Ken Paxton, in His Official Capacity as Attorney General for the State of Texas and the Office of the Attorney General for the State of Texas v. Delia Garza, in Her Official Capacity as Travis County Attorney; John Creuzot, in His Official Capacity as Dallas County Criminal District Attorney; And Brian Middleton, in His Official Capacity as District Attorney of Fort Bend County (268th Judicial District)

Opinion

ACCEPTED 15-25-00116-CV FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS 8/18/2025 11:41 PM No. 15-25-00116-CV CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE CLERK FILED IN I F C N THE IFTEENTH OURT OF PPEALS A 15th COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS 8/18/2025 11:41:55 PM CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE K EN P AXTON , IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS A TTORNEY G ENERALClerk FOR THE S TATE OF T EXAS , AND THE O FFICE OF THE A TTORNEY G ENERAL , Appellants,

v.

D ELIA G ARZA , IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS T RAVIS C OUNTY A TTORNEY ; J OSÉ P. G ARZA , IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS T RAVIS C OUNTY D ISTRICT A TTORNEY ; T RAVIS C OUNTY ; B RIAN M. M IDDLETON , IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS F ORT B END C OUNTY D ISTRICT A TTORNEY (268 T H J UDICIAL D ISTRICT ); H ARRIS C OUNTY D ISTRICT A TTORNEY S EAN T EARE ; H ARRIS C OUNTY ; E L P ASO C OUNTY D ISTRICT A TTORNEY J AMES M ONTOYA ; E L P ASO C OUNTY A TTORNEY C HRISTINA S ANCHEZ ; E L P ASO C OUNTY ; D ALLAS C OUNTY C RIMINAL D ISTRICT A TTORNEY J OHN C REUZOT ; D ALLAS C OUNTY ; B EXAR C OUNTY C RIMINAL D ISTRICT A TTORNEY J OE G ONZALES ; B EXAR C OUNTY ; AND S HAWN W. D ICK , IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS W ILLIAMSON C OUNTY D ISTRICT A TTORNEY (26 T H J UDICIAL D ISTRICT ), Appellees.

BRIEF OF THE TRAVIS COUNTY, HARRIS COUNTY, EL PASO COUNTY, DALLAS COUNTY, BEXAR COUNTY, AND WILLIAMSON COUNTY APPELLEES

[Appellees’ Attorneys Listed on Following Pages]

Oral Argument Requested Leslie W. Dippel Jonathan G.C. Fombonne State Bar No. 00796472 Deputy County Attorney & First Leslie.Dippel@traviscountytx.gov Assistant Todd A. Clark State Bar No. 24102702 State Bar No. 04298850 Jonathan.Fombonne@harriscountytx.gov Todd.Clark@traviscountytx.gov Tiffany S. Bingham Cynthia W. Veidt Managing Counsel State Bar No. 24028092 Affirmative & Special Litigation Division Cynthia.Veidt@traviscountytx.gov State Bar No. 24012287 Travis County Attorneys Tiffany.Bingham@harriscountytx.gov DELIA GARZA Christopher Garza TRAVIS COUNTY ATTORNEY Deputy Division Director P.O. Box 1748 Affirmative & Special Litigation Division Austin, TX 78767 State Bar No. 24078543 Tel.: (512) 854-9513 Christopher.Garza@harriscountytx.gov Fax: (512) 854-4808 Office of the Harris County Attorney CHRISTIAN D. MENEFEE Counsel for Appellees Delia Garza, in her HARRIS COUNTY ATTORNEY Official Capacity as Travis County Attorney, 1019 Congress Plaza, 15th Floor José P. Garza, in his Official Capacity as Houston, TX 77002 Travis County District Attorney, and Travis Tel.: (713) 274-5101 County Fax: (713) 755-8924

Alexandria Oberman Bradley W. Snead State Bar No. 24131555 State Bar No. 24032706 aoberman@milchev.com snead@wrightclosebarger.com Michael J. Statin, pro hac vice Michael Adams-Hurta msatin@milchev.com State Bar No. 24097860 MILLER & CHEVALIER CHARTERED hurta@wrightclosebarger.com 900 16th Street, NW WRIGHT CLOSE & BARGER, LLP Washington, DC 20006 One Riverway, Suite 2200 Tel.: (202) 626-5800 Houston, Texas 77056 Fax: (202) 626-5801 Tel.: (713) 572-4321 Fax: (713) 572-4320 Counsel for Appellees Criminal District Attorney John Creuzot; Dallas County; Criminal District Counsel for Appellees District Attorney Attorney Joe Gonzales; and Bexar County Sean Teare and Harris County

2 Christina Sanchez C. Robert Heath El Paso County Attorney State Bar No. 09347500 State Bar No. 24062984 bheath@bickerstaff.com Ch.sanchez@epcountytx.gov BICKERSTAFF HEATH DELGADO ACOSTA Bernardo Rafael Cruz 1601 S. Mopac Expy., Suite 400 Assistant County Attorney Austin, TX 78746 State Bar No. 24109774 Tel.: (512) 404-7821 b.cruz@epcountytx.gov CHRISTINA SANCHEZ Randy T. Leavitt EL PASO COUNTY ATTORNEY State Bar No. 12098300 320 S. Campbell St., Suite 200 randy@randyleavitt.com El Paso, TX 79901 LAW OFFICE OF RANDY T. LEAVITT Tel.: (915) 273-3247 1301 Rio Grande St. Austin, TX 78701 Counsel for Appellees El Paso County District Tel.: (512) 476-4475 Attorney James Montoya, El Paso County Attorney Christina Sanchez, and El Paso Attorneys for Appellee Shawn W. Dick in his County Official Capacity as Williamson County District Attorney (26th Judicial District)

3 T ABLE OF C ONTENTS Page T ABLE OF C ONTENTS .................................................................................................4 T ABLE OF A UTHORITIES ...........................................................................................6 S TATEMENT OF THE C ASE ..................................................................................... 13 I SSUES P RESENTED ................................................................................................... 14 I NTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 15 S TATEMENT OF F ACTS ............................................................................................ 17 S UMMARY OF THE A RGUMENT ............................................................................ 26 S TANDARD OF R EVIEW ........................................................................................... 28 A RGUMENT .................................................................................................................. 29 I. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Appellees established a probable right to the relief sought. ................... 30 A. The Attorney General lacks statutory authority to promulgate the Challenged Rules. .................................................... 30 1. The Legislature did not expressly grant the Attorney General power to promulgate the Challenged Rules. ..................................................................... 32 2. The Attorney General does not have the “implied” power to promulgate the Challenged Rules. .......................................................................................... 37 3. Statutory history confirms that Section 41.006 always focused on local prosecutors and their duties, not on the Attorney General’s powers. ................... 41 B. The Challenged Rules are invalid because they exceed the scope of Texas Government Code Section 41.006. ....................... 48 C. The Attorney General did not comply with the procedural requirements of the Texas Administrative Procedure Act.......... 52 1. The Challenged Rules were not adopted in substantial compliance with the reasoned justification requirement. ........................................................ 53 2. The Challenged Rules were not adopted in substantial compliance with Section 2001.024. .................. 56

4 D. The Challenged Rules violate the Texas Constitution’s separation of powers. ........................................................................... 57 II. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding that Appellees established a probable, imminent, and irreparable injury. ................................................................................................................. 64 A. The Attorney General has waived any challenge to the trial court’s injury findings or conclusions. .................................... 66 B. Nevertheless, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in holding that Appellees established this element. ........................... 66 III. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in preserving the status quo or otherwise weighing the equities. ......................................... 70 A. The temporary injunction preserves the status quo. .................... 70 B. This Court should not reweigh the equities. .................................. 71 C. To the extent it is relevant, the Attorney General overestimates his own harm............................................................... 73 D. The equities favor preserving the status quo. ................................ 76 IV. The temporary-injunction order is not overbroad. .................................. 78 P RAYER ......................................................................................................................... 79 C ERTIFICATE OF C OMPLIANCE ............................................................................ 82 A PPENDIX .................................................................................................................... 83

5 T ABLE OF A UTHORITIES Page(s) Cases Abbott v. Doe, 691 S.W.3d 55 (Tex. App.—Austin 2024, pet. filed) ................................. 28, 72 Am. Pearl Grp., L.L.C. v. Nat’l Payment Sys., L.L.C., 715 S.W.3d 383 (Tex. 2025) ................................................................................. 46 Armadillo Bail Bonds v. State, 802 S.W.3d 237 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) ............................................................ 58 Brown v. City of Houston, 660 S.W.3d 749 (Tex. 2023) ................................................................................. 42 Brown v. Humble Oil & Refin. Co., 83 S.W.2d 935 (Tex. 1935) ................................................................................... 63 Burkholder v. Wilkins, 504 S.W.3d 485 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2016, no pet.) ..... 73 Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198 (Tex. 2002) ............................................................................passim Cameron v. Terrell & Garrett, Inc., 618 S.W.2d 535 (Tex. 1981) ................................................................................. 34 Camp v. Shannon, 348 S.W.2d 517 (Tex. 1961) ................................................................................. 30 Cities of Austin, Dallas, Ft. Worth & Hereford v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 92 S.W.3d 434 (Tex. 2002) ................................................................................... 40 City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366 (Tex. 2009) ........................................................................... 67, 74 City of Houston v. James Const. Grp., LLC, No. 14-21-00322-CV, 2023 WL 3301739 & n.3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] May 8, 2023, no pet.) ............................. 52

6 Combs v. Ent. Publ’ns, Inc., 292 S.W.3d 712 (Tex. App.—Austin 2009, no pet.) ........................................ 72 Comm’n of Tex. (PUC) v. City Pub. Serv. Bd. of S.A., 53 S.W.3d 310 (Tex. 2001) ...................................................................... 33, 37, 39 Ctr. for Econ. Justice v. Am. Ins. Ass’n, 39 S.W.3d 337 (Tex. App.—Austin 2001, no pet.) .................................... 28, 71 Cupples Prods. Co., Div. of H.H. Robertson Co. v. Marshall, 690 S.W.2d 623 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1985, no writ)........................................ 68 Daniels v. Balcones Woods Club, Inc., No. 03-02-00353-CV, 2002 WL 31426294 (Tex. App.—Austin Oct. 31, 2002, no pet.)............................................................................................................ 73 El Paso Hosp. Dist. v. Tex. Health & Hum. Servs. Comm’n, 247 S.W.3d 709 (Tex. 2008) ................................................................................. 52 Fin. Comm’n of Tex. v. Norwood, 418 S.W.3d 566 (Tex. 2013) ................................................................................. 58 Gatlin v. GXG, Inc., No. 05-93-01852-CV, 1994 WL 137233 (Tex. App.—Dallas Apr. 19, 1994, no writ) ...................................................... 69 Hartzell v. S.O., 672 S.W.3d 304 (Tex. 2023) .................................................................... 32, 39, 49 Henry v. Cox, 520 S.W.3d 28 (Tex. 2017) ................................................................................... 28 Hill County v. Sheppard, 142 Tex. 358, 178 S.W.2d 261 (1944) ................................................................ 61 Hogan v. Zoanni, 627 S.W.3d 163 (Tex. 2021) ........................................................................... 45, 46 In re Bay Area Citizens Against Lawsuit Abuse, 982 S.W.2d 371 (Tex. 1998) ................................................................................. 50 In re Newton, 146 S.W.3d 648 (Tex. 2004) ................................................................................. 71

7 In re Off. of the Att’y Gen., No. 15-24-00091-CV, 2025 WL 2204075 (Tex. App.—15th Dist. Aug. 4, 2025, orig. proceeding)........................... 59, 63 In re Oncor Electric Delivery Co., 630 S.W.3d 40 (Tex. 2021) ............................................................................. 31, 41 In re State, 711 S.W.3d 641 (Tex. 2024) ................................................................................. 73 In re Tex. House of Representatives, 702 S.W.3d 330 (Tex. 2024) ........................................................................... 60, 61 In re Turner, 627 S.W.3d 654 (Tex. 2021) ........................................................................... 58, 61 INEOS Grp. Ltd. v. Chevron Phillips Chem. Co., 312 S.W.3d 843 (Tex. App.—Hous. [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.) .................... 30 Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748 (1996) ................................................................................................ 60 Main St. Legal Servs., Inc. v. Nat’l Sec. Council, 811 F.3d 542 (2d Cir. 2016) .................................................................................. 35 Martinez v. State, 323 S.W.3d 493 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) ............................................................ 58 Martinez v. State, 503 S.W.3d 728 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2016, pet. ref’d)................................... 58 Md. Am. Gen. Ins. Co. v. Blackmon, 639 S.W.2d 455 (Tex. 1982) ................................................................................. 68 Meshell v. State, 739 S.W.2d 246 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) ............................................... 59, 61, 62 Muth v. Voe, 691 S.W.3d 93 (Tex. App.—Austin 2024, pet. filed) ....................................... 72 Ojo v. Farmers Grp., Inc., 356 S.W.3d 421 (Tex. 2011) ................................................................................. 47

8 Paxton v. Annunciation House, Inc., __ S.W.3d __, No. 24-0573, 2025 WL 15362224, at *12 (Tex. May 30, 2025)............................................................... 50 Perry v. Del Rio, 67 S.W.3d 85 (Tex. 2001) ............................................................................... 59, 63 Pruett v. Harris Cnty. Bail Bond Bd., 249 S.W.3d 447 (Tex. 2008) .............................................................. 31, 37, 38, 39 R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Lone Star Gas Co., 844 S.W.2d 679 (Tex. 1992) ........................................................................... 31, 39 Rescue-National v. Planned Parenthood of, Hous., 937 S.W.2d 60 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1996) ................. 70 Rodriguez v. Serv. Lloyds Ins. Co., 997 S.W.2d 248 (Tex. 1999) ................................................................................. 53 Rose v. Doctors Hosp., 801 S.W.2d 841 (Tex. 1990) ................................................................................. 79 S.C. v. M.B., 650 S.W.3d 428 (Tex. 2022) ................................................................................. 36 Saldano v. State, 70 S.W.3d 873 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) .............................................................. 64 Smith v. Craddick, 471 S.W.2d 375 (Tex. 1971) ................................................................................. 78 State v. City of San Marcos, 714 S.W.3d 224 (Tex. App.—15th Dist. 2025, pet. filed)......................... 71, 78 State v. Hollins, 620 S.W.3d 400 (Tex. 2020) ................................................................................. 67 State v. Loe, 692 S.W.3d 215 (Tex. 2024) ................................................................................. 28 State v. Stephens, 663 S.W.3d 45 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) .......................................................passim Sun Oil Co. v. Whitaker, 424 S.W.2d 216 (Tex. 1968) ................................................................................. 30

9 Talisman Energy USA, Inc. v. Matrix Petrol., LLC, No. 04-15-00791-CV, 2016 WL 7379254, at (Tex. App.—San Antonio Dec. 21, 2016, no pet.) ............................................ 66 Tex. Alcoholic Beverage Comm’n v. Amusement & Music Operators of Tex., Inc., 997 S.W.2d 651 (Tex. App.—Austin 1999, pet. dism’d w.o.j.) ...................... 72 Tex. Ass’n of Acupuncture & Oriental Med. v. Tex. Bd. of Chiropractic Exam’rs, 524 S.W.3d 734 (Tex. App.—Austin 2017, no pet.) ........................................ 48 Tex. Boll Weevil Eradication Found., Inc. v. Lewellen, 952 S.W.2d 454 (Tex. 1997) ................................................................................. 63 Tex. Health & Hum. Servs. v. Advocates for Patient Access, Inc., 399 S.W.3d 615 (Tex. App.—Austin 2013, no pet.) ........................................ 72 Tex. St. Bd. of Exam’rs of Marriage & Fam. Therapists, 511 S.W.3d 28 (Tex. 2017) ................................................................................... 48 Unified Loans, Inc. v. Pettijohn, 955 S.W.2d 649 (Tex. App.—Austin 1997, no writ) ....................................... 57 United States v. Hernandez-Barajas, 71 F.4th 1104 (8th Cir. 2023) ............................................................................... 35 Washington v. Associated Builders & Contractors of S. Tex. Inc., 621 S.W.3d 305 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2021, no pet.) ....................... 30, 79 Webster v. Comm’n for Law. Discipline, 704 S.W.3d 478 (Tex. 2024) ................................................................................. 59 Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001) ................................................................................................ 45 Williams v. Tex. St. Bd. of Orthotics & Prosthetics, 150 S.W.3d 563 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, no pet.) ........................................ 31 Statutes TEX. BUS. & COMM. CODE §§ 17.464, 102.101, 114.0002, 303.004, 371.051, 848.151 ..................................................................................... 34 TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 2.305 .......................................................................... 34

10 TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 2A.205 ....................................................................... 63 TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 46B.460 ..................................................................... 34 TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 58.052 ........................................................................ 34 TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 2.01 ................................................................................. 23 TEX. CONST., art. II, § 1 ....................................................................................... 58, 70 TEX. CONST., art. IV, § 22 ................................................................................... 59, 63 TEX. CONST., art. V, § 21 ..................................................................................... 59, 64 TEX. CONST. of 1836, art. IV, § 5 ............................................................................. 59 TEX. CONST. of 1866, art. IV, § 13 ........................................................................... 59 TEX. CONST. of 1869, art. IV, § 23 ........................................................................... 59 TEX. GOV’T CODE § 41.006 ................................................................................passim TEX. GOV’T CODE §§ 402.0212–.036....................................................................... 33 TEX. GOV’T CODE §§ 420.005–.108 ......................................................................... 33 TEX. GOV’T CODE §§ 552.262–3031........................................................................ 33 TEX. GOV’T CODE § 2107.002 ................................................................................... 34 TEX. GOV’T CODE § 2001.001 ................................................................................... 53 TEX. GOV’T CODE § 2001.024 ............................................................................. 56, 57 TEX. GOV’T CODE § 2001.033 ............................................................................. 54, 55 TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 142.0104 ............................................................ 48 TEX. INS. CODE § 848.151 .......................................................................................... 34 TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE § 87.011 .............................................................................. 18 TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE § 87.911 .............................................................................. 50 TEX. NAT. RES. CODE § 11.071 ................................................................................. 64

11 TEX. OCC. CODE § 1704.101 ...................................................................................... 38 TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 371.051(g) ............................................................................ 34 TEX. UTIL. CODE § 35.002......................................................................................... 39 Prior Statutes and Acts Act of May 17, 1985, 69th Leg., R.S., ch. 480, § 1, 1985 Tex. Gen. Laws 1720, 1919 (codified as T EX . G OV ’ T C ODE § 41.006) ............................................. 47 T EX . C ODE C RIM . P ROC . at 181, sec. 3, art. 1 (1925) ...................................... 46 T EX . C ODE C RIM . P ROC . title. 1, arts. 28, 30, 40, 58 (1879) ............. 43, 44, 47 TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. at 2419, sec. 2 (1925)..................................................... 46, 47 T EX . R EV . C IV . S TAT . title 70, ch. 4, art. 4413 (1925)...................................... 46 Paschal’s Digest Art. 201-02 (Act of 11 May 1846) ............................................ 43 Rules Tex. R. App. P. 9.4 ...................................................................................................... 82 TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i) ................................................................................................ 66 Regulations 1 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 56.1–.8........................................................................passim 50 Tex. Reg. 2173 (2025) (Adopted Rules).....................................................passim Other Authorities Antonin Scalia & Bryan Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 152 (2012) ........................................................................ 35, 42, 46, 47 MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam- webster.com/dictionary (last updated Aug. 17, 2025) .............................. 35, 51 RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER’S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY (2d ed. 2001) .......... 35 Senate Judiciary Comm., Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 1228, 69th Leg., R.S. (1985) ................................................................................................................ 47

12 S TATEMENT OF THE C ASE

Nature of the Case: Appeal from a temporary injunction enjoining enforcement of new regulations promulgated by the Attorney General (a member of the Executive Department) that impose sweeping and continuous reporting requirements upon county and district attorneys (members of the Judicial Department) presiding in a district or county with a population of 400,000 or more (the “Challenged Rules”). Appellees (certain counties, district attorneys, and county attorneys subject to the Challenged Rules) challenged them as invalid.

Course of Proceedings: Appellees filed three lawsuits, which the trial court consolidated, and sought a temporary injunction. (CR339). Prior to the hearing, the parties stipulated to the Challenged Rules’ first imminent reporting deadlines and to the admissibility of 23 exhibits, including 9 sets of comments on the proposed rules and 10 declarations by attorneys and administrators in Appellees’ offices. (CR383–85). The trial court then held an evidentiary hearing where Appellees presented additional testimony by two live witnesses. (2RR35–160). The Attorney General presented no evidence.

Trial Court’s Disposition: The trial court granted a temporary injunction, finding that Appellees stated a valid cause of action, that they have a probable right to relief, and that they will suffer probable, imminent, and irreparable injury absent the temporary injunction. (CR392). The trial court held that Appellees are likely to prevail under four different legal theories, and the trial court found imminent and irreparable harm through (a) outlay of expenses and resources (diverting from core prosecutorial duties), and (b) forced disclosure of confidential information which interferes with Appellees’ “ability to perform their constitutionally assigned duties and protect their communities from criminal activity.” (CR392–93).

13 I SSUES P RESENTED A temporary injunction is an equitable tool meant to preserve the status quo while litigation is pending, the issuance of which is left to “the trial court’s sound discretion.” Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198, 204 (Tex. 2002). The Attorney General identified the question presented as generally whether the trial court abused its discretion in granting the temporary injunction below. For clarity, this case presents the following sub-issues:

1. Did Appellees establish a probable right to relief under at least one of the four legal theories accepted by the trial court, i.e., that—

• the Attorney General lacked authority under Texas Government Code Section 41.006 or any other statute to promulgate the Challenged Rules;

• the scope of the Challenged Rules exceeded the scope of Section 41.006;

• the Attorney General failed to comply with the procedural requirements of the Texas Administrative Procedure Act; and/or

• the Challenged Rules violate Texas Constitution’s separation of powers?

2. In an issue not squarely raised by the Attorney General, did Appellees establish a probable, imminent, and irreparable injury? And did the Attorney General waive this point by failing to challenge the trial court’s underlying factual findings here?

3. Did the trial court act within its sound discretion in preserving the status quo, given the probable success and injury established by Appellees and the equities that the trial court reasonably balanced?

4. Did the trial court act within its sound discretion in fashioning the scope of relief?

14 TO THE HONORABLE FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS:

I NTRODUCTION

The Attorney General promulgated the Challenged Rules, which

establish an unprecedented and burdensome executive-department regulatory

“reporting” regime over select large-county prosecutors, to “rein” them in.

Instead of citing any direct authority for rulemaking, however, the Attorney

General latches onto a single word (“directs”) to transform an innocuous statute

into a fountain of unlimited rulemaking and regulatory power. That statute,

Section 41.006 of the Texas Government Code, provides:

At the times and in the form that the attorney general directs, the district and county attorneys shall report to the attorney general the information from their districts and counties that the attorney general desires relating to criminal matters and the interests of the state. T EX . G OV ’ T C ODE § 41.006.

The Attorney General seeks to enforce his Challenged Rules while their

authority and legality is litigated—and force Appellees to ignore confidentiality

laws while diverting staff and millions of dollars from their prosecutorial

roles—based almost entirely on a cursory dictionary cherry-picking exercise.

He offers no structural reading of the statute and no precedent. Unlike every

other statute conferring rulemaking authority to the Attorney General, Section

41.006 does not say he “shall” or “may” adopt rules. But agencies must point to

a clear and unmistakable legislative authorization before asserting power. They

15 cannot conjure new powers by stretching isolated words beyond recognition.

Yet the Attorney General asks this Court to do just that—accept a construction

so untethered from context that it would give him a blank check to regulate

whenever expedient, even over other constitutional officers in different

government departments. And he asks this at the temporary-injunction stage.

Even if Section 41.006 could be bent to imply some rulemaking power,

the Challenged Rules far exceed any plausible statutory scope. They are

independently invalid because they were promulgated without compliance with

the Administrative Procedure Act and because they intrude on prosecutorial

duties constitutionally assigned to district and county attorneys.

Equally telling is what the Attorney General does not do. He ignores the

record evidence showing the Rules’ substantial burdens, offers none of his own,

and simply assures the Court the burdens are minor. He wholly disregards the

standard of review at this interlocutory posture: abuse of discretion.

A temporary injunction is meant to preserve the status quo while

litigation is pending. The procedural tool would be rendered a nullity if

temporary injunctions were disallowed against government entities asserting

wide swaths of power based on stilted statutory readings and an official’s desire

to exercise that power without heed to statutory and constitutional constraints.

The order here, instead, is paradigmatic of the temporary-injunction process.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion, and this Court should affirm.

16 S TATEMENT OF F ACTS Appellants—Attorney General Ken Paxton and the Office of the

Attorney General (collectively, “the Attorney General”)—promulgated

administrative rules that impose sweeping and continuous reporting

requirements upon district and county attorneys presiding in a county with a

population of 400,000 or more (the “Challenged Rules”). In adopting the rules,

the Attorney General claimed that the new regulations are “necessary to

implement §41.006” of the Government Code. 50 Tex. Reg. 2173 (2025)

(Adopted Rules). But Section 41.006 has nothing to implement, and the

Challenged Rules would require Appellees—a coalition of certain counties,

district attorneys, and county attorneys subject to the Challenged Rules1—to

divert numerous staff and millions of dollars from prosecutorial functions to

comply by identifying, reviewing, and maintaining massive amounts of data.

(See 3RRP-4 to P-12; 3RRP-14 to P-23 (detailing compliance costs and efforts

faced by various Appellees)).

Appellees sued, and the trial court issued a temporary injunction against

the enforcement of the Challenged Rules.

1 This brief is presented by all Appellees except for Fort Bend County District Attorney Brian M. Middleton. This brief refers to this group as “Appellees” for simplicity.

17 The Challenged Rules

The Challenged Rules require covered district and county attorneys to

submit highly burdensome initial, quarterly, and annual “reports.” 1 T EX .

A DMIN . C ODE § 56.1. Appellees must provide to the Attorney General

numerous categories of information and documents, including “case file[s]” for

particular categories of cases, “[a]ll correspondence” on particular topics or

with particular entities regarding decisions whether to indict an individual or

category of offenses, and the number of times certain prosecution events

occurred. Id. § 56.3; see also id. §§ 56.4, 56.9(c). The Challenged Rules explicitly

include protected “work product” and “otherwise privileged and confidential

matters” as items to be provided. Id. § 56.2(1). They also purport to expand the

meaning of “official misconduct” beyond the legislative definition. Compare id.

§ 56.8(1), with T EX . L OC . G OV ’ T C ODE § 87.011(3).

The stated intent of the Challenged Rules is to, among other things,

regulate local prosecutions by “ensur[ing] that county and district attorneys

are … appropriately prosecuting crimes.” 50 Tex. Reg. 2173. But, in a press

release issued on the day the Challenged Rules were published, the Attorney

General noted the rules target officials in major counties. The press release,

admitted into evidence without objection, is titled, “Attorney General Ken Pax-

ton Announces New Reporting Requirement to Rein in Rogue District Attor-

neys and Ensure the Prosecution of Violent Criminals,” and states:

18 In many major counties, the people responsible for safeguarding millions of Texans have instead endangered lives by refusing to prosecute criminals and allowing violent offenders to terrorize law- abiding Texans. This rule will enable citizens to hold rogue DA's accountable.

(3RRP-13).2

The Attorney General originally proposed an initial rule on March 8,

2024, similar to the one here. The initial proposed rule received many public

comments—mostly in opposition (and the record contains no comments in

favor). The Attorney General withdrew that proposal on September 13, 2024,

in favor of a new and similar proposed rule. The new proposal also received

numerous comments in opposition. Many of those comments came from

Appellees, detailing the extraordinary burden and cost associated with

compliance and raising concerns about conflicting statutory and ethical

obligations to safeguard sensitive and confidential information. (See 3RRP-4 to

P-12).

