
9 Plaintiff, ORDER RE: SCHEDULING OF PLAINTIFF’S DEPOSITION v. 10 Re: Dkt. 67 11 WILSHIRE QUINN CAPITAL INC., et al., Defendants. 12
13 14 All discovery matters in this case have been referred to the undersigned. [Dkt. 65]. Now 15 before the Court is a discovery letter brief filed by Defendants Wilshire Quinn Capital, Inc. 16 (“WQC”) and Wilshire Quinn Income Fund REIT, LLC (“WQIF”) (collectively “Defendants”) 17 regarding scheduling Plaintiff Kevin Gilmore’s (“Plaintiff”) deposition. [Dkt. 67]. The Court finds 18 this matter suitable for resolution at this stage without oral argument. See Civil L.R. 7-1(b). After 19 carefully reviewing the letter brief and all relevant submissions, the Court issues the following 20 Order. 21 LEGAL STANDARD 22 The Court has broad discretion and authority to manage discovery. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. 23 Co. v. Lee Inv. LLC, 641 F.3d 1126, 1136 n.10 (9th Cir. 2011) (“District courts have wide latitude 24 in controlling discovery, and their rulings will not be overturned in the absence of a clear abuse of 25 discretion.”); Laub v. U.S. Dep’t of Int., 342 F.3d 1080, 1093 (9th Cir. 2003). The Court’s discretion 26 extends to crafting discovery orders that may expand, limit, or differ from the relief requested. See 27 Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 598 (1998) (holding trial courts have “broad discretion to 1 limit the scope of any discovery method if it determines that “the discovery sought is unreasonably 2 cumulative or duplicative, or can be obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less 3 burdensome, or less expensive.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(i). 4 The relevant legal standards for discovery are well-known. Rule 26(b)(1) delineates the 5 scope of discovery in federal civil actions and provides that “[p]arties may obtain discovery 6 regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional 7 to the needs of the case.” Information need not be admissible to be discoverable. Id. Relevancy for 8 purposes of discovery is broadly defined to encompass “any matter that bears on, or that reasonably 9 could lead to other matter that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case.” In re Williams- 10 Sonoma, Inc., 947 F.3d 535, 539 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 11 U.S. 340, 350-51 (1978)); see also In re Facebook, Inc. Consumer Privacy User Profile Litig., No. 12 18-MD-2843 VC (JSC), 2021 WL 10282215, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2021) (“Courts generally 13 recognize that relevancy for purposes of discovery is broader than relevancy for purposes of trial.”) 14 (alteration omitted). 15 While the scope of relevance is broad, discovery is not unlimited. ATS Prods., Inc. v. 16 Champion Fiberglass, Inc., 309 F.R.D. 527, 531 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (“Relevancy, for the purposes of 17 discovery, is defined broadly, although it is not without ultimate and necessary boundaries.”). 18 Information, even if relevant, must be “proportional to the needs of the case” to fall within the scope 19 of permissible discovery. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). The 2015 amendments to Rule 26(b)(1) 20 emphasize the need to impose reasonable limits on discovery through increased reliance on the 21 commonsense concept of proportionality: “The objective is to guard against redundant or 22 disproportionate discovery by giving the court authority to reduce the amount of discovery that may 23 be directed to matters that are otherwise proper subjects of inquiry. The [proportionality 24 requirement] is intended to encourage judges to be more aggressive in identifying and discouraging 25 discovery overuse.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment. In evaluating 26 the proportionality of a discovery request, the Court considers “the importance of the issues at stake 27 in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties' relative access to the information, the parties' 1 of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). 2 The party seeking discovery bears the burden of establishing that its request satisfies the 3 relevancy requirements under Rule 26(b)(1). La. Pac. Corp. v. Money Mkt. 1 Inst. Inv. Dealer, 285 4 F.R.D. 481, 485 (N.D. Cal. 2012). The resisting party, in turn, has the burden to show that the 5 discovery should not be allowed. Id. The resisting party must specifically explain the reasons why 6 the request at issue is objectionable and may not rely on boilerplate, conclusory, or speculative 7 arguments. Id.; see also Blankenship v. Hearst Corp., 519 F.2d 418, 429 (9th Cir. 1975) (“Under 8 the liberal discovery principles of the Federal Rules defendants were required to carry a heavy 9 burden of showing why discovery was denied.”). 