Kenneth Martin v. Rains

• Court: District Court, C.D. California
• Decided: May 11, 2020
• Docket: 5:20-cv-00883
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 EASTERN DIVISION 11 12 KENNETH MARTIN, Case No. 5:20-cv-00883-FMO (AFM) 13 Plaintiff, ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 14 v. 15 DETECTIVE RAINS, et al., 16 Defendants. 17 18 On April 24, 2020,1 plaintiff filed a pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 19 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 1.) The Complaint was accompanied by a Request to 20 Proceed Without Prepayment of Filing Fees or In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”), which 21 was subsequently granted. Plaintiff is a detainee who is presently being held at the 22 Patton State Hospital, in Patton, California. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), 23 the Court has screened the pleading to determine whether plaintiff’s Complaint is 24 25 1 On April 7, 2020, plaintiff lodged for filing another pro se action: Martin v. People, Case No. 26 5:20-cv-00722-UA. That action is a Petition for Writ of Mandamus, but it has yet to be filed because plaintiff failed to either pay the required filing fees or file a request to proceed without 27 prepayment of the filing fees. In the present civil rights action, Case No. 5:20-cv-00883, plaintiff states that his Petition for Writ of Mandamus alleges that he “has been unjustifiably deemed as 28 incompetent and committed to a mental hospital.” (ECF No. 1 at 10.) 1 frivolous or malicious; fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or seeks 2 monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. Section 3 1915(e)(2) pertains to any civil action by a litigant who is seeking to proceed IFP. 4 See, e.g., Shirley v. Univ. of Idaho, 800 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 2015); Lopez v. 5 Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 n.7 (9th Cir. 2000) (“section 1915(e) applies to all 6 in forma pauperis complaints” and district courts should “dismiss a complaint that 7 fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted”) (en banc). In determining 8 whether the pleading states a claim on which relief may be granted, its allegations of 9 material fact must be taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to 10 plaintiff. See, e.g., Soltysik v. Padilla, 910 F.3d 438, 444 (9th Cir. 2018). However, 11 the “tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a 12 complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 13 (2009). Rather, a court first “discounts conclusory statements, which are not entitled 14 to the presumption of truth, before determining whether a claim is plausible.” 15 Salameh v. Tarsadia Hotel, 726 F.3d 1124, 1129 (9th Cir. 2013). Further, because 16 plaintiff is appearing pro se in this action, the Court must construe the allegations of 17 the pleading liberally and must afford plaintiff the benefit of any doubt. See, e.g., 18 Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Rosati v. Igbinoso, 791 19 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015) (in determining whether a complaint should be 20 dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), courts apply the standard of Fed. R. Civ. 21 P. 12(b)(6)). 22 In the Complaint, plaintiff names as defendants Los Angeles Police 23 Department Detective Rains, Los Angeles County Deputy District Attorney 24 Lieberman, the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office, the City of Los 25 Angeles (“City”), and the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department. (ECF No. 1 at 26 1, 13-14.) Plaintiff raises four claims. In his “Claim I,” plaintiff alleges that he was 27 “unjustifiably arrested and imprisoned under the false pretense that the plaintiff tried 28 to kill someone” and that Detective Rains failed to “comply with subpoena requests.” 1 (Id. at 15.) In his “Claim II,” plaintiff alleges the prosecutor filed “frivolous charges 2 against plaintiff,” obtained evidence “unethically” or “unlawfully,” and withheld 3 evidence from plaintiff. (Id. at 13, 16.) In his “Claim III,” plaintiff alleges that the 4 City endangered plaintiff by “employing vehicles that fly in [sic] low altitudes” 5 without informing the “public of said vehicles” and that a “trial judge retaliated” 6 against plaintiff and “committed him to a mental hospital.” (Id. at 17.) In his “Claim 7 IV,” plaintiff claims that his “property bag” was “stolen” while in custody, he was 8 “denied access to courts and phones,” he was harassed and “attacked,” and he was 9 “denied access to showers and running water.” (Id. at 18.) Plaintiff also alleges that 10 there is “no evidence” to support the charges against him (id. at 1-2); that “the courts 11 have maliciously raised a doubt as to the plaintiff’s mental competancy [sic]” (id. at 12 7); that he is serving “unnecessary time at Patton State Hospital” (id.); and that 13 “standby council” “tried to enter a plea . . . [of] not guilty by reason of insanity” 14 without plaintiff’s consent (id.). Plaintiff seeks monetary damages (id. at 1, 3, 5, 19) 15 and injunctive relief that includes dismissal of the “attempted murder” charge 16 pending against plaintiff and to have plaintiff “be deemed competent” (id. at 19). 