In adopting the Challenged Rules, the Attorney General dismissed the

public comments by moving forward without substantive modifications and

without engaging with commenters’ concerns about the rule’s legality, cost, or

feasibility. See 50 Tex. Reg. 2175–80.

2 Also available at https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/news/releases/attorney- general-ken-paxton-announces-new-reporting-requirement-rein-rogue-district- attorneys-and (last visited August 15, 2025).

19 The Lawsuit

Faced with the Attorney General’s attempt to “rein” them in through the

Challenged Rules, Appellees filed separate suits seeking injunctive relief and

declaratory relief that the Challenged Rules are invalid or ultra vires. The trial

court consolidated the separate lawsuits (CR339) and set a hearing on

Appellees’ temporary-injunction applications for June 16, 2025.

The Temporary Injunction Hearing and Evidence of Harm

For the temporary-injunction hearing, the parties stipulated to the

Challenged Rules’ first imminent reporting deadlines and the admissibility of

23 exhibits, including 9 sets of comments on the proposed rules and 10

declarations by attorneys and administrators in Appellees’ offices. (CR383–85).

Appellees also presented two live witnesses at the evidentiary hearing.

(2RR35–160). The Attorney General presented no evidence and offered no

objections.3

Appellees presented abundant evidence regarding the impact of the

Challenged Rules. For example, Appellees presented evidence that the

Challenged Rules divert Appellees’ resources from their core prosecutorial

functions. (See, e.g., 3RRP-14 at ¶ 13; P-20 at 2) (explaining how prosecutor-

3 The Attorney General comments that several other prosecutors have submitted initial reports to the Attorney General, “with nary a suggestion that the prosecutions in those jurisdictions have reached a standstill.” (Appellants’ Br. at 32–33). But these referenced reports are not in the record and not before this Court.

20 attorney time is required for compliance). They also presented evidence that

the rules would deprive Appellees of the ability to protect confidential

information in their judicial-department roles while requiring that the

confidential information be given to an executive entity without the protections

afforded by existing statutes, especially for individuals reporting crimes and

participating in prosecutions. (See, e.g., 3RRP-4 at 4–7; P-14 at ¶ 19; P-23 at

¶ 8). That confidential information includes grand jury information, informant

identities, and child sexual-abuse records, just to name a few confidential items

subject to the Challenged Rules. (E.g., 3RRP-4 at 4; P-9 at 3–4, 5–6; P-15 at 5;

P-18 at 6). For each disclosure mandated by the Challenged Rules, prosecutors

will be forced to “evaluate the risk of noncompliance”—that is, “the threat of a

removal action, quo warranto proceeding, or other Attorney General-initiated

lawsuit”—and weigh that against “the privacy rights, confidentiality laws, and

other statutory and regulatory provisions prohibiting release of certain case

information and communications.” (3RRP-14 at 4).

Appellees also demonstrated that, to comply, they would incur

significant economic costs and divert staff away from their core, constitutional

prosecutorial duties. For example, Joshua Reiss—the General Counsel of the

Harris County District Attorney’s Office—attested that ten full-time

employees would be required in new roles. (3RRP-20 at 2). Compliance by this

year’s earlier deadlines was “impossible” because the District Attorney’s office

21 lacked possession and control of some of the data required by the Rules and

because of the many hours of attorney review of the office’s data that will be

necessary to meet the Rules’ specifications. (Id. at 3–8). Over a 5-year period,

the Harris County District Attorney’s Office would be required to spend

millions of dollars and create a new unit just to comply. (See generally id.).

Likewise, Danny Smith of the Travis County Attorney’s Office testified

that his team has spent “hundreds of hours just in the last two months”

preparing to comply. (2RR74:5–22; see also CR94). “[B]y focusing on

[compliance] we are not focusing on what we can be doing for the actual

criminal cases that are filed in our office.” (2RR82:24–83:13). Holly Taylor of

the Travis County District Attorney’s Office added that she “ha[d] dedicated

most of [her] working hours to implementing methods for data and document

collection and retention to comply with the challenged rules.” (3RRP-15 at 2).

So has Williamson County District Attorney Shawn Dick. (3RRP-23 at ¶ 14.).

Amy Lechuga of the El Paso District Attorney’s Office “estimate[d] that

accurately completing the initial report will take over 12,000 hours of staff and

attorney time,” and that the county would “need to hire, at minimum, one

software developer, two secretaries, one attorney, and one functional data

analyst permanently on staff.” (3RRP-17 at 3–4). Marsha Edwards of the Dallas

County Criminal District Attorney’s Office explained that compliance would

“divert staff away from their core roles and responsibilities.” (3RRP-18 at 2).

22 Jamissa Jarmon of the Bexar County District Attorney’s Office stated that her

office would hire a third-party contractor because its IT department lacks “the

capacity, software, or personnel to review and search through such a large

volume of emails.” (3RRP-19 at 3–4). Williamson County already has hired an

outside contractor. (3RRP-23 at § 14).

Appellees further demonstrated that they would also be injured by the

forced disclosure of legally protected privileged and confidential information.

Holly Taylor specified several categories of confidential information “that

[are] commonly found in [case] files” including “victim contact information,

statements, and pseudonyms; DNA testing of rape kits; graphic photos; grand

jury testimony; identities of confidential informants; criminal history

information; mental health and substance abuse treatment records; CPS

records; and defense counsel’s confidential communications with prosecutors.”

CR100. Alma Trejo from the El Paso County Attorney’s Office provided a very

similar list. CR105-06. Joshua Reiss stated “federal agencies will disapprove” of

certain required disclosures. CR275. The District Attorney for Williamson

County also expressed legal and ethical reservations of turning over materials

protected by existing federal and state laws. (3RRP-23 at § 8; P-21 at § 12.).

Finally, Appellees presented evidence that these confidentiality

infringements and other burdens created by the Challenged Rules will hinder

“prosecutors from fulfilling their duty ‘to see that justice is done.’” (3RRP-9

23 at 10 (quoting T EX . C ODE C RIM . P ROC . § 2.01)). Specifically, the Challenged

Rules will impair the ability of prosecutors—whether constitutionally elected

officials or the line prosecutors serving the public—to explore legal theories

with their colleagues; have confidential discussions with defense counsel about

the theory of the case, circumstances of the defendant, or other sensitive

information; staff ongoing investigations with law enforcement; prepare a

victim for a difficult and invasive cross examination; and collaborate with child

advocacy centers, family violence centers, and other agencies that serve

survivors of trafficking or sexual assault. (3RRP-9 at 11–12; see also, e.g., 3RRP-

11 at 6; 3RRP-14 at 6; 3RRP-16 at 5).

The Injunction Order

The trial court granted the relief sought and issued a written temporary

injunction order. (CR391). It found that Appellees stated a valid cause of action

against the Attorney General, have a probable right to declaratory and

permanent injunctive relief, and will suffer probable, imminent, and irreparable

injury absent the temporary injunction. (CR392).

The trial court also found that Appellees are likely to prevail on their

claims that (1) Texas Government Code Section 41.006 does not confer any

rulemaking authority on the Attorney General; (2) the Challenged Rules

impermissibly impose burdens outside the scope of the statute; (3) the

Challenged Rules are not in substantial compliance with the Administrative

24 Procedure Act; and (4) the Challenged Rules violate the Texas Constitution’s

Separation-of-Powers Clause because they “permit the Executive Branch (the

Attorney General) to interfere with Judicial Branch officers’ performance of

their prosecutorial duties.” (CR392–93).

Further, the trial court found imminent and irreparable harm through

(a) the significant expenses and resources to provide the first reports, diverting

resources from prosecution of crimes; and (b) the Rules’ requiring disclosure of

confidential information, which causes irreparable harm both on its own and by

discouraging other people from reporting crimes and participating in

prosecution, thereby decreasing Appellees’ “ability to perform their

constitutionally assigned duties and protect their communities from criminal

activity.” (CR393).

25 S UMMARY OF THE A RGUMENT Appellate courts review temporary injunctions for an abuse of discretion,

and do not make final determinations of the merits at this stage. The trial

court’s discretion is broad, particularly when presented with uncontroverted

evidence.

First, Appellees established a probable right to relief. As a matter of law,

the Attorney General has no authority to promulgate rules under Texas

Government Code Section 41.006, contrary to his claims. That statute does not

reference rules or regulatory authority. It does nothing more than relate a duty

for county and district attorneys—a duty originally tied to repealed statutes.

Further, the Challenged Rules exceed any possible scope of Section 41.006; the

Attorney General did not comply with procedural requirements in

promulgating the rules; and the Challenged Rules constitute a separation of

powers violation.

Second, Appellees established a probable, imminent, and irreparable

injury. The Attorney General functionally does not challenge this conclusion.

There is no dispute that the likely injury for Appellees is probable and

imminent. And it is irreparable for numerous reasons: Appellees would sustain

economic harm that cannot be remedied through damages (because Appellees

are not entitled to money damages here), they would be forced to disclose

26 privileged and confidential information to others, and their constitutional

prosecutorial role would be impaired.

Third, the trial court properly preserved the status quo and was well

within its broad discretion in balancing the equities to do so. Appellees filed

suit before they were ever put under any reporting duty by the Challenged

Rules and, as this Court has recently held, a preservation of the status quo

cannot include the continued preservation of an invalid rule or law. Appellate

courts do not reweigh the equities, but the equities also support the trial court’s

conclusion. The Attorney General claims injury to his ability to enforce the

laws, but the logic is circular: given the temporary injunction, there is no

violation of any law for him to enforce. And if the Attorney General is

ultimately right on the merits, he suffers no more than a delay in obtaining

information, something he has been without for almost 150 years—and this

mere delay pales in comparison to the harms suffered here by the Appellees and

the public from interim reporting should the Challenged Rules be declared

invalid. The trial court’s balancing of the equities to preserve the status quo

was imminently reasonable, therefore, and certainly within its discretion.

Finally, the temporary injunction is not overbroad. The Challenged

Rules are likely invalid in their entirety. Generally enjoining their enforcement

was appropriate.

27 S TANDARD OF R EVIEW The decision to grant or deny a temporary injunction is reviewed under

an abuse-of-discretion standard. Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198, 204

(Tex. 2002). Under this standard, an appellate court “defer[s] to the trial

court’s factual findings if they are supported by the evidence” but “review[s]

legal determinations de novo.” State v. Loe, 692 S.W.3d 215, 226 (Tex. 2024).

The Court should “view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial

court’s order, indulging every inference in its favor.” Abbott v. Doe, 691 S.W.3d

55, 87 (Tex. App.—Austin 2024, pet. filed).

The Court should additionally “limit the scope of [its] review to the

validity of the order, without reviewing or deciding the underlying merits.”

Henry v. Cox, 520 S.W.3d 28, 33–34 (Tex. 2017). Indeed, the deference to the

trial court’s factual findings often means (especially for mixed questions of law

and fact) that the “trial judge is entitled to reserve difficult questions of law and

fact for full development at trial on the merits.” Ctr. for Econ. Justice v. Am. Ins.

Ass’n, 39 S.W.3d 337, 346 (Tex. App.—Austin 2001, no pet.). “Moreover, the

court of appeals cannot substitute its judgment for the trial court’s reasonable

judgment even if it would have reached a contrary conclusion.” Butnaru, 84

S.W.3d at 211. “The trial court does not abuse its discretion if some evidence

reasonably supports its decision, even if the evidence is conflicting.” Abbott, 691

S.W.3d at 87.

28 A RGUMENT “To obtain a temporary injunction, the applicant must plead and prove

three specific elements: (1) a cause of action against the defendant; (2) a probable

right to the relief sought; and (3) a probable, imminent, and irreparable injury

in the interim.” Butnaru, 84 S.W.3d at 204. A “temporary injunction’s purpose

is to preserve the status quo of the litigation's subject matter pending a trial on

the merits.” Id. Here, the trial court correctly found that Appellees met all three

elements and are entitled to a temporary injunction.

In his brief, the Attorney General challenges the trial court’s finding on

the second element, the trial court’s weighing of equities, and the scope of the

injunction order. Notably, he gives no deference to the trial court’s fact findings

where appropriate, urging this Court to essentially adopt a de novo review of

both the legal and factual questions. Nevertheless, this brief will address each

of these challenges (in Sections I, III, and IV below), as well as the trial court’s

finding on the third element (in Section II), which the Attorney General only

nominally challenges in the context of other sections.

In sum, the Attorney General is wrong on all counts, and the trial court

was well within its discretion to issue the temporary injunction.

29 I. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Appellees established a probable right to the relief sought.

To establish a probable right to relief sought, a temporary-injunction

applicant “is not required to establish that it will prevail on final trial.” Id. at 211

(citing Sun Oil Co. v. Whitaker, 424 S.W.2d 216, 218 (Tex. 1968)). That is, the

applicant need submit only “some evidence” that “tends to support its cause of

action.” INEOS Grp. Ltd. v. Chevron Phillips Chem. Co., 312 S.W.3d 843, 848

(Tex. App.—Hous. [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.) (citing Camp v. Shannon, 348

S.W.2d 517, 518–19 (Tex. 1961)). And, where an applicant has multiple claims

for relief, it need establish a probable right to relief on only one of the claims.

See, e.g., Washington v. Associated Builders & Contractors of S. Tex. Inc., 621

S.W.3d 305, 319 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2021, no pet.) (declining to review

different claims after holding that a temporary injunction was proper based on

one claim).

Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Appellees

established a probable right to relief on four separate claims, although it only

needed one. Each of the Attorney General’s contentions fail.

A. The Attorney General lacks statutory authority to promulgate the Challenged Rules.

The Attorney General appears to agree that neither he nor any other

state agency has inherent authority to promulgate an administrative rule.

Indeed, an agency may “exercise only powers conferred in clear and express

30 statutory language.” In re Oncor Electric Delivery Co., 630 S.W.3d 40, 45 (Tex.

2021) (emphasis added). It “can adopt only such rules as are authorized by and

consistent with its statutory authority.” R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Lone Star Gas

Co., 844 S.W.2d 679, 685 (Tex. 1992). And a rule is invalid if “the agency had

no statutory authority to promulgate it.” Williams v. Tex. St. Bd. of Orthotics &

Prosthetics, 150 S.W.3d 563, 568 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, no pet.).

Moreover, that statutory authority must generally amount to an express

grant of rulemaking power, but an agency may exercise an “implied” power to

promulgate an administrative rule for an industry only where the agency was

first given an “express” grant of authority to regulate the industry. See Pruett

v. Harris Cnty. Bail Bond Bd., 249 S.W.3d 447, 453 (Tex. 2008) (“When a statute

expressly authorizes an agency to regulate an industry, it implies the authority to

promulgate rules and regulations necessary to accomplish that purpose.”

(emphasis added)).

Here, the Attorney General contends that Texas Government Code

Section 41.006—which is silent on rulemaking—nevertheless grants him both

express and implied rulemaking authority. Again, that section provides:

At the times and in the form that the attorney general directs, the district and county attorneys shall report to the attorney general the information from their districts and counties that the attorney general desires relating to criminal matters and the interests of the state.

31 TEX. GOV’T CODE § 41.006.

In the Attorney General’s view, the word “directs” does all the work. He

essentially claims that, because some dictionaries define “direct” as “to

regulate,” the statute must provide “an express grant of authority for the

Attorney General to create rules with content regulating the ‘forms’ and ‘times’

of the production of information.” (Appellants’ Br. at 10). He alternatively

claims, citing to Hartzell v. S.O., 672 S.W.3d 304, 315 (Tex. 2023), that the

statute “is expansive and lacking in detail,” so the word must at least imply

rulemaking authority. (Id. at 11).

In short, the Attorney General’s cursory statutory construction fails, and

he takes Hartzell and other cases out of context. Reality is that the Legislature

did not clearly and expressly authorize the Attorney General to adopt the

Challenged Rules. It did not do so when it codified the current version of

Section 41.006, nor did it when the Legislature originally adopted that statute

over 100 years ago. Nor did it grant the Attorney General implied authority.

1. The Legislature did not expressly grant the Attorney General power to promulgate the Challenged Rules.

The Attorney General argues—relying exclusively on dictionary

definitions of “direct”—that Section 41.006 contains an express grant of

rulemaking authority because it states that district and county attorneys “shall

report” certain information “[a]t the time and in the form that the attorney

32 general directs.” (Appellants’ Br. at 10) (emphasis added). This contention fails

for several reasons.

First , the plain language of Section 41.006 lacks an explicit grant of

rulemaking authority. See T EX . G OV ’ T C ODE § 41.006. It does not say that the

Attorney General may or shall adopt a “rule” or “rules” or “regulations.” See id.

Nor does it use any other “clear and unmistakable language” granting such

authority. Pub. Util. Comm’n of Tex. (PUC) v. City Pub. Serv. Bd. of S.A., 53

S.W.3d 310, 315 (Tex. 2001).

Second, when the Legislature has conferred rulemaking authority to the

Attorney General in other statutes, it has consistently included the specific

word “rule” or “rules.” See, e.g., T EX . G OV ’ T C ODE § 402.0212(f) (“The

attorney general may adopt rules as necessary to implement and administer

this section.”); id. § 402.035(f-3) (“The attorney general may adopt rules to

administer the submission and collection of information ….”); id. § 402.0351(b)

(“The attorney general by rule shall prescribe ….”); id. § 402.036(e) (“The

attorney general by rule shall establish ….” ); id. § 420.005(b) (“The attorney

general may by rule….”); id. § 420.011(a) (“The attorney general may adopt

rules ….”); id. § 420.108 (“The attorney general may adopt rules ….”);

id. § 552.262(a) (“The attorney general shall adopt rules for use by each

governmental body….”); id. § 552.3031(c) (“The attorney general may adopt

rules necessary to implement this section ….”); id. § 1202.004(e) (“The attorney

33 general may adopt rules ….”); id. § 2107.002 (“the attorney general by rule may

establish collection procedures for the agency”); T EX . C ODE C RIM . P ROC . art.

46B.460(f) (“The attorney general shall adopt rules ….”); id. art. 56A.309 (“The

attorney general and the department shall each adopt rules as necessary to

implement this subchapter.”); id. art. 58.052(e) (“The attorney general shall

adopt rules to administer the program.”); id. art. 2.305(f) (“the attorney general

shall adopt rules to administer this article”); T EX . B US . & C OMM . C ODE

§ 102.101(b) (“The attorney general by rule shall prescribe ….”); id. § 114.0002

(“The attorney general by rule shall ….”); id. § 303.004 (“The attorney general

may adopt rules ….”); id. § 17.464(d) (“the attorney general may adopt rules”);

T EX . T RANSP . C ODE § 371.051(g) (“The attorney general by rule shall ….”);

T EX . I NS . C ODE § 848.151 (“the attorney general may adopt reasonable

rules”).

The Texas Legislature knows how to confer rulemaking authority on the

Attorney General, and it did not do so here. Just as “every word of a statute

must be presumed to have been used for a purpose[,] . . . every word excluded

from a statute must also be presumed to have been excluded for a purpose.”

Cameron v. Terrell & Garrett, Inc., 618 S.W.2d 535, 540 (Tex. 1981).

Third , the term “directs” is not a replacement for the use of the term

“adopt,” “rules,” or “regulate,” either. (Appellants’ Br. at 10). While the word

“direct” may suggest some type of authority, it has several meanings, and

34 certainly does not “clearly and unmistakably” confer rulemaking or regulatory

authority over an industry. One court explained:

As for the word ‘direct,’ while it can imply an exercise of authority, it does not always. ‘Direct’ can mean ‘to manage or guide by advice, helpful information, instruction, etc.’

Main St. Legal Servs., Inc. v. Nat’l Sec. Council, 811 F.3d 542, 556 (2d Cir. 2016)

(quoting R ANDOM H OUSE W EBSTER ’ S U NABRIDGED D ICTIONARY 558 (2d

ed. 2001)); see also United States v. Hernandez-Barajas, 71 F.4th 1104, 1107 (8th

Cir. 2023) (“[D]irection does not always require authority.”). Another

definition for “direct” is simply “to show or point out the way for”—that is,

“signs directing us to the entrance.” Direct, M ERRIAM -W EBSTER . COM

D ICTIONARY , https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/direct (last

updated Aug. 17, 2025).

Further, the term “directs” is part of a restrictive clause within a

prepositional phrase that starts the statutory sentence, and so it modifies only

“times” and “form.” See Antonin Scalia & Bryan Garner, Reading Law: The

Interpretation of Legal Texts 152 (2012) (Nearest-Reasonable-Referent Canon).

In other words, under the nearest-reasonable-referent canon, the Attorney

General’s authority to “direct” reaches no further than prescribing when and in

what format information must be reported. It cannot be read as a freestanding

grant of power to regulate district and county attorneys, much less the

35 substance of prosecutions or to impose broader regulatory obligations. Doing

so would wrench the word from its grammatical function and expand it beyond

the plain text.

Finally, the Attorney General argues as a last resort that no “magic

words” are necessary, citing to S.C. v. M.B., 650 S.W.3d 428, 444 (Tex. 2022).

(Appellants’ Br. at 11-12) While that may be true for statutory interpretation

generally, the context must still “plainly” indicate that the statute does what a

party urges, absent express words. The issue in S.C. was whether a new

property-division remedy created by the Family Code vested exclusive

jurisdiction in the original divorce court. The court held that it did not,

because—

[e]lsewhere, the Family Code repeatedly and unambiguously vests ‘continuing and exclusive jurisdiction’ in family courts over a host of matters. In fact, the Family Code uses the phrase ‘exclusive jurisdiction’ or some variation over a hundred times in at least fifty-five provisions, not counting the ten instances where it appears in a section’s title.

Id. at 443. Agreeing with the dissent that “[n]o magic words are necessary …

when the context plainly indicates that the statute creates” exclusive

jurisdiction, the Texas Supreme Court held that “the context here is a Code in

which the legislature repeatedly uses some version of ‘exclusive jurisdiction’

when exclusivity is what it wants.” Id. at 444 (ellipsis in original). The court

continued:

36 We would ignore that context if we dismissed the legislature's decision to omit remotely comparable language here. … Something unmistakable must be present to displace the strong presumption of jurisdiction. The Family Code generally achieves that goal with clear and express language of exclusivity, which is lacking here. Nothing else suffices to establish such exclusivity by implication.

Id. (alteration in original). Similarly here, the context—the Legislature’s

repeated uses of some version of “shall adopt” or “may adopt” “rules” when

delegating rulemaking authority to the Attorney General—indicates that it did

not intend to grant rulemaking authority in Section 41.006.

2. The Attorney General does not have the “implied” power to promulgate the Challenged Rules.

The Attorney General argues that “even if this Court disagrees” with its

argument that Section 41.006 expressly confers rulemaking authority, “the

language of section 41.006 logically implies rulemaking authority.”

(Appellants’ Br. at 11). In support of its position, the Attorney General quotes

Pruett v. Harris County Bail Bond Board: “‘When a statute expressly authorizes an

agency to regulate an industry, it implies the authority to promulgate rules and

regulations necessary to accomplish that purpose.’” (Appellants’ Br. at 11)

(quoting Pruett, 249 S.W.3d at 453 (emphasis added)). But as this quote

indicates, there must be an “express” grant of “regulatory authority” to an

agency before an agency may have the implied authority to promulgate a

particular rule. 249 S.W.3d at 452; see also PUC, 53 S.W.3d at 315–16; Amicus

37 Brief of Ron Beal, July 7, 2025, at 2. Put differently, an agency cannot have an

implied power to promulgate a particular rule absent an initial express grant of

authority to the agency to regulate a particular industry, subject area, or, in

this case, district and county attorneys.

The Supreme Court’s analysis in Pruett is instructive. Pruett concerned

the validity of administrative rules adopted by a bail bond board that restricted

the solicitation of bail bond customers. See Pruett, 249 S.W.3d at 450. Pruett, a

bail bondsman, “claim[ed] the Board’s adoption of certain rules exceeded the

powers the Bail Bond Act at the time expressly enumerated and was thus ultra

vires.” Id. at 452. The Court began its analysis by “turn[ing] to the provisions

of the Bail Bond Act,” where it observed that the Bail Bond Act expressly

authorized the board to regulate the bonding business and to adopt rules. See

id. The Bail Bond Act requires the board to “supervise and regulate each phase

of the bonding business in the county” and to “adopt and post rules necessary

to implement this chapter.” Id. (quoting T EX . O CC . C ODE § 1704.101)

(emphasis added). Thus, the Court concluded that “the legislature explicitly

conferred broad regulatory powers on the Board.” Id. at 453 (emphasis added).

In the end, the Court ruled on the scope of the statute’s rulemaking authority

and held that the scope was impliedly broad, even though the regulatory power

itself existed explicitly: “[w]hen a statute expressly authorizes an agency to

38 regulate an industry, it implies the authority to promulgate rules and

regulations necessary to accomplish that purpose.” Id. (emphasis added).

The Attorney General also quotes Hartzell, attempting to justify his

strained reading by claiming Section 41.006 “is expansive and lacking in detail,

leaving it to” him “to fill in the gaps.” (Appellants’ Br. at 11) (quoting Hartzell,

672 S.W.3d at 315). But no authority grants him the power to fill in those gaps.

Moreover, Hartzell also dealt with express authority: a statute granting the

University of Texas Board of Regents power to “promulgate and enforce such

other rules and regulations for the operation, control, and management of the

university system[.]” 672 S.W.3d at 315.

The other two cases cited by the Attorney General, PUC and Lone Star

Gas Co., also involved challenges to the validity of an agency’s rules adopted

under statutes that expressly authorized the agency to regulate an industry and

adopt “rules.” See PUC, 53 S.W.3d at 312 (quoting T EX . U TIL . C ODE § 35.002,

which instructs the Public Utility Commission to “adopt rules”); Lone Star Gas

Co., 844 S.W.2d at 685–87 (quoting the Texas Natural Resources Code, which

authorizes the Texas Railroad Commission to “make” or “adopt” “rules”). The

issue in each case was whether the agency had exceeded its statutory authority

in adopting the specific rules at issue. See PUC, 53 S.W.3d at 312; Lone Star Gas

Co., 844 S.W.2d at 682. In each case, as in Pruett and Hartzell, the Court did not

39 hold (and was not asked to hold) that an agency may have the implied power to

adopt rules despite the absence of any express grant of regulatory authority.

Here, by contrast, there is no express grant of authority to the Attorney

General to regulate district and county attorneys, much less an

“unambiguously broad” one. Section 41.006 does not authorize the Attorney

General to “regulate” district and county attorneys or to “adopt” or “make”

“rules.” Because there has been no express grant of regulatory authority, there

can be no implied rulemaking authority to adopt the Challenged Rules.

***

Rulemaking authority may be implied in the first instance only when

“necessary to accomplish the express duties that the Legislature gives to” the

agency. Cities of Austin, Dallas, Ft. Worth & Hereford v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 92

S.W.3d 434, 441 (Tex. 2002). But because Section 41.006 does not expressly

grant any duty to the Attorney General, the Challenged Rules cannot be

necessary for any such express duty. In any event, the Attorney General has no

argument for why the Challenged Rules, or any rules, are “necessary” to

effectuate the other authority he claims from Section 41.006.

Indeed, the Attorney General cites not one case where a Texas court has

ever held that an agency has the implied power to promulgate an administrative

rule absent an express grant of regulatory authority to the agency, because no

such case exists. And in its nearly 150 years of its existence, neither

40 Section 41.006 nor its predecessors have served as the basis for adopting

administrative rules. This is unsurprising given the context in which Section

41.006 appears—a statute in the Government Code governing prosecuting

attorneys and describing their powers and duties (not those of the Attorney

General or any executive agency).