10 With regard to proportionality, “[t]he parties and the court have a collective responsibility 11 to consider the proportionality of all discovery and consider it in resolving discovery disputes.” Fed. 12 R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment. “A party claiming undue burden or 13 expense ordinarily has far better information—perhaps the only information—with respect to that 14 part of the determination. A party claiming that a request is important to resolve the issues should 15 be able to explain the ways in which the underlying information bears on the issues as that party 16 understands them. The court’s responsibility, using all the information provided by the parties, is to 17 consider these and all the other factors in reaching a case-specific determination of the appropriate 18 scope of discovery.” Id. 19 As part of its inherent discretion and authority, the Court has broad discretion in determining 20 relevancy for discovery purposes. Surfvivor Media, Inc. v. Survivor Prods., 406 F.3d 625, 635 (9th 21 Cir. 2005) (citing Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002)). Similarly, a district court’s 22 determination as to proportionality of discovery is within the district court’s discretion. See Jones 23 v. Riot Hospitality Grp. LLC, 95 F.4th 730, 737-38 (9th Cir. 2024) (finding district court did not 24 abuse discretion on proportionality ruling). Ultimately, “the timing, sequencing and proportionality 25 of discovery is left to the discretion of the Court.” Toro v. Centene Corp., No. 19-cv-05163 LHK 26 (NC), 2020 WL 6108643, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2020). 27 DISCUSSION 1 deposition. Defendants have filed their Discovery Letter Brief on this dispute [Dkt. 67] without 2 obtaining the input of Plaintiff (who is appearing pro se).
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1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION 7 8 KEVIN E. GILMORE, Case No. 24-cv-04112-YGR (PHK)
9 Plaintiff, ORDER RE: SCHEDULING OF PLAINTIFF’S DEPOSITION v. 10 Re: Dkt. 67 11 WILSHIRE QUINN CAPITAL INC., et al., Defendants. 12
13 14 All discovery matters in this case have been referred to the undersigned. [Dkt. 65]. Now 15 before the Court is a discovery letter brief filed by Defendants Wilshire Quinn Capital, Inc. 16 (“WQC”) and Wilshire Quinn Income Fund REIT, LLC (“WQIF”) (collectively “Defendants”) 17 regarding scheduling Plaintiff Kevin Gilmore’s (“Plaintiff”) deposition. [Dkt. 67]. The Court finds 18 this matter suitable for resolution at this stage without oral argument. See Civil L.R. 7-1(b). After 19 carefully reviewing the letter brief and all relevant submissions, the Court issues the following 20 Order. 21 LEGAL STANDARD 22 The Court has broad discretion and authority to manage discovery. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. 23 Co. v. Lee Inv. LLC, 641 F.3d 1126, 1136 n.10 (9th Cir. 2011) (“District courts have wide latitude 24 in controlling discovery, and their rulings will not be overturned in the absence of a clear abuse of 25 discretion.”); Laub v. U.S. Dep’t of Int., 342 F.3d 1080, 1093 (9th Cir. 2003). The Court’s discretion 26 extends to crafting discovery orders that may expand, limit, or differ from the relief requested. See 27 Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 598 (1998) (holding trial courts have “broad discretion to 1 limit the scope of any discovery method if it determines that “the discovery sought is unreasonably 2 cumulative or duplicative, or can be obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less 3 burdensome, or less expensive.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(i). 