17 “Absent extraordinary circumstances, interests of comity and federalism 18 instruct [federal courts] to abstain from exercising our jurisdiction in certain 19 circumstances when . . . asked to enjoin ongoing state enforcement proceedings.” 20 Page v. King, 932 F.3d 898, 901 (9th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted, 21 alterations in original). “A federal court may abstain under Younger2 in three 22 categories of cases: (1) parallel, pending state criminal proceedings, (2) state civil 23 proceedings that are akin to criminal prosecutions, and (3) state civil proceedings that 24 implicate a State’s interest in enforcing the orders and judgments of its courts.” 25 Herrera v. City of Palmdale, 918 F.3d 1037, 1043 (9th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation 26 marks omitted). It has long been clear that “Younger preclude[s] federal intrusion 27 28 2 See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44-45 (1971). 1 into ongoing state criminal prosecutions.” Sprint Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs, 2 571 U.S. 69, 78 (2013). In addition, “state civil proceedings that are akin to criminal 3 prosecutions” warrant abstention, and federal courts should not interfere with 4 “pending civil proceedings involving certain orders . . . uniquely in furtherance of 5 the state courts’ ability to perform their judicial functions.” Sprint, 571 U.S. at 72, 6 78 (internal quotation marks omitted, alteration in original). To the extent a plaintiff 7 in a civil rights action seeks damages under § 1983 arising from a pending state 8 criminal case, such claims should be stayed. See Gilbertson v. Albright, 381 F.3d 9 965, 979-80 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (holding that Younger principles may apply to 10 claims for damages under § 1983, but federal courts should stay the federal action 11 until the state proceeding has been completed). Federal courts may raise the 12 abstention doctrine sua sponte. See Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 143 n.10 13 (1976); Columbia Basin Apt. Ass’n v. City of Pasco, 268 F.3d 791, 799 (9th Cir. 14 2001) (the Youngerdoctrine may be raised sua sponteat any timein the proceedings). 15 Plaintiff’s Complaint indicates that the state court criminal action against 16 plaintiff is ongoing. Plaintiff alleges that he has been charged with attempted murder, 17 that he has been “unjustifiably deemed as incompetant [sic]” and “committed . . . to 18 a mental hospital,” and that he is serving “unnecessary time at Patton State Hospital” 19 where he is presently being held. (ECF No. 1 at 7, 10, 16-17). Under California law, 20 if a criminal defendant is found not mentally competent to stand trial following a 21 competency hearing, criminal proceedings are suspended while the defendant is 22 committed to a state hospital for treatment. See Cal. Penal Code §§ 1368, 1372. 23 Because plaintiff seeks injunctive relief to dismiss pending criminal charges after 24 having been committed to a state hospital, it is clear that a final judgment has not 25 been entered in plaintiff’s state court criminal action. See, e.g., Jackson v. Superior 26 Court, 4 Cal. 5th 96, 105 (2017) (noting that under Cal. Penal Code § 1372, a 27 defendant who has regained competence should be returned to the court for criminal 28 proceedings to resume); Page, 932 F.3d at 902 (where “no final judgment has been 1 entered in state court, the state court proceeding is plainly ongoing for purposes of 2 Younger” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Further, the Superior Court 3 proceeding that resulted in a finding that plaintiff was mentally incompetent to stand 4 trial is an on-going proceeding that is not criminal in nature; rather, it is a quasi- 5 criminal proceeding that strongly implicates the state’s interest in enforcing its 6 orders. See, e.g., Sprint, 571 U.S. at 82; Bark v. Patton State Hosp., 2019 U.S. Dist. 7 Lexis 187689, at *18-*22 (C.D. Cal., Sept. 24, 2019) (Younger abstention applicable 8 where petitioner had been found to be mentally incompetent to stand trial and 9 committed to a state hospital because the criminal case “has been paused while 10 petitioner remains committed in the state hospital” and state criminal proceedings 11 remain ongoing), adopted by 2019 U.S. Dist. Lexis 187632 (C.D. Cal., Oct. 29, 12 2019); In re Taitano, 13 Cal. App. 5th 233, 239-40 (Cal. App. 2017) (explaining 13 California’s statutory scheme providing that a person “who is mentally incompetent 14 to stand trial” cannot be tried or convicted); People v. Quiroz, 244 Cal. App. 4th 15 1371, 1379 (Cal. App. 2016) (in California, a competency hearing is a “special 16 proceeding, not a criminal action”). 