In the end, the Attorney General’s argument that a statute may imply

rulemaking authority despite the absence of an express grant of regulatory

authority is not simply without precedent; it contradicts the longstanding

principle that an agency may “exercise only powers conferred in clear and

express statutory language.” In re Oncor Electric Delivery Co., 630 S.W.3d at 45.

To hold otherwise would turn the law on its head by requiring the Legislature

to affirmatively write into a statute that the statute does not confer rulemaking

authority rather than requiring the body to write that the statute does confer

rulemaking authority.

3. Statutory history confirms that Section 41.006 always focused on local prosecutors and their duties, not on the Attorney General’s powers.

Section 41.006 was first enacted as an auxiliary to a preexisting statutory

scheme in 1879 and then recodified multiple times without substantive change

before landing at Section 41.006. Far from a broad grant of rulemaking power,

the greatest power the scheme ever gave to the Attorney General was limited

to gathering certain information that he needed to make statutorily required

41 reports to the Governor. And in 1879, the Legislature required local

prosecutors to comply with those limited requests, by enacting the first version

of Section 41.006. The statutes have never provided anything like the broad

authority that the Attorney General asserts now.

Section 41.006 cannot be fully understood unmoored from its historical

context. The Texas Supreme Court looks to the statutory history—“the

statutes repealed or amended by the statute under consideration”—to discern

legislative intent. Brown v. City of Houston, 660 S.W.3d 749, 755 (Tex. 2023)

(quoting Scalia & Garner, Reading Law 256). This “statutory history … form[s]

part of the context of the statute, and (unlike legislative history) can properly

be presumed to have been before all the members of the Legislature when they

voted.” Scalia & Garner, Reading Law 256 (citation omitted) (emphasis in

original). This statutory history is part of the context of the statute “that is the

law.” Brown, 660 S.W.3d at 755. Section 41.006’s history reveals that it does

not grant any power to the Attorney General at all, and the Attorney General

was only otherwise granted a limited power by a separate statute (now

repealed) to assist his independent reports to the Governor.

The broader statutory scheme first came into being before the advent of

the current Constitution in 1846, as part of An Act Defining the Duties of the

Attorney-General of the State of Texas. As relevant to what would become

Section 41.006, that act provided that the Attorney General shall report to the

42 Governor certain prosecutorial data and that the Attorney General “shall

require the several district attorneys to communicate to him … all the

information necessary for his compliance” with his reports to the Governor.

Paschal’s Digest Art. 201-02 (Act of 11 May 1846).

This provision was recodified under our current constitution, with minor

modifications, in the 1879 Code of Criminal Procedure. Again, the scheme’s

second part (Article 30) granted the Attorney General the power to request

specific information from district and county attorneys:

He may require the several district and county attorneys, clerks of the district and county courts in the state, to communicate to him at such times as he may designate, and in such form as he may prescribe, all the information necessary for his compliance with the requirements of the preceding article [which describes Attorney General reports to the Governor].

T EX . C ODE C RIM . P ROC . title. 1, ch. 2, sec. I, art. 30 (1879). At the same time,

the Legislature added a companion provision (now codified as Section 41.006)

directed at local prosecutors and requiring them to provide the information that

the above article authorized the Attorney General to request. Article 40 read:

District and county attorneys shall, when required by the attorney-general, report to him at such times, and in accordance with such forms as he may direct, such information as he may desire in relation to criminal matters and the interests of the state, in their districts and counties.

43 T EX . C ODE C RIM . P ROC . title. 1, ch. 2, sec. II, art. 40 (1879); see 3RRDX-5. A

similar article in the 1879 Code also directed clerks to provide the same type of

information to the Attorney General. T EX . C ODE C RIM . P ROC ., title 1, ch. 2,

sec. VI, art. 58.

From the 1879 Code’s language, it is clear that Article 40, along with

Article 58, were merely auxiliary to Article 30, which empowered the Attorney

General to “require” specific information. For example, the new provisions

stated that the local prosecutors and clerks should respond at the “times” and

in the “forms” that the Attorney General requires, which directly parallels the

grant of authority in Article 30. That Code contained no other grant of

authority to which Articles 40 and 58 could be related. The statute did not give

the Attorney General authority to make rules setting out types of information

to be provided. Instead, the categories of information were limited by Article

30 to those identified in Article 29—i.e., data to be reported to the Governor.

The only other article in the section setting out the Attorney General’s general

powers makes no mention of any report or communication. See T EX . C ODE

C RIM . P ROC . title. 1, ch. 2, sec. I, art. 28 (1879) (requiring the Attorney

General to represent the State in criminal appeals except when conflicted).

Placed in proper context, then, it becomes clear why Section 41.006 was

written as an instruction to local prosecutors rather than as a grant of power

to the Attorney General. It was not an accident or oversight—that Section was

44 added to facilitate or effectuate the exercise of a preexisting obligation, not to

create any new power.

Section 41.006 can hardly be expected to create the significant

rulemaking authority that the Attorney General now claims, given the

circumstances under which it came into existence. It was added as part of a

recodification, as an auxiliary to preexisting provisions establishing the

relevant duty and power and phrased only as an instruction for local

prosecutors to cooperate. If the Legislature meant to grant the Attorney

General the power to establish detailed new reporting requirements by

administrative rules with the force of law and enforceable by removal from

office, it is hard to imagine a more egregious case of hiding an elephant in a

mousehole. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001) (Scalia,

J.) (“Congress, we have held, does not alter the fundamental details of a

regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary provisions—it does not, one

might say, hide elephants in mouseholes.”); Hogan v. Zoanni, 627 S.W.3d 163,

174 (Tex. 2021) (“[T]he Legislature does not hide elephants in

mouseholes ….”).

***

Then, some 45 years later and as a part of the 1925 recodification of

Texas’s statutes, the provision requiring the Attorney General to make reports

to the Governor and the companion provision directed to county and district

45 attorneys were both moved into the Revised Civil Statutes. T EX . R EV . C IV .

S TAT . title 70, ch. 4, art. 4413 (1925), id. title 15, sec. 3, art. 333. When moved,

the statute kept the exact same wording used in its prior codification. See id. At

the same time, however, the provision empowering the Attorney General to

require reports was dropped entirely. C OMPLETE T EX . S TATS . at 1387

(Vernon’s 1928) (Table Showing Corresponding Articles in 1879 and 1925

Codes of Criminal Procedure).

The 1925 recodification expressly repealed all statutes not included in

the new Codes, and so the recodification repealed the grant of authority to the

Attorney General to require reports under this scheme. See T EX . R EV . C IV .

S TAT . at 2419, sec. 2 (1925) (repealing civil and general statutes “not included

herein”); T EX . C ODE C RIM . P ROC . at 181, sec. 3, art. 1 (1925) (repealing penal

laws “that are not embraced in this Act and that have not been enacted during

the present session”). Such repeal does not transform an auxiliary provision into

a grant of authority, however, as the Attorney General suggests (Appellants’

Br. at 14). Instead, the statute must be read as it always was: that local

prosecutors should cooperate whenever the Attorney General directs reporting

consistent with his statutory powers established elsewhere. When viewing

statutory history, a “change in the language of a prior statute presumably

connotes a change in meaning.” Am. Pearl Grp., L.L.C. v. Nat’l Payment Sys.,

L.L.C., 715 S.W.3d 383, 388 (Tex. 2025) (quoting Scalia & Garner, Reading

46 Law 256) (emphasis added). But there was no change in the language here.

Regardless, “new language does not amend prior enactments unless it does so

clearly.” Scalia & Garner, Reading Law 257. The simple elimination of a

companion grant of authority is not the equivalent to new language clearly

expanding the Attorney General’s authority.

If there has been any substantive change in the text, it would be the 1985

recodification’s deletion of the phrase “when required by the Attorney General.”

Compare T EX . C ODE C RIM . P ROC . title. 1, ch. 2, sec. II, art. 40 (1879), and

T EX . R EV . C IV . S TAT . title 15, sec. 3, art. 333 (1925), with Act of May 17,

1985, 69th Leg., R.S., ch. 480, § 1, 1985 Tex. Gen. Laws 1720, 1919 (codified

as T EX . G OV ’ T C ODE § 41.006).4 Such deliberate removal of language that

suggests the Attorney General may “require” information cannot be read to

imply virtually unlimited rule-making authority but instead can only be read

to minimize any assumption of authority that the Attorney General might have.

Section 41.006 always described the mere duties for local prosecutors—

it did not independently grant authority to the Attorney General. So too now.

4 In the unlikely event this Court sees an ambiguity, 1985’s legislative history further confirms there is no rulemaking authority. See Senate Judiciary Comm., Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 1228, 69th Leg., R.S. (1985) (“[T]his bill does not delegate rulemaking authority to any state officer, agency, department, or institution.”); cf. Ojo v. Farmers Grp., Inc., 356 S.W.3d 421, 442 (Tex. 2011) (Willett, J., concurring in part) (“The springboard for diving into legislative history is ambiguity.”).

47 B. The Challenged Rules are invalid because they exceed the scope of Texas Government Code Section 41.006.

A rule is also invalid if it “runs counter to the general objectives of the

statute” or “imposes additional burdens, conditions, or restrictions in excess of

or inconsistent with the relevant statutory provisions.” Tex. St. Bd. of Exam’rs

of Marriage & Fam. Therapists, 511 S.W.3d 28, 33 (Tex. 2017); Tex. Ass’n of

Acupuncture & Oriental Med. v. Tex. Bd. of Chiropractic Exam’rs, 524 S.W.3d 734,

739 (Tex. App.—Austin 2017, no pet.). The Attorney General argues ipse dixit

that Section 41.006 provides a “capacious grant” of authority and that the

Challenged Rules actually “narrow and clarify the scope of Plaintiffs’ reporting

obligations.” (Appellants’ Br. at 16). Not so.

To begin, if the Attorney General’s supposed rulemaking authority

derives from the word “directs,” as explained above, that word modifies only

“the times” and “the form” of information reports, not their substance. T EX .

G OV ’ T C ODE § 41.006.5 In other words, if the Attorney General relies on that

word for authority, the corresponding scope of authority must rise and fall with

that word. In context, the word “directs” does not authorize the Attorney

General to enact a complete regulatory scheme like in Hartzell, where the statue

5 When the Legislature authorizes rulemaking about the substance of information, rather than just the form of reporting, it does so plainly. See, e.g., T EX . H EALTH & S AFETY C ODE § 142.0104 (“The executive commissioner by rule shall … specify the information provided … that a license holder shall report.”).

48 granted explicit regulatory authority over the entire “operation, control, and

management of the university system.” 672 S.W.3d at 315. Certainly, it makes

no sense to view this use of “direct” as giving the Attorney General authority

to promulgate rules defining and expanding types of information to be provided

(including privileged and confidential materials), especially given the statutory

history and Section 41.006’s limited original meaning.

Moreover, even if Section 41.006 is construed to grant more authority

over county and district attorneys, the Challenged Rules both exceed the

general objectives of the state and impose additional burdens.

First , the Challenged Rules run contrary to the general objective of

Section 41.006. The general objective of the statute is to aid the gathering of

“information,” as made apparent from its statutory history discussed above.

However, the Challenged Rules attempt to regulate the primary function of

county and district attorneys. For example, in the Preamble, the Challenged

Rules state that they “help[] ensure that county and district attorneys are

consistently complying with statutory duties.” 50 Tex. Reg. 2173, 2174.

Section 41.006 says nothing about policing district and county attorneys’

compliance with the law. The Attorney General essentially brushes aside the

import of the Challenged Rules’ oversight committee, but it confirms his

attempt to regulate the judicial department rather than just gather information

therefrom. Given that the Challenged Rules are an attempt by the Executive

49 Department to regulate the Judicial Department, see supra Section I.D, Section

41.006 must be read narrowly, not as a limitless authorization for Attorney

General oversight over prosecutors. See In re Bay Area Citizens Against Lawsuit

Abuse, 982 S.W.2d 371, 380 (Tex. 1998) (“We should, if possible, interpret the

statute in a manner that avoids constitutional infirmities.”).

Second , the Challenged Rules exceed the scope of any alleged authority

implied in Section 41.006 by allowing the Attorney General to treat any

violation of the Rules, “without limitation,” as grounds for removal from

office—an extreme remedy for noncompliance found nowhere in Section

41.006. See 1 T EX . A DMIN . C ODE § 56.8(1) (authorizing the Attorney General

to “construe the violation to constitute ‘official misconduct’ under Local

Government Code § 87.911”); see also id. § 56.8(2) (authorizing the Attorney

General to seek removal by filing a petition for quo warranto). To be clear,

Appellees do not complain about the Attorney General’s independent power to

institute quo warranto actions against county and district attorneys (to the

extent it exists), 6 but instead about the Challenged Rules’ choice to elevate the

quo warranto procedure to a specific and draconian enforcement mechanism for

mere administrative reporting rules (because otherwise, why else would the

6 The case cited by the Attorney General suggesting that his quo warranto power “flows directly from the Constitution” is only about the constitutional quo warranto authority to seek “charter revocation” from private corporations. See Paxton v. Annunciation House, Inc., __ S.W.3d __, No. 24-0573, 2025 WL 15362224, at *12 (Tex. May 30, 2025).

50 Attorney General promulgate Section 56.8?). When paired with the fact that

the Challenged Rules also single out district and county attorneys in “major

counties” with populations over 400,000—and the Attorney General’s public

statements about using the Rules to “rein in” “rogue prosecutors” (3RRP-13)—

it is evident that the Challenged Rules were designed to intrusively monitor

the operations of certain district and county attorneys, not to collect statewide

prosecution statistics. Because the Challenged Rules’ burdensome and invasive

reporting obligations far exceed the information collection that might be even

arguably authorized by the statute, they are invalid.

Finally, the Challenged Rules exceed the scope of the statute by

demanding much more than “information.” According to Webster’s Dictionary,

“information” means “knowledge obtained from investigation, study, or

instruction.” Information, M ERRIAM -W EBSTER . COM D ICTIONARY ,

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/information (last visited

August 15, 2025) (emphasis added). The Challenged Rules do not simply

establish the timing (“the times”) and format (“the form”) of “information”

district and county attorneys shall “report” to the Attorney General. Instead,

they demand entire “case files” (including core work product and evidence

regarding prospective and ongoing prosecutions), correspondence files,

internal policies and operating procedures, and accounting for uses of certain

funds received and further directs the offices to implement new document

51 retention policies. 1 T EX . A DMIN . C ODE §§ 56.3, 56.4, 56.6. The Attorney

General suggests this is a “form” contemplated by Section 41.006, but the

context of the statute suggests otherwise: it implies that the Attorney General

may direct the “shape and structure” or “orderly method of arrangement” of the

“sets of required information”—nothing more. City of Houston v. James Const.

Grp., LLC, No. 14-21-00322-CV, 2023 WL 3301739, at *7 & n.3 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] May 8, 2023, no pet.) (construing the noun “forms”). The

Challenged Rules go well beyond collecting prosecution statistics and instead

give the Attorney General near-unlimited access to district and county

attorneys’ emails, attorney work product, privileged information, and case

files—all untethered to any statutory responsibility of the Attorney General to

collect such information. And the burdens are excessive, as discussed

throughout this brief. (See also 3RRP-4 to P-12; 3RRP-14 to P-23). As a result,

the Challenged Rules are invalid because they conflict with the design of

Section 41.006 and impose burdens and conditions in excess of that

contemplated by the statute—and the Attorney General made no attempt

below to dispute the evidence on this topic.

C. The Attorney General did not comply with the procedural requirements of the Texas Administrative Procedure Act.

“When an agency promulgates a rule without complying with the proper

rule-making procedures, the rule is invalid.” El Paso Hosp. Dist. v. Tex. Health

52 & Hum. Servs. Comm’n, 247 S.W.3d 709, 715 (Tex. 2008). These procedures are

not mere technicalities; they instead are meant to “provide for public

participation in the rulemaking process.” T EX . G OV ’ T C ODE § 2001.001(2). In

requiring a reasoned justification for rules and a detailed cost estimate, for

example, “the APA assures that the public and affected persons are heard on

matters that affect them and receive notice of new rules.” Rodriguez v. Serv.

Lloyds Ins. Co., 997 S.W.2d 248, 255 (Tex. 1999). Here, the Attorney General

failed to follow the proper procedures in at least two ways.

1. The Challenged Rules were not adopted in substantial compliance with the reasoned justification requirement.

Under the Texas Administrative Procedure Act (APA), a state agency

order adopting a rule must include a “reasoned justification for the rule as

adopted.” The “reasoned justification” must include:

(A) a summary of comments received from parties interested in the rule that shows the names of interested groups or associations offering comment on the rule and whether they were for or against its adoption;

(B) a summary of the factual basis for the rule as adopted which demonstrates a rational connection between the factual basis for the rule and the rule as adopted; and

(C) the reasons why the agency disagrees with party submissions and proposals[.]

53 T EX . G OV ’ T C ODE § 2001.033(a)(1). The “agency’s reasoned justification”

must demonstrate in a “clear and logical fashion that the rule is a reasonable

means to a legitimate objective.” Id. § 2001.035(c). An agency rule is invalid if

it is not adopted in substantial compliance with APA Section 2001.033(a)’s

reasoned justification requirement. Id. § 2001.035. The Attorney General did

not substantially comply with this requirement.

First , the final notice of the Challenged Rules does not provide “a

summary of comments received from parties interested in the rule that shows

the names of interested groups or associations offering comment on the rule

and whether they were for or against its adoption.” Id. § 2001.033(a)(1)(a). The

Attorney General does not dispute this fact.

Second , the Attorney General’s “reasoned justification” does not

demonstrate in a “clear and logical fashion that the rule is a reasonable means

to a legitimate objective.” Id. § 2001.035(c). In his “Explanation and

Justification Rules,” the Attorney General states that the Challenged Rules

“help[] ensure that county and district attorneys are consistently complying

with statutory duties.” 50 Tex. Reg. 2173 (emphasis added). But the Challenged

Rules are not a reasonable means to achieve that objective because they ignore

district and county attorneys in jurisdictions with fewer than 400,000

attorneys—that is, prosecutors in 241 of the 254 counties in Texas, a

geographically diverse state that cannot be properly represented through such

54 exclusion. As such, the Challenged Rules cannot produce information that

informs the Attorney General whether county and district attorneys are acting

“consistently” throughout the State. The promulgating order states that the

“population requirement … allows the Attorney General to review data from

the largest counties in the state which will indicate trends for all counties in the

state.” 50 Tex. Reg. 2177. But the Attorney General did not explain how this

limited subset of prosecutors’ production of entire “case files” and

“correspondence” will indicate “trends.” Moreover, as quoted above, the

Attorney General acknowledged in a Press Release on its website that the true

purpose of the Rules is to “rein in” so-called “rogue district attorneys” in “major

counties” and “to enable citizens to hold rogue DA’s accountable.” (3RRP-13).

In other words, the Attorney General has conceded that the Challenged Rules

are targeted at particular major counties, not intended to serve as a statewide

proxy. As a result, the Attorney General’s goal of seeking the removal of duly

elected county officials is not a “legitimate objective,” “logical fashion,” or a

“rationale connection.” And, to be clear, this is not a matter of whether

Appellees “disagree” with the explanations (see Appellants’ Br. at 27), but

simply taking the Attorney General at his word.

Finally, the Attorney General did not provide “reasons why the agency

disagrees with party submissions and proposals.” T EX . G OV ’ T C ODE

§ 2001.033(a)(1)(C). Appellees submitted timely letters after the publication of

55 the proposed rules wherein they detailed the massive financial costs and other

burdens that must be incurred in order to comply with the Challenged Rules.

(3RRP-4 to P-12). The Attorney General failed to meaningfully engage with

or respond to Appellees’ concerns, instead asserting without factual basis or

analysis: that he “completed a fiscal impact analysis of the rule and concludes

that the costs should be minimal as complying with the rules could be absorbed

into the reporting entities’ ongoing operations.” 50 Tex. Reg. 2176.

2. The Challenged Rules were not adopted in substantial compliance with Section 2001.024.

Section 2001.024 requires the Attorney General to provide in its notice

of the proposed rule “the estimated loss or increase in revenue to the state or to

local governments as a result of enforcing or administering the rule.” T EX .

G OV ’ T C ODE § 2001.024(a)(4)(C). Similarly, Section 2001.024(a)(5) requires

the Attorney General to provide a statement of probable economic costs for the

first five years of implementation. Id.

The Attorney General failed to consider and address the loss of revenue

county governments will suffer because of the sweeping new compliance

burdens, including extensive collection, review, and submission of case files.

Instead, the notice blanketly asserted that “there may be minimal costs to local

governments for gathering and submitting quarterly and annual reports” and

that the Attorney General “cannot predict the cost amounts.” 50 Tex. Reg. at

56 2174. Section 2001.024(a)(4)(C), however, commands the Attorney General to

estimate what the loss or increase in revenue to the state and local governments

would be. Moreover, the Attorney General’s notice fails to consider at all the

costs for gathering and submitting the “initial report,” which requires the

production of information, case files, and correspondence going back to 2021.

The notice addresses the costs for gathering and submitting only the “quarterly

and annual reports.”

It does not matter if Section 2001.024 only applies to proposed rules, as

the Attorney General argues. (Appellants’ Br. at 28). The proposed rules here,

leading up to the Challenged Rules, still did not meet the cost-benefit analysis

requirement.

The APA’s cost-benefit requirements ensure transparency and

accountability in rulemaking. By failing to conduct and disclose a meaningful

cost analysis, the Attorney General deprived affected parties—including

Appellees and taxpayers—of the opportunity to fully understand the proposed

rule’s consequences and to offer informed objections. See Unified Loans, Inc. v.

Pettijohn, 955 S.W.2d 649, 651 (Tex. App.—Austin 1997, no writ).

D. The Challenged Rules violate the Texas Constitution’s separation of powers.

Finally, Appellees established a probable right to relief because the

Challenged Rules violate the separation of powers articulated in the Texas

57 Constitution. Our Constitution enshrines a clear separation of powers. After

expressly dividing the powers into three departments, it states: “no person, or

collection of persons, being of one of these departments, shall exercise any

power properly attached to either of the others, except in the instances herein

expressly permitted.” TEX. CONST. art. II, § 1. A constitutional violation occurs

when one department tries to usurp or interfere with the core function of

another. See In re Turner, 627 S.W.3d 654, 660 (Tex. 2021). “Exceptions to the

constitutionally mandated separation of powers are never to be implied in the

least; they must be ‘expressly permitted’ by the Constitution itself.” Fin.

Comm’n of Tex. v. Norwood, 418 S.W.3d 566, 570 (Tex. 2013) (quoting T EX .

C ONST ., art. II, § 1).

The separation of powers can be violated in two ways. “First, it is violated

when one branch of government assumes, or is delegated, to whatever degree,

a power that is more ‘properly attached’ to another branch.” Martinez v. State,

503 S.W.3d 728, 733 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2016, pet. ref’d) (quoting Armadillo

Bail Bonds v. State, 802 S.W.3d 237, 239 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (superseded by

statute on other grounds)). The second type of violation occurs “when one

branch unduly interferes with another branch so that the other branch cannot

effectively exercise its constitutionally assigned powers.” Id. (quoting Martinez

v. State, 323 S.W.3d 493, 501 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010)). Both grounds justify

relief here.

58 As background, the Attorney General and his office are constitutionally

part of the Executive Department, whereas the district and the county

attorneys are part of the Judicial Department. Compare T EX . C ONST ., art. V,

§ 21, with T EX . C ONST ., art. IV, § 22.7 The Attorney General’s primary duties

“are to render legal advice in opinions to various political agencies and to

represent the State in civil litigation.” Webster v. Comm’n for Law. Discipline, 704

S.W.3d 478, 494 (Tex. 2024) (quoting Perry v. Del Rio, 67 S.W.3d 85, 91 (Tex.

2001)). The Attorney General also has the “visitorial” right to “inquire” into

private corporations. See In re Off. of the Att’y Gen., No. 15-24-00091-CV, 2025

WL 2204075, at *2 (Tex. App.—15th Dist. Aug. 4, 2025, orig. proceeding)

(citing T EX . C ONST ., art. IV, § 22). In contrast, our Constitution charges

county and district attorneys with the function to “prosecute the pleas of the

state in criminal cases.” State v. Stephens, 663 S.W.3d 45, 50 (Tex. Crim. App.

2021) (quoting Meshell v. State, 739 S.W.2d 246, 254 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987)

and citing T EX . C ONST ., art. V, § 21).

The Challenged Rules necessarily would assume (or at least unduly

interfere with) the Judicial Department’s assigned prosecutorial functions and

7 In fact, district attorneys have been part of the judicial branch in Texas constitutions going back to 1836. See T EX . C ONST . of 1836, art. IV, § 5. The Attorney General was also part of the judicial branch prior to the Reconstruction Constitution (T EX . C ONST . of 1866, art. IV, § 13), but the office was part of the executive branch in the two constitutions since then. See T EX . C ONST ., art. IV, sec. 22; T EX . C ONST . of 1869, art. IV, § 23.

59 authority by attempting to regulate the county and district attorneys and their

prosecutorial decisions. As the Attorney General admits, the promulgation of

rules is a means of regulating another (such as “regulat[ing] an industry”).

(Appellants’ Br. at 10–11). And the Challenged Rules were promulgated with

regulatory purpose: to “ensure that county and district attorneys are

consistently complying with statutory duties, including seeking justice for

citizens who have been harmed by a criminal act, appropriately administering

funds, and appropriately prosecuting crimes.” 50 Tex. Reg. 2173. That is, the

Challenged Rules are a means of the Attorney General supervising county and

district attorneys “prosecuting crimes,” which is an improper assumption of, or

intrusion upon, their primary constitutional role. The Constitution precludes

the Attorney General from independent authority to prosecute crimes, Stephens,

663 SW3d at 57, and so necessarily must preclude his claiming authority to

supervise and oversee the elected officials assigned that role.

At minimum, the Challenged Rules unduly interfere with the Judicial

Department’s prosecutorial roles. Even when the department exerting

authority does not “arrogate power to itself, … the separation-of-powers

doctrine requires that a branch not impair another in the performance of its

constitutional duties.” In re Tex. House of Representatives, 702 S.W.3d 330, 344

(Tex. 2024) (quoting Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 757 (1996))

(alteration in original). Thus, “interference by one branch of government with

60 the effectual function of another raises concerns of separation of powers.” Id.

(emphasis in original) (quoting In re Turner, 627 S.W.3d at 660). Nor does such

interference require that the intrusion “destroy” Appellees’ ability to perform

their constitutional duties, as Appellants imply. See Stephens, 663 S.W.3d at 54

(“The standard for whether this is a violation of the separation of powers is not

whether a legislative grant of authority to the attorney general would ‘destroy’

the county or district attorney’s office.”). “Where certain duties are imposed or

specific powers are conferred upon a designated officer, the Legislature cannot

withdraw them … nor confer them upon others nor abridge them or interfere

with the officer’s right to exercise them unless the Constitution expressly so

provides.” Meshell, 739 S.W.2d at 254 (quoting Hill County v. Sheppard, 142 Tex.

358, 178 S.W.2d 261, 264 (1944)) (alteration in original) (emphasis removed).

The trial court considered abundant and unrebutted evidence about how

the Challenged Rules create that interference, and the trial court’s conclusions

on the facts of interference are accorded deference at this stage, when a

definitive declaration of the merits should not yet be made. That includes not

only the trial court’s finding of interference through resource diversions but

also the finding that forced disclosure of confidential information “will

discourage people from reporting crimes, investigating crimes, and/or

participating in the prosecution of crimes, thereby decreasing the Plaintiffs’

ability to perform their constitutionally assigned duties and protect their

61 communities from criminal activity.” (CR393; see also, e.g., 3RRP-9 at 11–12; P-

11 at 6; P-14 at 6; P-16 at 5). The Attorney General questions the effect of the

resource diversions (Appellants’ Br. at 31-33), but “any attempt by one

department of government to interfere with the powers of another is null and

void,” regardless of the magnitude of that attempt, unless that attempt is

“authorized by an express provision of the constitution.” Stephens, 663 S.W.3d

at 50 (quoting Meshell, 739 S.W.2d at 252) (emphasis added). Appellees

therefore established a probable right to relief on their constitutional claims,

despite the Attorney General’s assertions here about the weight of that

uncontroverted evidence.

