Geaham, Judge,
delivered the opinion of the court:
The statutes cited on behalf of the parties in this case are as follows:
Section 1766 of the Eevised Statutes:
“ No money shall be paid to any person for his compensation who is in arrears to the United States, until he has accounted for and paid into the Treasury all sums for which he may be liable. In all cases where the pay or salary of any person is withheld.in pursuance of this section, the accounting officers of the Treasury, if required to do so by the party, his agent or attorney shall report forwith to the-Solicitor of the Treasury the balance due; and the solicitor shall, within sixty days thereafter, order suit to be commenced against such delinquent and his sureties.”
The act of July 16, 1892, 27 Stat. 177:
“ The pay of officers of the Army may be withheld under-section 1766 of the Eevised Statutes on account of an indebtedness to the United States admitted or shown by the judgment of a court, but not otherwise unless upon a special order issued according to the discretion of the Secretary of War.”
Section 145 of the Judicial Code:
“ The Court of Claims shall have jurisdiction to hear and', determine the following matters: * * *
“ Third. The claim of any paymaster, quartermaster, commissary of subsistence, or other disbursing officer of the United States, or of his administrators or executors, for relief from responsibility on account of loss by capture or-otherwise, while in the line of his duty, of Government funds,, vouchers, records, or papers in his charge, and for which such officer was and is held responsible.”
[333]*333Section 147 of the Judicial Code:
“ Whenever the Court of Claims ascertains the facts of any loss by any paymaster, quartermaster, commissary of subsistence, or other disbursing Officer, in the cases hereinbefore provided, to have been without fault or negligence on the part of such officer, it shall make a decree setting forth the amount thereof, and upon such decree the proper accounting officers of the Treasury shall allow to such officer the amount so decreed as a credit in the settlement of his accounts.”
The facts, so far as they appear, are set forth in the findings. A brief review of a few of them is necessary.
The plaintiff, a captain in the Quartermaster Corps of the Army, was in October, 1919, assigned to duty as superintendent of the United States Quartermaster Army retail store at Atlanta, Ga. The proof does not disclose what his duties and responsibilities were as superintendent except as the word “ superintendent ” may suggest. The volume of business in the store was large. Six persons were employed in different capacities, as appears from the insurance policy — a finance clerk, three cashiers, a stamp clerk, and a bookkeeper by the name of David S. Wells. It was the custom for one of the cashiers to collect the money received from a day’s business and hand it over to the said Wells, whose duty it was to receive and receipt for the same. What disposition it was his duty to make of the money after receiving it does not appear.
On November 10 one of the cashiers handed Wells the sum of $2,557.60, which he received and receipted for. Between that time and the next day the money was lost. No other facts in connection with its disappearance are shown. A board of officers, convened for the purpose of inquiring into and reporting on the facts, found that the money was lost through criminal negligence or was feloniously abstracted.
In September, 1919, prior to the assignment of the plaintiff to duty as superintendent, there had been taken out an insurance policy with the National Surety Co., of New York, in the sum of $50,000, protecting against criminal conduct on the part of certain employees, such as personal dishonesty, forgery, theft, embezzlement, or wrongful conversion. It applied to the six employees of the store heretofore mentioned, and certain amounts were fixed as to each in an at[334]*334tached schedule. Among these employees was the said Wells and the amount fixed as to him was $10,000.
Wells was employed in the store before the plaintiff assumed his duties as superintendent, and the insurance policy was taken out before that time. It does not appear that he had any authority to discharge Wells or any of the employees. As stated, a large volume of business was conducted at the store. It is admitted that plaintiff, as far as the loss is concerned, was free from any fault or negligence, and a board of officers so found. It is not shown that the lost sum was ever in the actual possession of the plaintiff or that it had been deposited to his account or in any safe over which he had control or to which he had the combination. It does not even appear that he knew or should have known prior to the loss that this money had been received in the store by Wells.
After the loss of the money the said insurance company was notified of it. The evidence does not show who took out the policy or who had possession of it. The company not acknowledging liability, some one whose name is not given, placed the matter in the hands of the Attorney General, who transmitted it to the Solicitor of the Treasury for such action as was required, and the solicitor in turn sent the case to the district attorney at Atlanta with instructions to bring suit against the company. The district attorney brought a suit, not however until he had expressed a doubt as to his ability to prove conduct of the character covered by the policy. The insurance policy was not in the name of the United States nor any individual, but was drawn “to the superintendent U. S. Army Quartermaster retail store, Atlanta, Georgia, employer.”