17 Accordingly, it appears that plaintiff’s claims herein that seek dismissal of the 18 state criminal charges pending against plaintiff or the reversal of the state’s finding 19 that plaintiff is mentally incompetent to stand trial fall within the Younger abstention 20 doctrine, and this Court must abstain from interfering in the pending state court 21 proceedings. 22 In addition, plaintiff’s claims against the Los Angeles County District 23 Attorney’s Office and those for retroactive relief against Deputy District Attorney 24 Lieberman in his official capacity are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The 25 Eleventh Amendment bars federal jurisdiction over suits by individuals against a 26 State and its instrumentalities, unless either the State consents to waive its sovereign 27 immunity or Congress abrogates it. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 28 465 U.S. 89, 99-100 (1984). Further, “the eleventh amendment bars actions against 1 state officers sued in their official capacities for past alleged misconduct involving a 2 complainant’s federally protected rights, where the nature of the relief sought is 3 retroactive, i.e., money damages.” Bair v. Krug, 853 F.2d 672, 675 (9th Cir. 1988). 4 To overcome this Eleventh Amendment bar, the State’s consent or Congress’ intent 5 must be “unequivocally expressed.” Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 99. While California 6 has consented to be sued in its own courts pursuant to the California Tort Claims Act, 7 such consent does not constitute consent to suit in federal court. See BV Engineering 8 v. University of California, Los Angeles, 858 F.2d 1394, 1396 (9th Cir. 1988). 9 Finally, Congress has not repealed state sovereign immunity against suits brought 10 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In California, a district attorney is a state official when 11 acting within his or her prosecutorial capacity, and the Los Angeles County District 12 Attorney’s Office acts as a state office with respect to actions taken in connection 13 with a criminal prosecution. See Jackson v. Barnes, 749 F.3d 755, 767 (9th Cir. 14 2014) (a district attorney’s office “acts as a state office with regard to actions taken 15 in its prosecutorial capacity, and [it] is not subject to suit under § 1983”); Del Campo 16 v. Kennedy, 517 F.3d 1070, 1073 (9th Cir. 2008). 17 Further, plaintiff’s claims for damages against Deputy District Attorney 18 Lieberman in his individual capacity appear to be barred by absolute immunity. 19 Individual prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity from damages liability when 20 they engage in activities “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal 21 process,” such as the prosecution and presentation of the state’s case. See Imbler v. 22 Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427, 430-31 (1976). This immunity applies even if it “does 23 leave the genuinely wronged defendant without civil redress against a prosecutor 24 whose malicious or dishonest action deprives him of liberty.” Imbler, 424 U.S. at 25 427. However, it is the nature of the function performed, not the role or title of the 26 actor that determines the scope of absolute immunity. See Engebretson v. Mahoney, 27 724 F.3d 1034, 1039 (9th Cir. 2013) (“the Supreme Court has emphasized this 28 functional approach for determining when public officials may claim absolute 1 immunity under § 1983”). Here, plaintiff’s claims against Deputy District Attorney 2 Lieberman all arise from acts undertaken by the Deputy District Attorney in 3 initiating, preparing for, or presenting a criminal prosecution against plaintiff. 4 Prosecutorial immunity extends to all “acts undertaken by a prosecutor in preparing 5 for the initiation of judicial proceedings or for trial, and which occur in the course of 6 his role as an advocate for the State.” See Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 7 (1993); see also Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 341-42 (2009) (discussing 8 circumstances under which prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity while 9 acting as “an officer of the court”); Stapley v. Pestalozzi, 733 F.3d 804, 809 (9th Cir. 10 2013) (“prosecutors have absolute immunity under § 1983 for a decision to initiate a 11 criminal prosecution”). 