The Attorney General also maintains that his “exercise of legislatively

delegated authority to obtain information from the judicial branch” somehow

overrides Appellees’ constitutional duties. (Appellants’ Br. at 30). But it is clear

that the Attorney General is not merely attempting to exercise fact-finding

authority but attempting to “ensure” specific conduct by county and district

attorneys. 50 Tex. Reg. 2173. Next, if there is a constitutional impairment such

that this balancing is required, the “probable right to relief” standard is already

satisfied since the “probable right” standard is not a final determination of the

merits. At any rate, the Attorney General wrongly describes his authority here.

As discussed above, Section 41.006 itself does not expressly delegate such

authority, and so the Attorney General’s exercise of legislative authority is also

62 a constitutional violation. See Perry, 67 S.W.3d at 93 (“As a member of the

executive branch, the Attorney General may not perform legislative functions

unless expressly authorized to do so.”). 8 To the extent Section 41.006 could be

read otherwise, this would be a different violation not only of the traditional

separation of powers but also of the nondelegation doctrine, an interpretation

that should not be engrafted onto the statute. Cf. Tex. Boll Weevil Eradication

Found., Inc. v. Lewellen, 952 S.W.2d 454, 466 (Tex. 1997) (explaining the “power

to pass laws rests with the Legislature, and that power cannot be delegated to

some commission or other tribunal” (quoting Brown v. Humble Oil & Refin. Co.,

83 S.W.2d 935, 941 (Tex. 1935)).

When the Legislature properly delegates any of its inquiry power to the

Attorney General, in relation to local prosecutors, it specifies the information

to be collected and then designates the Attorney General as the executive

officer to administer that collection. See, e.g., T EX . C ODE C RIM . P ROC .

art. 2A.205 (detailing annual reports on human-trafficking investigations); id.

art. 2A.213 (concerning information needed for the federal habeas review by

8 The Texas Constitution does not otherwise give the Attorney General such a broad power of inquiry. His inquiry power is explicitly granted only as to private corporations, and even that power is limited. See T EX . C ONST ., art. IV, § 22; see also In re Off. of the Att’y Gen., 2025 WL 2204075, at *3 (“We decline the OAG’s invitation to be the first Texas state court to hold that state law grants that department an across-the-board right to demand pre-suit depositions.”); id. at *5 (Brister, C.J., dissenting) (agreeing that there is no grant so broad).

63 the Attorney General); id. art. 59.06 (detailing auditing procedures related to

proceeds from forfeited property); T EX . N AT . R ES . C ODE § 11.071 (detailing

reports concerning persons who have taken mineral or other property from

public lands). Those statutes, as opposed to the Attorney General’s broad

exertion of power here, show a proper delegation of authority that respects the

Texas Constitution’s “vertical separation of powers between the Attorney

General and the district attorneys in matters of criminal prosecution.” See

Stephens, 663 S.W.3d at 50 (quoting T EX . C ONST ., art. V, § 21, and Saldano v.

State, 70 S.W.3d 873, 877 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)). The way the Attorney

General overreads Section 41.006 and seizes authority through the Challenged

Rules, however, is a grab of power that our State’s Constitution and statutes do

not give him.

II. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding that Appellees established a probable, imminent, and irreparable injury.

The trial court made the following factual findings to support its

conclusion that Appellees established a probable, imminent, and irreparable

injury:

1. [Appellees] will need to expend a significant amount of resources, personnel time, and taxpayer funds to provide the first quarterly report and initial report … . Compliance with the Challenged Rules has already diverted and will continue to divert resources and personnel time from performing necessary tasks related to the investigation and prosecution of criminal activity.

64 2. The Challenged Rules require disclosure of case files, explicitly including confidential work product and privileged communications, as well as [other sensitive information].

3. Plaintiffs will be forced to disclose confidential information about previous and ongoing criminal prosecutions and law enforcement investigations, including records and information that are specifically protected from unauthorized disclosure by Plaintiffs under other state and/or federal laws that contain both civil and criminal penalties.

4. Plaintiffs will be forced to disclose the private and confidential information provided to the district and county attorneys in connection with the performance of their prosecutorial duties and such disclosure of confidential and private information containing highly sensitive and personal matters to Defendants will discourage people from reporting crimes, investigating crimes, and/or participating in the prosecution of crimes, thereby decreasing the Plaintiffs’ ability to perform their constitutionally assigned duties and protect their communities from criminal activity.

(CR393). The Attorney General does not specifically challenge any of these

findings on appeal and presented no controverting evidence nor objections to

Appellees’ proffered evidence. Instead, he argues that the “equitable balancing”

of harms favors the Attorney General. (Appellants’ Br. at 34). Nevertheless, the

trial court’s conclusion and uncontroverted evidence supporting it merit

affirmance.

65 A. The Attorney General has waived any challenge to the trial court’s injury findings or conclusions.

By not specifically challenging any of the factual findings that underpin

the trial court’s legal conclusion that Appellees established a probable,

imminent, and irreparable injury, the Attorney General waived any argument

to the contrary. See T EX . R. A PP . P. 38.1(i); Talisman Energy USA, Inc. v.

Matrix Petrol., LLC, No. 04-15-00791-CV, 2016 WL 7379254, at *5 (Tex.

App.—San Antonio Dec. 21, 2016, no pet.) (affirming the temporary injunction

“[b]ecause [appellant] did not attack all of the trial court's irreparable injury

or equivalent findings in its original brief”). The Attorney General also does

not challenge the legal conclusion itself but instead argues for a different

weighing of equities. But whether Appellees themselves were in danger of a

probable, imminent, and irreparable injury is a separate question from the

balancing of the harms or equities. By challenging imminent and irreparable

harm solely by arguing about the balance of equities, therefore, the Attorney

General has not actually challenged whether Appellees meet this temporary-

injunction element.

B. Nevertheless, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in holding that Appellees established this element.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Appellees

would suffer a probable, imminent, and irreparable injury absent a temporary

injunction.

66 First , the parties stipulated that the First Quarterly Report was due June

30, 2025, the “Initial Report” was due July 1, 2025, and the First Annual Report

and the Second Quarterly Report were due September 30, 2025. (CR384). They

also stipulated that the Attorney General intended to enforce those reporting

deadlines. (CR384). The probability and imminence elements of the test were

accordingly established by stipulation.

Second , Appellees presented abundant evidence below that they would

be irreparably injured. “An injury is irreparable if the injured party cannot be

adequately compensated in damages or if the damages cannot be measured by

any certain pecuniary standard.” Butnaru, 84 S.W.3d at 204. Appellees cannot

be compensated in damages here. See State v. Hollins, 620 S.W.3d 400, 410 (Tex.

2020) (“Money damages are not available in an ultra vires action.”). Here, the

trial court found that Appellees’ compliance with the Challenged Rules will

cause Appellees to suffer significant fiscal costs, as supported by the record. (See

3RRP-4 to P-12; 3RRP-14 to P-23). That is enough. See City of El Paso v.

Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366, 368–69 (Tex. 2009) (“We conclude that while

governmental immunity generally bars suits for retrospective monetary relief,

it does not preclude prospective injunctive remedies in official-capacity suits

against government actors who violate statutory or constitutional

provisions.”).

67 Third , because the Challenged Rules explicitly call for the disclosure of

privileged and confidential information, see 1 T EX . A DMIN . C ODE § 56.2(1),

Appellees (as well as members of the public) suffer another irreparable injury.

For example, “[t]he supreme court has made it clear that forced disclosure of

privileged material subjects the party disclosing to irreparable harm” for which

there is no adequate legal remedy through an appeal or otherwise. Cupples

Prods. Co., Div. of H.H. Robertson Co. v. Marshall, 690 S.W.2d 623, 625 (Tex.

App.—Dallas 1985, no writ) (citing Md. Am. Gen. Ins. Co. v. Blackmon, 639

S.W.2d 455, 456 (Tex. 1982)). This makes sense especially in the attorney

context, because the entire purpose of the privilege is “to promote the

unrestrained communications” of an attorney in their communications with

their client or in their work product. Blackmon, 639 S.W.2d at 458. The risk of

disclosure of confidential and privileged materials to the Attorney General—

particularly core attorney work product disclosing the prosecutor’s thoughts,

impressions, opinions, and legal strategies in prospective and ongoing cases—

will suppress and discourage full and open communications and strategy. (See,

e.g., 2RR86–87; 3RRP-8 at 2, P-9 at 1–2, P-14 at 4–5). Appellees have identified

a plethora of confidentiality laws that would be violated by their compliance

with the Challenged Rules. (CR31, 74, 150, 314–18; 3RRP-4 at 4–7, P-5 at 6–

68 7, P-9 at 3–7, P-11 at 6–7, P-16 at 3–4).9 Damages do not adequately remedy

this harm. Once the information is disclosed, it cannot be undisclosed.

Fourth, the trial court found that compliance with the Challenged Rules

would cause the Appellees to divert significant resources away from their core

responsibilities of prosecuting criminal cases. The Attorney General argues

that diversion would be minimal (e.g., Appellants’ Br. at 32 (“It blinks reality to

suggest that the Rules will grind prosecutions in Harris County to a halt.”)).

The Attorney General’s jury-type argument is wrong and without evidentiary

support. Also, the size of the injury does not matter. See, e.g., Gatlin v. GXG,

Inc., No. 05-93-01852-CV, 1994 WL 137233, at *6 (Tex. App.—Dallas Apr. 19,

1994, no writ) (“It is not so much the magnitude of the harm suffered, but its

irreparability that matters for purposes of a temporary injunction.”). At any

rate, the diversion of limited resources is a significant injury that cannot be

redressed by damages.

Finally, the trial court found that compliance with the Challenged Rules

would result in the constitutional deprivation of the separation of powers,

which is an irreparable injury in and of itself. As part of the Judicial

9 As ipse dixit, the Attorney General claims he is subject to the same confidentiality laws as local prosecutors, but that would not absolve Appellees of any unauthorized disclosure to the Attorney General. And there is no evidence of any law or other authority that would protect confidentiality once these materials are with the Attorney General, despite the question being asked of a witness at the hearing. (2RR65:15–22).

69 Department, the Appellee county and district attorneys have the exclusive

constitutional right that “no person, or collection of persons” from another

department of the State—including the Attorney General—“shall exercise any

power” that violates the separation of powers between one branch and another.

T EX . C ONST . art. II, § 1. This unique constitutional injury independently

satisfies the requisites for a temporary injunction, as well. E.g., Op. Rescue-

National v. Planned Parenthood of Hous., 937 S.W.2d 60, 77 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 1996) (“[A] violation of a constitutionally guaranteed

right inflicts irreparable injury warranting injunctive relief.”) (internal citations

omitted), aff’d as mod., 975 S.W.2d 546 (Tex. 1998).

III. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in preserving the status quo or otherwise weighing the equities.

Temporary injunctions are meant to preserve the status quo pending

litigation. So when Texas courts refer to an “abuse of discretion” for temporary

injunctions, that discretion is especially bound in the decision to preserve the

status quo and the balancing of equities the trial court conducts before issuing

its equitable decision. This Court should defer to the trial court’s discretion on

these remaining issues beyond the essential elements of a temporary injunction.

A. The temporary injunction preserves the status quo.

Any consideration of equities beyond the required elements for a

temporary injunction necessarily refers to the maintenance of the status quo.

70 E.g., Ctr. for Econ. Justice v. Am. Ins. Ass’n, 39 S.W.3d at 343 (“A temporary

injunction is a remedial writ through which the court exercises its equity

jurisdiction in order to maintain the status quo.”). The status quo is the “last,

actual, peaceable, non-contested status which preceded the pending

controversy.” State v. City of San Marcos, 714 S.W.3d 224, 243 (Tex. App.—15th

Dist. 2025, pet. filed).

Section 41.006 has existed for well over a century and yet no county and

district attorney has ever been subject to any regulatory reporting deadline

under the statute; preventing that from happening now maintains the status

quo. The analysis does not change because Appellees filed suit after the

Challenged Rules came into effect, either, especially since the Challenged Rules

were invalid to begin with. Such “continuation of illegal conduct,” as this Court

has explained, “cannot be justified as preservation of the status quo.” Id. at 245

(quoting In re Newton, 146 S.W.3d 648, 651 (Tex. 2004)). And since “the acts

sought to be enjoined constitute violation of the law … the status quo to be

preserved cannot be a continuation of those acts.” Id.

B. This Court should not reweigh the equities.

Beyond the simple “status quo” alone, a reminder of the standard of

review is important here. The abuse-of-discretion standard applied to

temporary injunctions is appropriate for reviewing all sorts of decisions by a

trial court sitting in equity. See Wagner & Brown, Ltd. v. Sheppard, 427–29 &

71 n.54 (Tex. 2008) (discussing several equitable actions). Critically, the “court of

appeals cannot substitute its judgment for the trial court’s reasonable judgment

even if it would have reached a contrary conclusion.” Butnaru, 84 S.W.3d at 211.

That is, a balancing of the equities is not even part of this Court’s review.

Certainly, an appellate court may not rebalance the equities and impose its own

view of them.

Trial courts have frequently issued temporary injunctions in APA cases

challenging the validity or application of the administrative rule, and appellate

courts have affirmed these orders without any reference to the balancing of the

equities. See generally, e.g., Tex. Health & Hum. Servs. v. Advocates for Patient

Access, Inc., 399 S.W.3d 615 (Tex. App.—Austin 2013, no pet.); Tex. Alcoholic

Beverage Comm’n v. Amusement & Music Operators of Tex., Inc., 997 S.W.2d 651

(Tex. App.—Austin 1999, pet. dism’d w.o.j.); see also Muth v. Voe, 691 S.W.3d

93 (Tex. App.—Austin 2024, pet. filed); Doe, 691 S.W.3d 55; Combs v. Ent.

Publ’ns, Inc., 292 S.W.3d 712, 724–25 (Tex. App.—Austin 2009, no pet.). For

example, in Advocates for Patient Access, the court affirmed the trial court’s

issuance of a temporary injunction in a declaratory-judgment action

challenging a regulatory rule after noting that “the only question before the

trial court is whether the applicant is entitled to preservation of the status quo

pending trial on the merits.” 399 S.W.3d at 629.

72 Even when a party has raised the equities, courts of appeals have

unsurprisingly affirmed temporary injunctions even if there is a valid argument

for the equities weighing in the other direction. See, e.g., Burkholder v. Wilkins,

504 S.W.3d 485, 493 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2016, no pet.)

(“Given that some record evidence reasonably supports the trial court’s

assessment of the balance of equities, we cannot conclude that the trial court

abused its discretion.”); Daniels v. Balcones Woods Club, Inc., No. 03-02-00353-

CV, 2002 WL 31426294, at *3 (Tex. App.—Austin Oct. 31, 2002, no pet.)

(“Although equities may exist on both sides, we cannot say that the district

court abused its discretion in finding that the equities balance in favor of the

Association.”). This Court should affirm for the same reasons, too.

C. To the extent it is relevant, the Attorney General overestimates his own harm.

Even though it is irrelevant to the essential elements of a temporary

injunction and was never raised in the trial court, the Attorney General relies

on his own harm in arguing that this Court should reverse. Citing no evidence

in the record, the Attorney General relies heavily on the State’s intrinsic right

to enforce its own laws, noting that ultra vires conduct “automatically results in

harm to the sovereign as a matter of law.” (Appellants’ Br. at 34–35) (citing In

re State, 711 S.W.3d 641, 647 (Tex. 2024)). This theory has multiple logical

73 problems; on closer inspection, the Attorney General has no significant harm

at all.

First and foremost, the State’s intrinsic right to enforce its own laws can

only apply when there is a preexisting law to enforce, not in a case involving a

legal challenge to the validity of a brand-new, never-enforced regulation. After

all, Appellees are the government officials bringing an ultra vires action—not

the Attorney General—and Appellees have shown a probable right to relief, as

discussed above and as the district court found. Allowing the Attorney General

to invoke this doctrine in defending against an ultra vires claim would shield

the Attorney General from ultra vires actions, which is not what Texas Supreme

Court precedent permits. That Court has explained that “ultra vires suits do not

attempt to exert control over the state—they attempt to reassert the control of

the state.” Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d at 372. “Stated another way, these suits do not

seek to alter government policy but rather to enforce existing policy.” Id. Yet

the ultra vires tool would be useless—and Texas Supreme Court precedent null

and void—if state officials could impose ultra vires regulations upon local

officials, then turn around and claim that an injunction should not issue because

the local officials’ desire not to abide by the invalid regulations is itself ultra

vires. Under this theory, a Court could never temporarily enjoin any rule, even

if it is blatantly unconstitutional or plainly violates the APA. Yet that is what

74 the Attorney General asks, despite no on-point authority to support his

argument.

Additionally, the injunction is not a “violation of duly enacted state law

by government officials,” as the Attorney General suggests. (Appellants’ Br.

at 35). For one, the Challenged Rules were not duly enacted, as this brief

illustrates. Two, the injunction does not create a violation of the Challenged

Rules, in any event. The entire purpose of the injunction is to preserve the

status quo and protect Appellees from irreparable harm; that is, it is meant to

preclude any violations by Appellees that would subject them to irreparable

harm. Critically, enjoining the enforcement of the Challenged Rules necessarily

enjoined the effect of the Challenged Rules’ deadlines, so Appellees cannot

violate the Challenged Rules while the injunction is in effect. In this sense, even

if the Challenged Rules are valid, there is therefore no current violation of the

law for the Attorney General to enforce.

To the extent he can claim any remaining harm, the Attorney General

ignores the fact that his own potential success in this lawsuit means he could

still achieve the object of his statutory “desire”: the report of information

specified by the Challenged Rules. At most, the Attorney General only faces a

mere delay. That is not a harm that changes the status quo, which the

temporary injunction preserves.

75 D. The equities favor preserving the status quo.

At bottom, the trial court did not abuse its broad discretion in preserving

the status quo and, in fact, was correct in its view of the equities. Simply stated,

the burden of delayed enforcement of a brand-new administrative rule, for

which Appellees present a serious challenge, counts for little against the

thousands of personnel hours, millions of dollars, and confidential information

which the Appellees are poised to lose, not to mention the constitutional

violation of the separation of powers.

Even if the public suffers some indirect alleged harm through the

Attorney General merging with the public, as he suggests (Appellants’ Br. at

35), the record shows evidence of the public being harmed only by compliance

with the Challenged Rules, not an injunction against their enforcement. It is

uncontroverted that Appellees’ ability to prosecute crimes for the benefit of the

public will be harmed by the enforcement of the Challenged Rules. Such harm

is far from “implausible,” as the Attorney General exclaims without evidence

(Appellants’ Br. at 36), but illuminated by competent and uncontroverted

testimony. For example, the Assistant Director of the Family Violence Division

for Travis County Attorney Delia Garza testified live about the harms that

would ensue, and how the Challenged Rules would likely cause lost trust with

crime victims:

76 Q. And what potential effect on community safety do you think this will have when the public becomes aware of what you’re required to turn over in terms of confidential information?

A. Well, I mean, my concern is obviously that - - and I’ll use my current example as -- my current experience as the prime example. Family violence cases are intrinsically difficult sometimes to get victims to cooperate, for whatever reason, because of the cycle of violence someone is involved in, because of fear for their future safety, because of fear for their family safety, things of that nature. It’s already hard enough to get people to cooperate and prosecute family violence assaults.

If a family violence victim is aware that then we’re going to turn over all of their confidential information, including if they’ve elected to be in a pseudonym what their real name is, where they live, their medical and substance abuse history, if any, to an agency that they have no idea who’s going to be looking at it, they -- I build relationships with victims on cases that I prosecute, and I get them to trust me. And it is a very different situation for me to say, Trust this nameless, faceless agency at the Attorney General because they said they won’t disclose it.

(2RR86–87). And, of course, there is the diversion of resources (already

discussed) from live prosecutions. Between the limited resources and the lost-

trust dynamic of the confidential-information disclosures, the public interest

weighs more heavily in favor of the injunction than against it.

The Attorney General also accuses Appellees of “slumber[ing] on their

rights” (Appellants’ Br. at 35), but that is false. The record demonstrates that

Appellees spent hundreds of hours trying to comply with the Challenged Rules

77 before filing suit (e.g., 2RR74) and even asked the Attorney General’s counsel

for an agreement not to require production during the pendency of the

litigation (to which counsel said “no”). (2RR148).

All in all, the equities favor the trial court’s relief. At minimum, the trial

court was within its broad discretion to balance the equities in order to preserve

the status quo. The temporary injunction thus could not have been an abuse of

discretion.

IV. The temporary-injunction order is not overbroad.

Lastly, the Attorney General asserts that the temporary injunction was

“broader than necessary to provide complete relief to each plaintiff with

standing to sue” (Appellants’ Br. at 37), but he does not explain how the

injunction is actually so broad. If a statute or regulation is unconstitutional or

invalid, it “must be declared invalid in its entirety.” Smith v. Craddick, 471

S.W.2d 375, 378 (Tex. 1971); cf. City of San Marcos, 714 S.W.3d at 243

(justifying a full injunction against enforcement based on the plaintiff’s

demonstration of a probable right on preemption). After all, courts must “give

effect to the language of the constitution without regard to the consequences.”

Craddick, 471 S.W.2d at 378.

Likewise, the Challenged Rules’ severability provision does not matter

when there is a probable right to success on claims that the rules are either

completely invalid (due to lack of authority) or contain so many invalid

78 provisions that severance is not functionally possible. When a law is invalid and

all the provisions are “connected in subject-matter,” “dependent on each other,”

and “operating together for the same purpose,” a trial court is within its

discretion not to sever invalid provisions in a temporary injunction.

Washington, 621 S.W.3d at 322 (quoting Rose v. Doctors Hosp., 801 S.W.2d 841,

844 (Tex. 1990)).

P RAYER Appellees respectfully request that this Court affirm the trial court’s

temporary injunction order.

Respectfully submitted,

[Signatures on following pages]

79 /s/ Leslie W. Dippel /s/ Bradley W. Snead Leslie W. Dippel Jonathan G.C. Fombonne State Bar No. 00796472 Deputy County Attorney & First Leslie.Dippel@traviscountytx.gov Assistant Todd A. Clark State Bar No. 24102702 State Bar No. 04298850 Jonathan.Fombonne@harriscountytx.gov Todd.Clark@traviscountytx.gov Tiffany S. Bingham Cynthia W. Veidt Managing Counsel State Bar No. 24028092 Affirmative & Special Litigation Division Cynthia.Veidt@traviscountytx.gov State Bar No. 24012287 Travis County Attorneys Tiffany.Bingham@harriscountytx.gov DELIA GARZA Christopher Garza TRAVIS COUNTY ATTORNEY Deputy Division Director P.O. Box 1748 Affirmative & Special Litigation Division Austin, TX 78767 State Bar No. 24078543 Tel.: (512) 854-9513 Christopher.Garza@harriscountytx.gov Fax: (512) 854-4808 Office of the Harris County Attorney CHRISTIAN D. MENEFEE Counsel for Appellees Delia Garza, in her HARRIS COUNTY ATTORNEY Official Capacity as Travis County Attorney, 1019 Congress Plaza, 15th Floor José P. Garza, in his Official Capacity as Houston, TX 77002 Travis County District Attorney, and Travis Tel.: (713) 274-5101 County Fax: (713) 755-8924

Bradley W. Snead /s/Michael Satin State Bar No. 24032706 Alexandria Oberman snead@wrightclosebarger.com State Bar No. 24131555 Michael Adams-Hurta aoberman@milchev.com State Bar No. 24097860 Michael J. Statin, pro hac vice hurta@wrightclosebarger.com msatin@milchev.com WRIGHT CLOSE & BARGER, LLP MILLER & CHEVALIER CHARTERED One Riverway, Suite 2200 900 16th Street, NW Houston, Texas 77056 Washington, DC 20006 Tel.: (713) 572-4321 Tel.: (202) 626-5800 Fax: (713) 572-4320 Fax: (202) 626-5801 Counsel for Appellees District Attorney Counsel for Appellees Criminal District Attorney Sean Teare and Harris County John Creuzot; Dallas County; Criminal District Attorney Joe Gonzales; and Bexar County

80 /s/ Bernardo Cruz /s/Randy T. Leavitt Christina Sanchez C. Robert Heath El Paso County Attorney State Bar No. 09347500 State Bar No. 24062984 bheath@bickerstaff.com Ch.sanchez@epcountytx.gov BICKERSTAFF HEATH DELGADO ACOSTA Bernardo Rafael Cruz 1601 S. Mopac Expy., Suite 400 Assistant County Attorney Austin, TX 78746 State Bar No. 24109774 Tel.: (512) 404-7821 b.cruz@epcountytx.gov CHRISTINA SANCHEZ Randy T. Leavitt EL PASO COUNTY ATTORNEY State Bar No. 12098300 320 S. Campbell St., Suite 200 randy@randyleavitt.com El Paso, TX 79901 LAW OFFICE OF RANDY T. LEAVITT Tel.: (915) 273-3247 1301 Rio Grande St. Austin, TX 78701 Counsel for Appellees El Paso County District Tel.: (512) 476-4475 Attorney James Montoya, El Paso County Attorney Christina Sanchez, and El Paso Attorneys for Appellee Shawn W. Dick in his County Official Capacity as Williamson County District Attorney (26th Judicial District)

81 C ERTIFICATE OF C OMPLIANCE This document complies with the typeface requirements of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4(e) because it has been prepared in a conventional typeface no smaller than 14-point for text and 12-point for footnotes. This document also complies with the word-count limitations of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4(i), if applicable, because it contains 14,995 words, excluding any parts exempted by Rule 9.4(i)(1).

/s/ Michael Adams-Hurta Michael Adams-Hurta

82 A PPENDIX

Tab A: 50 Tex. Reg. 2173–82 (2025) (Adopted Rules) (also available at 3RRP-1)

Tab B: T EX . G OV ’ T C ODE § 41.006

Tab C: Paschal’s Digest Art. 198-213 (Act of 11 May 1846)

Tab D: Excerpts from the 1879 Texas Code of Criminal Procedure (also available at 3RRDX-5)

Tab E: Excerpts from the 1925 Texas Revised Civil Statutes

Tab F: C OMPLETE T EX . S TATUTES at 1387 (Vernon’s 1928) (Table Showing Corresponding Articles in 1879 and 1925 Codes of Criminal Procedure)

Tab G: Excerpts from Act of May 17, 1985, 69th Leg., R.S., ch. 480, § 1, 1985 Tex. Gen. Laws 1720, 1919 (codified as T EX . G OV ’ T C ODE § 41.006)

83 APPENDIX TAB A 50 TEX. REG. 2173-82 (2025) (Adopted Rules) (also available at 3RRP-1). c,_d'pOPTED LES Adopted rules include new rules, amendments to existing rules, and repeals of existing rules. A rule adopted by a state agency takes effect 20 days after the date on which it is filed with the Secretary of State unless a later date is required by statute or specified in the rule (Uovernment Code, §2001.036 ). If a rule is adopted without change to the text of the proposed ru le, then the Texas Register does not republi sh the rule text here. If a rul e is adopted with change to the text of the proposed rule, then the final rule text is included here. T he final rule text will appear in the Texas Administrati ve Code on the effective date.