The district attorney brought a suit in the name of the United States. The plaintiff was not consulted about the suit, and it does not appear that he knew of it, the matter having been taken in hand by the officials of the Government, presumably on the suggestion of the council of administration of the post exchange. The company defended denying liability and demanding proof. Thereafter the suit was dismissed on the payment by the company of $1,000 [335]*335in full satisfaction of the claim against it. The said sum was afterwards covered into the United States Treasury. This action was taken apparently on account of inability to prove conduct by Wells that came within the protection of the bond. It does not appear that plaintiff knew of or had anything to do with the settlement. There remained of the loss unsatisfied $1,557.60. The Solicitor of the Treasury gave the opinion to the Secretary of War that plaintiff was primarily responsible for this sum and suggested that there should be a stoppage of a portion of his salary for the purpose of paying the balance. Thereupon the Secretary of War issued an order directing that $50 a month should be deducted from plaintiff’s salary and appropriated to pay the balance stated. This sum was withheld from his pay for 14 months, at the end of which time the Secretary of War reached the conclusion that the plaintiff was not liable, wrote to the Solicitor of the Treasury for an opinion, and the latter concurring in the Secretary’s view recommended that the stoppage of plaintiff’s salary be suspended, and this was done.
It will be seen that $700 of plaintiff’s pay was withheld.
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Geaham, Judge,
delivered the opinion of the court:
The statutes cited on behalf of the parties in this case are as follows:
Section 1766 of the Eevised Statutes:
“ No money shall be paid to any person for his compensation who is in arrears to the United States, until he has accounted for and paid into the Treasury all sums for which he may be liable. In all cases where the pay or salary of any person is withheld.in pursuance of this section, the accounting officers of the Treasury, if required to do so by the party, his agent or attorney shall report forwith to the-Solicitor of the Treasury the balance due; and the solicitor shall, within sixty days thereafter, order suit to be commenced against such delinquent and his sureties.”
The act of July 16, 1892, 27 Stat. 177:
“ The pay of officers of the Army may be withheld under-section 1766 of the Eevised Statutes on account of an indebtedness to the United States admitted or shown by the judgment of a court, but not otherwise unless upon a special order issued according to the discretion of the Secretary of War.”
Section 145 of the Judicial Code:
“ The Court of Claims shall have jurisdiction to hear and', determine the following matters: * * *
“ Third. The claim of any paymaster, quartermaster, commissary of subsistence, or other disbursing officer of the United States, or of his administrators or executors, for relief from responsibility on account of loss by capture or-otherwise, while in the line of his duty, of Government funds,, vouchers, records, or papers in his charge, and for which such officer was and is held responsible.”
[333]*333Section 147 of the Judicial Code:
“ Whenever the Court of Claims ascertains the facts of any loss by any paymaster, quartermaster, commissary of subsistence, or other disbursing Officer, in the cases hereinbefore provided, to have been without fault or negligence on the part of such officer, it shall make a decree setting forth the amount thereof, and upon such decree the proper accounting officers of the Treasury shall allow to such officer the amount so decreed as a credit in the settlement of his accounts.”
The facts, so far as they appear, are set forth in the findings. A brief review of a few of them is necessary.
The plaintiff, a captain in the Quartermaster Corps of the Army, was in October, 1919, assigned to duty as superintendent of the United States Quartermaster Army retail store at Atlanta, Ga. The proof does not disclose what his duties and responsibilities were as superintendent except as the word “ superintendent ” may suggest. The volume of business in the store was large. Six persons were employed in different capacities, as appears from the insurance policy — a finance clerk, three cashiers, a stamp clerk, and a bookkeeper by the name of David S. Wells. It was the custom for one of the cashiers to collect the money received from a day’s business and hand it over to the said Wells, whose duty it was to receive and receipt for the same. What disposition it was his duty to make of the money after receiving it does not appear.
On November 10 one of the cashiers handed Wells the sum of $2,557.60, which he received and receipted for. Between that time and the next day the money was lost. No other facts in connection with its disappearance are shown. A board of officers, convened for the purpose of inquiring into and reporting on the facts, found that the money was lost through criminal negligence or was feloniously abstracted.
