Kepler v. NaphCare Incorporated

District Court, D. Arizona·Decided May 21, 2025·No. 4:24-cv-00220·Unknown

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Karina Kepler, et al., No. CV-24-00220-TUC-AMM

10 Plaintiffs, ORDER

11 v.

12 NaphCare Incorporated, et al.,

13 Defendants. 14 15 Pending before the Court is Plaintiffs Karina Kepler and Carlin Casey’s Motion to 16 Compel Discovery from the County Defendants. (Doc. 68.) Plaintiffs seek to compel 17 Defendants Pima County and Sheriff Chris Nanos (together “County Defendants”) to 18 supplement or produce discovery. (Id.) The motion is fully briefed. (Docs. 70, 72.) For the 19 reasons addressed below, the Court will grant the motion in part and deny it in part. 20 I. Overview 21 Plaintiffs, on behalf of the estate of Mary Faith Casey (“Ms. Casey”), bring claims 22 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Arizona state law against County Defendants, NaphCare 23 Incorporated, Registered Nurse Jason Chamberlain, Nurse Practitioner Leo Easley, Dr. 24 Mikell Karsten, mental health professional Matthew Woods (together “NaphCare 25 Defendants”), and Dr. John Samaan. (Doc. 1.) Plaintiffs allege Defendants provided Ms. 26 Casey unconstitutionally deficient medical and mental health services in the Pima County 27 Jail (the “Jail”) that led to her deterioration and eventual death. (Id.) 28 On January 22, 2025, a discovery dispute conference was held to discuss the 1 disputed Requests for Production (“RFP”) pursuant to the Court’s September 27, 2024 2 Scheduling Order. (Doc. 44 at 2–3.) On January 27, 2025, the Court ordered Plaintiffs to 3 file a motion to compel. (Doc. 67.) Thereafter, the present motion was filed.1 (Doc. 68.) 4 II. Discussion 5 A. The Scope of Discovery is Governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26. 6 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) provides that “[p]arties may obtain 7 discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or 8 defense and proportional to the needs of the case . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Factors 9 courts consider in determining proportionality are “the importance of the issues at stake in 10 the action, the amount in controversy, the parties' relative access to relevant information, 11 the parties' resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether 12 the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” Id. 13 Importantly, “[i]nformation within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in 14 evidence to be discoverable.” Id. District courts have broad discretion in resolving 15 discovery disputes. See Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 598 (1998); Hallett v. 16 Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002). 17 Here, Plaintiffs request discovery regarding County Defendants’ treatment of other 18 patients at the Jail and Defendants’ response to “adverse events” at the Jail.2 Plaintiffs also 19 seek to clarify that their counsel’s communication with Ms. Casey’s former public defender 20 does not violate Arizona Ethics Rule 4.2. As an initial matter, the Court will deny RFP 14 21 to Pima County and RFP 4 to Sheriff Nanos. The Court finds these requests are duplicative, 22 1 County Defendants join in NaphCare Defendants’ request to deny Plaintiffs’ Motion to 23 Compel arguing that it violates Local Rule 7.2(e) by exceeding the permitted page limit. (Doc. 70 at 2.) Local Rule 7.2(e) prohibits motions and responses from exceeding 24 seventeen (17) pages, excluding attachments and required statements of facts. LRCiv 7.2(e). When a motion is brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(3)(B), 25 as it is here, Local Rule 37.1 requires the moving party provide—separately from a memorandum of law—the discovery requested, the response received, and the reason(s) 26 why the response is deficient. LRCiv 37.1. Plaintiffs’ motion is seventeen pages, excluding attachments. (See Doc. 68.) Therefore, Plaintiffs did not violate LRCiv 7.2(e) and County 27 Defendants’ request is denied. 2 As noted in the Court’s May 20, 2025 Order, the Court infers that the terms “serious 28 adverse event” and “adverse event” are defined by contract or National Commission on Correctional Health Care (“NCCHC”) standard. (See Doc. 96 at 4 n.4.) 1 unduly burdensome, or disproportionate to the needs of the case. County Defendants’ 2 objections to these discovery requests are sustained. The Court addresses the remaining 3 requests below.3 4 B. County Defendants’ Response to Adverse Events Involving Other Patients are Relevant. 5 6 Plaintiffs seek to compel discovery related to six RFPs, all of which go to County 7 Defendants’ response to adverse events in the Jail involving other patients. (Doc. 68.) 8 Because Plaintiffs bring claims pursuant to § 1983, to establish municipal liability, 9 Plaintiffs must show, inter alia, that “a ‘policy or custom’ led to the [plaintiff’s injury].” 10 Castro v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1073 (9th Cir. 2016). “Official municipal 11 policy includes the decisions of a government's lawmakers, the acts of its policymaking 12 officials, and practices so persistent and widespread as to practically have the force of law.” 13 Endy v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 975 F.3d 757, 769 (9th Cir. 2020). 14 Here, Plaintiffs allege “Ms. Casey’s mistreatment and death occurred pursuant to 15 multiple ‘systems, policies, practices, and customs’ under Monell” in violation of County 16 Defendants’ constitutional duty to provide adequate patient care. (Doc. 68 at 10–11.) 17 County Defendants object to the requests as irrelevant, disproportionate to the needs of the 18 case, overly broad, unduly burdensome, or compound. (See Docs. 68-14, 68-15.) County 19 Defendants further object on the bases of work product doctrine, attorney-client privilege, 20 Arizona quality assurance privilege, or the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability 21 Act (“HIPAA”). (Id.) 22 County Defendants attempt to narrow discovery by emphasizing that Ms. Casey did 23 not die until “seven weeks after her release from custody.” (Doc. 70 at 5.) County 24 Defendants, in opposing Plaintiffs’ request for Jail “death reviews,” assert that “neither 25 County Defendant is aware of any other death at the Jail that involved delayed mental 26 health medication or treatment, starvation, or a hunger strike.” (Id.) County Defendants

27 3 Because County Defendants assert Ms. Edminson does not wish to speak with Plaintiffs’ counsel without her counsel present, Defendants assert, and Plaintiffs agree, that the issue 28 of communicating ex parte is moot. (Doc. 70 at 7; Doc. 72 at 2.) As such, the Court will not address this request. 1 further assert that Plaintiffs’ request for Jail “death reviews” should be denied because 2 “they are medical, not custodial claims,” and Plaintiffs’ claims against the County 3 Defendants are “premised solely on a non-delegable duty theory and based solely on the 4 actions of NaphCare.” (Id.) 5 Defendants mischaracterize the scope of discovery in this case. Federal Rule of Civil 6 Procedure 26 is clear that material relevant to “any party’s claim or defense” is 7 discoverable. Fed. R. Civ. P.

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