TITLE 1. ADMINISTRATION drafts and final copies, that were produced within or received by the reporting entity's office, including work product and otherwise PART 3. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY privileged and confidential matters. A "case file" does not include a reporting entity employee's correspondence that is purely per- GENERAL sonal in nature and has no connection with the transaction of official business. CHAPTER 56. DISTRICT AND COUNTY Adopted new §56.2(2) defines the term "correspondence" as any ATTORNEY REPORTING REQUIREMENTS email, letter, memorandum, instant message, text message, or t TAC §§56.1 - 56.10 direct message, received or issued by an employee of the report- ing entity. "Correspondence" does not include a reporting entity The Office of the Attorney General (OAG) adopts new chapter employee's correspondence that is purely personal in nature and 56 in Title 1 of the Texas Administrative Code (TAC) , relating to has no connection with the transaction of official business. reporting requirements for district attorneys and county attorneys presiding in a district or county with a population of 400,000 or Adopted new §56.2(3) defines the term "electronic copies" as more persons. Adopted new chapter 56 consists of §§56.1 - a digital version of a record that can be stored on a computer 56.10. New chapter 56 is necessary to implement Government device. Code §41.006 and is in the public's interest. These new rules Adopted new §56.2(4) defines the term "reporting year" as the are adopted with changes to the proposed text as published in period of September 1 through August 31. the September 13, 2024, issue of the Texas Register(49TexReg 7139). The new rules will be republished. The changes are in Adopted new §56.2(5) defines the term "report" as all information response to public comments. submitted to the OAG by a reporting entity under this chapter. EXPLANATION OF AND JUSTIFICATION RULES Adopted new §56.2(6) defines the term "reporting entity" as the office of a District Attorney or County Attorney serving a popula- Texas Government Code §41.006 states that "[a]t the times and tion of 400,000 or more persons. in the form that the attorney general directs, the district and county attorneys shall report to the attorney general the infor- Adopted new §56.2(7) defines the term "violent crime" to include mation from their districts and counties that the attorney gen- capital murder, murder, other felony homicides, aggravated as- eral desires relating to criminal matters and the interests of the sault, sexual assault of an adult, indecency with a child, sexual state." Adopted new chapter 56 helps ensure that county and assault of a child, family violence assault, aggravated robbery, district attorneys are consistently complying with statutory du- robbery, burglary, theft, automobile theft, riot, any crime listed in ties, including seeking justice for citizens who have been harmed Code of Criminal Procedure §17.50(3), and any attempt to com- by a criminal act, appropriately administering funds, and appro- mit such crimes. priately prosecuting crimes. VVhether a public official and office Adopted new §56.3(a) specifies the content of the reports that whose purpose is to fairly prosecute crimes and keep commu- must be electronically submitted to the OAG on a quarterly basis nities safe is enforcing criminal prosecution laws is a criminal each reporting year. matter and within the interest of the state. Adopted new §56.3(b) specifies that reporting entities must sub- Section 41.006 also states that the information must be submit- mit an initial report containing the contents of the reports de- ted to the OAG at the times and in the form the OAG directs. New scribed in adopted new §56.3(a) for reporting events that oc- chapter 56 is necessary to implement §41.006. The adopted curred between January 1, 2021, and the effective date of this chapter prescribes the time, form, and content of reports the rule. This section provides exceptions to the initial report require- OAG requires from certain district and county attorneys' offices. ment. SECTION-BY-SECTION SUMMARY Adopted new §56.4 specifies the content of the reports that must Adopted new §56.1 specifies that district attorneys and county be electronically submitted to the OAG on an annual basis. attorneys presiding in a district or county with a population of Adopted new §56.5(a) sets forth the deadlines for reporting enti- 400,000 or more are required to submit initial, quarterty, and an- ties to electronically submit each type of report. Quarterly reports nual reports relating to criminal matters and the interests of the must be submitted within 30 days of the beginning of each new state to the OAG in a manner prescribed by the OAG. reporting quarter. Annual reports must be submitted at the end Adopted new §56.2(1) defines the term "case file" as all docu- of each reporting year and not later than September 30. The ini- ments, notes, memoranda, and correspondence, in any format tial reports must be submitted within 90 days of the effective date such as handwritten , typed, electronic, or otherwise, including of this rule. Adopted new §56.5(a) also provides that the OAG's

ADOPTED RULES March 28, 2025 50 TexReg 2173

Exhibit P-1 Oversight Committee may grant exceptions to the deadlines on self-loading model. However, it is likely that reporting entities a case-by-case basis if the reporting entity can establish good already maintain a scanner in their respective offices. Because cause for not meeting the reporting deadlines. the reporting entities are required to submit the information electronically, there will be no postage or printing cost to do so. Adopted new §56.5(b) establishes that a reporting entity must submit all reports under this chapter electronically. Information The OAG acknowledges it will take some time for county em- on how to submit reports electronically will be found on the ployees to compile the required reporting data. However, the OAG's website. OAG estimates such time will be minimal as the reporting entity should maintain standard law enforcement record keeping prac- Adopted new §56.6 establishes that reporting entities must tices. The OAG estimates individual employee compensation for implement document retention policies reasonably designed an administrative assistant to be $21.29 an hour, and the OAG to preserve all documents which are, or may be, subject to estimates one to ten hours of work to scan and electronically sub- the requirements in this chapter, The retention policies must mit documents to the OAG. This wage is based on the national preserve documents for at least two years after the dates when median hour1y wage for each dassification as reported in the they are due to be reported. May 2023 National Industry Specific Occupational Employment Adopted new §56. 7 establishes that if an entity fails to comply and Wage Estimates. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Occupational with this chapter, the OAG may send notice to the reporting en- Employment Statistics, United States Dep't of Labor (August 8, tity identifying the reporting entity of its failure to comply. A re- 2024 2:38 p.m.), www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes436014.htm. porting entity must remedy the identified reporting failure within PUBLIC BENEFIT AND COST NOTE 30 days after receipt of notice. Any reporting entity that fails to timely comply with this chapter's reporting requirements may be Mr. Reno has determined that for the first five-year period the identified on the OAG's website as being out of compliance with adopted rules are in effect, the public will benefit because the both this chapter as well as Texas Government Code §41.006. rule will help ensure that county and district attorneys are consis- tently complying with statutory duties, appropriately administer- Adopted new §56.8 establishes that if a district attorney or county ing funds, appropriately prosecuting crimes, and seeking justice attorney violates adopted new chapter 56, without limitation, the for citizens who have been harmed by a criminal act. Attorney General may (1) construe the violation to constitute "of- ficial misconduct" under Local Government Code §87.011; (2) Mr. Reno has also determined that for each year of the first file a petition for quo warranto under Civil Practice and Reme- five-year period the adopted rules are in effect, there are min- dies Code 66.002; or (3) file a petition for an injunction in a civil imal anticipated costs to the county and district attorneys that proceeding ordering the District Attorney or County Attorney to are required to comply with the adopted rules. The costs de- comply. tailed below are the same costs detailed in the Public Benefit and Cost Note section of this adoption order. Adopted new §56.9 specifies the makeup and responsibilities of the Oversight Advisory Committee as it relates to adopted new Because the content of the reports will differ between reporting chapter 56. The Oversight Advisory Committee is an internal entities, the OAG cannot predict the cost amounts but expects OAG committee composed of OAG employees who will review, the cost to be minimal and likely absorbed into reporting entities' collect, and advise on the reports submitted under new adopted ongoing operations with minimal, if any, fiscal impact. chapter 56. Adopted new §56,9 also states that the Oversight According to Texas SmartBuy, the cooperative purchasing Advisory Committee may request entire case files from reporting program provided by the Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts, entities based on submitted reports or any other information that scanners range from $50 to $10,000, and the price will de- the Oversight Advisory Committee desires relating to criminal pend on the scanner's quality, speed, and if it is a portable or matters and the interests of the state on a case-by-case basis, self-loading model. However, it is likely that reporting entities as consistent with Texas Government Code §41.006. already maintain a scanner in their respective offices. Because Adopted new §56.10 specifies that all provisions of new adopted the reporting entities are required to submit the information chapter 56 are severable. electronically, there will be no postage or printing cost to do so. FISCAL IMPACT ON STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT The OAG acknowledges it will take some time for county em- ployees to compile the required reporting data. However, the Josh Reno, the Deputy Attorney General for Criminal Justice, OAG estimates such time will be minimal as the reporting entity has determined that for the first five-year period the adopted should maintain standard law enforcement record keeping prac- rules are in effect, enforcing or administering the rules does not tices. The OAG estimates individual employee compensation for have foreseeable implications relating to cost or revenues of an administrative assistant to be $21.29 an hour, and the OAG state government. estimates one to ten hours of work to scan and electronically sub- Mr. Reno has determined that there may be minimal costs to lo- mit documents to the OAG. This wage is based on the national cal governments for gathering and submitting quarter1y and an- median hourly wage for each classification as reported in the nual reports to OAG. Because the content of the reports will dif- May 2023 National Industry Specific Occupational Employment fer between reporting entities, the OAG cannot predict the cost and Wage Estimates. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Occupational amounts but expects the cost to be minimal and likely absorbed Employment Statistics, United States Dep't of Labor (August 8, into reporting entities' ongoing operations with minimal, if any, 2024 2:38 p.m.), www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes436014.htm. fiscal impact. IMPACT ON LOCAL EMPLOYMENT OR ECONOMY According to Texas SmartBuy, the cooperative purchasing Mr. Reno has determined that the adopted rules do not have an program provided by the Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts, impact on local employment or economies because the adopted scanners range from $50 to $10,000, and the price will de- rules only impact governmental bodies. Therefore, no local em- pend on the scanner's quality, speed, and if it is a portable or

50 TexReg 2174 March 28, 2025 Texas Register

Exhibit P-1 ployment or economy impact statement is required under Texas Commenters also commented that the rule violates the nondele- Government Code §2001.022. gation doctrine in Article 3, Section 56(2) of the Texas Constitu- tion. Commenters state Government Code §41.006 is so broad ECONOMIC IMPACT STATEMENT AND REGULATORY FLEX- and lacking in reasonable standards that it is an impermissible IBILITY ANALYSIS FOR SMALL BUSINESSES, MICROBUSI- exercise of legislative authority. NESSES, AND RURAL COMMUNITIES OAG Response Mr. Reno has determined that for each year of the first five-year period the adopted rules are in effect, there will be no foresee- The OAG considered the comment and declines to make able adverse fiscal impact on small business , micro-businesses, changes to the rule as Article 3, Section 56(2) of the Texas or rural communities as a result of the adopted rules. Constitution does not apply to the rulemaking authority of the OAG, but instead it imposes requirements and limitations on the Since the adopted rules will have no adverse economic effect Legislature. on small businesses, micro-businesses, or rural communities, preparation of an Economic Impact Statement and a Regulatory Commenters also commented that Government Code §41.006 Flexibility Analysis, as detailed under Texas Government Code does not authorize the OAG to remove duly elected district at- §2006.002, is not required. torneys and county attorneys from office. Commenters stated Texas law already delineates a specific set of criteria for remov- TAKINGS IMPACT ASSESSMENT ing prosecuting attorneys from office under Local Government The OAG has determined that no private real property interests Code Chapter 87 and the definition of "official misconduct" that are affected by the adopted rules, and the adopted rules do not can result in removal from office does not include failure to make restrict, limit, or impose a burden on an owner's rights to the a report to the Office of the Attorney General. owner's private real property that would otherwise exist in the OAG Response absence of government action. As a result, the adopted rules do not constitute a taking or require a takings impact assessment The OAG reviewed the comments and declines to make changes under Texas Government Code §2007 .043. to the rule as the OAG does not purport to have authority to re- move district or county attorneys under Local Government Code GOVERNMENT GROWfH IMPACT STATEMENT Chapter 87. Under Local Government Code 87.012, only a dis- In compliance with Texas Government Code §2001.0221, the trict judge may remove a district or county attorney from office. agency has prepared a government growth impact statement. The rule states the OAG may construe the violation to constitute During the first five years the adopted rules are in effect, the "official misconduct." Section 87.015 sets forth procedures for adopted rules: petitioning a district court for the removal of an attorney. It does not state the OAG may remove a district or county attorney from - will not create a government program; office. - will not require the creation or elimination of employee posi- Commenters also commented that the OAG does not have orig- tions; inal jurisdiction to prosecute state criminal offenses and has no - will not require an increase or decrease in future legislative legitimate law enforcement purpose in receiving or reviewing this appropriations to the agency; information. - will not lead to an increase or decrease in fees paid to a state OAG Response agency; The OAG considered the comment and declines to make - will create a new regulation; changes to the rule as the rule does not state the OAG has original jurisdiction to prosecute criminal offenses nor is there a - will not repeal an existing regulation; "legitimate law enforcement purpose" requirement for receiving - will not result in a decrease in the number of individuals subject information under Government Code §41.006. to the rule; and Comments regarding Separation of Powers - will not positively or adversely affect the state's economy. Commenters commented that the rule violates the separation of PUBLIC COMMENTS powers provision of the Texas Constitution because the respec- tive duties of district and county attorneys shall be regulated by The OAG held a public hearing on November 18, 2024, and re- the Texas Legislature. ceived verbal and written comments on the proposed rule from several county attorneys, district attorneys, organizations and in- OAG Response: dividuals. The OAG considered the comments and declines to make Comments regarding the OAG's authority changes to the rule as the OAG determined the requirements in the rule do not violate the separation of powers provision in Commenters commented that the OAG lacks authority to adopt the Texas Constitution. The rule implements Government Code this rule. Commenters state that the Texas Legislature did not §41.006 as it prescribes the time , form , and content of reports delegate express or implied authority to the OAG to adopt rules the OAG requires from certain district and county attorneys' under Government Code §41.006. offices. OAG Response: Commenters further commented that the rule implies that the The OAG considered the comments and declines to make OAG has original jurisdiction over the criminal matters in the changes to the rule as the OAG has authority to implement State of Texas. Government Code §41.006. OAG Response:

ADOPTED RULES March 28, 2025 50 TexReg 2175

Exhibit P-1 The OAG considered the comments and declines to make certain groups and organizations that the OAG agrees with. changes to the rule because the rule does not imply that the Commenters stated the purpose of the rule is for the OAG to OAG has original jurisdiction over the criminal matters in the determine who should or should not be prosecuted. State of Texas. The rule implements Government Code §41.006 Commenters also commented that the purpose of the rule is to as it prescribes the time, form, and content of reports the OAG provide a method to remove elected district and county attorneys requires from certain district and county attorneys' offices. over failures to comply with the rule or scrutinize or remove dis- Commenters also commented that the OAG misrepresents the trict and county attorneys if the attorney general disagrees with primary duty of prosecuting attorneys under the Texas Constitu- a district or county attorneys' approach on a particular case. tion. Commenters also commented that the purpose of the rule is OAG Response: to gain information pertaining to elections because the Attorney General has not been successful in prosecuting election related The OAG considered the comments and declines to make crimes due to lack of information. Commenters stated that re- changes to the rule as the rule does not make any represen- view of case files pertaining to elections serves to intimidate elec- tation of the primary duty of prosecuting attorneys. The rule tion workers around the state. implements Government Code §41.006 as it prescribes the time, form, and content of reports the OAG requires from certain OAG Response district and county attorneys' offices. The OAG considered the comments and declines to make Comments regarding fiscal impact, cost, and burden changes to the rule as the purpose of the rule is to prescribe the time, form, and content of reports the OAG requires from Commenters commented that the rule is an unfunded mandate certain district and county attorneys' offices under Government that imposes significant financial and operational burdens on re- Code §41.006. porting entities. Comments regarding confidential, sensitive, and privileged Commenters commented that compliance with the rule would information require the diversion of significant resources from the essential functions of reporting entities and divert critical resources from Commenters commented that the proposed rules, and broad the reporting entity's central purpose. definition of "case file," would require reporting entities to dis- close to the OAG confidential information that they are not legally Commenters also commented that the rule is likely to cost coun- permitted to disclose. Commenters stated that reporting entities ties and taxpayers millions of dollars in additional staff time and are not permitted to disclose specific information, including, but by acquiring new staff to comply with the initial and annual re- not limited to: Grand jury infonnation , healthcare records, juve- porting requirements in the rule. Commenters commented that nile justice information, criminal history information, information the rule's financial impact analysis underestimates operational, pertaining to victims and child victims, and DNA information. technology, and labor costs and fails to consider and specify cu- mulative costs. OAG Response: Commenters further commented that compiling the initial report The OAG considered the comments and declines to make will require making case-by-case determinations in each case changes to the rule as the OAG has not identified any instances file as to whether the circumstances of a particular case fall in which a reporting entity would be prohibited from sharing within the parameters of the required reports, which would re- information with the OAG. Reporting entities currently routinely quire enormous resources and could effectively bring everyday submit their entire case files, including all of the types of informa- operations to a halt. tion specified in the comments, to the OAG in various manners and in compliance with other statutes that only generally require OAG Response: disclosure of information to the OAG. The rule implements The OAG considered the comments and declines to make Government Code §41.006, which specifically states the district changes to the rule as the OAG completed a fiscal impact and county attorneys shall report to the attorney general the analysis of the rule and concluded that costs should be minimal information the attorney general desires. The OAG is required as complying with the rule could be absorbed into the reporting to comply with the same confidentiality statutes for which the entities' ongoing operations. Because the content of the reports reporting entities are required to comply. Any confidential infor- will differ between reporting entities, the OAG could not predict mation provided to the OAG pursuant to the rule and §41.006 the exact cost amounts for each reporting entity but expects maintains its confidentiality under the respective confidentiality the cost to be minimal and likely absorbed into reporting en- laws. tities' ongoing operations with minimal, if any, fiscal impact. Commenters also commented that the rule may require report- Additionally, the OAG acknowledges it will take some time for ing entities to submit information to the OAG that is subject to employees to compile the required reporting data. However, the work product or attorney-client privileges. Commenters state the OAG estimates such time will be minimal as the reporting that once the privileged material has been knowingly and volun- entity should maintain standard law enforcement record keeping tarily disclosed to a third party, even in response to a governmen- practices. tal reporting requirement, the privilege as to that information is Comments regarding the purpose of the rules waived. Commenters commented that the purpose of this rule is purely OAG Response: political and designed to allow the OAG to influence arrests, The OAG has reviewed the comments and declines to make indictments, and prosecutions. Commenters also commented changes to the rule as submitting information to the OAG un- that the purpose of the rule is to target specific groups and der the rule and Government Code §41.006 will not waive the organizations that the OAG disagrees with and to protect work product or attorney-client privileges.

50 TexReg 2176 March 28, 2025 Texas Register

Exhibit P-1 Commenters also commented that there is no provision in the statistical reports which might incorrectly imply to the public that rule to ensure the privacy of sensitive case information , indud- there has been a significant increase in actual violent crimes. ing crime victim and witness information. Because of this, com- Commenters further state that defining "violent crime" is a leg- menters state the rule will have a chilling effect on crime victims islative issue. and witnesses from coming forward to report crimes, which could OAG Response: result in increased crime. Commenters stated that should these rules go into effect, victims will no longer be assured of how sen- The OAG reviewed the comments and declines to make changes sitive case information will be accessed, shared, or utilized. to the rule because the definition of "violent crime" in §56.2(7) is only applicable to the reporting requirements in the rule. The rule OAG Response: does not purport to amend the definition of "violent crime" in any The OAG has reviewed the comments and declines to make other context. Further, the rule does not speak to generation changes to the rule as the law requires the OAG to comply with of statistical reports. The rule implements Government Code the same confidentiality statutes for which the reporting entities §41.006 as it prescribes the time, form , and content of reports the are required to comply. OAG requires from certain district and county attorneys' offices. Commenters commented that the rules violate Article 1. §30 of Comments regarding the Oversight Advisory Committee the Texas Constitution; Rights of Crime Victims. Commenters commented that the work of the Oversight Advisory OAG Response: Committee has no scope at all in the rule. The OAG reviewed the comments and declines to make changes OAG Response: to the rule because the rule does not violate the Texas Constitu- The OAG considered the comments and declines to make tion. changes to the rule as 1 TAC §56.9 specifies the makeup and Comments regarding data storage: responsibilities of the Oversight Advisory Committee. Commenters commented that the rule does not indicate where Comments regarding Quarterly Reports and how the OAG will store the information received from re- Commenters asked whether the quarterly reports should repeat porting entities. Commenters commented that the rule does not information each quarter if the status of the cases has not provide assurances as to the security of the data it receives from changed. Commenters also asked whether cases that are reporting entities. declined initially but refiled upon further investigation should be OAG Response: included in the quarterly reports. The OAG considered the comments and dedines to make OAG Response: changes to the rule because the OAG has a legal duty to, and The OAG considered the comments and declines to make does secure, safeguard, and properly maintain data. changes to the rule as the rule does not require clarification. Commenters further commented that it may not be possible for The quarterly reports must include a running list of the required reporting entities to transmit electronically the volume of data reporting information, including cases that were declined initially required to be reported under the rule. but refiled upon further investigation. OAG Response: Commenters commented that the quarterly reports are not "re- ports" but instead are quarterly demands by the OAG for any The OAG considered the comments and dedines to make case file it wants. changes to the rule as reporting entities currently routinely submit electronically their entire case files to the OAG in various OAG Response: manners and in compliance with other statutes. The OAG considered the comments and declines to make Comments regarding the population requirement for com- changes to the rule as reporting requirements are only for pliance with the rule information that relates to criminal matters and the interests of the state, which is consistent with Texas Government Code Several commenters commented that the fact that the reporting §41.006. The term "report" is defined in 1 TAC §56.2(5) as all requirements are only for district attorneys and county attorneys information submitted to the OAG by a reporting entity under presiding in a district or county with a population of 400,000 or this chapter. more persons is arbitrary and lacks a statutory basis. Comments regarding Annual Reports: OAG Response : Commenters commented that §56.4(a)(2) is unclear and ask The OAG considered the comments and declines to make what state and federal ordinances would be responsive to the changes to the rule. The population requirement for compliance section. with the rule allows the OAG to review data from the largest counties in the state which will indicate trends for all counties in OAG Response: the state. The OAG considered the comment and declines to make Comments regarding the rule's definition of "violent crime" changes to the rule as the rule clear1y identifies the information the OAG is requesting. The term ordinance is part of an inclu- Commenters commented that the fact that the definition of "vi- sive list of actions that refers not just to actions of state and olent crime" in §56.2(7) includes crimes the commenters de- federal entities, but also to local and county entities who may scribed as nonviolent, such as theft, and any attempt to commit pass ordinances. such crimes, is a misleading and overly broad re-categorization of the term violent crime. Commenters state this will generate

ADOPTED RULES March 28, 2025 50 TexReg 2177

Exhibit P-1 Commenter commented §56.4(a)(4) and (5) are very unclear The OAG considered the comments and revised §56.3(a)(3) to and asks if the requirement indudes ARPA funds, government clarify that the request is for the number of prosecutions involv- grants, or general fund disbursements. ing a defendant's discharge of a firearm where any prosecutorial decision was based on Title 9 of the Penal Code. OAG Response: Comments regarding 1 TAC §56.3(a)(4) The OAG considered the comment and dedines to make changes to the rule as §56.4(a)(4) and (5) specify the requested Commenters requested clarification as to what party recom- information relates to funds accepted by the commissioners mends to a judicial body that a person subject to a final judgment court of their county pursuant to Texas Government Code of conviction be released from prison before the expiration of §41.108. Section 41.108 states "the commissioners court of the their sentence; resentenced to a lesser sentence; or granted a county or counties composing a district may accept gifts and new trial based on a confession of error. grants from any foundation or association for the purpose of OAG Response: financing adequate and effective prosecution programs in the county or district." The OAG considered the comment and ind uded clarifying lan- guage in §56.3(a)(4) that the recommendation to a judicial body Comments regarding 1 TAC §56.3(a)(1) that a person subject to a final judgment of conviction be re- Commenters asked whether the reporting requirement for indict- leased from prison before the expiration of their sentence; re- ment of police officers includes cases in which officers are in- sentenced to a lesser sentence; or granted a new trial based on dicted for personal conduct. a confession of error is a recommendati on made by the reporting entity. OAG Response: Comments regarding 1 TAC §56.3(a)(6) The OAG considered the comment and included darifying la~ guage in §56.3(a)(1) to indicate that the reporting requirement is Commenters commented that the language in §56.3(a)(6) re- only for indictment of a peace officer for conduct that occurred garding cases where "substantial doubt" for probable cause is while the peace officer was conducting official duties. extremely broad. Commenters commented that the rule creates a deterrent to the OAG Response: indictment of peace officers which will result in a risk of increased The OAG considered the comment and dedines to make violence to Texans from law enforcement. changes as substantial doubt is at the discretion of the OAG's OAG Response: Oversight Advisory Committee. The OAG considered the comments and declines to make Comments Regarding 1 TAC §56.3(a)(7) changes to the rule as the rule does not regulate the indictment Commenters commented that the requirement is undear as to of peace officers. The rule implements Government Code whether the section only refers to a violent crime or if it includes §41.006 as it prescribes the time, form, and content of reports any case that was resolved by deferred prosecution or any case the OAG requires from certain district and county attorneys' where all charges were dropped for cases that do not fall under offices. the definition of violent crime. Comments regarding 1 TAC §56.3(a)(2) OAG Response: Commenters commented that the reporting requirement in The OAG considered the comment and declines to make §56.3(a)(2) regarding a decision to indict a poll watcher presents changes to the rule. The reporting requirement in 1 TAC a conflict of interest for the OAG and a safety risk to voters. §56.3(a)(7) only applies to arrests for violent crime as defined OAG Response: in the rule. The OAG considered the comments and declines to make Comments Regarding 1 TAC §56.3(a)(11) changes to the rule as the reporting requirement does not Commenters commented that 1 TAC §56.3(a)(11) is broad and present a conflict of interest to the OAG nor a safety risk to unclear. Commenters ask whether the required communication individuals. The rule implements Government Code §41.006 indude communications with the Children's Advocacy Center, as it prescribes the time, form, and content of reports the OAG local crisis shelters, and other community partners. requires from certain district and county attorneys' offices. OAG Response Commenters also commented that §56.3(a)(2) contains a typo- graphical error as "Teas" is not a word. The OAG considered the comment and included clarifying lan- guage in 1 TAC §56.3(a)(11) that the reporting requirement is for OAG Response: correspondence with any non-profit organization, not for profit or- The OAG considered the comment and corrected the error to ganization, and non-governmental organization regarding a de- read "Texas" in §56.3. cision to indict an individual. The requirement includes commu- nications with the Children's Advocacy Genter, local crisis shel- Comments Regarding 1 TAC §56.3(a)(3) ters, and other community partners that are a non-profit organ- Commenters commented that §56.3(a)(3) is undear because it ization, not for profit organization, and/or a non-governmental does not define how a defendant "raises a justification under organization. Chapter 9 of the Penal Code." Comments regarding 1 TAC §56.3(a)(12) OAG Response: Commenters commented that §56.3(a)(12) is undear and does not define the term "complaint."

