Kerwin / Faria v. Salko

CourtCourt of Appeals of Oregon
DecidedJune 17, 2026
DocketA185601
StatusUnpublished

This text of Kerwin / Faria v. Salko (Kerwin / Faria v. Salko) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Oregon primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Kerwin / Faria v. Salko, (Or. Ct. App. 2026).

Opinion

782 June 17, 2026 No. 568

This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1).

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON

Terry Tyrone KERWIN, Personal Representative of the Estate of Terence Kerwin, Plaintiff-Respondent, and Margie KERWIN or current Trustee of the Margie Kerwin Living Trust, u.d.d. November 6, 1995, Defendant-Respondent, v. Alex Joe SALKO and Angie Howe, Defendants-Appellants. Shawna FARIA, Personal Representative of the Estate of Margie Kerwin, Cross-Claim Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Alex Joe SALKO and Angie Howe, Cross-Claim Defendants-Appellants. Jackson County Circuit Court 21CV15213; A185601

David J. Orr, Judge. Argued and submitted May 12, 2026. Christopher L. Cauble argued the cause for appellants. Also on the briefs was Cauble Furr & Beguin, LLP. Connor D. King argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent Terence Kerwin and joined the brief of respon- dent Shawna Faria. Nonprecedential Memo Op: 350 Or App 782 (2026) 783

Eugene V. Anderson and Davis, Hearn, Anderson & Selvig filed the brief for respondent Shawna Faria. Before Ortega, Presiding Judge, Joyce, Judge, and Hellman, Judge. PER CURIAM Affirmed. 784 Kerwin / Faria v. Salko

PER CURIAM Appellants appeal from the trial court’s denial of their motion to set aside a judgment of default entered against them. They moved to set aside the default judgment on the basis that although they were served with the cross- claims against them, soon after service their attorney with- drew without adequately impressing upon them the need to answer those claims. In light of that, appellants argued that their failure to respond to the complaint constitutes excus- able neglect under ORCP 71 B. The trial court denied the motion and appellants reprise their arguments on appeal. We have reviewed the trial court’s findings, which we defer to on appeal, Union Lumber Co. v. Miller, 360 Or 767, 777, 388 P3d 327 (2017), and conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion. See Ballard v. City of Albany, 221 Or App 630, 636, 191 P3d 679 (2008) (observing that we will not disturb a determination that conduct did not amount to excusable neglect except for manifest abuse of discretion). We find particularly significant that the trial court had spe- cifically advised the appellants—after they had been served with the cross-claims and after their counsel had with- drawn—that they had to take action to respond to the cross- claims because they were a “fresh lawsuit against you” and “it needs to be answered.” Affirmed.

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Related

Ballard v. City of Albany
191 P.3d 679 (Court of Appeals of Oregon, 2008)
Union Lumber Co. v. Miller​​​​​
388 P.3d 327 (Oregon Supreme Court, 2017)

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Bluebook (online)
Kerwin / Faria v. Salko, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kerwin-faria-v-salko-orctapp-2026.