Kenneth Witmer v. Acument Global Technologies

694 F.3d 774, 54 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 1056, 2012 WL 4053734, 194 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2001, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 19457
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
DecidedSeptember 17, 2012
Docket11-1793
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 694 F.3d 774 (Kenneth Witmer v. Acument Global Technologies) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Kenneth Witmer v. Acument Global Technologies, 694 F.3d 774, 54 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 1056, 2012 WL 4053734, 194 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2001, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 19457 (6th Cir. 2012).

Opinions

SUTTON, J., delivered the opinion of the court in which, GRIFFIN, J., joined. DOWD, D.J. (pp. 780-81), delivered a separate dissenting opinion.

OPINION

SUTTON, Circuit Judge.

At stake is whether Acument Global Technologies promised lifetime, unchangeable healthcare benefits to its retired employees. Because the company expressly reserved the right to modify or terminate benefits, we agree with the district court that no such promise was made.

I.

A collective bargaining agreement governs the relationship between Acument Global Technologies and its retired employees. Prior to 2008, the company paid healthcare and life-insurance benefits to qualified retirees. When Acument ended these benefits in 2008, a class of sixty-four retirees claimed that the company had violated the CBA in violation of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act and the Labor Management Relations Act. The district court granted Acument’s motion for summary judgment, and the plaintiffs appealed.

II.

Although the plaintiffs bring this claim under ERISA and the LMRA, their entitlement to health benefits is “a matter of contract.” Reese v. CNH America, LLC, 574 F.3d 315, 321 (6th Cir.2009). The contractual question is this: Did the governing CBA create unalterable lifetime— “vested” — healthcare and life-insurance benefits? The contractual answer is no. The CBA reserved Acument’s right to modify or terminate future benefits.

The relevant language appears in “Appendix E” to the CBA, R.98-1 at 22-24, reprinted as its own appendix to this opinion. It starts by saying that “the Company will revise the pension plan established in 1955, hereinafter referred to as the ‘Plan,’ as follows.” It then contains five numbered paragraphs. The first three deal with the use of an insurance company to manage the pension fund and with the company’s lack of responsibility for the insurance company’s treatment of contributions and pay outs. Paragraph four contains a reservation-of-rights clause. “The Company,” it says, “reserves the right to amend, modify, suspend, or terminate the Plan.” The fifth paragraph introduces the benefits provided under the Plan, saying that the “[principal provisions of the pension plan are shown below.” What follows are several listed retirement benefits: retiree medical coverage; retirement income; disability income; and life insurance. In addition to describing the benefits, this section of the Appendix identifies the minimum years of service needed to obtain each benefit as well as other eligibility requirements and qualifications.

The key problem for plaintiffs is that the same document that contains the promise on which they rely (“continuous health insurance” at retirement) contains a reservation-of-rights clause (“reserving] the right [776]*776to amend ... or terminate the Plan”). Their claim for benefits gets nowhere without Appendix E, and yet Appendix E broadly reserves the company’s right to change the Plan benefits, using language that is incompatible with a promise to create vested, unchangeable benefits. See Maurer v. Joy Techs., Inc., 212 F.3d 907, 919 (6th Cir.2000).

The language and structure of Appendix E show that the reservation-of-rights clause applies to all benefits listed there, not just to some of them. After describing the company’s reservation of rights in paragraph four, paragraph five says that the “[pjrincipal provisions of the pension plan are shown below.” Below that are provisions for “retiree medical coverage” and “continued life insurance” alongside retirement-income and disability-income provisions. What Appendix E broadly gives in the form of a wide range of retirement benefits it thus broadly reserves the right to take away or modify.

Nor is the mingling of healthcare and retirement-income provisions an unusual thing to find in a CBA. In point of fact, several of our decisions in this area rely on the tying of eligibility for and vesting of healthcare benefits to the same requirements for retirement-income benefits. See Yolton v. El Paso Tenn. Pipeline Co., 435 F.3d 571, 585 (6th Cir.2006); see also Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 490 (6th Cir.2009); Reese, 574 F.3d at 322-23; Noe v. PolyOne Corp., 520 F.3d 548, 558-59 (6th Cir.2008); McCoy v. Meridian Auto. Sys., Inc., 390 F.3d 417, 422 (6th Cir.2004); Golden v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 73 F.3d 648, 656-57 (6th Cir.1996). “[Ljanguage tying health care benefits” to retirement-income benefits, we have held, demonstrates the parties’ intent to create vested healthcare benefits as well. Yolton, 435 F.3d at 584. If that is true, so too is the opposite: When retirement-income benefits have not vested due to a reservation of rights, “language tying health care benefits” to retirement-income benefits demonstrates that the employer did not promise lifetime, unchangeable benefits. Id. Just so here. To rule otherwise would alter the neutral premise of our decisions: by using tying as a relevant benchmark when it shows vesting but treating it as an irrelevant benchmark when it shows lack of vesting. That cannot be.

That particularly cannot be here. This plan not only generally ties eligibility requirements for retirement-income benefits and healthcare benefits together, but it also explicitly provides for them in the same plan and with the same reservation-of-rights clause. More than that, Appendix E provides that some funding for the two benefits may come from the same source. In providing that the company will reimburse the retiree for the monthly cost of Medicare Part B as part of the “retiree medical coverage,” the plan says that the company will pay for the benefit “either directly or from the pension fund.” The company and the employees thus had one more reason to provide all of these benefits under the same Appendix E umbrella: Some of the healthcare benefits could be funded by the pension fund.

The plaintiffs respond that the “pension plan established in 1955” did not originally cover retiree healthcare benefits. That is true but irrelevant. When the company and the union modified Appendix E to the CBA in the 1970s, they added healthcare benefits and did so by expanding the benefits provided under the pension plan— making healthcare benefits a “[pjrincipal provision of the pension plan.” Nothing prevents the parties from defining “the Plan” however they wish and above all from changing it from time to time. That the 1955 plan has been continuously revised is borne out by the preamble to [777]*777Appendix E, which explains that “the Company will revise the pension plan established in 1955 ... as follows.” (Emphasis added.)

The plaintiffs also claim that the “formal pension plan documents” support their position. Br. at 27. Nothing in those documents covers retiree healthcare benefits, they point out, meaning that “the Plan” mentioned in Appendix E must not do so either. That is backwards. The “retirement income plan” documents do not define the scope of Appendix E; Appendix E defines the scope of the relevant plan documents and how and when they can be modified.

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694 F.3d 774, 54 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 1056, 2012 WL 4053734, 194 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2001, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 19457, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kenneth-witmer-v-acument-global-technologies-ca6-2012.