50 TexReg 2178 March 28, 2025 Texas Register

Exhibit P-1 OAG Response: The OAG considered the comment and declines to make changes as the proposal was published on September 13, The OAG considered the comments and revised §56.3(a)(12) 2024, and provided for a 30-day public comment period. to clarify that the information the OAG is requesting is all corre- spondence written at any time by an assistant district attorney Commenters also comment that the Texas Register notice fails or assistant county attorney regarding the attorney's resignation to ensure that stakeholders understand the implications of this under a formal or informal complaint process. This section does rule and that stakeholders won't understand that highly personal not include communications regarding salary negotiations or re- and confidential information from case files could be transmitted tirement policies. to the attorney general likely without notice or consent given the points in the process when this must occur, under a range of Comments regarding retention circumstances. Commenters commented that the reporting requirements for the OAG Response: initial report are impractical and legally dubious, as many report- ing entities either do not maintain certain categories of informa- The OAG reviewed the comment and declines to make changes tion or have already disposed of records in accordance with law- to the rule as the proposal complies with the notice requirements ful document retention policies. in Government Code Chapter 2001. OAG Response: Additional Comments The OAG considered the comments and declines to make Commenters commented that if the OAG makes recommenda- changes to the rule as §56.3(b)(1) provides exceptions to the tions on charges in cases obtained under this rule and the county initial reporting requirement in §56.3(a). The exceptions include fails to obtain convictions in the resulting proceedings, the gov- the option for reporting entities to provide a sworn affidavit ernment would be exposed to greater financial and legal liabili- that states the information cannot be produced because it ties. was destroyed or otherwise discarded pursuant to a bona fide OAG Response: document retention policy that existed prior to the effective date of this rule and that is described in detail and transmitted to the The OAG has considered the comments and declines to make Oversight Advisory Committee. changes to the rule as the rule does not contemplate OAG recommendations on cases. The rule implements Government Commenters also commented that the rules seek information Code §41.006 as it prescribes the time, form , and content that reporting entities may not possess or have no existing obli- of reports the OAG requires from certain district and county gation to track. Commenters further commented that the rule attorneys' offices. creates numerous new data and case information reporting re- quirements for prosecutor offices and require the collection, stor- Commenters commented that the data collection in the rule fo- age, documentation, and dissemination of records that are not cuses on "arrests" and very often an arrest is made that is not ordinarily retained as part of a criminal case file. adequately supported by probable cause. A number of "arrests" should never be used as a measure of criminality because Amer- OAG Response: icans are not guilty at the point of arrest. Commenters further The OAG considered the comments and declines to make stated that district attorneys have a responsibility to the Texas changes to the rule as §56.6 establishes that reporting entities taxpayer to pursue only those indictments where probable cause must implement document retention policies reasonably de- clearly exists. signed to preserve all documents which are, or may be, subject OAG Response: to the requirements in this Chapter. The retention policies must preserve documents for at least two years after the dates when The OAG has considered the comments and declines to make they are due to be reported. changes to the rule as the rule does not contemplate the mea- sure of criminality or pursuit of indictments. The rule implements Commenters also commented that §56.6 requires retention of Government Code §41.006 as it prescribes the time, form , and any documents required by this report but provides no exception content of reports the OAG requires from certain district and for expunged matters which could cause a conflict with the penal county attorneys' offices. violations for maintaining records which have been expunged. Additionally, the OAG's office will need to be included in future Commenters commented that the information required to be re- expunctions for any cases related to these reports. ported under the rule is too specific and at the same time so broad such that it will reveal very little about the actual perfor- OAG Response: mance of a district attorney's office. The OAG has considered the comment and declines to make OAG Response: changes to the rule as laws regarding expunged matters take precedence over administrative rules. Additionally, the OAG will The OAG considered the comment and declines to make implement a process to be included in future expunctions for any changes to rule as the rule implements Government Code cases related to reports submitted to the OAG under the rule. §41.006 as it prescribes the time, form, and content of reports the OAG requires from certain district and county attorneys' Comments Regarding Procedure offices. Government Code §41.006 authorizes the attorney Commenters commented that providing only a seven-day notice general to direct districts and counties attorneys' offices to report of comment and hearing is insufficient and does not allow for the the information that the attorney general desires. interests of our communities to be adequately represented. Commenters also commented that the rule interferes with the OAG Response: professional responsibilities and discretion of local prosecutors. OAG Response:

ADOPTED RULES March 28, 2025 50 TexReg 2179

Exhibit P-1 The OAG considered the comments and declines to make (a) Content of reports. Reporting entities must submit elec- changes to the rule as the rule does not speak to how a local tronic copies of the following information to the OAG quarterly in ac- prosecutor executes their duties. The rule implements Govern- cordance with this chapter. ment Code§ 41.006 as it prescribes the time, form, and content (1) The number of instances that the Reporting Entity in- of reports the OAG requires from certain district and county dicted a peace officer for the peace officer's conduct during official du- attorneys' offices. ties; Other changes (2) The number of instances that the reporting entity in- The OAG corrected identified, non-substantive typographical er- dicted an individual for a criminal violation under the Texas Election rors. Code. STATUTORY AUTHORITY (3) The number of prosecutions involving a defendant's discharge of a firearm resulting in any prosecutorial decision based on New 1 TAC Chapter 56 is adopted pursuant to Texas Govern- Title 9 of the Penal Code; ment Code §41.006. (4) The case file for instances a recommendation made by CROSS-REFERENCE TO STATUTE the Reporting Entity is made to a judicial body that a person subject This regulation clarifies Texas Government Code §41.006. No to a final judgment of conviction be released from prison before the other rule, regulation, or law is affected by this proposed rule. expiration of their sentence; resentenced to a lesser sentence; or granted a new triaJ based on a confession of error; §56.I. General Reporting Requirements. (5) The case file for prosecutions for which the Texas Gov- District Attorneys and County Attorneys presiding in a district or ernor has announced that The Office of the Texas Governor is consid- county with a population of 400,000 or more persons must submit an ering a pardon; initial, and quarterly and annual reports relating to criminal matters, and the interest of the state, to the Office of the Attorney (OAG) in a (6) Any case file for prosecutions relating to criminal mat• manner prescribed by the OAG and as set forth in this chapter. ters and the interests of the state, as requested by the Attorney General through the Oversight Advisory Committee, including cases where §56.2. Definitions. there are substantial doubts by the Oversight Advisory Committee The following words and terms, when used in this subchapter, have the whether probable cause exists to support a prosecution; following meanings: (7) The number of instances that an arrest was made for a (1) "Case file" means all documents, notes, memoranda, violent crime but no indictment was issued, the case was re-solved by and correspondence, in any format such as handwritten, typed, elec- deferred prosecution or a similar program, or all charges were dropped; tronic, or otherwise, including drafts and final copies, that were pro- (8) All correspondence requested by OAG's Oversight Ad- duced within or received by the reporting entity's office, including work visory Committee for a matter listed in response to paragraph (7) of this product and otherwise privileged and confidential matters. A "case file" subsection on a prior quarterly report; does not include a reporting entity employee's correspondence that is purely personal in nature and has no connection with the transaction of (9) All correspondence and other documentation descril:r official business. ing and analyzing a reporting entity's policy not to indict a category or sub-category of criminal offenses; (2) "Correspondence" means any email, letter, memoran- dum, instant message, text message, or direct message, received or is- (10) All correspondence with any employee of a federal sued by an employee of the reporting entity. "Correspondence" does agency regarding a decision whether to indict an individual; not include a reporting entity employee's correspondence that is purely (11) All correspondence with any non-profit organization personal in nature and bas no connection with the transaction of official regarding a decision whether to indict an individual; and business. (12) All c-0rrcspondcnce written at any time by an assistant (3) "Electronic c-0pies" means a digital version of a record district attorney or assistant county attorney regarding the attorney's that can be stored on a computer device. resignation under a formal or informal complaint process. This section (4) "Reporting year" means the period of September l does not include communications regarding salary negotiations or re- through August 31. tirement policies. (5) "Report" means all information submitted to the OAG (b) Initial Report. A reporting entity must submit an electronic by a reporting entity under this chapter. copy of the infonnation outlined in this section for which a reporting event occurred between January 1, 2021 , and the effective date of this (6) "Reporting entity" means the office of a District Attor- rule, unless: ney or County Attorney serving a population of 400,000 or more per- sons. (I) The reporting entity obtains a written exception, in whole or in part, from the OAG; (7) "Violent crime" includes capital murder, murder, other felony homicides, aggravated assault, sexual assault of an adult, inde- (2) The reporting entity provides a sworn affidavit that cency with a child, sexual assault of a child, family violence assault, states the information: aggravated robbery, robbery, burglary, theft, automobile theft, riot, any (A) was the exclusive product of a previous District or crime listed in Code of Criminal Procedure§ 17.50(3), and any attempt County Attorney; and to commit such crimes. (B) is not reflective of the reporting entity's current op- §56.3. Quarterly and Initial Reporting Requirements. erations due to a formal change in the office's policies, and the formal

50 TexReg 2180 March 28, 2025 Texas Register

Exhibit P-1 change is described in detail and transmitted to the Oversight Advisory §56.6. Document Retention. Committee; or Reporting entities must implement document retention policies reason- (3) The reporting entity provides a sworn affidavit that ably designed to preserve all documents which are, or may be, subject states the information cannot be produced because it was destroyed or to the requirements in this chapter. The retention policies must pre- otherwise discarded pursuant to a bona fide document retention policy serve documents for at least two years after the dates when they are that existed prior to the effective date of this rule and that is described due to be reported. in detail and transmitted to the Oversight Advisory Committee. §56. 7. Overdu

ADOPTED RULES March 28, 2025 50 TexReg 2181

Exhibit P-1 Justin Gordon During this period, HHSC received comments regarding the pro- General Counsel posed rule from three commenters: the Texas Association of Be- Office of the Attorney General havioral Health Systems, the Children's Hospital Association of Effective date: April 2, 2025 Texas, and the Texas Hospital Association. A summary of com- Proposal publication date: September 13, 2024 ments relating to §353.1306 and HHSC's responses follow. For further information, please call: (512) 475-4291 Comment: Multiple commenters requested that HHSC withdraw the CHIRP rule amendment due to new Federal reporting re- ♦ ♦ ♦ quirements and recent Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Ser- vices (CMS) guidance on the CHIRP program. Commenters be- PART 15. TEXAS HEALTH AND lieve that the CHIRP rule should be withdrawn and that HHSC HUMAN SERVICES CO:MMISSION should draft an alternative amendment to include greater details and clarity on CMS requirements for the program. CHAPTER 353. MEDICAID MANAGED CARE Response: HHSC appreciates the comment and understands SUBCHAPTER 0. DELIVERY SYSTEM AND the desire for greater clarity and transparency. The rule amend- ment, as proposed , describes the CHIRP Program as is; HHSC PROVIDER PAY1v1ENT INITIATIVES is continuing to work with CMS on requirements for future years. 1 TAC §353.1306 Depending on the outcomes of these discussions, additional rule amendments may be made in future years. No revision to the The executive commissioner of the Texas Health and Hu- rule text was made in response to this comment. man Services Commission (HHSC) adopts amendments to §353.1306, concerning Comprehensive Hospital Increase Comment: Multiple commenters requested that HHSC provide Reimbursement Program for Program Periods on or after greater clarity and transparency for program definitions and de- September 1, 2021. scriptions including dass definitions and separation by managed care programs in alignment with new CMS requirements for the Section 353.1306 is adopted with changes to the proposed text CHIRP program. as published in the September 13, 2024, issue of the Texas Reg- ister (49 TexReg 7143). This rule will be republished. Response: HHSC appreciates the comment and understands the desire for greater clarity and transparency. HHSC is contin- BACKGROUND AND JUSTIFICATION uing to work with CMS on requirements for future years. De- HHSC has been working since September 2022 to evaluate the pending on the outcomes of these discussions, additional rule future of the Medicaid hospital financing system in a post-pub- amendments may be made in future years. No revision to the lic health emergency environment. With the combination of new rule text was made in response to this comment. Medicaid fee-for-service and managed care rules at the federal Comment: A commenter stated that, in light of recent CMS re- level, the unwinding of the Medicaid caseload coverage from quirements for the CHIRP program for SFY 2025, it is important the public health emergency, and the interplay between directed to ensure that all CHIRP payments are capped at 100 percent of payment programs and new supplemental payment programs the average commercial rate for all program components. (e.g., the private graduate medical education (GME) and Hos- pital Augmented Reimbursement program (HARP)), hospital ~ Response: HHSC appreciates this comment. In the rule text, nancing in Medicaid and for the uninsured has been challenging language is included to increase the percentage of ACR UPL to to forecast. With the support of hospitals and their representa- 100 percent by the program period beginning on or after Septem- tives, Medicaid managed care organizations and their represen- ber 1, 2027. No revision to the rule text was made in response tatives, and industry subject matter experts, HHSC made final to this comment. decisions regarding the program design for CHIRP that will be Comment: A commenter requested darifications to the language implemented , beginning in state fiscal year (SFY) 2026. of the ACIA allocation of available funds to take into considera- Comprehensive Hospital Increase Reimbursement Program tion UHRIP payments because the ACIA distribution occurs after the UHRIP distribution. Beginning in SFY 2025, CHIRP is composed of three compo- nents: Uniform Hospital Rate Increase Payment (UHRIP), Av- Response: HHSC appreciates the comment and has updated erage Commercial Incentive Award (ACIA), and Alternate Par- subsection (g)(3)(A) to clarify that the allocation of available ticipating Hospital Reimbursement for Improving Quality Award funds across hospital classes will be proportional to the com- (APHRIQA). The amendment to §353.1306 updates the ACIA bined ACR gap less UHRIP payments of each hospital class component calculation beginning in SFY 2026 to calculate the within an SDA to the total ACR gap of all hospital classes within Average Commercial Reimbursement (ACR) gap on an aggre- the SDA. In addition, (g)(3)(D) is updated to clarify that the ACIA gated, per-class basis. The amendment to §353.1306 also allo- payment example is for program periods beginning on or before cates available ACIA funds across hospital classes based on the September 1, 2024. proportion of the combined ACR gap of each hospital class within Comment: A commenter requested that HHSC oppose CMS's a Service Delivery Area (SDA) to the total ACR gap of all hos- requirement lo limit the Medicare UPL gap to ACR gap limits. pitals within the SDA. Lastly, the rule amendment to §353.1306 updates the maximum ACR Upper Payment Limit (UPL) percent- Response: This comment is outside the scope of the rule age to 95 percent beginning in SFY 2027 and to 100 percent be- amendment. No revision to the rule text was made in response ginning in SFY 2028. to this comment. COMMENTS Comment: A commenter stated that they believed that the new federal rule does not explicitly limit CHIRP payments at the ag- The 31-day comment period ended October 15, 2024. gregate ACR rate for inpatient behavioral health services in an

50 TexReg 2182 March 28, 2025 Texas Register

Exhibit P-1 APPENDIX TAB B TEX. GOV’T. CODE § 41.006. § 41.006. Report to Attorney General, TX GOVT § 41.006

Vernon's Texas Statutes and Codes Annotated Government Code (Refs & Annos) Title 2. Judicial Branch (Refs & Annos) Subtitle C. Prosecuting Attorneys Chapter 41. General Provisions Subchapter A. Office of Prosecuting Attorney

V.T.C.A., Government Code § 41.006

§ 41.006. Report to Attorney General

Currentness

At the times and in the form that the attorney general directs, the district and county attorneys shall report to the attorney general the information from their districts and counties that the attorney general desires relating to criminal matters and the interests of the state.

Credits Acts 1985, 69th Leg., ch. 480, § 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1985.

V. T. C. A., Government Code § 41.006, TX GOVT § 41.006 Current through legislation effective July 1, 2025, of the 2025 Regular Session of the 89th Legislature. Some statute sections may be more current, but not necessarily complete through the whole Session. See credits for details.

End of Document © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

WESTLAW © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 1 APPENDIX TAB C Paschal’s Digest Art. 198-213 (Act of 11 May 1846). • THE LIBRARY OF .

THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS THE LAW LIBRARY Presented by Joe Moore

K?-r I :L:JS' P.:J J'l'?§ V, I A TIO R ~ E Y. Jl: 1t 110 admission made bv the district attornev in A ◄ lrnl,s!o\on not; any suit or action in which the state is a party, shall operate to prcjmlicc' the to pn•jndice. ArL '..lltl. interests of the state. ART. 194. (G28) (141 That each district attorney shall keep, in proper !5hull k<-cpa books, to be procured for that purpose at the expense of _the state, a n•gistcr r,,gl1:1tcr, of all his official nets and reports, and of all actions aud d<>mands prosecuted or defended by him, of all proceedings ha

AN ACT TO REGULATE TUE SALi.RIES OF DISTRICT ATTORNEYS. Act of 2,-J ,Jan. l:-,.&..'1; took {·llCct fr.,m l~A1,rll, ABT. 196. (630) fl] That the se,·eral district attorneys of this state shall 184-S. Vol. 11, p. 13. receive an annual safary of five hundred dollars, to be paid quarterly. 811liu-y.

AN ACT TO REQUIRE DISTRICT ATTORNEYS TO REPORT TO THE COMP- Act of 4 O,•c. 1 ~1 ; tnok l'ffcct TROLLER'S OFFICE IN CERTAIN CASES, fr.,lll jlll.5"-/l~C. \' vi. :tu. pnrl 1, p. 11. ART. 197. [I] That the comptroller shall furnish to the several district l'omptmlkr to attorne1s respective statements of defalcations to the state in their districts, turnh1h list of tlcfaultcra. specifymg names of defaulters and amounts due, which claims shall have been placed in the charge of said attorneys for collection ; and thereupon said attorneys, respectivel;r, shall make complete returns to the comptroller twice a year, at the expirat10n of the regular circuits of the courts of the districts, showing the exact condition of any suits that shall h:n·e been instituted for Dlstrlctattor,. euch collections, and the precise situation of the collections that shall have ney11 to rt'por\ when. been made, either with or without suits; and in any case where such attorney ehall have failed to make such return, the salary of snch delinquent shall not Arl 1st. be paid, until the proper return shall have been received at the comptroller's office.

~ttorntJt==8tntral. .&Jr J.0'1' DEJ'INING THE DUTIES OF THE A'.lTORNEY-GENERAL OF THE STATE t&t~~rt!!:.1~.. OF TEXAS, t::r fo~ ABT. 198. (65)J1J It shall be the duty of the attorney-general to prose- Dnt'lea. Gllt.e and defend a actions in the supreme court of the state, in which the Note 11S. 8'at.e may be interested; and also to perform such other duties aa may bE' praicribed by the constitution and laws of the state. ABT. 199. (66) [2] If any attorney-general shall fail, from any cause, to

Failure to attend attend said court at any of its sessions, his salary shall be liable to such conn-pe..ity. deduction as may be rrescribcd by law. To advise dt1- ART. 200. (67) [3 The attorney-general shall counsel and advise the sev- trlet ai&orne7L eral district attorneys in the state, in the prosecution and defence of all actions in the district courts, wherein the state is interested, whenever requested by them so to do; and it shall be the duty of the attomey-~eneral to appear and defend the interests of the state, in any snits now pending, or which may be hereafter instituted, in the district court, by empressa1ios for the settlement of their claims. Report annually AnT. 201. (68) [ 4] It shall be the dntf of the attorney-general to report to governor. to the governor on the first Monday o December, annually, and at such Art.182. other times as he may require, the number of indictments which have been found by grand juries in this state for the precerling year; the offences charged therein ; the nnmber of arraignments, convictions, and acquittals, for each offence; the number of indictments which have been disposed of without the intervention of a petit jury, with the cause and manner of such disposition ; and also a summary of the judgments rendered on conviction, specifying the offence, the nature and amount of penalties imposed, and the amount of fines collected. Shall require re- ART. 202. {69) [5] He shall require the several district attorneys to com- portsfromdis- trlct atlorn.-ys. municate to him, sem1-annually, at the close of the courts of their respective Arts. 182, 201. districts, in such form as he may prescribe, all the information neeeseary for his compliance with the requisitions of the fourth section. Trnn~mft ln- ART, 203. (70) [6] He shall trnnsmit to the roper district attqrneys, 1 11tr11ctlon11 to dis- with such instrnctio11s as he may deem necessnry, al certified accounte, bonds, trict attorney, or other demands, which may have been delivered to him, by the comptroller of public accounts, for prosecution and suit. Shall rcqutro re• ART. 204. (71) (7] He shall require the several district attorneys to pm-ts of dh!trlet report to him sem1-annually, at the close of the courts of their respective attorneys or suits ror pub. monL•y. districts, in such form as he may prescribe, precise information of the sitna-- tion of all snits instituted by them for the collection of public money. Jteport to ART. 205. (72) [s] He shall report to the comptroller of public account.a uom1,b:ollcr. annually, on the last day of October, and at such other times as the comp- trnller may require, a full and correct statement of the situation of all suit.a instituted for the collection of public money. Gi\"n opinion tn ART. 206. (73) [9] The attorney-general shall, at the request of the gover- writing lo public ollic(:ra. nor, secretary of state, comptroller of public accounts, state treasurer, asses: sor or collector of taxes, or treasurer of any county, give an opinion in writ- ing, in all cases touching the public interest, or concerning the revenue or expenses of the state. ART, 207. (74) [to] He shall, whenever requested by the comptroller of Prepare fonna ot public accounts, prepare proper forms for contracts, obligations, and other contr&eta. instruments, which ma_y be wanted for tbe nse of the state. ART. 208. (75) [11 J All money received by the attorney-general, for debta Pay money into due or penalties forfeited to the state, shall be paid by him into the treasury, treasury, immediately after the receipt thereof. Keep books and ART, 209. (76) [12] The attorney-general shall keep in proper books, to register or optn- be provided for that purpose at the expense of the state, a register of all ll n& I\D.d acta. his official acts and opimons; of all actions and demands, pr011ecuted or defended by him or any district attorney, in which any portion of the revenue of the state is involved, and of all proceedings bad in relation thereto; and shall deliver the same to his successor in office. lni.Lltuto eulte ART. 210. ('77) [13) It shall be the duty of the attorney-general of this Rg&in11t culony oontroetun. state to file the petition or information, and institute legal prooeedings Art. 8511. against all colony contractors who have entered into contracts with any Note 216. president of the republic of Texas; which proceedings may be oommenoed m any district court for any county, where the whole or any portion of terri-, tory embraced in any colony may be situate. ' Rights of ata!e ART. 211. (78) [14] No admission, agreement, or waiver, made by the •ball not be pre- attorney-general, in any action or snit in which the republic of Texas or the J;f.11~ state is a party/, shall prejudice the rights of the state. Reside and keep office at these-at ART. 212. \'79) [15) The attorney-general shall reside at, and hep Ill or government. office at the seat of government. Repoallng cl&I.IH.. ART. 213. (BO) [16) That all laws and parts of lawa, oonttary to or conflict with this aot, are hereby repealed. • a; ATTORNEY-GEN.-BANKRUPTOY.-BILL OF EXCEPTIONS. 141

AN A.Cl' TO AUTHORIZE THE GOVERNOR TO E3IPLOY COUNSEL TO REPRESE1'11"i' Act of rn ,Inn. THE STATE IN CERTAIN CASES, 1'3-!Yl; took l'ffo-ci frnm pns-..o.a,gc. Yul. 13, 1• :.i. ABT. 214. (81) fl] Whenever a vacancy ruay occur in the office of attor- Oon-rnor to n11point state ney-general by deaib, resignation, or o_therwise, it shall he the duty of the counsel, whco. governor, whenever the interest of the state may require it, to appoint coun- sel to represent the state; which counsel, so appointed, shall hold his appoint- For how long. ment until an attorney-general can be elected and qualified, and no longer ; and shall be entitled to receive, as compensation for his services, at the same Compensation. rate as is by law allowed to the attorney-general.

)l;ankrupttJI. J..N Act TO REPEAL "AN ACT CREATING A SYSTEM OF BANKRUPTCY AND Act or 2 ,Jnn. REGlJLATING THE COLLECTION OF FOREIGN DEBI'S." i:r1~rW,0 8rff.('et f V(ll. l~p. lS. ABT. 215. [I) That" An act creating a syAtem of bankruptcy, and regu- Jlnrt 1f>9I. 1ting the collection of foreign debts," approved January 19th, 1841, be, and 0 JvW.78. the same is hereby repealed. 278. It le the orlnion of the EDITOR tbo.t the bnnkrupt act (vol. 5, p. 8S) WllS superseded by the St.'\tC con- atltution; or, th11.t, I not actually superseded, lts ~mctlea oferu.tlon was M1sfc1uh•1\, becnuse the proce1•(lin;.:s Note 185. :t :i!Uo: J.~c~~eTj~~~~tfs ~f!S~ti1':1tt;!e ~~~~~! o:~\!:~idt~:!~hD~~t\!~o 2!1h:~~i ~f ~~~~~~t;'~} ~6:1~~t~~h: Vol. 11• p. lSl. 0 1 0

18'-~ .. to orgtlnlze county courts," limits their juris,!ictid persons, and to police mattl'rS Hart. SO!J. ~a:::i; ~~:1:e:u:~;1t/olir~d1~~! ~~~ltv;i~~!~~;n ti~ 1:~~i~~tlb~~l::~J n;1i1ttlle~•(~~f:eis~e~1~r~~~]t~r,;l:h~:~ Note 198. empUons., ru-e in conflict witf:t1ie resm·\·ations. The net is thnefore not puhlishcd as a repcalcfu~• !:r :r~:i1~5 b;th!blt~ th s}c~io/!~ f~!c~:f:t~ufga~i!, ~• o~t~1~~,~~a~ 0 Notcollntcrnlly, aoo~ notice, specifying in writing such fraud or concealment" Id .A. ~:i!~'~t! ~:rr:~~c~~B wi:k;,?ilf1f~p(}n~( 1~ i~ ¼fee;,tba{b~b~f\b; \?11J1~U\~ ~tf oJ~~;~fs~ 8 0 1 0

c:::ti ~fl it!:. 6 ~ 0 Tb~t~~~ ie~t~~d 1 f!eo th :~:;~. Be~~~~~nid tll~io:1e~~~\ne;~r ti~ J!:~;~~;er~~~~!tcd Nuu>a and approved. in Barnett v. Pool, 28 Tex. 619. It Is the well-settled doctrlno of the common Jaw, that rl'al 420 4 to 96. property ta o.xclusivoly subject to the law:i of the gevernment within whose territory it Is situate. Id. Tho law of oslocpel dlcl not llpri• l4- TPat the ortgiqal c.ertificnte of ha.nkrqptcy required to be 1·ecorclcQ, under ~u-:n.e 04,:i~ ~Work, 18't~l~~as in imother oounty, is no exouaa fur usiDQ' a oop;y of tbe rceord of H"rt. 96.

)l;ill of ~xctptions. ABT. 216. ('154) [100) After the charge of the judge, either party, or his attorney, may present m writing, but without argument, such charges or instructions as ·he desires to be given to the jury, which the jurlge shall deliver to the jury in whole or in part, or refuse to deliver the same, as he Special !ostrne- ti"ll:< :-isk,•il ~tum! may think proper; but where the charge asked, or any part thereof, is re- a~ <:xt·,·ptions. fused to be given, the judge shall write down distinctly what portions of the same he refuses, and what portion he gives, and also subscribe his name Art. H'" thereto, all of which shall be filed by the elerk, and constitute a part of the Note :,G~ reoords of the case, subject to revision for error by the supreme court, in the same manner as if a regular bill of exceptions had been signed. 979. As to the insb'nctions mbmitted by the parties in writing, there Is no necessity or B bill of excep- 8-e>-0 CooRT8, .... from etther party. Jorles v. Thurmond, 6 Tex. 828. Exceptions to the genernl charge mny be taken before D1sTRrCT, sec. 91. "ftnlie&., ud reduced to wrlUog at 11ny Uma during the teno. Id. At 116 early a day aa practicable. lil. Art. 1464. APPENDIX TAB D Excerpts from 1879 Texas Code of Criminal Procedure (also available at 3RRDX-5). Texas Historical Statutes Project 1879 Code of Criminal Procedure of the EXHIBIT State of Texas D-5 a s Stat ex e T ~ . ~ L y

aw r Li br a This project was made possible by the Texas State Law Library and a grant from the Litigation Section of the State Bar of Texas THE

COI)E OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE OF THE

ST A TE OF TEXAS PASSED DY THE

SIXTEENTH LEGISLATURE,

FFBRUARY 21, 1879,

TOOK EFFECT JULY 24, 1879.