12 Finally, to state a federal civil rights claim, a plaintiff must allege that the 13 named defendant deprived him of a right guaranteed under the United States 14 Constitution or a federal statute, and that the “deprivation was committed by a person 15 acting under color of state law.” See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). “A 16 person deprives another ‘of a constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, 17 if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts, or omits to 18 perform an act which he is legally required to do thatcauses the deprivation of which 19 [the plaintiff complains].’” Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988) 20 (emphasis and alteration in original). “[A] local government may not be sued under 21 §1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents. Instead, it is when 22 execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by 23 those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the 24 injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.” Monell v. New 25 York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978); see also Connick v. 26 Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60(2011) (“under § 1983, local governments are responsible 27 only for their own illegal acts” (emphasis in original, internal quotation marks 28 omitted)). In order to state a claim arising from the execution of a local entity’s 1 policy or custom, plaintiff must set forth factual allegations to show that the execution 2 of a specific policy, regulation, custom or the like was the “actionable cause” of any 3 alleged constitutional violation. See, e.g., Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 4 1146 (9th Cir. 2012) (“a plaintiff must also show that the policy at issue was the 5 ‘actionable cause’ of the constitutional violation, which requires showing both but- 6 for and proximate causation”). 7 Here, plaintiff alleges that the City “neglected to inform and protect” plaintiff, 8 “recklessly endangered” him, and negligently failed to inform the “public” about 9 “vehicles that fly in [sic] low altitudes.” Plaintiff also alleges that the City failed to 10 warn the public about actions taken in connection “with a ring of celebrity home 11 burglaries” and that helicopters were used in residential areas causing a “disterbance 12 [sic] of peace” and “sleep fragmentation” or “death.” Plaintiff alleges that he “has 13 been subjected to violent and mentally deteroriating [sic] circumstances” in 14 connection with his pending criminal case. (ECF No. 1 at 5-6, 14, 17.)3 The Court 15 discounts plaintiff’s conclusory statements concerning the City in determining the 16 plausibility of any claim alleging a violation of a right guaranteed under the United 17 States Constitution or a federal statute. See, e.g., Salameh, 726 F.3d at 1129. Thus, 18 as currently pled, plaintiff’s Complaint fails to allege any claim against the City that 19 has an arguable basis in either fact or law, and plaintiff’s factual allegations 20 concerning actions taken by the City appear frivolous because they “rise to the level 21 of the irrational or the wholly incredible.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31-33 22 (1992); see also Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). 23 /// 24 /// 25 26 3 Although plaintiff also alleges that a “trial judge retaliated against the plaintiff,” he does not name any judge as a defendant. (ECF No. 1 at 17.) Moreover, even if plaintiff had named a trial 27 judge in connection with the state court proceedings against plaintiff, any judge would be entitled to absolute immunity from suit for actions taken in his or her judicial capacity. Mireles v. Waco, 28 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991); Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 1986) (en banc). 1 IT THEREFORE IS ORDERED that, on or before June 30, 2020, plaintiff 2 || shall show cause in writing why: 3 (1) Plaintiff's claims seeking injunctive relief against all defendants pertaining 4 || to the state criminal charges pending against plaintiff or the state’s finding that 5 || plaintiff is incompetent to stand trial should not be dismissed pursuant to Younger; 6 (2) Plaintiffs claims for monetary damages against Deputy District Attorney 7 || Lieberman should not be dismissed as barred by absolute immunity; 8 (3) Plaintiff's claims against the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s 9 || Office should not be dismissed as barred by the Eleventh Amendment; and 10 (4) Plaintiff's federal civil rights claims for monetary damages against the 11 || City of Los Angeles should not be dismissed as frivolous. 12 Plaintiff’s failure to respond to this Order to Show Cause in writing may 13 || be deemed by the Court as plaintiff’s consent to the dismissal of this action 14 | without prejudice. 15 IT IS SO ORDERED. 16 17 || DATED: 5/11/2020 (dy □ {--— □□ ALEXANDER F. MACKINNON 20 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28