Kenney v. Kansas City, Pittsburg & Gulf Railroad

74 Mo. App. 301, 1898 Mo. App. LEXIS 311
Missouri Court of Appeals·Decided March 29, 1898·Published·Cited by 5 cases

Opinions

Biggs, J.

— The railroad which is operated by the defendant extends through the valley of Shoal creek in Newton county. Shoal creek drains a large area of country. The valley varies in width from one half to one mile. What is known as the Ford farm is situated in this valley. It is located on an island formed by Shoal creek and a slough. It has for its southern and western boundaries the main channel of the creek, and the slough forms its eastern boundary. At this point Shoal creek runs in a northwesterly direction. The slough puts out from the creek at the southern boundary of the farm; It runs east several rods, turns to the northwest, and leads back into' the creek about one mile below. The railroad is constructed through this farm. In its construction a solid embankment was made across the southern end of the slough a few rods east of the point where it separates from Shoal creek, and about one half mile north where the roadbed crosses back to the east side of the slough another embankment was made. In 1895 the plaintiff cultivated this farm. He raised about thirty-five acres of corn, which he cut up and put in shocks. The greater portion of the corn was grown on the west side of the railroad. In December, 1895, there was an overflow of the waters of Shoal creek, and the plaintiff’s corn was washed away, and about three acres of growing wheat was also destroyed.

He avers that the slough was a water course; that the construction of the embankment across it was unlawful, and that by reason of the obstructions the plaintiff’s crops were destroyed. The answer of the [307] defendant is a general denial. It contains the further averments that the damage to the plaintiff’s crops was caused by surface water, and that the railroad was owned by the Philadelphia Construction Company; that the defendant was placed in possession of the road for the purpose of operating it, and for no other purpose, except to make such repairs as were incident to the operation of the road; that the defendant had nothing to do with the original construction of the roadbed, and it could not be held for damages resulting from its negligent construction. * * * At the close of the plaintiff’s testimony and also at the close of the case, the defendant asked the circuit court to direct a verdict for it. This the court refused to do. The jury found the issues for the plaintiff and assessed his damages at the sum of $65. The defendant has appealed.

All of the witnesses agree that the flood in question was caused by an unusual and almost unprecedented rainfall. The rainfall was so great that the overflow water from the creek covered the greater part of the valley. The water was deep enough on plaintiff’s land to carry off the corn on both sides of the railroad. The chief ground of nonsuit is that there is no substantial evidence that the obstruction of the water by reason of the embankments was one of the efficient causes of the injuries complained of.

The argument in support of the nonsuit assumes that the slough is in fact a water course, and that its obstruction in the manner indicated was unlawful, but that the defendant can not be held for the damages complained of, for the reason that all of the testimony tended to prove that the injuries were to be attributed solely to the act of Grod. In other words, that all the evidence tended to prove that the flood was unusual and there was no substantial, evidence that the concur[308] ring negligence in the construction of the roadbed, when combined with the act of God, produced the alleged injuries.

NofGo<dBNCB: act We had occasion to discuss this question in the recent case of James against this defendant, reported in 69 Mo. App. 431. In that case we followed the rule announced by the supreme court of Pennsylvania in the case of Railroad v. School District, 96 Pa. St. 65. That court said: “We apprehend that the concurring negligence, which, when combined with the act of God, pi’oduce the injury, must be such as is in itself a real producing cause of the injury, and not a merely fanciful, or speculative, or microscopic negligence which may not have been in the least degree the cause of the injury. »In other words, if the act of God in the particular case was of such an overwhelming and destructive character as by its force, and independently of the particular negligence alleged or shown, to produce the injury,, there would be no liability though there was some negligence in the maintenance of the particular structure. To create a liability, it must have required the combined effect of the act of God and the concurring negligence to produce the injury. The present c^se affords a fair illustration of the reason for this distinction. The defendant’s witnesses testified that the force and volume of the water were so very great that it would have required one hundred and twenty such culverts to pass it off.”

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Kenney v. Kansas City, Pittsburg & Gulf Railroad, 74 Mo. App. 301, 1898 Mo. App. LEXIS 311 (Mo. Ct. App. 1898).

74 Mo. App. 301 (Kenney v. Kansas City, Pittsburg & Gulf Railroad) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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