4 The relevant legal standards for discovery are well-known. Rule 26(b)(1) delineates the 5 scope of discovery in federal civil actions and provides that “[p]arties may obtain discovery 6 regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional 7 to the needs of the case.” Information need not be admissible to be discoverable. Id. Relevancy for 8 purposes of discovery is broadly defined to encompass “any matter that bears on, or that reasonably 9 could lead to other matter that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case.” In re Williams- 10 Sonoma, Inc., 947 F.3d 535, 539 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 11 U.S. 340, 350-51 (1978)); see also In re Facebook, Inc. Consumer Privacy User Profile Litig., No. 12 18-MD-2843 VC (JSC), 2021 WL 10282215, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2021) (“Courts generally 13 recognize that relevancy for purposes of discovery is broader than relevancy for purposes of trial.”) 14 (alteration omitted). 15 While the scope of relevance is broad, discovery is not unlimited. ATS Prods., Inc. v. 16 Champion Fiberglass, Inc., 309 F.R.D. 527, 531 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (“Relevancy, for the purposes of 17 discovery, is defined broadly, although it is not without ultimate and necessary boundaries.”). 18 Information, even if relevant, must be “proportional to the needs of the case” to fall within the scope 19 of permissible discovery. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). The 2015 amendments to Rule 26(b)(1) 20 emphasize the need to impose reasonable limits on discovery through increased reliance on the 21 commonsense concept of proportionality: “The objective is to guard against redundant or 22 disproportionate discovery by giving the court authority to reduce the amount of discovery that may 23 be directed to matters that are otherwise proper subjects of inquiry. The [proportionality 24 requirement] is intended to encourage judges to be more aggressive in identifying and discouraging 25 discovery overuse.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment. In evaluating 26 the proportionality of a discovery request, the Court considers “the importance of the issues at stake 27 in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties' relative access to the information, the parties' 1 of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). 2 The party seeking discovery bears the burden of establishing that its request satisfies the 3 relevancy requirements under Rule 26(b)(1). La. Pac. Corp. v. Money Mkt. 1 Inst. Inv. Dealer, 285 4 F.R.D. 481, 485 (N.D. Cal. 2012). The resisting party, in turn, has the burden to show that the 5 discovery should not be allowed. Id. The resisting party must specifically explain the reasons why 6 the request at issue is objectionable and may not rely on boilerplate, conclusory, or speculative 7 arguments. Id.; see also Blankenship v. Hearst Corp., 519 F.2d 418, 429 (9th Cir. 1975) (“Under 8 the liberal discovery principles of the Federal Rules defendants were required to carry a heavy 9 burden of showing why discovery was denied.”). 10 With regard to proportionality, “[t]he parties and the court have a collective responsibility 11 to consider the proportionality of all discovery and consider it in resolving discovery disputes.” Fed. 12 R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment. “A party claiming undue burden or 13 expense ordinarily has far better information—perhaps the only information—with respect to that 14 part of the determination. A party claiming that a request is important to resolve the issues should 15 be able to explain the ways in which the underlying information bears on the issues as that party 16 understands them. The court’s responsibility, using all the information provided by the parties, is to 17 consider these and all the other factors in reaching a case-specific determination of the appropriate 18 scope of discovery.” Id. 19 As part of its inherent discretion and authority, the Court has broad discretion in determining 20 relevancy for discovery purposes. Surfvivor Media, Inc. v. Survivor Prods., 406 F.3d 625, 635 (9th 21 Cir. 2005) (citing Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002)). Similarly, a district court’s 22 determination as to proportionality of discovery is within the district court’s discretion. See Jones 23 v. Riot Hospitality Grp. LLC, 95 F.4th 730, 737-38 (9th Cir. 2024) (finding district court did not 24 abuse discretion on proportionality ruling). Ultimately, “the timing, sequencing and proportionality 25 of discovery is left to the discretion of the Court.” Toro v. Centene Corp., No. 19-cv-05163 LHK 26 (NC), 2020 WL 6108643, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2020). 