AUSTIN: STATE PRINTING-OFFICE, l 8 8 '7. Section 2. BE IT FURTHER ENACTED, That the following articles shall hereafter constitute the CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE of the State of Texas, to wit: THE CODE OF

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE. -- TITLE L :!l,ntrod:n.ctory.

CHAPTER ONE. CONTAINING GENERAL PROVISIONS. ArLicle . Artlolt Objects of tbis Code .......... -'· . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Conviction shall not work corruption of The same................................... 2 blood, etc.................................... 14 Tr-ial by due course of law secured........... 3 No conviction for treason, except, etc........ lo Rights of accused persons.. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . 4 Privilege of senators and representatives .... 16' Protection against ·searches· and seizures..... 5 Privilege of voters.. .. .. .. .. .. . . .. .. . . . . .. . . . . 17 Prisoners entitled to. bail, except in certain Change of venue ............................. 18 cases....................................... 6 Conserva.tors of the p(lace, style of proct'lss, Writ of• habeas corpus shall never be sus- etc ....................................... 19 pended ..................................... 7 In what cases accused may be tried, etc., after • Excessive bail, fines, etc., forbidden-open conviction.. .. . . . .. .. .. . .. . .. .. . ......... 20 courts ........·. :. . . . . . . . . . .. . .. . .. . .. . . . . .. . 8 Same subject.................................. 21 No person shall_ be twice put in jeopardy for N(! convictio~ of felony except by verdict of same offense, ... :........................... 9 Jury ....................................... 22 Trial by jury shall remain inviolate .......... 10 Defendant may waive any right, except, etc. 23 Liberty of sreech and of the press.. . .. . . . . . . 11 Trials shall be public.. .. . .. . .. . . . .. .......... 24 Person shal not be disqualified as a witness Defendant shall be confronted by witnesses, : for -religious opinion, or want of religious except .. .-..... ; .............................. 25 belief ... : ... : ................................ 12 Construction of this Code. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26. Outlawry and transportation prohibited .... 13 When rules of common law shall govern ..... 27

ARTICLE 1. It is hereby declared. that this Code is intended to embrace Oblects of thi• rules applicable to the prevention and prosecution of offenses against the ~ct8 Feb. 15, laws of this state, and to make the rules of proceeding in respect to the. f 8i)A 26 prevention and punishment of offenses intelligible to the officers who are ~85i.l ug. ' to act under them, and to all persons whose rights are to be affected by c.c.P. 1: them. It seeks- 1. To adopt measures for preventing the commission of crime. 2. To exclude _the offender from all hope of escape. a 3. To insure trial with as little delay as shall be_ consistent with the en_ds of justice. . 4. To bring to the_ investigation of each offense, on the trial, all the evidence t~nding to produce conviction or acqmttal. 5. To insure a fair and impartial trial; and, 6. The ce_rtain lclxecut1on of the ,sentellpe of the_ law when de.dared. B 2 TITLE 1.-GENERAL PROVISIONS.-CH. 1.

"hes'!.me. ART. 2. In order to collect together, for the convenience oi officers and C.O.P. 2. all others charged with the enforcement of the laws, the material provis- ions of the constitution of this state respecting the prosecution of offenses, the following provisions of said instrument are here inserted: 1'rial by due ART. 3. No citizen of this state shall be deprived of life, liberty, course of law se~1ured. property or privileges, outlawed, exiled, or in any manner disfranchised, C.C.P. 3. except by due course of the law of the land. (Bill of Rights;, sec. 19.) Rights of ac- ART. 4. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have a speedy cusPd nersons. C.C.P. 4. public trial by an impartial jury. He shall have the right to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, and to have a copy thereof. He shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself. , He shall have the right of being heard by himself or counsel, or both; shall be con- fronted with the witnesses against him and shall have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in bis favor. And no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense, unless on indictment of a grand jury, except in cases in which the punishment is by fine, or imprisonment other- wise than in the penitentiary; in cases of impeachment and in cases aris- ing in the army and navy, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger. (Bill of Rights, sec. 10.) Protection ART. 5. The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and against search- es and seizures. possessions from all unreasonable seizures or searches; and no warrant to C.C.P. 5. search any place, or to seize any person or thing, shall issue without describing them as near as may be, nor without probable cause supported by oath or affirmation. ( Bill of Rights, sec. 9.) Prisoners en- ART. 6. All prisoners shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, unless for titled ici bail, ,except in cer- capital offenses, where the proof is evident; but this provision shall not tain cases. be so construed as to prevent bail after indictment found, upon examina- C.C.P. 6. tion of the evidence in such manner as may be prescribed by law. (Bill of Rights, sec. 11.) Writ of habeas ART. 7. The writ of habeas corpus is a writ of right, and shall never corpus shall never be sus- be suspended. (Bill of Rights, sec. 12.) pended. I

C.C.P. 7. Excessive bail, ART. 8. Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines fines, etc., for- bid. imposed, nor cruel or unusual punishment inflicted. All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done him in his lands, goods, Open courts. C.C.P. 8. person or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law. (Bill of Rights, sec. 13.) No person shall ART. 9. No person for the same offense shall be twice put in jeopardy be twice ptJt in of life or liberty; nor shall a person be again put upon trial for the same jeopardy for same offense, offense after a verdict of not guilty in a court of competent jurisdiction. etc. • C.C.P. 9. (Bill of Rights, sec. 14.) . Trial by jury ART, 10. The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate. (Bill of shall remain inviolate. Rights, sec. 15.) C.C.P. 9, ART. 11. Every person shall be at liberty to speak, write or publish his opinion on any subject, being responsible for the abuse of that privi- lege; and no law shall ever be passed curtailing the liberty of speech or of the press. In prosecutions for the publication of papers investigating the conduct of offi~ers or men in public capacity, or when the matter published is proper for public information, the truth thereof may be given in evi- dence. And in all indictments for libels the jury shall have the right to determine the law and the facts, under the direction of the court, as in other cases. (Bill of Rights, sec. 8.) Person shaU ART. 12. No person shall be disqualified to give evidence in any of the Jl°! be disg_~ali- courts of this state on account of bis religious opinions, or for the want of !1:stf~~;'n~- any religiomi belief; but all oaths or affirmations shall be administered in ~oru!~Ei ;f~~- the mode most binding upon the con.iCie11.ce, and shall be taken subject 0

ligious bellef. to the pains and penalties of perjury. (Bill of Rights, sec. 5.) TITLE !.--GENERAL PROVISIONS.-OH. 1. 3 ART. 13. No citizen shall be outlawed; r..or shall any person be trans- ot utlawry a,:,a . d wit po, te d out of t he sLate f or any off ense comtt.ntte • h'm t h e same. (B'l'l ransportat,on 1 prohibited. of Rights, sec. 20.) Awr. 14. No conviction shall work corruption of blood or forfeiture of Convlct•oo estate. ( Bill of Rights, sec. 21.) ~~:~~~;~;~fir blood, etc. ART. 15. No person shall be convicted of treason, except on the testi- No convi;,tion • mony of two w1tnessess to t he same overt act, or on con fess10n• m • open for treason ex• cept, etc. ' • com;t. (Bill of Ri.ghts, sec. 2 2.) ART. 16. Senators and representa,tives shall, except in cases of treason, Privitleg,ofd . .1ege d f rom arrest d urmg f e1ony or b reac h o f t h e peace, b e pnv1 . t h e session . r!'presenta sen1 ors 'll!I

of the legislature, and iP going to and returning from the same, allowing tivc'..c.P. 12. one day for every twenty miles such member may reside from the place at which the legislature is convened. (State Constitution, art. 3, sec. 14.) ART. l_ 7. Voters shall, in all cases except_ treason, felony or breach of Privilege e>t the peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance at elections, vo\J~o:P. n and in going to and returning therefrom. (State Constitution, art. 6, • sec. 5.) ART. 18. The power to change the venue in civil and criminal cases Change of shall be veHted in the courts, to be exercised in such manner as shall be venue. provided by law. (State Constitution, art. 3, sec. 45.) ART. 19. All judges of the supreme court, court of appeals and district cn:ervatQ~<> O courts shall, by virtue of their offices, be conservators of the peace e peace throughout the state. The style of all writs and process shall be "The State of Texas." All prosecutions shall be carried on in the name and by Style of pro- the authority of "The State of Texas," and conclude, "against the peace cess, etc. and dignity of the state." (State Constitution, art. 5, sec. 12.) ART. 20. By the provisions of the constitution, no person shall be exempt In whaj caset 0 from a second trial for the same offense, who has been convicted upon an fJ~~~~t~a,if. illegal indictment or information and the judgment thereupon arrested· terconviction. . ' f d ' C.C.P. 19. nor where a new tnal has been granted to the de en ant, nor where a jury has been discharged without rendering a verdict, nor for any cause other than that of a legal conviction. ART. 21. By the provisions of the constitution, an acquittal of the Same subject. defendant exempts hi.m from a second trial or a second prosecut10n for c.c.P. ~- the same offense, however irregular the proceedings may have been; but if the defendant shall have been acquitted upon trial in a court having no jurisdiction of the offense, he may, nevertheless, be prosecuted again in a court having jurisdiction. ART. 22. No person can be convicted. of a felo::iy except upon the No conviction of felony ex- verdict of a jury duly rendered and recorded., cept by verdict of jury. C.C.P. 22. ART. 23. The defendant to a criminal prosecution for any offense may De~endantmay waive any right secured. to him by law, except the right of trial by jury ~:~~ !;[ept, in a felony case. etcC.C.P. 26 .

ART, 24. The proceedings and trials in all courts shall be public. Trials ~hall b'3 public. C.0.P. 23. ART. 25. The defendant upon a trial shall be confronted with the ~hf;rhdea~~n- witnesses, except in certain cases provided for in this Code, where d.eposi- fronted by wit- tions have been taken. nesc~~.J~8f.pt. ART. 26. 'fhe provisions of this Code shall be liberally construed, so as Cons~ruction to attain the objects intended by the legislature, the prevention, suppres- of tg\~,.~~it sion and punishment of crime. , ART. 27. Whenever it is found that this Code fails to provide a rule of When rules of • any part1cu proce d ure m • 1ar state of case wh'1c h may anse, • t h e ru l es of t h e comwon law shall govern. oommon law shall be applied and govern• (Act Feb. 15, 1858,) C.O.P. i7. TITLE !.-GENERAL DUTIES OF OFFIOERS.-CH. 2.

CHAPTER TWO. THE GENERAL DUTIES OF OFFICERS CHARGED WITH T.HE ENFORCEMENT OF THE CRIMINAL LAWS. Artiole Art.iole 1. The Attorney-Gene-rat. 4, Peace Officers. Attorney-general shall represent the state .. , 28 Who are peace officers ........................ 44 Shall report to governor annually, . . . . . . . . . . 29 Certain military officers and privates are May require certain officers Lo report to him. dO peace officers ......................... 44--Note Duties and powers of peace officers .......... 45 2. District and County Attorneys. May summon aid when resisted. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 Duties of district attorneys.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 Person neglectmgrefusing to obey liable to prosecution 47 Same subject ................. , ............... 32 Officer to execute process may he fined for contempt. .. . . . . . .. . . . .. . .. . : . . . .. 48 Duties of coun,y attorneys ................. 33 Duty to pres,ml otlicer for neglect of duty, 5. Sheriffs, etc ..................... , , . . . . .. . .. . .. .. .. . .. 34 Shall be a conservator of the peace, and ar- Shall hear complaints, and what the same rest offenders, etc ....... _.. .. .. .. .. . .. .. . .. 49 shall contain ........................... 35 Keeper of jail. ......... _..... __ .... _......... 50 Special duty to file complaints for violations Shall place in jail every person committed hy of "local opt10n Ia w " ................ 35-Note lawful authority ............................ 51 Duty when complaint has been made ........ 36 Sheriff' shall notify district or county attorney May administer oaths ........................ 37 of prisoners, etc............................. 52 Shall not dismiss case, unless, etc . . . . . . . . . . . 38 May appoint a jailer, who shall be responsible 53 Attorney pro tcm. may be appointed., ....... 39 May rent room and empl<:>y guard, when ..... 54 Shall report to attorney-general when re- quired.... . . .. .. .. . . .. .. .. . : . .'. .. . . .. . .. . .. . 40 Deputy may perform duties of sheriff'........ 55 Shall not be of counsel adverse to the state .. 41 6. Olerk.s of the District and County Courts. Shall file all papers, issue process, etc ........ 56 3. Magistrates. Power of deputy clerks,... . ............. , 57 Who are magistrates.. .. . . .. . .. .. .. .. . .. .. . 42 Shall report to attorney-general when re- Duty of 11\agistrates ......................... 43 quired .................................. 58

I. THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL. Attorner-gene- ARTICLE 28. It is the duty of the attorney-general to represent the ral sl1al repre- sent the state, state in all criminal cases in the court of appeals, except in cases where etc. ' he.may have been employed adversely to the state, previously to his elec- C.C.P. 28. tion; and he shall not appear as counsel against the state in any court. Shall report to ART. 29. He shall report to the governor on the first Monday of Decem- governor annu- ally. ber, annually, and at such other times as the governor may require, the P.D. 201. number of indictments which have been found by grand juries in this state for the preceding year; the number of informations filed in this state for the preceding year; the offenses charged in such indictments or informa- tion; the number of arraignments, convictions and acquittals for each offense; the number of indictments and informations which have been dis- posed of without the intervention of a petit jury, with the cause and man- ner of such disposition; and also a summary of the judgments rendered on conviction, specifying the offense, the nature and amount of :penalties imposed, and the amount of fines collected. • lllay,reqmre ART. 30. He may reqmre the several district and county attorneys, certatu officers to report to clerks of the district and county courts in the state, to communicate to him him. at such times as he may designate, and in such form as he may prescribe, P.D. 20'J.. C.C.P. 944. all the information necessary for his compliance with the requirements of the preceding article. II. DISTRICT AND COUNTY ATTORNEYS. Duties of dis- ART. 31. It is the duty of each district attorney to represent the state trict attorneys. C.C.P. 50, in all criminal cases in the· district courts of his district, except in cases where he has been, before his election, employed adversely, and he shall not appeal as counsel agamst the state, in any court, and he shall not, after the expiration of his term of office, appear as counsel against the state in any case in which he may have appeared as counsel for the state. Sarne subject, ART. 32. When any criminal proceeding 1s had before an examining C.C.P. 3L court in his district, or before a judge upon habeas corpus, and he is noti- fied of the same, and is at the time within the county where such prn- ceeding is had, he shall represent the state therem, unless prevented by other offimal duties. TITLE r.-GENERAL DUTIES OF OFFICERS.-OH. ~- ART. 33. It shall be the duty of the county attorney to attend the !Jntles or couP- terms of t h e county an d .mf enor. courts of h•1s •county, an d to represenL (Act •Y atturn0ys. Au_g. 21, the state in all criminal cases under examination or prosecution in said fl~t Xu!~ 3,/ courts. He shall attend all criminal prosecutions before justices of the 1876, p. 85.)' ~ peace m • h'1s county, w h en not1'fie d of t h e pen d ency of sue h prosecutions, . • (Const., art. o, §21.> and when not prevented by other official duties. He shall conduct ail prosecutions for crimes and offenses cognizable in such county and inferior courts of his county, and shall prosecute and defend all other actions in such courts in which the state or the county is interested. He shall also attend the terms of the district court in his county, and if there be a dis- trict attorney of the dist1'ict including such county, and such district attorney be in attendance upon such court, the county attorney shall aid him when so requested, and when there is no such district attorney, or when he is absent, the county attorney shall represent the state in such court and perform the duties required by law of district attorneys. . ART. 34. It shall be the duty of the district or county attorney to pre- Dfflutytopreaenr . sent to t h e court h avmg • . d'1ct10n, Juns . any offi cer, b y m • f ormatwn, . f or t h e oJee~cer for ne6 - of duty, negle_ct or failure of any duty el!-joined upon such office~, when such neglect <'X~t Aµ . 7, or failure can be presented by mformatwn, whenever 1t shall come to the 1876, p. No.) knowledge of said attorney that there has been a neglect or failure of duty upon the part of said officer; and it shall be his duty to bring to the notice of the grand jury all acts of violation of law, or neglect or failure of duty upon the part of any officer, when such violation, neglect or failure are not presented by information, and whenever the same may come to his knowledge. ART. 35. Upon complaint being made before a district or county attor- Sh~II hearcom• • dm ney t h at an off ense h as b een comm1tte • h'1s d'1str10t • or county, h e sh a11 what plamtstheand same reduce the complaint to writing and cause the same to be signed and shall contain. 7 sw01:n to by the complainant, and it shall be duly attested by said attor- \ti'l, t~!i, §13.) ney. Said complaint shall state the name of the accused, if his name is known, and if his name is not known it shall describe him as fully as pos- sible, and the offense with which he is charged shall be stated in plain and intelligible words, and it must appear that the offense was committed in the county where the complaint is filed, and within a time not barred by limitation. NoTE.-Chapter 42, acts 1879, makes it the special duty of the county attorney to sr,ecial .:Ju.tr, to file or have filed complaints against all keepers of houses where liquor is sold for re C?fl;'!arn;s violations of the "local option" law.-L. 0ir~~~!1:i°;s tion'' taw. ART. 36. If the offense be a misdemeanor, the attorney shall forthwith Duty when prepare an m • f ormat10n, • an d fil e t h e same, togeth er wit • h t h e comp lamt, , m • comp1arnt been made.nas the court having jurisdiction of the offense. If the offense charged be a f~it A'.1i 7§1~ > felony, he shall forthwith file the complaint with a magistrate of the 'P· ' • county, and cause the necessary process to be issued for the arrest of the accused. ART. 37. For the purposes mentioned in the two preceding articles, Maya mission of the presiding judge, who shall be satisfied that the reasons so stated are good and sufficient to authorize such dismissal. ART. 39. Whenever any district or county attorney shall fail to a,ttend Attotneytro any term of the district, county or justice's court, the judge of said court, ~~olri~t1. e or such justice, may appoint some competent attorney to perfo1~m the t~c.t 810 Aui 1, 12 duties of such district or county attorney, who shall be allowed the same ' P • §, .l compensation for his services as are allowed the district or county attor- 6 TrrLE 1.-GENERAL DUTIES OF OFFICERS.-CH. 2. ney. Said appointment ishall not extend beyond the term of the court at which it is made, and shall be vacated upon the [lppearance of the district or county attorney. Shall report to ART. 40. District and county attorneys shall, when required by the attorney-gene- ral when re- attorney-general, report to him at such times, and in accordance with such qwred. forms as he may direct, such information as he may desue in relation to criminal matters and the interests of the state, in their districts and co1mties. Shall not be of ART. 41. District and county attorneys shall not be of counsel adversely counsel ad- verse to the to the state in any case, in any court, nor shall they, after they cease to state. be such officers, be of counsel adversely to the state in any case in which O.O.P. 30. they have been of counsel for the state. III. MAGISTRATES, Who are mag• ART. 42. Either of the following officers is a "magistrate" within the istrates. O.O.P. 52. meaning of this Code: the judges of the supreme court, the judges of the court of appeals, the judges of the district court, the county judge of the county, either of the county commissioners, the justices of the peace, the mayor or recorder of an incorporated city or town. Duty of mag- ART. 43. It is the duty of every magistrate to preserve the peace istrates. O.O.P. 32. within his jurisdiction by the use of all lawful means; to issue all process intended to aid in preventing and suppressing crime; to cause the arrest of offenders, by the nse of lawful means, in order that they may be brought •to punishment. IV. PEACE OFFICERS. Who are peace ART. 44. The following are "peace officers": the sheriff and his depu- officers O.O.P. 53. ties, constable, the marshal, constable or policeman of an incorporated town or city, and any private person specially appointed to execute crim- inal process. Certain milita• NoTE.-Section 6, chapter 123, acts 1879, clothes the officers, non-commissioned ry officers and officers and privates of a military company, organized under the act, with the privates are peace officers. powers of peace officers, and requires them to aid the civil authorities in the execu- tion of th.f) law. They have authority to make arrests, hut are to be governed in such cases by the law regulating sheriffs in the discharge of similar duty, and are to take an oath to discharge such duty faithfully and in accordance with law.-L. Duties and ART. 45. It is the duty of every peace officer to preserve the peace powers of peace officers, within his jurisdiction. To effect this purpose he shall use all lawful O.O.P.34 means. He shall, in every case where he is authorized by the provisions of this Code, interfere without warrant to prevent or suppress crime. He shall execute all lawful process issued to him by any magistrate or court. He shall give notice to some magistrate of all offenses committed within his jurisdiction, where he has good reason to believe there has been a violation of the penal law. He sh&ll arrest offenders without warrant in every case where he is authorized by law, in order that they may be taken before the prbper magistrate or court and be brought to punishment. May summon ART. 46. Whenever a peace office11 meets with resistance in discharging aid when re- sisted. any duty imposed upon him by law, he shall summon a sufficient number CC.P. 44. of citizens of his county to overcome the resistance, and all persons Rum, moued are bound to obey, and if they refuse are guilty of the offense prescribed in article 229 of the Penal Code. ):'erson refus- ART. 47. The peace officer who has summoned any person to assist him lrltti t:~~ose- in performing any duty, shall report such person if he refuse to obey, to cut~C.P. 45_ the district or county attorney of the proper district or county, in order that he may be prosecuted for the offense. 9fflcer neglect- • ART. 48. If any sheriff or other officer shall willfully refuse or fail mg to execute . Krocess maybe from neglect, to execute ·any summon~, su_bp?'lna or att~chment for a w1t- t.:',:;~for con- ness, or any other legal process, whwh 1t is made his duty by law to (Act Feb. 11, execute, he shall be liable to a fine for contempt not less than ten nor more 1860 ·> than two hundred dollars, at t.be dwicretion of the court having cognizance APPENDIX TAB E Excerpts from the 1925 Texas Revised Civil Statutes. Texas Historical Statutes Project 1925 Constitution of the United States and Texas a s Stat ex e T ~ . ~ L y

aw r Li br a This project was made possible by the Texas State Law Library and a grant from the Litigation Section of the State Bar of Texas

3. GENERAL PROVISIONS. Article Article Qualifications - - - - - - c c ~ - - , - - 3:J2 Collection r e p o r t " - - - - - · - 3 3 7 Report to Attorney GeneraL______ 333 Register _ _ _ _ _ _ __ 33 8 Shall advise officers__ • 334 To prosecute officers 339 Collections and fees ' 335 Admissions 340 Accepting rewar _ _ _ _ _ _ 336 Population determine 341

Art. 332. [352] [354] [355] Qualifications.-No person who is not a duly licensed attorney at law shall be eligible to the office of district or county attorney. District and county attor- neys shall reside in the district and county, r~spectively, for which they were elected; and they shall, as soon as practicable after their election and qualification, notify the Attorney Gen- eral and Comptroller of their post-office address. [Acts 1876, ·p. 85.] Art. 333. To report to Attorney General.-District and County Attorneys shall, when required by the Attorney General, report to him at such times and in such form as he may direct, such information as he may desire in relation to criminal mat- ters and the interests of the State, in their districts and coun- ties. Art. 334. [356] [290] [253] Shall advise officers.-The district and county attorneys, upon request, shall give an opinion or advice in writing to any county or precinct officer of their district or county, touching their official duties. [Acts 1913, p. 48.] • Art. 335. [363] [297] [257] Collection and fees.-When- ever a district or county attorney has collected money for the State or for any county, he shall within thirty days after receiv- ing the same, pay it into the treasury of the State or of the county in which it belongs, after deducting therefrom and re- taining the commissions allowed him thereon by law. Such dis- trict or county attorney shall be entitled to ten per cent commis- sions on the first thousand dollars collected by him in any one case for the State or county from any individual or company, and five per cent on all sums over one thousand dollars, to be .• • retained out of the money when collected, and he shall also be en- titled to retain the same commissions on all collections made for the State or for any county. This article shall also apply to money realized for the State under the escheat law. [Acts 1876, p. 86; G. L. Vol. 8, p. 922.] . Art. 336. [365] [299] [259] Accepting reward.-No dis- trict or county attorney shall take any fee, article of value, com- pensation, reward or gift or any promise thereof, from any per- son whomsoever, to prosecute any case which he is required by law to prosecute, or consideration of or as a testimonial for his services in any case which he is required by law to prosecute, either before or after such case has been tried and finally de- termined. [Id.] Art. 337. [361] [362] Collection reports.-On or before the last day of August of each year, each district or county at- torney shall file in the office of the Comptroller or of the county treasurer, as the case may be, a sworn account of all money re- ceived by him by virtue of his office during the preceding year, payable into the State or county treasury. [Id.] Art. 4410. Escheats.-The Attorney General shall institute and prosecute, or cause to be instituted and prosecuted, all suits and proceedings necessary to recover for and on behalf of the State all properties, real, personal or mixed, that have escheat- ed or may escheat to the State under the laws of the State. [Acts 1917, p. 376.] Art. 4411. [4429] [29!02] [2807'] No admission to preju- dice.-No admission, agreement or waiver, made by the Attor- ney General, in any action or suit in which the State is a party, shall prejudice the rights of the State. [Acts 1846, p. 206; P. D. 211; G. L. Vol. 2, p. 1148.] Art. 4412. [ 4431] First office assistant.-In case of the absence or inability of the Attorney General to act, the first office assistant of the Attorney General shall discharge the duties which devolve by law upon the Attorney General. [Act 1903, p. 117.] Art. 4413. Biennial report.-The Attorney General shall re- port to the Governor biennially on the first Monday in December next preceding the expiration of his official term the number of indictments which have been found by grand juries in this State for the two preceding years; the offenses charged, the number of trials, convictions and acquittals for each offense; the number of dismissals and also a summary of the judgments rendered on conviction, the nature and amount of penalties im- posed and the amount of fines collected. This report shall also give a general summary of all the business, civil and criminal, disposed of by the Supreme Court and Court of Criminal Ap- peals, so far as the State may be a party, and all civil causes to which the State is a party prosecuted or defended by him in any other courts, State or Federal. [Acts 1885, p; 61; G.· L. Vol. 9, p. 681.] APPENDIX TAB F COMPLETE TEX. STATUTES at 1387 (Vernon’s 1928) (Table Showing Corresponding Articles in 1879 and 1925 Codes of Criminal Procedure). '28 TEx.crv.ST.-1 ARTICLES OF THE SHOWING CORRESPONDING ARTICLES IN

CIVIL STATUTES AND

This table of corresponding articles is intend·ed to show those articles of the 1879 Code of Criminal Procedure which have been carried into Vernon's Annotated Revised Criminal and Civil Statutes 1925 and the 1928 Complete Texas Statutes.