In September, 1919, prior to the assignment of the plaintiff to duty as superintendent, there had been taken out an insurance policy with the National Surety Co., of New York, in the sum of $50,000, protecting against criminal conduct on the part of certain employees, such as personal dishonesty, forgery, theft, embezzlement, or wrongful conversion. It applied to the six employees of the store heretofore mentioned, and certain amounts were fixed as to each in an at[334]*334tached schedule. Among these employees was the said Wells and the amount fixed as to him was $10,000.
Wells was employed in the store before the plaintiff assumed his duties as superintendent, and the insurance policy was taken out before that time. It does not appear that he had any authority to discharge Wells or any of the employees. As stated, a large volume of business was conducted at the store. It is admitted that plaintiff, as far as the loss is concerned, was free from any fault or negligence, and a board of officers so found. It is not shown that the lost sum was ever in the actual possession of the plaintiff or that it had been deposited to his account or in any safe over which he had control or to which he had the combination. It does not even appear that he knew or should have known prior to the loss that this money had been received in the store by Wells.
After the loss of the money the said insurance company was notified of it. The evidence does not show who took out the policy or who had possession of it. The company not acknowledging liability, some one whose name is not given, placed the matter in the hands of the Attorney General, who transmitted it to the Solicitor of the Treasury for such action as was required, and the solicitor in turn sent the case to the district attorney at Atlanta with instructions to bring suit against the company. The district attorney brought a suit, not however until he had expressed a doubt as to his ability to prove conduct of the character covered by the policy. The insurance policy was not in the name of the United States nor any individual, but was drawn “to the superintendent U. S. Army Quartermaster retail store, Atlanta, Georgia, employer.”
The district attorney brought a suit in the name of the United States. The plaintiff was not consulted about the suit, and it does not appear that he knew of it, the matter having been taken in hand by the officials of the Government, presumably on the suggestion of the council of administration of the post exchange. The company defended denying liability and demanding proof. Thereafter the suit was dismissed on the payment by the company of $1,000 [335]*335in full satisfaction of the claim against it. The said sum was afterwards covered into the United States Treasury. This action was taken apparently on account of inability to prove conduct by Wells that came within the protection of the bond. It does not appear that plaintiff knew of or had anything to do with the settlement. There remained of the loss unsatisfied $1,557.60. The Solicitor of the Treasury gave the opinion to the Secretary of War that plaintiff was primarily responsible for this sum and suggested that there should be a stoppage of a portion of his salary for the purpose of paying the balance. Thereupon the Secretary of War issued an order directing that $50 a month should be deducted from plaintiff’s salary and appropriated to pay the balance stated. This sum was withheld from his pay for 14 months, at the end of which time the Secretary of War reached the conclusion that the plaintiff was not liable, wrote to the Solicitor of the Treasury for an opinion, and the latter concurring in the Secretary’s view recommended that the stoppage of plaintiff’s salary be suspended, and this was done.
It will be seen that $700 of plaintiff’s pay was withheld. He is asking relief under the provisions of paragraph 3 of section 145, and section 147, of the Judicial Code, heretofore cited.
An historical statement taken from the regulations of the War Department and the statutes is attached hereto.1 The [336]*336general facts therein stated with regard to the organization, ownership, and conduct of post exchanges, such as the one of which plaintiff was superintendent, apply to the present case, as the regulations for the year 1917, which were in force at the time of the loss involved in this case are practically the same. They show that the stock in the post exchange was owned by the different organizations at the post, and [337]*337not the property of the Government, and that the post ■exchange was conducted by the council of administration appointed by the commanding officer at the post. The money lost in this case was the property of the post exchange and .not the property of the Government. This being so, the plaintiff was not in arrears through the loss thereof, and did not come within the provisions of section 1766 of the Re[338]*338vised Statutes, supra, prohibiting the payment of money to a person for his compensation who is in arrears to the United States.
This court in Hedrick v. United States, 16 C. Cls. 88, 104, held, construing section 1766, that where an employee is not liable to the Government nothing can be deducted from his compensation. Not only should the plaintiff not have been held and treated as liable for the loss, but the withholding of his pay was without authority of law.
This case is in effect a suit by the plaintiff to recover $700 withheld from his pay, to which claim the defendant, sets up what is equivalent to a counterclaim for the unpaid balance of the lost funds, amounting to $1,557.60. As the plaintiff should not have been held liable for this loss, the counterclaim should be and is hereby dismissed. The plaintiff, an officer' of the Army, has had his pay unjustly withheld and is entitled to recover $700. Judgment should, be entered for that amount, and it is so ordered.
Hat, Judge; Booth, Judge; and Campbell, Ghief Justice, concur.