27 DISCUSSION 1 deposition. Defendants have filed their Discovery Letter Brief on this dispute [Dkt. 67] without 2 obtaining the input of Plaintiff (who is appearing pro se). Defendants have attached as exhibits to 3 their brief several email strings between Defendants’ counsel and Plaintiff, to at least provide some 4 insight into Plaintiff’s communications on the current dispute. Id. at Exhs. 1-4 and 6. 5 The Court’s Standing Discovery Order requires all discovery disputes to be presented as a 6 Joint Discovery Letter so that the Court has the input of both Parties. See Standing Discovery Order 7 at Section H(3). Defendants’ reason for filing this as a unilateral discovery letter brief is the alleged 8 difficulty in communicating with this pro se Plaintiff regarding scheduling of his deposition, as well 9 as the impending fact discovery cutoff date of February 6, 2026. [Dkt. 67 at 1-2] There are also 10 apparently issues concerning whether Plaintiff is now represented by attorney Kenneth V. Walton 11 in this litigation (and thus whether the scheduling of the deposition should accommodate that 12 lawyer’s availability as well), given that no attorney has entered appearance for Plaintiff. Id. at 2- 13 3. 14 The record presented indicates that there were weeks of emails in which the Parties 15 attempted to negotiate a date for the Plaintiff’s deposition. Id. at Exhs. 1-4 and 6. Section D of the 16 Court’s Standing Discovery Order regarding scheduling of depositions requires an objecting party 17 to provide alternate dates for an objectionable deposition date. Based on the emails provided, 18 Plaintiff apparently suggested deposition dates which are after the fact discovery cutoff and has 19 proposed starting the deposition at 6 PM. Id. at Exh. 3. Ultimately, Defendant noticed the 20 deposition for January 9, 2026 (to be taken by remote means) and Plaintiff failed to appear at the 21 deposition as noticed. Id. at 3. Plaintiff failed to file a motion for a protective order and no counsel 22 for Plaintiff appeared either before, during, or after the noticed deposition. 23 Based on the record presented, the Parties have not fully met and conferred (either in person 24 or by video conference) as required by the Court’s Standing Discovery Order regarding this dispute. 25 See Standing Discovery Order at Section H(1)-(2). Accordingly, the Court ORDERS the Parties to 26 meet and confer either in-person or by videoconference call on or before Tuesday, January 27, 27 2026 to finalize the schedule for Plaintiff’s deposition. The Court further ORDERS counsel for 1 Order, the obligation to meet and confer, and for the purpose of obtaining his email address, fax 2 number, and current contact address. 3 If attorney Kenneth V. Walton is representing or advising Plaintiff in this matter (including 4 with regard to this deposition), attorney Kenneth V. Walton is ORDERED to participate in this 5 meet and confer process. Until attorney Kenneth V. Walton enters appearance in this case, Plaintiff 6 is reminded that Plaintiff personally must continue to comply with this Court’s orders and directives 7 regarding the conduct of discovery in this case, including his participation in this ordered meet and 8 confer. 9 The Parties are ORDERED to file a Joint Status Report on the results of this meet and confer 10 on or before Wednesday, January 28, 2026. 11 During the meet and confer, the Parties are directed that Plaintiff’s deposition SHALL be 12 taken on a mutually available date on or before the fact discovery cutoff (whether the current 13 deadline or any deadline extended by Judge Gonzalez Rogers). However, the Court ORDERS that 14 this deposition may be scheduled for and taken on the earliest mutually-available date after the fact 15 discovery cutoff deadline, if no date prior to the fact discovery cutoff is available for all the Parties 16 and their counsel. 17 For clarity on the logistics of the deposition, the Court ORDERS that Plaintiff’s deposition 18 SHALL commence at 9 AM on the day noticed, and SHALL last for no more than 7 hours on the 19 record. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(d)(1). The Parties may, by mutual agreement, set the start time for 20 the deposition at a different time of day. But to be clear, Plaintiff is not authorized to demand that 21 the deposition start at 6 PM absent a showing of good cause and a Court Order confirming such a 22 late start time. The Parties may, by mutual agreement, convert the deposition to an in-person 23 deposition, and may also, by mutual agreement, extend the 7-hour time limit for the 24 deposition. Nothing in this Order either requires or prohibits any mutual agreements altering the 25 ordered logistics for this deposition. 