c.c.P. C.C.P. c.c.P. C.C.P. C.C.P, C.C.P. c.c.P. c.c.P. 1879 1925 and 1928- 1879 1925 and 1928 1879 • 1925 and 1928 1879 192~ and 192S .Art. .Art. Art. .Art. Art. .Art. .Art. .Art. 60 . . . . . . . . . • . . . ............ 48 117 ......................... 103 173 ......................... 155 1 ···············"········ 1 3 ··········............... z: 61 .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . 49 118 . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . 104 174 ......................... 156 4 ......................... 3 62 . . . • . . . . • . . . . . . • • • • . . . .. . 50 119 .. .. . . . . . . . • . .. . . .. . .. . . . 105 175 ......................... 157 5 ......................... 4- 63 ·········•· .............. 35 120 ............... : ......... 106 176 ......................... 158 6 ......................... 6 64 . . . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . 61 121 . . .. . .. .. . . . .. .. . . . . . . . . . 107 177 . ....... •.................. 159 7 ......................... s: 68 ......................... 54· 122 ..................... : ... 108 178 ... ; .......... . .......... 160 8 ......................... 7 69 . . • .. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 123 • .. • .. • .. .. .. .. . • • • • . • • • • 109 179 ......................... 161 9 ......................... 8- 70 . .. • . . .. . . . .. . . .. . . .. . . . . 54 125 . ......................... 110 180 ....... : .... : ............ 162 10 •••••• ................... 10 71 ......................... 117 126 ........ : ................ 111 181 ......... .. .............. 163 11 ......................... 13 72 .................. 52-8S, 56 128 .......... . .............. 112 182 ......................... 164 12 ......................... 14' 73 .................. 52-89, 59 129 .. . . .. . . . .. .. . . . . . . .. . ... 89 , 183 ......................... 165 13 ••••••••• ................ 1& 74 .................. 52-90, 117 130 ..... : ................... 113 184 .. ; ........... ,. . .. . .. .. . 166 14 .... . .................... 16 75 .................. 52-91, 57 131 ......................... 113 185 ......................... 167 15 ......................... 17 75a ..... 52-157, 58; Civ. 2455 132 ..... : ................... -114 186 ..................... : ... 168 16 ......................... lS 76 .. .. . . . ... .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . . 60 133 ......................... 115 187 ....... _.................. 169 17 ......................... 19 77 ......................... 61 134 ...... : ... : ............ : .. 116 188 ...... : .................. 170 79 . . .. .. .. ... .. ..... ..... . 63 135 ...... ., ................. 117 189 ......................... 171 19 ·········"······ .. •••••• 20 80 ......................... 65 136 ........... :: ............ us 191 ......................... 172 21 ······................... 9 22 ......................... 1Z 81 ......................... 66 137 ...................... •... 119 192 ...... : .................. 173 23 .......................... 11 82 .................. ., .. . .. 67 138 . .. .. .. . .. .. . . .. .. . . . . . . . 120 193 ; ........................ 174 24 ••••••••• ... • ............ 21 83 . . . . . .. . . . . . .. . . . . . .. . . . . 68 139 . . . . .. . . .. . . . .. .. • . . .. . . . 121 194 ......................... 175 25 ••••••••••• ... • .......... 22 84 .. .. . . . . . .. . . .. . . .. . . . . . . 69 140 .. .. . . . . . .. . .. . . .. . .. . . . . 122 195- ......................... 176 26 ......................... 23 85 .. . .. .. .. .. . . . . . . .. . . . .. . 70 141 . . .. . . . . .. . . .. .. . . .. .. .. . 123 196 ......................... 177 27 ......................... 24 86 ......................... 71 142 ......................... 124 · 197 ......................... 178 29 .................... Civ. 4113 87 ......................... 72 -143 ............. ••••••• ..... 125 · 198 ............ : ........... . 179 31 ......................... 25 88 .... . .. . ... . ..... .. ... . . . 74 144 ......................... 126 199 ......................... 180. 32 ......................... 25 89 ......................... 73 145 ; ........................ 121 · 200 ......................... 181 33 ......................... 26 90 . . • . . .. . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . .. 75 146 . . .. . . . . .. .. . .. . . . . . .. . . . 128 201 ........... : ............. 182 34 ......................... 27 91 ......................... 76 147 : . ....................... 129 202 ......................... 183 35 ......................... 2S 92 . .. . .. .. .. . .. .. . .. .. • . . . . 77 148 .. .. .. .. .. . .. . .. . . . . .. .. . 130 203 ......................... 184 36 ......................... 29 93 .. . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . .. .. . . .. 78 149 ; ........................ 131 204 .... : ... ........ .. ....... 1S5 37 ......................... 30 94 . . . . . . .. . . .. .. . . . . .. .. . . . 79 150 ........... ; ; ............ 132 205 ................... •••••• 186 38 ......................... 577 95 ......................... 80 151 ............ ; ............ 133 206 ... : ...... : .............. 187 39 ......................... 31 96 . . .. .. . . . . . .. .. .... .. .. . .. 81 152 ......................... 134 207 ......................... 188 ~ ..................... Clv. 333 97 .. . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82 153 . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . .. . . . .. . . 135 208 ......................... 189 41 ••.......•............... 32 98 ... ; ........... ; ... ...... 83 154 ..... ; ................... 136 209 ............. . ........... 190 42 ......................... 33 99 . . .. .. .. .. .. .. . . .. . .. . . .. 84 155 .......................... 137 210 ............ . ............ 191 43 ......................... 34 100 .. . .. .. . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 85 156 ... : ..................... 138 211 .......... : .............. 192 44 ......................... 36 101 .. • • .. .. . .. .. .. . .. . . . . .. . 86 157 ......................... 139 212 ......................... 193 45 ......................... 37 102 ................ ;; ....... 87 158 ......................... 140 213 ......................... 194 46 ......................... 38 103 . .. . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. . 88 159 ......................... 141 214 ............... , ......... 195 47 ......................... 39 104 . .. . .. .. .. . .. . . . .. .. . .. .. 90 160 ......................... 142 215· ....... _. ...... : .......... 196 4S ......................... 40 105 .. .. .. .. .. . .. .. . .. .. . .. .. 91 161 ......................... 143 . 216 ......................... 197 49 ......................... 41 106 . . .. .. . . .. . .. . .. ... .. . . .. 92 162 ......................... 14! 216a ........................ 199 50 .................... Civ. 5116 107 ...................... 93, 94 163 ......................... 145 216b ........................ 200 51 ......................... 42 108 .. .. .. .. . . . .. .. . . .. . .. .. . 94 164 ......................... 146 217 ......................... 201 52 ••••••••••••• ............ 43 109 .......... ·. ........ .•.... 95 165 ......................... 147 218 ........ : ................ 202 53 ................... Civ. 5116 110 .. . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. 96 166 • .. .. .. .. .. . .. .. . . .. . .. . . 148 219 ......................... 203 54 .................... Clv. 5116 111 ......................... 97 167 ...... , .................. 149 220 ......................... 204 65 ......................... .. 112 . . . .. . . . . . . .. ... .. . . . . . .. 98 168 ......................... 160 221 ......................... 205 56 ......................... 45 113 .. . .. . . . .. . . . . . .. .. . . • .. . 99 169 ......................... 151 222 ......................... 208 57 ......................... 46 11( ............. ······ ...... 100 170 ......................... 152 223 ?09 115 ......................... 101 171 ................ ···•·• ... 153 224 ::::::::::::::::::::::::: 210 58 68 ·······"··"·"··"·· ... 47 ......................... 48 225 ......................... 211 ll6 ......................... 102 172 ......................... 154 '28 TEx.C.O.P. (Page 1387) APPENDIX TAB G Excerpts from Act of May 17, 1985, 69th Leg., R.S., ch. 480, § 1, 1985 Tex. Gen. Laws 1720, 1919 (codified as TEX. GOV’T CODE § 41.006). CH 479 69th LEGIS-REGULAR SESSION Passed the Senate on May 2, 1985, by the following vote: Yeas 31, Nays 0; passed the House on May 17, 1985, by a non-record vote. Approved: June 11, 1985 Effective: September 1, 1985

CHAPTER 480

S.B. No. 1228 An Act relating to adoption of a nonsubstantlve revision of the statutes relating to the judiciary; making conforming amendments and repeals and Including penalties.

Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Texas: SECTION 1, ADOPTION OF CODE TITLE. Title 2, Government Code, is adopted to read as follows: GOVERNMENT CODE TITLE 2. JUDICIAL BRANCH Subtitle A. Courts Chapter 21. General Provisions Chapter 22. Appellate Courts Chapter 23. General Provisions for Trial Courts Chapter 24. District Courts Chapter 25. [reserved for Statutory County Courts] Chapter 26. Constitutional County Courts Chapter 27. Justice Courts Chapter 28. Small Claims Courts Chapter 29. Municipal Courts Chapter 30. Municipal Courts of Record Subtitle B. Judges Chapter 31. Additional Compensation of Justices of Courts of Appeal~ Chapter 32. Supplemental Compensation of District Judges for Certain Duties Chapter 33. State Commission on Judicial Conduct [Chapters 34-40 reserved for expansion] Subtitle C. Prosecuting Attorneys Chapter 41. General Provisions Chapter 42. State Prosecuting Attorney Chapter 43. District Attorneys Chapter 44. Criminal District Attorneys Chapter 45. County Attorneys Chapter 46. Professional Prosecutors Chapter 47. Prosecutor Council; Discipline of Prosecutors [Chapters 48-50 reserved for expansion] Subtitle D. Judicial Personnel and Officials Chapter 51. Clerks Chapter 52. Court Reporters Chapter 53. Bailiffs Chapter 54. Masters; Magistrates; Referees Chapter 55. Other Court Personnel [Chapters 56-60 reserved for expansion] Subtitle E. Juries Chapter 61. General Provisions Chapter 62. Petit Juries [Chapters 63-70 reserved for expansion] Subtitle F. Court Administration Chapter 71. Texas Judicial Council

1720 69th LEGIS-REGULAR SESSION CH 480, SEC 1 Chapter 72. Office of Court Administration Chapter 73. Administration of Courts of Appeals Chapter 74. Administration of District Courts Chapter 75. Other Court Administration [Chapters 76-80 reserved for expansion] Subtitle G. [reserved for State Bar Act, Board of Law Examiners, and statutes relating to licensing ofattomeys] Subtitle H. Information Resources Chapter 91. State Law Library TITLE 2. JUDICIAL BRANCH SUBTITLE A. COURTS CHAPTER 21. GENERAL PROVISIONS Sec. 21.001. INHERENT POWER AND DUTY OF COURTS Sec. 21.002. CONTEMPTOFCOURT Sec. 21.003. OFFICERS NOT TO APPEAR Sec. 21.004. STATE OF JUDICIARY MESSAGE CHAPTER 21. GENERAL PROVISIONS Sec. 21.001. INHERENT POWER AND DUTY OF COURTS. (a) A court has all powers necessary for the exercise of its jurisdiction and the enforcement of its lawful orders, including authority to issue the writs and orders necessary or proper in aid of its jurisdiction. (b) A court shall require that proceedings be conducted with dignity and in an orderly and expeditious manner and control the proceedings so that justice is done. (V.A.C.S. Art. 191 la, Sec. I (part).) Sec. 21.002. CONTEMPT OF COURT. (a) A court may punish for contempt. (b) The punishment for contempt of a court other than a justice court or municipal court is a fine of not more than $500 or confinement in the county jail for not more than six months, or both such a fine and confinement in jail. (c) The punishment for contempt of a justice court or municipal court is a fine of not more than $100 or confinement in the county or city jail for not more than three days, or both such a fine and confinement in jail. (d) An officer of a court who is held in contempt by a trial court shall, on proper motion filed in the offended court, be released on his own personal recognizance pending a determination of his guilt or innocence by a judge of a district court that is not the offended court. The presiding judge of the administrative judicial district in which the alleged contempt occurred shall appoint a judge of a district court other than the offended court to determine the guilt or innocence of the officer of the court. (e) This section does not affect a court's power to confine a contemner to compel him to obey a court order. (f) Section 5, Article 42.03, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1965, and Section 14.12, Family Code, apply when a person is punished by confinement for contempt of court for disobedience of a court order to make periodic payments for the support ofa child. (V.A.C.S. Art. 191 la, Secs. l (part), 2, 3, 4.) Sec. 21.003. OFFICERS NOT TO APPEAR. (a) A judge or clerk of the supreme court, the court of criminal appeals, a court of appeals, or a district court may not appear and plead as an attorney at law in any court of record in this state. (b) A county judge or county clerk who is licensed to practice law may not appear and practice as an attorney at law in any county or justice court except in cases over which the court m which the judge or clerk serves has neither original nor appellate jurisdiction. (c) A county clerk who is licensed to practice law may not appear and practice as an attorney at law in the supreme court, the court of criminal appeals, a court of appeals, or a district court unless the court in which the clerk serves has neither original nor appellate jurisdic- tion. (V.A.C.S. Art. 319 (part).) Sec. 21.004. STATE OF JUDICIARY MESSAGE. (a) At a convenient time at the commencement of each regular session of the legislature, the chief justice of the supreme court shall deliver a state of the judiciary message evaluating the accessibility of the courts to the citizens of the state and the future directions and needs of the courts of the state.

1721 CH 480, SEC 1 69th LEGIS-REGULAR SESSION

(2) the deponent's name and residence; (3) the directions, if any, of the commission or special master; and (4) a request for an order requiring the person to appear and testify before a designated officer. (c) On the filing of the petition, the court may order the person to appear and testify. The clerk shall issue a subpoena for the deposition. The person taking the deposition shall take and return it in the manner prescribed by law for depositions in civil actions. (d) Failure to obey the subpoena or an order connected with the subpoena shall be dealt with as contempt. (V.A.C.S. Art. 5966a, Sec. 9.) Sec. 33.028. PROCESS AND ORDERS. (a) Process issued in an investigation or formal proceeding under this chapter is valid anywhere in the state. (b) On request of the commission, a commission member, or an authorized representative of the commission, a sheriff or a constable shall serve any process or execute lawful orders issued by the commission. A commission member, a special master, or a person whom the commission designates may also serve process or execute a lawful order of the commission. (V.A.C.S. Art. 5966a, Secs. 5, 7.) Sec. 33.029. WITNESSES' EXPENSES. A witness other than an officer or employee of the state or a political subdivision or court of the state is entitled to the same mileage expenses and per diem as a witness before a state grand jury. The commission shall pay these amounts from its appropriated funds. (V.A.C.S. Art. 5966a, Sec. 10.) Sec. 33.030. ASSISTANCE TO COMMISSION AND SPECIAL MASTER. (a) On request of the commission, the attorney general shall act as its counsel generally or in a particular investigation or proceeding. (b) A state or local government body or department, an officer or employee of a state or local government body, or an official or agent of a state court shall cooperate with and give reasonable assistance and information to the commission, an authorized representative of the commission, or a special master concerning an investigation or proceedmg before the commission or master. (V.A.C.S. Art. 5966a, Secs. 2 (part), 4.) Sec. 33.031. NO AWARD OF COSTS. The commission, a special master, or a district court may not award costs in a proceeding under this chapter. (V.A.C.S. Art. 5966a, Sec. 11.) Sec. 33.032. CONFIDENTIALITY OF PAPERS, RECORDS, AND PROCEED- INGS. The papers filed with and proceedings before the commission are confidential prior to the convening of a formal hearing. The formal hearing, and all papers, records, documents, and other evidence introduced during the formal hearing, shall be public. (V.A.C.S. Art. 5966a, Sec. SA.) Sec. 33.033. NOTIFICATION TO COMPLAINANT. (a) The commission shall promptly notify a complainant of judicial conduct of the disposition of the complaint. (b) The communication shall inform the complainant that: ( l) the complaint has no basis and has been dismissed; (2) appropriate action has been taken, the nature of which will not be disclosed; or (3) formal proceedings have been instituted. (c) The communication may not contain the name of a judge unless formal proceedings have been instituted. (V.A.C.S. Art. 5966a, Sec. ISA.) [Chapters 34-40 reserved for expansion] SUBTITLE C. PROSECUTING ATTORNEYS CHAPTER 41. GENERAL PROVISIONS SUBCHAPTER A. OFFICE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY Sec. 41.001. QUALIFICATIONS Sec. 41.002. NOTIFICATION OF ADDRESS Sec. 41.003. ADMISSION BY PROSECUTOR Sec. 41.004. ACCEPTANCEOFREWARD Sec. 41.005. COLLECTION OF MONEY Sec. 41.006. REPORT TO ATTORNEY GENERAL Sec. 41.007. OPINIONS TO COUNTY AND PRECINCT OFFICIALS Sec. 41.008. REGISTER Sec. 41.009. PROSECUTION OF OFFICERS ENTRUSTED WITH PUBLIC FUNDS

1918 69th LEGIS-REGULAR SESSION CH 480, SEC 1 Sec. 41.010. APPOINTMENT OF INITIAL DISTRICT OR CRIMINAL DISTRICT AT- TORNEY [Sections 41.011-41.100 reserved for expansion] SUBCHAPTER B. STAFF OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY Sec. 41.101. DEFINITION Sec. 41.102. EMPLOYMENT OF ASSIST ANTS AND PERSONNEL Sec. 41.103. ASSISTANT PROSECUTING ATTORNEYS Sec. 41.104. BOND Sec. 41.105. REMOVAL Sec. 41.106. COMPENSATION Sec. 41.107. EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES Sec. 41.108. GIFTS AND GRANTS Sec. 41.109. AUTHORITY OF INVESTIGATOR [Sections 41.110-41.200 reserved for expansion] SUBCHAPTER C. APPORTIONMENT OF STATE FUNDS FOR PROSECUTION IN CERTAIN COUNTIES Sec. 41.201. ELIGIBLE COUNTIES Sec. 41.202. TRANSFER BY COMPTROLLER Sec. 41.203. AMOUNTOFTRANSFER Sec. 41.204. APPORTIONMENT BY COMMISSIONERS COURT CHAPTER 41. GENERAL PROVISIONS SUBCHAPTER A. OFFICE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY Sec. 41.001. QUALIFICATIONS. A district or county attorney must be a licensed attorney. (V.A.C.S. Art. 332 (part).) Sec. 41.002. NOTIFICATION OF ADDRESS. Each district and county attorney shall notify the attorney general and comptroller of his post office address as soon as practicable after his election and qualification. (V.A.C.S. Art. 332 (part).) Sec. 41.003. ADMISSION BY PROSECUTOR. An admission made by a district or county attorney in a suit or action to which the state is a party does not prejudice the rights of the state. (V.A.C.S. Art. 340.) Sec. 41.004. ACCEPTANCE OF REWARD. A district or county attorney, either before or after the case is tried and finally determined, may not take from any person a fee, article of value, compensation, reward, or gift, or a promise of any of these, to prosecute a case that he is required by law to prosecute or as consideration or a testimonial for his services in a case that he is required by law to prosecute. (V.A.C.S. Art. 336.) Sec. 41.005. COLLECTION OF MONEY. (a) Not later than the 30th day after the date on which a district or county attorney receives any money collected for the state or a county, the district or county attorney shall, after deducting the commissions provided by this section, pay the money into the treasury of the state or of the county to which it belongs. (b) The district or county attorney may retain a commission from money collected for the state or a county. The amount of the commission in any one case is 10 percent of the first $1,000 collected, and five percent of the amount collected over $1,000. (c) Subsections (a) and (b) of this section also apply to money realized for the state under the laws governing escheat. (d) Not later than the last day of August of each year, each district and county attorney shall file in the office of the comptroller or of the county treasurer, as the case may be, a sworn account of all money received by him by virtue of his office during the preceding year and payable into the state or county treasury. (V.A.C.S. Arts. 335, 337.) Sec. 41.006. REPORT TO ATTORNEY GENERAL. At the times and in the form that the attorney general directs, the district and county attorneys shall report to the attorney general the information from their districts and counti~ that the attorney general desires relating to criminal matters and the interests of the state. (V.A.C.S. Art. 333.)

1919 CH 480, SEC 1 69th LEGIS-REGULAR SESSION

Sec. 41.007. OPINIONS TO COUNTY AND PRECINCT OFFICIALS. A district or county attorney, on request, shall give to a county or precinct official of his district or county a written opinion or written advice relating to the official duties of that official. (V.A.C.S. Art. 334.) Sec. 41.008. REGISTER. (a) Each district or county attorney shall keep a register of all his official acts and reports, all actions or demands prosecuted or defended by him as district or county attorney, and all proceedings held in relation to his official acts. (b) A district or county attorney shall keep the register in proper books obtained by him for that purpose at his own expense. (c) The register shall be available at all times for inspection by any person appointed to examine it by the governor or by the commissioners court of a county. (d) Each district and county attorney shall deliver the books that comprise the register to his successor in office. (V.A.C.S. Art. 338.) Sec. 41.009. PROSECUTION OF OFFICERS ENTRUSTED WITH PUBLIC FUNDS. If a district or county attorney learns that an officer in his district or county who is entrusted with the collection or safekeeping of public funds is neglect in~ or abusing the trust confided in him or is failing to discharge his duties under the law, the district or county attorney shall institute the proceedings that are necessary to compel the performance of the officer's duties and to preserve and protect the public interest. (V.A.C.S. Art. 339.) Sec. 41.010. APPOINTMENT OF INITIAL DISTRICT OR CRIMINAL DISTRICT ATTORNEY. If a new office of district attorney or criminal district attorney is created, the governor shall appoint a person to fill the office until the next general election. (V.A.C.S. Art. 199a, Sec. 6.001 (part).) [Sections 41.011-41.100 reserved for expansion] SUBCHAPTER B. STAFF OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY Sec. 41.101. DEFINITION. In this subchapter, "prosecuting attorney" means a county attorney, district attorney, or criminal district attorney. (V.A.C.S. Art. 332a, Sec. I.) Sec. 41.102. EMPLOYMENT OF ASSISTANTS AND PERSONNEL. A prosecuting attorney may employ the assistant prosecuting attorneys, investigators, secretaries, and other office personnel that in his judgment are required for the proper and efficient operation and administration of the office. (V.A.C.S. Art. 332a, Sec. 2.) Sec. 41.103. ASSISTANT PROSECUTING ATTORNEYS. (a) An assistant prosecuting attorney must be licensed to practice law in this state and shall take the constitutional oath of office. (b) An assistant prosecuting attorney may perform all duties imposed by law on the prosecuting attorney. (V.A.C.S. Art. 332a, Sec. 3.) Sec. 41.104. BONO. A prosecuting attorney may require his assistant prosecuting attorneys, investigators, and secretaries to have a bond in the amount that the prosecuting attorney sets. (V.A.C.S. Art. 332a, Sec. 4 (part).) Sec. 41.105. REMOVAL. All personnel of a prosecuting attorney's office are subject to removal at the will of the prosecuting attorney. (V.A.C.S. Art. 332a, Sec. 4 (part).) Sec. 41.106. COMPENSATION. (a) A prosecuting attorney shall fix the salaries of his assistant prosecuting attorneys, investigators, secretaries, and other office personnel, subject to the approval of the commissioners court of the county or counties composing the district. (b) In addition to their salaries, assistant prosecuting attorneys and investigators may be allowed actual and necessary travel expenses incurred in the discharge of their duties, not to exceed the amount fixed by the prosecuting attorney and approved by the commissioners court of the county or counties composing the district. The county may pay claims for travel expenses from the general fund, the officers' salary fund, or any other available funds of the county. (V.A.C.S. Art. 332a, Secs. 5, 6.) Sec. 41.107. EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES. (a) The commissioners court of the county or counties composing a district may furnish telephone service, typewriters, office furniture, office space, supplies, and the other items and equipment that are necessary to carry out the official duties of the prosecuting attorney's office and may pay the expenses incident to the operation of the office. (b) The commissioners court of the county or counties composing a district may furnish automobiles for the use of the prosecuting attorney's office in conducting the official duties of the office and may provide for the maintenance of the automobiles. (V.A.C.S. Art. 332a, Sec. 7.) Sec. 41.108. GIFTS AND GRANTS. The commissioners court of the county or counties composing a district may accept gifts and grants from any foundation or association for the purpose of financing adequate and effective prosecution programs in the county or dis- trict. (V.A.C.S. Art. 332a, Sec. 8.)

1920 Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.

Alysa Slocum on behalf of Brad Snead Bar No. 24049835 slocum@wrightclosebarger.com Envelope ID: 104532011 Filing Code Description: Brief Requesting Oral Argument Filing Description: Brief of the Travis County, Harris County, El Paso County, Dallas County, Bexar County, and Williamson County Appellees Status as of 8/19/2025 7:13 AM CST

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Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status

Christopher Garza 24078543 christopher.garza@harriscountytx.gov 8/18/2025 11:41:55 PM SENT

Cynthia Veidt 24028092 cynthia.veidt@traviscountytx.gov 8/18/2025 11:41:55 PM SENT

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Jonathan G.C. Fombonne Jonathan.Fombonne@harriscountytx.gov 8/18/2025 11:41:55 PM SENT

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Christina Sanchez Ch.sanchez@epcountytx.gov 8/18/2025 11:41:55 PM SENT Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.

Alysa Slocum on behalf of Brad Snead Bar No. 24049835 slocum@wrightclosebarger.com Envelope ID: 104532011 Filing Code Description: Brief Requesting Oral Argument Filing Description: Brief of the Travis County, Harris County, El Paso County, Dallas County, Bexar County, and Williamson County Appellees Status as of 8/19/2025 7:13 AM CST

Case Contacts

Christina Sanchez Ch.sanchez@epcountytx.gov 8/18/2025 11:41:55 PM SENT

Bernardo Rafael Cruz b.cruz@epcountytx.gov 8/18/2025 11:41:55 PM SENT

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Cynthia W. Veidt Cyntia.Vedt@traviscountytx.gov 8/18/2025 11:41:55 PM ERROR

Alexandria Oberman aoberman@milchev.com 8/18/2025 11:41:55 PM SENT

Michael J. Statin mstatin@milchev.com 8/18/2025 11:41:55 PM ERROR

Laura G. Ferguson lferguson@milchev.com 8/18/2025 11:41:55 PM SENT

Jacob Beach Jacob.Beach@oag.texas.gov 8/18/2025 11:41:55 PM SENT

Michael J.Satin msatin@milchev.com 8/18/2025 11:41:55 PM SENT

Laura G.Ferguson lferguson@milchev.com 8/18/2025 11:41:55 PM SENT

William H. Farrell H.Farrell bill.farrell@oag.texas.gov 8/18/2025 11:41:55 PM ERROR

Leslie W.Dippel leslie.dippel@traviscountytx.gov 8/18/2025 11:41:55 PM SENT

Leslie W.Dippel leslie.dippel@traviscountytx.gov 8/18/2025 11:41:55 PM SENT

Bradely W.Snead snead@wrightclosebarger.com 8/18/2025 11:41:55 PM SENT

Bernardo Cruz b.cruz@epcountytx.gov 8/18/2025 11:41:55 PM SENT

Bernardo Cruz b.cruz@epcountytx.gov 8/18/2025 11:41:55 PM SENT

Bernardo Cruz b.cruz@epcountytx.gov 8/18/2025 11:41:55 PM SENT

Alexandria Oberman Oberman aoberman@milchev.com 8/18/2025 11:41:55 PM SENT

Alexandria Oberman aoberman@milchev.com 8/18/2025 11:41:55 PM SENT

Alexandria Oberman aoberman@milchev.com 8/18/2025 11:41:55 PM SENT

Melissa Contreras m.contreras@epountytx.gov 8/18/2025 11:41:55 PM SENT

Isela Baeza i.baeza@epcountytx.gov 8/18/2025 11:41:55 PM SENT

Isela Jones carl.jones@epcountytx.gov 8/18/2025 11:41:55 PM SENT Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.

Alysa Slocum on behalf of Brad Snead Bar No. 24049835 slocum@wrightclosebarger.com Envelope ID: 104532011 Filing Code Description: Brief Requesting Oral Argument Filing Description: Brief of the Travis County, Harris County, El Paso County, Dallas County, Bexar County, and Williamson County Appellees Status as of 8/19/2025 7:13 AM CST

Case Contacts

Isela Jones carl.jones@epcountytx.gov 8/18/2025 11:41:55 PM SENT

Pamela Lopez Pam.Lopez@epcountytx.gov 8/18/2025 11:41:55 PM SENT

Amy Pollock amy.pollock@traviscountytx.gov 8/18/2025 11:41:55 PM SENT

Michael J. Satin msatin@milchev.com 8/18/2025 11:41:55 PM SENT

Andrea Mintzer andrea.mintzer@harriscountytx.gov 8/18/2025 11:41:55 PM SENT

Andrea Mintzer andrea.mintzer@harriscountytx.gov 8/18/2025 11:41:55 PM SENT