26 The Court ORDERS counsel for Defendants to send by email, fax, and overnight express 27 delivery service a courtesy copy of this Order to attorney Kenneth V. Walton at his address available 1 identified Kenneth V. Walton as his counsel for this matter to counsel for Defendants, counsel for 2 Defendants are reminded of their ethical obligations and are directed, at a minimum, to 3 contemporaneously “cc” attorney Kenneth V. Walton on all correspondence and emails with 4 Plaintiff (at least until attorney Walton enters appearance or confirms he is not Plaintiff’s counsel 5 for this matter). 6 Upon receipt of this Order, attorney Kenneth V. Walton is directed to enter an appearance 7 on behalf of Plaintiff without delay if that attorney is, in fact, representing or advising Plaintiff in 8 this matter. If attorney Kenneth V. Walton is not representing Plaintiff in this litigation (including 9 in connection with this deposition), attorney Kenneth V. Walton is ORDERED to file a Notice with 10 the Court immediately as to his status with regard to representing (or not representing ) Plaintiff in 11 this matter (including with regard to this deposition). 12 Because Plaintiff has apparently not registered as an e-Filer with the Court’s ECF system, 13 and because of the upcoming fact discovery cutoff deadline, the Court further ORDERS counsel 14 for Defendants to email a copy of this Order to Plaintiff (at his email address with which the Parties 15 have been corresponding, see e.g., Exhs. 1-4 and 6) immediately and to serve without delay a hard 16 copy of this Order on Plaintiff via overnight delivery service to his mailing address. In the Joint 17 Status Report ordered herein, Defendant shall also report on the status of serving this Order on 18 Plaintiff and attorney Walton. 19 Further, the Court ORDERS Plaintiff to immediately update his contact information on the 20 Court’s ECF system to include his email address and to register as an e-Filer so that he may receive 21 case filings without delay. 22 The Court recognizes that Plaintiff is proceeding pro se. Under this Court’s Civil Local 23 Rules, “[a] person representing him or herself without an attorney is bound by the Federal Rules, as 24 well as by all applicable local rules.” See Civil L.R. 3-9(a). While members of the bar of this Court 25 are required to be familiar with the Court’s Guidelines for Professional Conduct, see id. L.R. 11-4, 26 those guidelines may also help provide guidance for pro se litigants on the type of behavior which 27 the Court expects when litigating a case. See https://cand.uscourts.gov/forms/guidelines-for- 1 and meritorious objectives expeditiously and as economically as possible in a civil and 2 || professional manner.” Id. at Guideline 2 (emphasis added). Further, “[a] lawyer should make 3 || reasonable efforts to schedule meetings, hearings, and discovery by agreement whenever possible 4 || and should consider the scheduling interests of opposing counsel, the parties, witnesses, and the 5 court... . A lawyer should not arbitrarily or unreasonably withhold consent to a request for 6 || scheduling accommodations.” /d. at Guideline 3. Specifically with regard to discovery, “[a] lawyer 7 || should conduct discovery in a manner designed to ensure the timely, efficient, cost effective and 8 || just resolution of a dispute.” /d. at Guideline 9. While the Court recognizes that these are guidelines 9 || for lawyers, as noted the Court brings them to Plaintiff's attention as guidance for the general 10 || character of conduct expected of litigants in federal court. 1] ADVISEMENT OF PRO SE RESOURCES 12 Plaintiff is ADVISED that there are several resources for pro se litigants. The Court makes 13 available a guide for pro se litigants called “Representing Yourself in Federal Court: A Handbook 14 || for Pro Se Litigants,” which provides instructions on how to proceed at every stage of a case, 3 15 including discovery, motions, and trial. This guide is available electronically online at 16 || https://cand.uscourts.gov/representing-yourself/pro-se-handbook or in hard copy free of charge i 17 || from the office of the Clerk of Court. The Court additionally has a webpage with resources for pro Z 18 || se litigants: https://cand.uscourts.gov/representing-yourself, 19 This Order RESOLVES Dkt. 67. 20 21 IT IS SO ORDERED. 22 || Dated: January 22, 2026 □□ 24 , PETER H. KANG 25 United States Magistrate Judge 26 27 28